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SUMMARY 
 
The primary goal of this study is to promote knowledge and understanding of the restructuring 
process of the Family Violence Child Protection and Sexual Offences (FCS) unit in the South 
African Police Service (SAPS) through impact evaluation. Many evaluation programmes provide 
blueprints and methods to manage and help solve organisational transformation. They, however, 
lack dealing with the unique organisational transformation process characterised in the South 
African Police Service (SAPS). Given this importance, there appears to be potential value in 
evaluating the impact of the restructuring process in the FCS. 
  
During the research extensive panel studies and individual interviews were conducted in the 
West Rand policing district with FCS members, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
directly involved with family violence, child protection and sexual offences, Senior Public 
Prosecutors involved with cases concerning the FCS and researchers at a security research 
institute. Furthermore, a descriptive literature study was conducted to acquire relevant 
information and perspective from available national and international literature. 
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Various objectives were fulfilled in this study: 
• The impact of the restructuring process in the FCS, to assess the internal and external 
climate on service delivery, was identified and described.  
• It was determined whether the restructuring process in the FCS is achieving its proposed 
objective.  
• Feedback to help improve the effectiveness of the restructuring process and improve 
future strategies was provided. 
 
Moreover, this study and its results provide a framework to the SAPS as an organisation that is 
currently going through an extensive transformation process. As a result, the management of the 
SAPS will receive first hand information on the areas to specifically focus on during the 
restructuring of the FCS, or utilised this impact evaluation as a learning curve and an opportunity 
to rectify shortcomings and also systematically be guided through this process in realisation 
thereof. Consequently, this impact evaluation could act as a management tool to support and 
further develop the transformation process in the SAPS.  
 
Finally, this study contributes to the baseline of knowledge, with regard to structural 
transformation in the specialised field of policing. 
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reform; transformation  
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CHAPTER 1  OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the study. It follows that the research problem is identified 
and presented. Subsequently, the aims and objectives of this study are delineated and the reason 
for the research problem is defined. Consequently, an explanation of the scope and demarcation 
of the field of study - including geographical and time limitations - follows. Theoretical 
definitions central to this study then follow, for explanation. Additionally, problems encountered 
during this study are identified and the ways in which they were overcome, are explained.  
 
This chapter, furthermore, pays attention to the research approach and design, the sampling of 
the population, methods of data collection, data analysis procedures and a description of the 
measuring instrument. Finally, methods to ensure validity and reliability are also incorporated 
into this chapter.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
During the past decade, numerous countries in transition across the globe have been working on 
transforming their police organisations to meet new challenges. The growing number of 
organisations carrying out police transformation proves its increasing significance. These 
countries have realised that police organisations are no longer the established, hierarchical 
structures they previously were to endure change, and as a result, are involved in rethinking their 
roles, restructuring their organisations and changing their cultures in order to adjust to the 
changing conditions.   
 
Similar to these emerging democracies, the face of the policing sector in South Africa has – as 
with many other aspects – changed dramatically over the past decade. After South Africa had 
become a democracy in 1994, the South African Police Service (SAPS) also underwent 
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substantial organisational transformation. New organisational forms have emerged within the 
organisation. For example, the bureaucratic nature and style of South African policing has 
drastically shifted to a total community-conscious and people-oriented approach. Human rights 
issues have also significantly emerged in this process and played a key role in facilitating and 
supporting democratic policing in South Africa. At the same time, new managerial structures 
have been developed and introduced. Furthermore, new government guiding principles have 
aimed to transform the police force through the incorporation of affirmative action, 
professionalisation, the introduction of a new type of recruit and voluntary retirements. In 
addition, an entire new organisational culture had to be established.    
 
In addition, Rossi and Freeman (1989:228) regard the assessment of impact as critical throughout 
the life course of social programmes, and, furthermore, consider it foolish to implement a new 
programme without some knowledge of its impact. Simpson, Hamber and Stott (2001:9) 
furthermore emphasise that comparisons cannot stop at the level of policy making and therefore 
have to be measured against the hard impact assessment of deliverables. In other words, it is 
about an ability to evaluate what policies worked in a country and why they worked, and then to 
evaluate the transferability of these policies to different contexts. Moreover, Schraeder 
(2004:332) also emphasises the potential value and importance of evaluation during 
organisational change. He believes that since it is in an organisation’s competitive best interest, 
and since human resources play such a vital role in the success of organisations, it seems prudent 
to evaluate these human reactions by evaluating employee attitudes and perceptions in the midst 
of change. Schraeder furthermore considers that the findings of such evaluations can provide 
organisational leaders with valuable information regarding the efficiency of the change efforts, 
thus prompting necessary adjustments to implementation strategies and avoiding potential 
catastrophes.  
 
Fifteen years into transition, the SAPS is still understandably experiencing difficulty in dealing 
with the challenges of democratic policing and in completely gaining South African society’s 
confidence. Numerous transformation initiatives have been implemented at many levels since 
democratising the SAPS, resulting in different uniforms, a demilitarised rank structure, a new 
promotion policy, amended training curricula, the revision and introduction of its legislative 
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framework and operational services, and new policing priorities and objectives.  
Progress has been achieved, but in many cases the process has been uneven and incomplete. As a 
result, some initiatives have been implemented more successfully than others. Newham and 
Bruce (2000), however, regard these initiatives of police transformation as primarily structural in 
nature, and which have not significantly led to changes in police behaviour. Stated differently, 
state change and changes in legislation, policy and Constitution alone do not give rise 
automatically to police transformation (Marks, 2000:559). 
 
In affirmation to the difficulties experienced by the SAPS, Ivkovic and Haberfeld (2000:194) 
confirm that the problem of changing a police force which used to be a militia, characterised by a 
secretive and abusive nature, into a professional police service accountable to the public, is by no 
means a simple task. Moreover, Bass (2000:148) maintains that the fundamental function of 
policing makes it a particularly difficult institution to change. Das (1995:624), however, is of the 
opinion that the nature of the challenges faced by the police in different societies depends on the 
level of democracy – that, perhaps, makes a difference in the degree of the seriousness of some 
of the challenges, and the availability of responses to confront them.  
 
Ahn, Adamson and Dornbusch (2004:115), in support of Ivkovic and Haberfeld, are of the 
opinion that the high failure rates of change management initiatives indicate the difficulty and 
complexity entailed in the successful realisation of any process of change. Agreeing with the 
above authors, LaClair and Rao (as quoted by Karp, 2005:87) are of the opinion that the recent 
past years’ track records of change initiatives have not often demonstrated much success. Given 
the fast pace and wide scope of police reform activities, it is understandably difficult to assess 
experiences and draw out lessons from the wide range of initiatives being conducted (O’Neill, 
2005:1). As a result, many initiatives nominally supposed to manage change are either 
ineffective in their original formulation or rendered so by the process of implementation. Studies 
indicate that 50% to 70% of change management initiatives fail to make any lasting impact on 
the organisation they claim to reform (LaClair & Rao, as quoted by Ahn et al., 2004:113). 
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In support of the abovementioned authors’ findings, it was found in a study of 40 major change 
management programmes, that 58% failed and 20% captured only a third or less of the value 
expected (LaClair & Rao, as quoted by Ahn et al., 2004: 115). In addition to the difficulty and 
complexity of change initiatives, Hart (1996) suggests that theories of change management are 
far from complete and the phenomenon of change management is generally poorly explained – 
this being especially apparent in respect of police organisations. On the other hand, Newham and 
Bruce (2000) are of the belief that police reform is a difficult process, however, not impossible.  
 
Simpson et al. (2001), however, believe the challenge to policy making in countries in transition, 
is to conduct international comparisons. Consequently, such countries can learn valuable lessons 
that could potentially assist them to develop improved impact assessment tools. However, the 
real power of cross-country comparisons is not just an understanding of the policy making 
process and its relationship to delivery, but in the strategic endeavour of developing tools for 
evaluation and impact analysis. Global international comparisons tend to take place at the level 
of policy comparisons, without actually looking at the impact of policy innovations – that is, the 
relationship between policy and delivery, what is being delivered, how effectively is it being 
delivered. Is the non-delivery about flaws within the policy paradigm or is it about other criteria 
and practice such as state institutions’ resistance, failure to recognise the magnitude of the 
transformation agenda inside the state, or failure to build popular support for policy 
interventions? 
 
Although these initiatives, among others, have undoubtedly brought about significant 
organisational transformation in the SAPS, it is vital to reconsider current restrictions and 
shortcomings not successfully implemented to restore the equilibrium in the transformation 
process of this diverse organisation. Despite the successful introduction and implementation of 
various transformation initiatives, a range of concerns have presented themselves.  
 
It follows that, during recent findings in Van Graan (2005:186-198), it became clear that the 
SAPS top management were unable to effectively communicate the urgency of transformation to 
the members at ground level. As a result, these members do not realise the urgency of  
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transformation that in turn created confusion, uncertainty, negativity and anxiety among 
members who had no idea about the effects of a complex change process. Consequently, 
members focused on self-preservation rather than organisational transformation.  
 
Furthermore, it is evident that the top management of the SAPS experiences problems with 
specifying the necessity for change and establishing a clear vision for the future.  
In addition, the implementation of the transformation process in the SAPS appears to be vague 
and impulsive rather than a planned action.  
 
Effective communication is one of the cornerstones, perhaps the most important system, for the 
effective functioning of any organisation during a process of transformation, since it promotes 
the circulation of the information that is vital to the effectiveness of a transformation process. 
Nevertheless, it furthermore emerged in Van Graan (2005:190) that the internal communication 
and information management of transformation in the SAPS appears to be unreliable, confusing 
and uncertain. This ineffective communication thus leads to the exclusion of members at ground 
level, concerning participative decision making, a culture of involvement, as well as consulting 
and interaction with members. Moreover, the lack of creating recognition and reward systems 
has also been identified as a bureaucratic obstacle that may have a negative effect on the 
transformation process in the SAPS. Additionally, changes introduced into the SAPS, such as a 
new insignia and uniform, as well as a new name, are regarded as superficial and not meaningful 
enough to members at ground level. Furthermore, it emerged that SAPS members at ground level 
are not as energised and motivated to push change forward as the SAPS management would like 
them to be, since they feel they are negatively influenced by transformation in the organisation. 
The deeply embedded police force culture is also regarded as a major force to reckon with during 
the process of transformation in the SAPS.  
 
From the above it is thus clear that the SAPS has taken enormous steps forward during the 
transformation process thus far. However, it is equally evident that various shortcomings and 
challenges exist and are still facing the organisation in future, during this complex process.  
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In addition, the researcher has found, after consultation with various senior officials at the SAPS 
Head Office, that previous transformation initiatives in the SAPS have not been evaluated, 
despite the organisation’s industrious efforts to transform.  
 
The SAPS is currently systematically implementing another transformation initiative in the form 
of a restructuring process in each province, in order to streamline the organisation’s management 
(Steenkamp, 2006:2). The organisation has, after careful consideration of its consistent challenge 
to improve service delivery, identified the existence of many layers of command and control 
within the organisation, which often leads to duplication of functions as the key blockage to 
service delivery. Currently, the SAPS has four levels of command, i.e. national, provincial, area 
and station level. These four levels present the organisation with the challenge of a deep structure 
that result in a lack of accountability and, among other things, communication distortion and the 
restriction of efficient and effective service delivery (Communique on the restructuring …, 
2006).    
 
This restructuring process therefore strives to provide the SAPS with a flatter organisational 
structure than is currently in place. However, to achieve this, the SAPS has to reorganise itself 
and root out unnecessary duplication of functions and activities by reducing the current four 
levels to three. In order to achieve a flatter structure, station commissioners need to have the 
necessary powers and decision making authority within their precinct. As a result, this approach 
renders the existence of area level superfluous. The restructuring process attempts the following 
advantages for the SAPS (Communique on the restructuring …, 2006): 
• With fewer levels there will be more policing members at station level. 
• Authority will be developed downwards to enable police officials to have more 
responsibility when they perform their functions, thus enabling them to respond quickly 
to the needs of the SAPS clients. 
• Police-community trust will be enhanced. 
• Higher morale will be generated. 
• Capacity at station level will be strengthened with sufficient resources through training, 
skills transfer and adequate authority. 
• The station commissioners will be held accountable for the results of precinct policing. 
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In addition, according to police spokesperson Director Selby Bokaba (as quoted by Mkhwanazi, 
2006:6), specialised units in the SAPS such as the Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual 
Offences (FCS) Unit are to be closed down as a result of the low conviction rate and the 
strengthening of expertise at local police station level. According to De Beer (2006) the long-
term objective of the redeployment of the FCS Units is to ultimately ensure that every member at 
every police station has the necessary skills and expertise to professionally assist and advise 
child victims and their guardians and to expedite the investigation procedures. On the other hand, 
police officers are of the opinion that the restructuring would have a huge impact in terms of 
losing skilled officers who specialise in dealing with cases of violence against women and 
children. A senior police official is of the opinion that this restructuring is taking the fight against 
child and woman abuse back ten years, and the restructuring occurred at a time when the FCS 
was gaining a lot of experience in handling cases of serial rapists. In addition, child protection, 
welfare and gender organisations are of the belief that, as major role players, they were never 
consulted by the SAPS about the restructuring of the FCS units.  
 
Detectives performing duties with these units will be redeployed to police stations in their areas, 
to continue their specialised investigations at local level. Police stations in adjacent areas will be 
clustered in groups of seven or eight that will share information on crime and crime patterns. Mr. 
Anthony Altbeker, a former senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies is of the 
opinion that the SAPS needs a centralised capacity to investigate high profile crimes, and this 
management model could easily fail if it is not implemented discreetly. Altbeker is also of the 
view that the station commissioners’ management expertise will be of critical importance, since 
certain police stations are already poorly managed. Additional responsibility on such managers 
will therefore be an added burden on them. Director Bokaba, however, believes that the 
restructuring process will enhance service delivery considerably, since expertise will then be 
deployed on local level, the allocation of resources will be simplified and the bureaucratic bother 
will also be removed (Steenkamp, 2006:2). 
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This research thus seeks to overcome shortcomings in practice through evaluating the impact of 
the restructuring process in the Family Violence, Sexual Offences and Child Protection Unit 
(FCS), with the aim of identifying the impact and effectiveness of the restructuring concerning 
the functioning of the FCS. The combination of a series of existing forces, such as the lack of 
evaluating the impact of previous transformation initiatives in the SAPS, the shortcomings 
identified during previous transformation initiatives, as well as the diverse workforce of the 
organisation in terms of race, language, educational background, culture and political orientation, 
has increased the need to evaluate the restructuring process in the FCS.   
 
It follows that the study will concentrate on the evaluation of the impact of the restructuring 
process in the FCS. This study is of importance, as an impact evaluation of the restructuring in 
the FCS could provide the SAPS management with valuable information regarding the 
effectiveness and impact of the organisation’s efforts to improve accountability, communication 
and service delivery through the implementation of restructuring. Such an impact evaluation will, 
in addition, provide information on the following: 
 
• the SAPS’s progress regarding restructuring efforts, in comparison to international best 
practices. 
• prompting essential adjustments to implementation strategies and processes and avoiding 
potential and future shortcomings.  
• could serve as a planning instrument used to guide similar or other change initiatives in 
the SAPS, as well as a problem-solving instrument to assess similar or other change 
initiatives    
 
1.3 Value of the Study 
 
Once an impact evaluation of the restructuring process in the FCS has been completed, the study 
and its results will, firstly, benefit the SAPS as an organisation that is currently going through an 
extensive transformation process. As a result, the management of the SAPS will receive first-
hand information on the areas to specifically focus on during the restructuring of the FCS, utilise 
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this impact evaluation as a learning curve and an opportunity to rectify shortcomings, and also 
systematically be guided through this process in realisation thereof. Consequently, this impact 
evaluation could act as a management tool to support and further develop the transformation 
process in the SAPS. 
 
Subsequently, the SAPS management could have an improved understanding of the obstacles 
and uncertainties they are experiencing as a result of the restructuring process in the FCS. 
Recommendations will also be presented that will provide guidelines on how to rectify such 
shortcomings towards the successful restructuring in the SAPS, which may have a significant 
impact on transformation in the organisation. Furthermore, through evaluating the impact of the 
restructuring process in the FCS, weaknesses and possible adjustments and solutions could be 
identified for implementation in the organisation, and could also be an essential step towards the 
overall improvement and effectiveness of this process. As a result, the SAPS could have an 
excellent opportunity for organisational learning. Such an impact evaluation could, in addition, 
assist the SAPS to reflect on where it is heading and how it is accomplishing its transformation 
objectives.    
 
Secondly, the study and its results may benefit individuals or organisations that are responsible 
for developing and implementing programmes of democratic police reform, since this impact 
evaluation could increase awareness and also be used as a guide for such reforms. Furthermore, 
it could provide practical advice to democratic police reformers, as well as assistance to foreign 
police organisations undergoing similar transformations. 
 
Thirdly, the South African community could also benefit from the study and its results, since 
such an impact evaluation could contribute to the realisation of a truly professional and 
accountable, democratic police service. In addition, the academic community could also benefit 
from the study and its results, as such a programme evaluation could be used in related studies, 
research and included in learning material. 
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Lastly, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and 
other government departments could also benefit from the study and its results, since it could 
provide these organisations with practical advice that in turn could enhance organisational 
learning.  
 
1.4 Goal and objectives of the study 
 
This section indicates the general aims of the study and gives the reasons for studying the 
particular phenomenon. A clear and unambiguous statement of the research objectives is also 
indicated (Mouton, 2001:48). Mark (1996:364) adds that the objectives of the study should be 
specific, clear and achievable. In addition, De Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport (2002:118) 
state that the researcher must explicitly delimit the focus of the study and discuss the research 
goals and objectives. 
 
1.4.1 Goal 
 
The goal of this study is to promote knowledge and understanding of the restructuring process of 
the FCS in the SAPS through impact evaluation. Many evaluation programmes provide 
blueprints and methods to manage and help solve organisational transformation. However, they 
lack dealing with the unique organisational transformation process characterised in the SAPS. 
Given this importance, there appears to be potential value in evaluating the impact of the 
restructuring process in the FCS, to assess whether this process has been successful and to what 
extent, and to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, impact and progress of the restructuring 
process in order to direct and, if necessary, redirect the SAPS in this process to improve the 
results of transformation.   
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1.4.2 Objectives 
 
The primary objectives of this study are:  
 
- To identify and describe the impact, that is, the overall long-term effects – positive or 
negative, intended or not – of the restructuring process in the FCS, in order to assess the 
internal and external climate on service delivery.  
 
● If the restructuring process in the FCS is identified and described then the internal and 
external climate on service delivery can be assessed. 
 
- To determine whether the restructuring process in the FCS is achieving its proposed 
objective, according to the extent and manner in which the beneficiaries’ (victims of 
FCS-related crimes as mentioned in paragraph 1.7) situation has changed as a result of 
this process. 
 
● If it is determined that the set objective of the transformation in the FCS has been met, 
then its impact on the changed beneficiaries’ situation can be determined. 
 
- To provide feedback to help improve the effectiveness of the restructuring process and 
improve future strategies. 
 
● If the effectiveness and impact of the restructuring process can be determined, then 
recommendations can be made to improve future restructuring strategies. 
 
- To make a contribution in the study of policing – especially the use of impact evaluation 
 in transforming organisations. 
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1.5 Demarcation of the field of study 
 
This study restricts itself to the FCS in the West Rand policing area. The population of the study 
will be described in detail in paragraph 1.10.3.  Nine panel studies were conducted with the FCS 
members at the various decentralised units. Additionally, six semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with Childline and the Teddy Bear Clinic, NGOs directly involved with family 
violence, child protection and sexual offences. In addition, six semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with Senior Public Prosecutors in the jurisdiction of the West Rand involved with 
cases concerning the FCS - which is attached to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). 
These panel studies and semi-structured interviews were conducted at three points in time over a 
period of one year, with six months intervals. Additionally, one semi-structured interview was 
also conducted with the Head: Efficiency Services at the SAPS Head Office and two researchers 
at the Institute for Security Studies. The South African Police Union (SAPU) was also 
approached for its views on the restructuring of the FCS. Electronic correspondence was 
received from SAPU. A comparative study with five international police organisations regarding 
restructuring processes in police organisations, was also conducted. In addition, the snowball 
sampling technique was adopted, as the interviewer was referred to other experts who added 
value to the study. The saturated sampling method was additionally used, since the researcher 
collected data until it reached saturation point. Saturated sampling was also applied in this study, 
since demographic characteristics were also taken into consideration in the sample.  
 
1.6 Key Theoretical Concepts 
 
According to Bless and Higson-Smith (1995:35), the main functions of concepts are, firstly, to 
facilitate communication among human beings. Secondly, concepts are to aid in the classification 
of the elements of reality and their generalisation. However, for these concepts to be useful, they 
must be defined in a clear, precise, non-ambiguous and agreed-upon way. Definitions also 
concretise the intended meaning of a concept in relation to a particular study (De Beer, 1999:15).  
In addition, operational definitions will be presented after explaining the key theoretical 
concepts. The aim of operational definitions is to identify the “indicators”, the specific events or 
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phenomena that truthfully represent an abstract concept (De Vos et al., 2002:35). Stated 
differently, Mouton (1996:189-190) clarifies that theoretical definitions specify the connotation 
of concepts, while operational definitions make the denotations of a concept explicit. In other 
words, a theoretical definition spells out what is meant or intended by a certain concept, whereas 
operational definitions link a concept with certain clearly identifiable “objects” in the social 
world. 
 
The following concepts are central to this study and are clearly defined, so that there is a 
common understanding of their meaning in the study. 
 
1.6.1 Programme Evaluation 
 
Programme evaluation is a management tool. It is a time-bound exercise that attempts to assess, 
systematically and objectively, the relevance, performance and success of planned, ongoing or 
completed programmes or projects, or some aspect thereof. Evaluation is undertaken selectively 
to answer specific questions to guide decision-makers and/or programme managers, and to 
provide information on whether underlying theories and assumptions used in programme 
development were valid, what worked and what did not work, and why. Evaluation commonly 
aims to determine the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of a 
programme or project (Programme Manager’s Planning …, 2004:1).  
 
Rossi and Freeman (1989:18) furthermore describe evaluation as the systematic application of 
social research procedures for assessing the conceptualisation, design, implementation and utility 
of social intervention programmes. In other words, evaluation researchers use social research 
methodologies to judge and improve the ways in which human services policies and programmes 
are conducted, from the earliest stages of defining and designing programmes, through their 
development and implementation.  
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For the purpose of this study, programme evaluation can be regarded as the application of 
research methodologies to judge and improve the restructuring process in the FCS in the West 
Rand policing area, prior to or immediately after implementation, during the restructuring 
process and after the process was implemented.  
 
1.6.2 Impact Evaluation 
 
Impact evaluation is the systematic identification of the effects – positive or negative, intended 
or not – on, among others, institutions caused by a given development activity such as a 
programme or project as a whole (OED and Impact Evaluation …, 2005). In other words, impact 
evaluations investigate longer-term and broader effects of change initiatives. Regalia (1999) 
explain impact evaluation as an indispensable tool to assess whether a programme is achieving 
its objective, how the beneficiaries’ situation changed as a result of the programme and what the 
situation would have been without the programme. An impact evaluation gauges the extent to 
which a programme causes change in the desired direction (Rossi & Freeman, 1989:49). 
 
Impact evaluation in this study can be considered as the systematic investigation and 
identification of the long-term effects, positive or negative, of the restructuring process in the 
FCS, in order to assess whether this process is achieving its objective and how the situation of 
the members of the FCS has changed as a result of the restructuring process. 
 
1.6.3 Transition 
 
According to the Oxford Dictionary for the Business World (1993:880), transition is the passing 
or change from one place, state, condition, etc., to another.  
 
In addition, transition is an act, process or instance of change in structure, appearance or 
character, or, transition can be described as a conversion, revolution, makeover, alteration or 
renovation (Transformation, 2007). 
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For the purpose of this study, transition in the SAPS is mainly the change from the previous 
militaristic, autocratic and bureaucratic policing approach of the South African Police (SAP), to 
the new democratic, service orientated and community conscious SAPS.  
 
1.6.4 Restructuring Process 
 
According to the Longman Business English Dictionary (2000:414), if a company restructures, 
or someone restructures it, it changes the way it is organised or financed. Moreover, restructuring 
is the general term for major corporate changes aimed at greater efficiency and adaptation to 
changing markets. Restructuring is therefore a significant modification made to the operations 
and structure of a company (Restructuring, 2007).  
 
For the purpose of this study, the restructuring process of the FCS entails the redeployment of 
members of the FCS from their separately based offices to station level, where these members 
will, while performing their functions as FCS detectives, train police officials at police station 
level to render a skilled service to victims of family violence and sexual offences. The SAPS has 
identified the existence of many layers of command and control within the organisation, which 
often lead to duplication of functions, as the key obstacle to service delivery. As a result, the four  
levels of command are reduced to three. The long-term objective of the redeployment of FCS 
units is therefore to ultimately ensure that every member at every police station has the necessary  
skills and expertise to professionally assist and advise victims and their guardians, and to 
expedite the investigation process. It follows that the functioning of the FCS is being changed. 
 
1.6.5 Triangulation 
 
Konstantinos and Efrosini (2003:16) explain triangulation as the use of different data collection 
techniques and different research strategies to study the same programme. Patton (as quoted by 
Konstantinos & Efrosini, 2003:16) describes the term triangulation as derived from the 
geometric shape “triangle”. The triangle is the strongest of all the geometric shapes and 
triangulated evaluation designs are aiming at increasing the strength of any evaluation.  
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Patton (as quoted by Konstantinos & Efrosini, 2003:16) furthermore describes triangulation as a 
powerful solution to the problem of relying too much on any single method and thereby 
undermining the validity and credibility of findings, because of the weaknesses of any single 
method. In addition, the author is of the opinion that triangulation is the recognition that the 
evaluator needs to be open to more than one way of looking at the programme. In addition, 
Patton (as quoted by Konstantinos & Efrosini, 2003:17) describes triangulation as one way of 
increasing methodological power, while a second way is to borrow and combine parts from pure 
methodologies, thus creating mixed methodological approaches. 
 
However, the concept of triangulation is sometimes used to designate a conscious combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methodology (De Vos et al., 2002:365). On the other hand, according 
to Mouton and Marais (as quoted by De Vos et al., 2002:365), triangulation refers mainly to the 
use of multiple methods of data collection, with a view of increasing the reliability of 
observation, and not specifically to the combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches.  
 It is therefore essential for a researcher to state clearly what is meant when using this term 
within a particular study.   
 
Triangulation in this study is the application of different data collection techniques, such as a 
literature study and interviews. In addition, different research strategies will be applied in this 
study by means of a non-experimental research design in the form of a pretest-posttest design, 
panel studies, and a comparative study. Through the application of these various data collection 
techniques and research strategies, the validity and credibility of the findings in this study will 
therefore be improved.  
 
1.7 Geographical Limitation 
 
This study is restricted to the FCS unit in the West Rand policing area in Gauteng. The findings 
from this study can not be generalised, due to the qualitative nature of the study, but can be 
transferred to similar contexts. The transferring agent should however ensure the applicability of 
these findings to the similar setting (De Vos, Stydom, Fouche & Delport, 2002: 352). The need 
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to establish a unit within the SAPS to prevent and combat crimes against children was identified 
during 1986. As a result, the Child Protection Unit was established. In past years the need for the 
expansion of the sensitive service rendered to children and adult victims of family violence and 
sexual offences, was identified. This led to the establishment of the Family Violence, Child 
Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS).  The establishment of the FCS was approved by the 
Provincial Commissioner, Gauteng, on 18 March 1995. The first Child Protection Unit to be 
transformed into a Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual Offences Unit was the 
Braamfontein (Johannesburg) branch, on 18 March 1996, and the second one in July 1996 in 
Benoni. Other units have also since been transformed. Members attached to the FCS have 
already completed the basic police training at one of the Police Colleges, and have already 
gained some experience in general policing. Most of these members have already attended a 
Basic Detective Training Course.  
 
Crimes policed by members of the FCS are: 
 
• Family Violence (intra-familial, victims of 18 years and older) 
assault with the intention to do grievous bodily harm 
attempted murder 
 
• Child Protection (victims under the age of 18 years) 
rape 
incest 
indecent assault 
attempted murder 
assault with the intention to do grievous bodily harm 
common assault (only if there were three or more incidents over a period of time – intra-familial) 
kidnapping 
abduction 
crimes with regard to the abuse/exploitation of children, under the Prevention of Family 
Violence Act 133 of 1993 and the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 
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crimes with regard to the sexual exploitation of children, under the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 
1957, as amended 
Child Care Act 74 of 1983, as amended 
Films and Publication Act 65 of 1996, with regard to child pornography 
 
• Sexual Offences (victims of 18 years of age and older) 
rape 
incest 
indecent assault 
crimes with regards to the sexual exploitation of adults, under the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 
1957, as amended 
crimes with regard to sexual offences against adults, under the Prevention of Family Violence 
Act 133 of 1993 and the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 (Family Violence, Child Protection 
and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS), 2006). 
 
Gauteng was formed from part of the old Transvaal province after South Africa’s first all-race 
elections on 27 April 1994. It was initially named Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (or PWV) 
and was renamed Gauteng in December 1994. Situated in the heart of the Highveld, Gauteng is 
the smallest province in South Africa with only 1.4 percent (17 010 square metres) of the land 
area, but it is highly urbanised and has a population of 8 837 178 (2001 South African National 
Census), growing at around 100 000 people every year. The name “Gauteng” comes from the 
Sesotho phrase meaning Place of Gold, referring to the thriving gold industry in the province, 
following the 1886 discovery of gold in Johannesburg. Gauteng is divided into 3 metropolitan 
municipalities and 3 district municipalities (which are further divided into 8 local 
municipalities). This province, furthermore, has a diverse population that consists of 73,8% 
blacks, 19,9% whites, 3.8% coloureds and 2,5 percent Indians/Asians. In the province, 14,4% of 
residents speak Afrikaans at home, 12,5% English, 1,9% IsiNdebele, 7,6% IsiXhosa, 21,5% 
IsiZulu, 10,7% Sepedi, 13,1% Sesotho, 8,4% Setswana, 1,4% SiSwati, 1,7% Tshivenda, 5,7% 
Xitsonga, and 1% of the population speaks a non-official language at home. The capital of 
Gauteng is Johannesburg. (Gauteng, 2007).   
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It follows that the entire province is not included in this study, as a result of the large geographic 
area of the province. The researcher aims to obtain a comprehensive viewpoint of the research 
problem.  
 
The West Rand is the name for the urban western part of the Witwatersrand that is functionally 
merged with the Johannesburg metropolis. The West Rand extends from Randfontein in the west 
to Roodepoort in the east, and includes the town of Krugersdorp. The areas of Carletonville and 
Westonaria are sometimes included as being part of the Far West Rand. The areas are 
economically linked to the city through the gold mining industry. The following ethnic groups 
are found in the area: 
 
Black African (population of 586 665 (78,84%) 
White (population of 132 849 (17,85%) 
Coloured (population of 17 531 (2,36%) 
Indian/Asian (population of 7123 (0,96%) 
(West Rand District Municipality, 2007). 
 
As a result, the FCS in the West Rand was chosen, attributable to its diverse population that 
includes the 4 race groups in South Africa. The province has 7 policing areas with 127 police 
stations. In addition, Gauteng has 24 735 sworn police officers (excluding civilians) with the 
police-population ratio equalling one police officer for every 385 citizens. The Gauteng 
Provincial Police Headquarters is situated in Johannesburg (Profile: SAPS Gauteng, 2007).   
 
1.8 Time Limitation 
 
This study was conducted between August 2007 and December 2008. As a result, the data 
collected has remained relevant. Individual interviews and panel studies were conducted during 
the periods August 2007, February 2008 and August 2008, respectively.   
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1.9 Difficulties Encountered During the Study 
 
Some complexities outside the researcher’s control were encountered during the study and 
included the following: 
 
The researcher experienced enormous difficulty in obtaining approval for this study, from the 
SAPS. As a result, various SAPS Provincial Commissioners were approached. It followed that 
one SAPS Provincial Commissioner did not approve the study in the particular province, since 
the restructuring of the SAPS was, at the time, in the implementation phase and of a sensitive 
nature. Consequently, this study was not approved, due to the concern of additional negative 
publicity. Two other provinces’ Provincial Commissioners, on the other hand, failed to reply to 
the application to conduct research in their provinces. However, final approval for the study was 
obtained in Gauteng province.  
 
Additionally, the inaccessibility of information with reference to the restructuring of the FCS 
also proved to be challenging. The Head: Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual 
Offences Unit were telephonically approached for an interview, however, the researcher was 
referred to the Head: Effeciency Services for commentary (The Head: Family Violence, Child 
Protection and Sexual Offences Unit, 2009). Various attempts including a telephonic 
conversation and e-mail messages to obtain the views of the Police and Prisons Civilian Rights 
Union (POPCRU) regarding the restructuring of the FCS have also failed (Communications 
Officer: POPCRU, 2009).    
 
1.10  Research Methodology 
 
The research methodology adopted by a study refers to the exact steps that are taken to address 
the research problem. According to Rudestam and Newton (1992:60), the goal of the research 
methodology is to provide a clear and complete description of the specific steps to be followed in 
addressing the research problem.  
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Stated differently, Silverman (2001:4) is of the opinion that methodology refers to the choices 
one makes about cases to study, methods of data gathering and forms of data analysis in planning 
and executing a research study. In other words, the research methodology defines how one will 
go about studying any phenomenon. 
 
1.10.1 The explorative characteristics of the study 
 
The purpose of exploratory research is to gain insight into a situation, phenomenon, community 
or person. The need for such a study could arise from a lack of basic information on a new area 
of interest (Bless & Higson-Smith, 1995:42). Babbie (2004:87-88) explains that exploratory 
studies are most typically done, among other purposes, to satisfy the researcher’s curiosity and 
desire for better understanding to familiarise themselves with a topic. According to Welman and 
Kruger (1999:19), the purpose of exploratory research is to determine whether or not a 
phenomenon exists, and to gain familiarity with such phenomenon. 
 
This study aims to gain insight into the restructuring process in the FCS as well as the difficulties 
and challenges experienced by members on management and ground level, regarding this 
process. In addition, the study aims to evaluate the impact of this process characterised in the 
SAPS, to assist and guide the organisation in this complex process, as the goal in paragraph 1.4.1 
states. 
 
1.10.2 Research approach and design 
 
During the research design, the researcher must decide how to measure the two main variables in 
the hypothesis and on what group of people to test the hypothesis. This involves deciding not 
only how many people will be used as subjects but also what their particular characteristics 
should be and under what circumstances the data will be gathered (Bailey, 1987:14). Stated 
differently, Welman and Kruger (1999:46) regard the research design as the plan according to 
which one obtains research participants and collects information from them.  
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It describes what the researcher is going to do with the data, with a view to reaching conclusions 
about the research problem. Rubin and Babbie (2001:107) furthermore refer to research design as 
all the decisions the researcher makes in planning the study in its broadest sense. This refers to 
all the decisions the researcher makes in planning the study – decisions not only about what 
overall type of design to use, but also about sampling, sources and procedures for collecting data, 
measurement issues and data analysis plans.  
 
De Beer (1999:24) also mentions four research questions that give structure to the  
research design: 
_   How will the design connect to the paradigm being used? 
_   Who or what will be studied? 
_   What strategies of enquiry will be used? 
_   What methods or research tools will be used for collecting and analysing empirical  
      materials? 
 
A combination of methodological approaches was applied for the research design in this study, 
through triangulation. Firstly, a non-experimental research design in the form of a pretest-
posttest design was used, given the fact that no provision was made for control or comparison 
groups as part of the evaluation plan. Non-experimental designs do not use control or 
comparison groups, and the pretest-posttest design is commonly used when the researcher does 
not have a control group and also does not have pre-intervention data (Adamchak, Bond, 
MacLaren, Magnani, Nelson & Seltzer, 2000:79,81). Babbie (2004:222) explains pretesting as 
the measurement of a dependent variable among subjects, whereas posttesting is the 
measurement of a dependent variable among subjects after they have been exposed to an 
independent variable.  
In this study, data was collected shortly after the programme was implemented, as the 
programme progressed, and at the completion of the programme.  
 
Secondly, panel studies, as mentioned in paragraph 1.10.4.2, were conducted as part of another 
study design. Babbie (2004:104) describes panel studies as being when data is collected from the 
same set of people at several points in time.  
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Panel studies were used to obtain an in-depth understanding of the programme as a distinct 
whole, and the impact the programme had on its efforts. The purpose of a panel study is to study 
intensely one set of something – programmes, cities, counties, worksites, etc. – as a distinct 
whole, in its particular context.  
 
A panel study was conducted of the FCS in the West Rand policing area, in order to obtain an in-
depth understanding of the effects that the restructuring process has had on the FCS. 
Lastly, a comparative study was carried out, in this study, with five international police 
organisations, comprising developed and developing countries, as well as two multinational and 
two national non-policing organisations, respectively, to search for explanations for similarities 
and differences, in order to generalise from them or to gain a greater awareness and a deeper 
understanding of processes, such as restructuring, in different national contexts. 
 
Hantrais (1995) explains the benefits of cross-national comparisons as follows: 
● When researchers from different backgrounds are brought together on collaborative or 
cross-national projects, it can enable them to capitalise on their experience and 
knowledge of different intellectual traditions and to compare and evaluate a variety of 
conceptual approaches. 
 
● Comparisons can lead to fresh, exciting insights and a deeper understanding of issues that 
are of central concern in different countries. They can lead to the identification of gaps in 
knowledge, and may point to possible directions that could be followed - and about which 
the researcher may not previously have been aware. They may also help to sharpen the 
focus of analysis of the subject under study by suggesting new perspectives. 
 
● Cross-national projects give researchers a means of confronting findings, in an attempt to 
identify and illuminate similarities and differences, not only in the observed 
characteristics of particular institutions, systems or practices, but also in the search for 
possible explanations in terms of national likeness or unlikeness.  
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Cross-national comparativists are forced to attempt to adopt a different cultural perspective, to  
learn to understand the thought processes of another culture and to see it from the native’s  
viewpoint, while also reconsidering their own country from the perspective of a skilled, external 
observer. 
 
1.10.3  Sampling of the population 
 
According to Reid and Smith, as well as Sarantakos (as quoted by De Vos et al., 2002:199), the 
major reason for sampling is feasibility. A complete coverage of the total population is seldom 
possible, and all the members of a population of interest cannot possibly be reached. Even if it 
were theoretically possible to identify, contact and study the entire relevant population, time and 
cost considerations usually make this a prohibitive undertaking. The use of samples may 
therefore result in more accurate information than might have been obtained if one had studied 
the entire population. With a sample, time, money and effort can be concentrated to produce 
better quality research – better instruments, more in-depth information and better-trained 
interviewers or observers. 
Given the fact that not all the FCS units in Gauteng were included in the study, a non-probability 
sampling method through convenience sampling was used in this study - which ensured validity 
and reliability (all FCS members in the West Rand policing area happened to be with their 
respective units at a particular time, and were readily available for research purposes).  
 
According to Welman and Kruger (1999:62), convenience sampling or accidental sampling is the 
most convenient collection of members of the population that are near and readily available for 
research purposes.  In addition, the researcher took the race, rank, gender, length of service, 
diverse backgrounds and geographical areas of members into consideration. In conjunction with 
the various unit commanders of the restructured FCS units in the West Rand, the researcher 
attended a number of the units’ meetings. During these meetings the researcher conducted panel 
studies, as mentioned in paragraph 1.10.4.2. 
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Furthermore, a snowball sampling method was applied in this study, as stated in section 1.5. 
Babbie (2001:180) explains that researchers collect data on the few members of the target 
population they can locate, and then seek information from those individuals that enables them to 
locate other members of that population. In addition, saturated sampling was also used in this 
study, as mentioned in paragraph 1.5. 
 
Stratified sampling was also applied in this study since demographic characteristics were also 
taken into consideration in the sample. Stratified sampling designs are frequently used in 
demographic and socio-economic surveys. It may be possible to divide a heterogeneous 
population into sub populations each of which is internally homogenous. Geographical regions 
are generally used as strata in most of the stratified sampling surveys. If each stratum is 
homogenous, a precise estimate of any stratum parameter can be obtained from a small sample in 
that stratum. These estimates can then be combined into a precise estimate for the whole 
population (Satharasinghe, Ranjith, De Silva, Thattil & Samitha, 2003: 1&2). 
 
1.10.4  Methods of data collection 
 
Welman and Kruger (1999:129) state that one has to consider which data-collecting method is 
the most appropriate in the light of the research problem and the particular population in 
question. For the purposes of this study, the following methods will be utilised: 
 
1.10.4.1  Literature study 
 
The literature review must clarify the theoretical context of the problem under investigation and 
how it has been studied by others (Singleton & Straits, 1999:547). In support of Singleton and 
Straits, Babbie (2004:113) suggests that the literature review should answer the following 
questions: What have others said about this topic? What theories address it and what do they 
say? What previous research exists? Are there consistent findings or do past studies disagree? 
Are there flaws in the body of existing research that you think you can remedy?  
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The research design of this study is presented in the form of a literature study composed of 
material such as official SAPS documents, library sources, media and newspaper reports, 
research reports and international best practices regarding the impact evaluation of restructuring 
initiatives in organisations. In addition, the researcher conducted extensive database searches 
during the entire study, in order to be assured that the most relevant and up to date sources were 
consulted. 
 
1.10.4.2 Panel Studies 
 
Nine panel studies were conducted with FCS members at the three newly established 
decentralised FCS units in the West Rand policing district. These panel studies were conducted 
shortly after the restructuring process was implemented, as the process progressed and after the 
completion of the process. 
 
According to Rossi and Freeman (1989:260) panel studies are based on repeated measures of 
exposed targets of which the results are more credible than the pretest-posttest design through the 
addition of more data collection points. The authors also stresses the importance of the additional 
time points that could, when properly carried out, allow the researcher to begin to specify the 
processes by which an intervention has impacts among targets. Consequently, data will be 
collected from the same participants at two or more points in time in order to measure changes in 
some indicators more precisely. 
 
The purpose of a panel study is to study intensely one set (or unit) of something - programmes, 
cities, counties or worksites – as a distinct whole. A panel study is particular useful for 
evaluating programmes when programmes are unique, when an established programme is 
implemented in a new setting, when a unique outcome warrants further investigation, or when a 
programme occurs in an unpredictable environment. The rich detail of a panel study provides 
good information about the design of a programme and the context in which it is delivered, thus 
allowing others to determine its appropriateness for their areas. In addition, a panel study 
evaluation allows greater latitude in seeking out and assessing programme impacts.  
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The FCS in the West Rand policing area was studied intensely in order to gain rich detail 
concerning the impact of the restructuring process. The placing of members of the FCS unit in 
Krugersdorp at different police stations were monitored carefully by the researcher in 
conjunction with The Provincial Coordinator, Family Violence, Child Protection and Sexual 
Offences, Provincial Head Office, Gauteng. As a result, the data collection process was enhanced 
and therefore bias was also limited.  
 
1.10.4.3 Individual Interviews 
 
Interviewing can be described as data collection in face-to-face settings, using an oral question-
and-answer format, which either employs the same questions in a systematic and structured way 
for all respondents, or allows respondents to talk about issues in less directed but discursive 
manner (Payne & Payne, 2004:129).  
 
Stated differently, Seidman (as quoted by de Vos, Strydom, Fouche and Delport, 2002:292) 
states that one interviews because one is interested in other people’s stories. Every word that 
people use in telling their stories is a microcosm of their consciousness. Manning (as quoted by 
Holstein and Gubrium, 1995:3,4) furthermore regards all interviews as interactional events and 
interviewers are deeply and unavoidably implicated in creating meanings that ostensibly reside 
within participants. As a result, both parties, the researcher and the participant, are thus 
necessarily and unavoidably active and involved in meaning-making work. 
 
One semi-structured interview was conducted with the Head: Efficiency Services at the SAPS 
Head Office and two researchers at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Electronic 
correspondence (e-mail message attached as Annexure E) was also conducted with SAPU 
(Machakela, 2009). Furthermore, six semi-structured interviews were also conducted with the 
Teddy Bear Clinic and Childline, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) directly involved 
with family violence, child protection and sexual offences. In addition, nine semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with Senior Public Prosecutors of the National Prosecuting Authority 
involved with cases concerning the FCS. The number of interviews was determined by the time 
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that the data collection reached saturation level. It follows that a firsthand comprehensive 
perspective was obtained internally (ground level, middle management of the SAPS) and 
externally (example ISS, NGOs and senior public prosecutors) in order to gain a holistic and 
better understanding of the restructuring process in the FCS. 
 
The Efficiency Services Component of the SAPS develops and maintains efficient functional 
structures, procedures, systems and methods. It assists with organisational development in the 
SAPS. The component also assists the SAPS management with certain managerial 
responsibilities (Support Services, 2009). 
The ISS is a non-profit regional human security research institute operating across sub-Saharan 
Africa and is one of the largest strategic studies/peace research institutes in Africa, which among 
other, conduct research on security sector transformation (History of the ISS, 2005).  
 
The South African Police Union (SAPU) was established in November 1993 and has an 
extensive membership within the policing cluster which includes the South African Police 
Service (SAPS), Department of Correctional Service (DCS), Metro Police Departments and 
Traffic Departments. SAPU is a participating union in the Public Service Co-ordinating 
Bargaining Council (PSCBC) and the Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council (SSSBC) 
where transverse and sector employee issues are negotiated (South African Police Union, 2009).  
 
As indicated by Welman and Kruger (1999:167) one may consider semi-structured interviews 
when: 
 
_ the topics are of a very sensitive nature 
_ the respondents come from divergent backgrounds 
 
Taking the above two points into consideration, semi-structured interviews were therefore 
conducted, since transformation in the SAPS is of a sensitive nature as a result of South Africa’s 
political history. Members of the SAPS also have divergent backgrounds and educational levels.  
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As a result, the researcher used probes with the intention of clearing up vague responses, and/or 
asked for elaboration of incomplete answers through the application of semi-structured 
interviews.   
 
The objective as mentioned in paragraph 1.4.2 was explored and described in response to - and 
the interpretation of - semi-structured interviews and panel studies conducted at the FCS in the 
West Rand, with unit commanders and members on ground level, in the jurisdiction of the 
Gauteng policing area. Additionally, a comparative study with two international police 
organisations was conducted in order to gain a deeper understanding of similar restructuring 
processes in such organisations. 
 
This section presented the reader with a discussion on how this study was approached and 
designed. Stated differently, details were presented on how the researcher obtained participants 
and collected information from them, and what the researcher did with the data. 
 
1.10.5 Data analysis 
 
Data analysis involves breaking up the data into manageable themes, patterns, trends and 
relationships. The aim of analysis is to understand the various constitutive elements of one’s 
data, through an inspection of the relationship between concepts, constructs or variables, and to 
see whether there are any patterns or trends that can be identified or isolated, or to establish 
themes in the data (Mouton, 2001:108). De Vos et al. (2002:339) give a less complicated 
explanation, stating that data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure and meaning to 
the mass of collected data. 
 
Individual interviews and panel studies were conducted, and a comprehensive body of literature, 
including international best practices, were studied to further validate the findings. This research 
used a triangulation of methods to ensure validity of the findings. Interviews were conducted to 
determine the impact of the restructuring process of the FCS, and a comprehensive literature 
review studied. 
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1.10.5.1 Qualitative data analysis 
 
Qualitative methods produce detailed and non-quantitative accounts of small groups, seeking to 
interpret the meaning people make of their lives in natural settings, on the assumption that social 
interactions form an integral set of relationships best understood by inductive procedures (Payne 
& Payne, 2004:175). Williams (2003:5) regards qualitative research as the qualities things have. 
The essential characteristic of qualitative research is that it is about interpreting and coming to 
understand the social world at a micro-level. One of the basic approaches to qualitative research 
is ethnographic summary, which relies on direct quotation of discussions. Qualitative data uses 
words as basic tools.  The eventual analysis of the information obtained from focus groups is 
based on the interviewer’s records.  The researcher took notes of the focus groups’ responses, 
with a view to writing a more complete report afterwards.  The interviews and focus group 
interviews were tape recorded, with the view to having them transcribed. The transcribed 
interviews and focus group interviews formed part of the qualitative data. 
 
The application of Guba and Tesch’s (Tesch, 1990: 142-145) techniques formed part of the 
qualitative data analysis, which included grouping the data according to categories, themes and 
codes. 
 
1.10.6 Description of the measuring instrument 
 
In order to collect data, some form of measuring instrument has to be used. In the human 
sciences, “measuring instrument” refers to such instruments as questionnaires, observation 
schedules, interviewing schedules, etc. (Mouton, 2001:100). Welman and Kruger (1999:146) 
state that the constructs in the human behavioural sciences often involve human attributes, 
actions and artifacts. It may appear to a layperson that these can be appropriately measured by 
merely asking research participants directly about them.  For example, a layperson might argue 
that participants should simply be asked whether or not they are dominant by nature.  However, 
for several reasons, the reliability and validity of the measurements obtained in this fashion 
would be highly suspect.  On the one hand, participants may have insufficient knowledge about 
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themselves, or they may be unable to verbalise their innermost feelings.  On the other hand,  
participants may deliberately provide incorrect answers with a view to putting themselves in a 
positive or negative light.   
The measuring instrument for this study is thus data received from the interviews, focus group 
interviews and panel studies, that were validated and contextualised in terms of the literature 
study.  
 
1.10.7  Methods to ensure validity and reliability 
 
De Vos et al. (2002:166) consider validity and reliability two of the most important concepts in 
the context of measurement. As a result, to obtain valid and reliable data, one must ensure,  
before implementing the study, that the measurement procedures and the measurement 
instruments to be used have acceptable levels of reliability and validity. 
 
Validity is concerned with the effectiveness of the measuring instrument.  According to Welman 
and Kruger (1999:138), the instrument must measure what it is supposed to measure.  In other 
words: how accurately does it measure? De Vos et al. (2002:166) similarly describe validity in 
two parts: the instrument actually measures the concept in question, and the concept is measured 
accurately. 
Reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same 
category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions (Silverman, 
2001:225). Welman and Kruger (1999:142) explain reliability as the extent to which comparable 
measurements indicate similar results. Validity and reliability will be ensured by using the 
following methods:  
In terms of sampling, the convenience sampling method was used, which ensured validity and 
reliability. All unit commanders/members would be at their respective police stations at a 
particular time and readily available for research purposes. 
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An experienced qualitative researcher assisted the researcher in the application Guba and Tesch’s 
(Tesch, 1990: 142-145) techniques, by grouping data according to categories, themes and codes. 
 
The panel –and interview schedule were developed from the relevant literature whereafter it was 
piloted by experienced researchers before implementation and adapted where necessary.  
 
1.11  Ethical Considerations 
 
According to Mouton (2001:238), the ethics of science concerns what is wrong and what is right 
in the conduct of research. Because scientific research is a form of human conduct, it follows that 
such conduct has to conform to generally accepted norms and values. The term “ethics” also 
refers to the values by which we morally evaluate the character or conduct of a person (Rosnow 
& Rosenthal, 1999:57). In addition, Robson (2000:29) states that evaluations deal with issues 
which affect people’s lives. There are different stakeholders, each with an interest in an 
evaluation. As a result, these interests must be recognised and respected if the evaluation is to be 
carried out in an ethically responsible manner. Therefore, evaluations should be conducted 
legally, ethically and with due regard for the welfare of those involved in the evaluation, as well 
as of those affected by the results. The researcher adhered to the ethical principles valued by the 
University of South Africa. 
 
1.11.1  Informed consent 
 
In support of moral and legal reasons, subjects were not coerced into participating in this 
research project. Not only must subjects understand that their participation is voluntary, they 
must also be given enough information about the research to make an informed decision about 
whether to participate or not (Singleton & Straits, 1999:517). Stated differently, De Vos et al. 
(2002:65) are of the opinion that emphasis must be placed on accurate and complete information, 
so that subjects will fully comprehend the investigation and consequently be able to make a 
voluntary, thoroughly reasoned decision about their possible participation.  
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Kutchins (1991:111) goes further, stating that the researcher remains obliged at all times to give 
a complete explanation of the total investigation, without pressure or unnecessary interference, in 
clear and intelligible language. 
 
Each participant was informed of the reasons for the research, and the principle of voluntary 
participation was also emphasised. As a result, no participant was forced to participate in the 
study and their voluntary consent was obtained. 
 
1.11.2  Influences 
 
Given the sensitive nature of transformation in the SAPS, measures to prevent researcher 
influence were implemented and adhered to. As a result, a letter of permission and a cover letter 
explaining the objective of the study were implemented in the qualitative data analysis, to 
prevent researcher influence in the meaning participants presented to their experience and 
behaviour of transformation in the SAPS.  
 
Respondents in the individual interviews and panel studies were assured that the researcher was 
acting totally independently and impartially, and also not acting on behalf of the SAPS.       
 
1.11.3  Preserving anonymity and confidentiality 
 
Babbie (2004:65-66) regards the clearest concern in the protection of the subject’s interests and 
well-being, as the protection of their identity. Two techniques however assist researchers in this 
regard – anonymity and confidentiality. The author explains that a research project guarantees 
anonymity when the researcher – not only the people who read about the research – cannot 
identify a given response with a given respondent. On the other hand, a research project 
guarantees confidentiality when the researcher can identify a given person’s response, but 
essentially promises not to do so publicly.  
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Anonymity and confidentiality are two mechanisms that acted as safeguards in this study, in 
order to protect participants’ identities. The participants were assured that neither their names nor 
locations would be revealed. Transformation in the SAPS can be regarded as a sensitive issue 
among members; therefore, the participants were furthermore assured that any information they 
provided would not be made available to anyone who was not directly involved in this study.  
 
1.12 Summary 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the study. The motivation for the study as well as the 
significance thereof was presented. The focus of the study was highlighted by the goal and 
objectives, and the introduction of key theoretical definitions provided additional clarification. 
Moreover, time and geographical limitations were presented to clarify where and when the study 
was conducted. 
 
This chapter provided hypothetical information on the research methodology, and accentuated 
the particular steps that were followed to address the research problem and also to reach the goal 
of this chapter – namely, to present a transparent and comprehensive explanation of the steps to 
be followed. These steps included the research approach and design, the sampling of the 
population, methods of data collection, data analysis procedures, a description of the measuring 
instrument, and methods to ensure validity and reliability. The goal of this study is to promote 
knowledge and understanding of the restructuring process in the Family Violence, Child 
Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS) through impact evaluation by making use of a 
literature study, panel studies and individual interviews. The research is of a qualitative nature. 
Additionally, the methods to ensure validity and reliability were also enlightened. Ethical 
considerations were then outlined. 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of impact evaluations in organisations. This overview presents a 
review of the literature on impact evaluations in organisations, and elucidates the relationship 
between this study and previous research conducted on the topic.  
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CHAPTER 2  AN OVERVIEW OF THE USE OF IMPACT EVALUATION IN 
ORGANISATIONS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
A comprehensive body of literature on impact evaluation in organisations as well as international 
illustrations of public sector –and policing organisations’ - impact evaluation processes provides 
the foundation of this chapter.   
 
A strategic contextualisation of programme evaluation will follow for discussion, in order to 
contextualise programme evaluation in this study. 
 
2.2 Strategic Contextualisation of Programme Evaluation 
 
Programme evaluation is the systematic study conducted to assess how well a programme is 
working, typically focused on achievement of programme objectives. Programme evaluation can  
help managers and staff find out what is working well and what is not. It can be used to identify 
areas needing improvement, strategies for better achieving established goals, and ways to 
improve data collection or measurement of programme results (What is programme evaluation? 
([s.a.]). 
 
Nagel (1990) subsequently clarifies the meaning of policy evaluation, explaining that other 
concepts that are often used to mean the same thing as public policy analysis, include policy 
evaluation, policy studies, programme evaluation, public management science and policy 
science. One could make distinctions between those concepts as follows: policy evaluation 
emphasises evaluating alternative public policies, in contrast to describing them or explaining 
why they exist.  
 
A summarised history of programme evaluation follows. 
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2.3 Brief History of Programme Evaluation 
 
In order to present the reader with background on the origin and development of  
programme evaluation that includes impact evaluation (Rossi, Lipsey & Freeman (2004:8-12), 
a brief history of programme evaluation in both the social sector and government department, is 
provided. Although its historical roots date back to the 17th century, widespread systematic 
evaluation research is a relatively modern 20th century development. The application of social 
research methods to programme evaluation coincides with the growth and refinement of research 
methods themselves, as well as with ideological, political and demographic changes.  
 
The systematic evaluation of social programmes first became commonplace in education and 
public health. Prior to World War Ι, for instance, the most significant efforts were directed at 
assessing literacy and occupational training programmes and public health initiatives to reduce 
mortality and  morbidity from infectious diseases. By the 1930s social scientists were using 
rigorous research methods to assess social programmes in a variety of areas. Lewin’s pioneering 
“action research” studies and Lippitt and White’s work on democratic and authoritarian 
leadership (as quoted by Rossi et al., 2004:8-12), for example, were widely influential evaluation 
studies. From such beginnings, applied social research grew at an accelerating pace, with a 
strong boost provided by its contributions during World War ΙΙ.  
 
Following the war, numerous major federal and privately funded programmes were launched to 
provide urban development and housing, technological and cultural education, occupational 
training, and preventative health activities. It was also during this time that federal agencies and 
private foundations made major commitments to international programmes. Expenditures were 
very large and consequently they were accompanied by demands for “knowledge of results”.  
By the end of the 1950s, programme evaluation was commonplace. Programme evaluation 
studies were undertaken not only in the United States, Europe, and other industrialised countries 
but also in less developed nations.  
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Increasingly, evaluation components were included in programmes - among others, agricultural 
and community development in Africa. Expanding knowledge of the methods of social research 
made large-scale, multisite evaluation studies possible. During the 1960s the number of articles 
and books about evaluation research grew dramatically. Hayes’s monograph, published in 1959, 
on evaluation research in less developed countries, Suchman’s review of evaluation research 
methods (1967), and Campbell’s call for social experimentation (1969) a few illustrations. By 
the late 1960s, evaluation research had become a growth industry.   
 
In the early 1970s, evaluation research emerged as a distinct specialty field in the social sciences 
(Rossi et al., 2004:8-12). A variety of books appeared, including the first texts - critiques of the 
methodological quality of evaluation studies, and discussions of the organisational and structural 
constraints on evaluation research. The first journal in evaluation, Evaluation Review, was 
launched in 1976 by Sage Publications. Other journals followed in rapid succession, and 
currently there are at least a dozen devoted primarily to evaluation. During this period, special 
sessions on evaluation studies at meetings of academic and practitioner groups became 
commonplace, and professional associations specifically for evaluation researchers were 
founded.  
 
By 1980, Cronbach and his associates were able to state that “evaluation has become the liveliest 
frontier of American social science” (Rossi et al., 2004:8-12). Evaluation is now sustained 
primarily by funding from policymakers, programme planners and administrators, who use the 
findings, and by the interest of the general public and the clients of the programmes evaluated. 
Evaluation may not make front page headlines, but it is often a matter of intense concern to 
informed citizens, programme sponsors and decision makers, and to those whose lives are 
affected, directly or indirectly, by the programme at issue. 
(Rossi et al., 2004:8-12). 
 
According to Rossi et al. (2004:8-12), evaluation has now become a political and managerial 
activity that contributes significant input into the complex mosaic from which emerges policy 
decisions and resources for starting, enlarging, changing or sustaining programmes to better the 
human condition. In this regard, therefore, evaluation research must be seen as an integral part of 
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the social policy and public administration movements. It follows that social programmes and the 
associated evaluation activities have emerged from the relatively recent transfer of responsibility 
for the nation’s social and environmental conditions, and the quality of life of its citizens, to 
government bodies. Indeed, government – particularly the federal government (United States) – 
was comparatively small before the 1930s. Correspondingly, there was little demand for social 
and economic information. Even in the late 1930s, federal expenditure for social science research 
and statistics was only $40 - $50 million, as compared to many times that amount today. All this 
began to change in the 1930s, however. Human services grew at a rapid pace with the advent of 
the Great Depression, and so did the government. During this period, scholars with social science 
training began to investigate the political, organisational and administrative decisionmaking that 
took place in executive departments and other government agencies. In part, their interests were 
purely academic – they wanted to understand how government worked (Rossi et al., 2004:8-12).  
 
However, individuals in leadership positions in government agencies, who were investigating  
ways to deal with their large staffs and full coffers of funds, recognised a critical need for  
orderly, explicit ways to handle their policy, administrative, programme, and planning  
responsibilities. As government became increasingly complex and technical, its programmes 
could no longer be adequately managed by people hired as intelligent generalists, or because of 
their connections with political patrons, relatives, or friends. The importance of evaluation is 
now widely acknowledged by those in political and administrative roles in government (Rossi et 
al., 2004:8-12).  
 
Many federal agencies have their own evaluation units, as do a large number of their state 
counterparts. In addition, federal, state and local agencies regularly contract for programme 
evaluation with university researchers or research firms and consultants. Although evaluation 
research continues to have an academic side oriented toward training, methodology, theory, and 
study of the nature and effects of social programmes, it is now generally practised in a context of 
policymaking, programme management or client advocacy. Thus, not only is its history 
intertwined with the social policy and public administration movements, but its practice typically  
occurs in the same political and organisational arenas as policy analysis and public 
administration (Rossi et al., 2004:8-12).  
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Themes and subcategories that emerged from the literature on impact evaluation in 
organisations, are now presented.  
 
2.4 Impact Evaluation in Organisations 
 
In this age of global capitalist ascendency, knowledge has become “intellectual capital”. During  
the agricultural age, land tenure emerged as the dominant form of wealth. In the industrial age,  
financial capital moved the world. Now, in the knowledge age, corporations are focusing on  
“intellectual capital”. In the endlessly hyped knowledge age of the new millennium, evaluators  
are being asked to generate lessons learnt and best practices. As a result, the demand for  
knowledge acquisition, which demonstrates membership in the elite ranks of learning  
organisations, has crescendoed into an organisational development and programme evaluation  
mania. It follows that evaluation has moved from merely generating findings about specific  
programmes, to generating knowledge (Patton, 2001:329,332).  
 
Successful programmes to improve, among others, health, literacy and learning conditions, are 
an essential part of global progress. Therefore, when opportunities to learn are seized, the 
benefits can be large and global (Savedoff, Levine & Birdsall, 2006:1). In recognition of these 
authors’ statements, Blomquist (2003:1) stresses that there is increasing acknowledgement 
among many government departments and donor organisations, that rigorous evaluation of 
public interventions should feature in the social policy decisionmaking process. It follows that as  
pressure worldwide increases to reduce the size of governments and expand private sector and  
non-governmental involvement in social services, it becomes increasingly important to justify  
public spending and ensure that the funded interventions are achieving intended objectives.   
 
In support of the abovementioned authors, Clements (2001:1) confirms that in recent years 
funders have started asking for reports on impacts or outcomes – actual benefits for participants 
during or after their involvement with a programme. Furthermore, funders want to know what 
changes their money is making, and how people’s lives have changed. In addition, most 
community organisations also want to know: Is what we’re doing worthwhile?  In order to 
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highlight the importance of impact evaluations, Blomquist furthermore explains that countries 
from Chile to Indonesia to Sweden have embraced evaluation as a crucial element of good public 
sector management. In addition, the international community has also turned to more systematic 
evaluation of its own programmes in order to make aid and assistance more effective.  
 
2.4.1 Impact evaluation in non-policing organisations: International examples 
 
Examples of international non-policing organisations are now described, to highlight the 
significance of impact evaluation. A summarised overview of non-policing organisations in 
Mexico, Kenya and India are presented, to illustrate these organisations’ impact evaluation 
efforts.  
 
The first international public sector organisation to be presented is Mexico. 
 
2.4.1.1 An impact evaluation of Mexico’s PROGRESA programme 
 
The International Food Policy Research Institute’s (IFPRI) in-depth evaluation of Mexico’s 
PROGRESA (Programmea de Educación, Salud y Alimentación) indicated that anti-poverty 
programmes that combine education, health and nutrition interventions in one package, can be 
quite successful in improving the capacity of families to extricate them from the poverty that 
often ensnares generations. In collaboration with the Mexican government, IFPRI rigorously 
reviewed PROGRESA’s impact on education, nutrition, health and rural poverty, as well as the 
programme's overall operation. The evaluation was based on repeated surveys of individuals 
from 24,000 households in 506 localities in randomly assigned PROGRESA and non-
PROGRESA areas. Formal surveys, structured and semi-structured interviews, focus groups and 
workshops were held in seven states where the programme was first implemented on a pilot 
basis. As a result, the research asked a series of questions about PROGRESA’s effectiveness 
(Breaking the silence on poverty. Mexico PROGRESA, 2002:1).  
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It followed that the results of PROGRESA’s impact on poverty showed that PROGRESA 
interventions reduced the number of people with income levels below the poverty level by about 
10%. The depth of poverty was reduced by 30%, and the severity index was reduced by 45%. 
For comparison, an untargeted transfer was found to reduce the depth of poverty by 28% and the 
severity of poverty by 36%. Given that these indicators put greater weight on the poorest of the 
poor, the simulation results suggested that PROGRESA’s largest reductions in poverty were 
being achieved in the poorest population (Skoufias, in Breaking the silence on poverty. Mexico 
PROGRESA, 2002:2). 
  
Additionally, PROGRESA’s impact on education, concluded, after an exhaustive series of 
statistical tests, that in all cases PROGRESA had a positive enrolment effect for both boys and 
girls in primary and secondary schools. At primary school level, where enrolment rates before 
PROGRESA were already between 90% and 94%, statistical methods that control the age and 
family background of children as well as community characteristics, revealed that PROGRESA 
succeeded in increasing the enrolment rate of boys up to 1.07% and girls up to 1.45%. At 
secondary school level, where the initial enrolment rates before PROGRESA were 67% for girls 
and 73% for boys, the increase in enrolment effects for girls ranged from 7.2% to 9.3% and for 
boys from 3.5 to 5.8 percentage points. This represents a proportional increase of above 8% 
for boys’ enrolment and 14% for girls’ enrolment (Schultz, in Breaking the silence on poverty. 
Mexico PROGRESA, 2002:3). 
 
 Moreover, PROGRESA’s impact on health, nutrition and health care use indicated that 
improved nutrition and preventative care in PROGRESA areas made younger children more 
robust against illness. PROGRESA children aged 0–5 had a 12% lower incidence of illness than 
non-PROGRESA children. In addition, adult members in beneficiary households were found to 
be significantly healthier. On average, PROGRESA adult beneficiaries had 19% fewer days of 
difficulty with daily activities due to illness, than non-PROGRESA individuals, 17% fewer days 
incapacitated, and 22% fewer days in bed. Adult PROGRESA participants were able to walk 
about 7% more than non-beneficiaries, without tiring (Gertler, in Breaking the silence on 
poverty. Mexico PROGRESA, 2002:5). 
 
 42 
 
The second public sector organisation’s impact evaluation to be presented is Kenya’s agricultural 
extension services. 
 
2.4.1.2 Evaluating the impact of Kenya’s agricultural extension services 
 
The Training and Visit (T&V) system of agricultural extension sought to strengthen links 
between research and extension, and get these results to farmers through frequent visits by 
extension workers to farmers – at least monthly and often more frequently. The approach was 
widely adopted in the 1980s, with much World Bank support. However it began to attract critics. 
It was known to be costly and there was scant evidence of any impact on agricultural 
productivity. As a result, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group study entered this 
debate in 2000 in order to provide such evidence for the case of Kenya. Consequently, the study 
suggested that agricultural extension has a potentially important role to play: the data showed 
that farmers who were aware of improved practices usually put them into effect. This suggests 
that lack of knowledge was indeed a constraint. However, the Bank’s two National Extension 
Projects (NEP I and II) were not seen as having alleviated that constraint, and so had had no 
discernible impact on production.  As a result, the report pointed clearly to changes which 
needed to be made (White, 2006:36).  
 
In its current form extension services were having little impact and so by definition were 
inefficient. Impacts were discernible for poorer areas: extension services had played a role in 
allowing less productive areas to catch up. However, delivery had been concentrated in the more 
productive areas where they had least impact. The IEG study thus recommended a re-targeting to 
poorer areas. It also pointed out that messages had to be better tailored to the needs of farmers, 
rather than a uniform package being delivered to all farmers. One way to achieve this was to 
become less top-down and more responsive to farmer demands. Finally, the rate of innovation 
did not support such an intensive delivery system: a leaner extension service with broader 
coverage would be more efficient (White, 2006:36). 
The impact evaluation of India’s Integrated Nutrition Project follows. 
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2.4.1.3 The impact of India’s Integrated Nutrition Project 
 
The Tamil Nadu Integrated Nutrition Project (TINP) operated between 1980 and 1989. The 
overall objective of the project was to improve the nutritional and health status of pre-school 
children, pregnant women and nursing mothers. The intervention consisted of a package of 
services, including nutrition education, primary health care, supplementary feeding, 
administration of vitamin A, and periodic deworming. The project was the first to employ 
Growth Monitoring and Promotion (GMP) on a large scale. The evaluation is concerned with 
the impact of the project on the nutritional status of children.  It follows that the study used three 
cross-sectional rounds of data collected by the TINP Monitoring Office. Child and household 
characteristics of children participating in the programme were collected in 1982, 1986 and 
1990, each round consisting of between 1000 and 1500 observations. The study used before-after 
comparisons of means, regression analysis and charts, to provide evidence of the following: 
frequency of project participation, improvement in the nutritional status of participating children 
over time, differential participation and differential project impact across social groups. Data on 
the change in nutritional status in project areas is compared to secondary data on the nutritional 
status of children outside the project areas. With some assumptions, the use of secondary data 
makes the findings plausible. Consequently, the study concluded that the implementation of 
Growth Monitoring and Promotion programmes on a large scale is feasible, and that this had a 
positive impact on the nutritional status of children of Tamil Nadu (White, 2006:43). 
 
The impact evaluation of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grants in large cities 
within the United States, follows, for discussion as an example of impact evaluation in police 
organisations.   
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2.5 Impact evaluation in police organisations: International examples 
 
International examples of police organisations’ impact evaluation processes follow, to illustrate 
the value of impact evaluation efforts in these organisations.  
 
2.5.1 Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) in America 
 
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 authorised the creation of an 
intergovernmental grant programme within the U.S. Department of Justice to fund the hiring and 
redeployment of 100,000 additional community policing officers on America’s streets. The 
programme that administered the grants was the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services (COPS). By encouraging community policing, COPS grants were expected to reduce 
fear of crime, increase the quality of life, promote social control and boost citizen satisfaction 
with police services, while improving information sharing between citizens and the police. Two 
sets of regression analyses are used for this evaluation. To determine the impact of COPS grants 
on city police expenditures, the first set of modelling estimates a police expenditure function 
with police expenditures as the dependent variable. The police expenditure function is specified 
with variables that are thought to predict police spending. The second set of models estimates the 
relationship between COPS grants and crime rates. In the crime models, the dependent variables 
are crime rates for murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft. 
COPS administered three general types of grants. First, the hiring grants paid for 75% of the 
salaries of newly hired officers over three years. Second, the Making Officer Redeployment 
Effective (MORE) grants provided funding for technology, officer overtime and civilian staff 
salaries. The MORE grants were intended to redeploy veteran officers from administrative tasks 
to community policing. Third, the innovative grants provided funding for addressing specific 
problems such as domestic violence, gangs, and youth firearms violence. Two questions were 
asked in this paper: Do COPS grants stimulate local police department spending in large cities? 
Do COPS grants deter crime in large cities? In recent years, new impact evaluations estimating 
the effect of COPS on crime rates have been produced. However, these evaluations have 
produced conflicting findings and conclusions. 
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The Heritage Foundation published the first impact evaluation of COPS, which found that the 
relationship between COPS hiring and MORE grants and county violent crime rates was statisti-
cally insignificant, while innovative grants were associated with small reductions in violent 
crime. A COPS-funded evaluation found that the innovative grants were associated with 
reductions in both violent and property crime rates in cities and towns with populations above 
1,000 residents. The hiring and MORE grants did not have a statistically significant relationship 
with crime rates. However, when the analysis was limited to cities above 10,000 residents, the 
innovative and hiring grants were associated with reductions in violent and property crime rates. 
Two other studies of cities with populations over 10,000 residents indicated that COPS grants 
were associated with reductions in crime. The results of this study indicate that COPS grants 
awarded to large cities did not stimulate local spending and that the cities may have used the 
grants to supplant local police expenditures. This finding was supported by the U.S. Department 
of Justice Office of Inspector General audits of COPS grants. 
Whether or not community policing is an effective crime reduction strategy, this evaluation 
found that federal funding for community policing was associated with small reductions in crime 
in large cities. However, the monetary impacts produced by the three grants were not equal. The 
innovative and MORE grants produced positive net benefits, while the hiring grants produced 
negative returns. A stronger emphasis on oversight by COPS may improve the effectiveness of 
the grants (Muhlhausen, 2006). 
 
An example of an impact evaluation initiative of England’s police organisation follows.  
 
2.5.2 The National Reassurance Policing Programme: England  
 
This report sets out the key findings of an impact evaluation of the outcomes achieved by the 
National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) in England between 2003/04 and 
2004/05. The main aim of the study was to fill a gap in the research evidence in England, 
on the impact of a package of local policing activities. The evaluation covered all 16 sites 
in eight forces which formed the NRPP. The report presents results from the six sites where it 
was possible to match control areas (Tuffin, Morris & Poole, 2006). 
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Neighbourhood policing has become a central part of the Government’s police reform 
programme. The basis of a neighbourhood policing model is to have dedicated police 
resources for local areas, and for police and their partners to work together with the public, 
to understand and tackle the problems that matter to them most. International evidence showed 
indications that this type of local policing could serve to reduce both actual and perceived levels 
of crime and disorder, as well as improve the public’s perceptions of the police. The 
development of a UK evidence base dealing with the impact of this type of local policing 
activity, is critical to the success of the reform programme and to sustained investment. 
The evaluation reported here is one of the most robust tests of a neighbourhood policing 
model ever completed, and therefore marks a key step in building the evidence base. The 
results presented in the report show that the NRPP delivered positive changes in key outcome 
indicators, such as crime, perceptions of antisocial behaviour, feelings of safety after dark and 
public confidence in the police. This type of policing seemed to have less impact on neighbours 
being prepared to intervene to prevent anti-social behaviour. The findings of this study show that 
the public not only noticed increased police foot patrol, they also noticed the efforts that the 
police put into engagement and the effects of properly targeted problem solving designed to 
reduce anti-social behaviour. All these elements appear key to a successful approach to 
neighbourhood policing (Tuffin et al., 2006). 
 
Reassurance policing is a model of neighbourhood policing which seeks to improve public 
confidence in policing. It involves local communities in identifying priority crime and 
disorder issues in their neighbourhood, which they then tackle together with the police and 
other public services and partners. Reassurance policing was developed in Surrey to address 
the gap between the public perception of rising crime and the falling crime rate. The idea grew 
from collaborative work between Surrey police and the University of Surrey, drawing on the 
“signal crimes” perspective developed by Martin Innes. This perspective held that some crimes 
and disorders were more important to members of the public than others. These would act as 
signals which the police needed to target to reduce feelings of risk and increase perceptions of 
safety.  
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The NRPP grew out of trials of reassurance policing by Surrey police and the Metropolitan 
Police Service (MPS). The NRPP later expanded its objectives to examine whether 
local schemes could address antisocial behaviour, in addition to public perceptions and feelings 
of safety. The evaluation covered all 16 sites in eight forces that took part in the NRPP. 
The outcomes sought by the NRPP were:  
 
• reduced antisocial behaviour and improved quality of life 
• reduced fear of crime and improved sense of safety 
• increased public satisfaction with, and confidence in, the police 
• improved social capacity - that is, the ability of a community to help itself 
(Tuffin et al., 2006). 
 
This report considers only those six sites which were matched with a control site in order to 
provide a clear standard of evidence. Outcomes were measured using police statistics, and 
principally through a telephone survey in each site, where the same respondents were 
interviewed at the outset and one year later. A sample of 300 respondents was selected randomly, 
with a panel sample of approximately 200 achieved in each site. The baseline survey was 
conducted between November 2003 and January 2004, with the follow-up survey one year later, 
between November 2004 and January 2005. Across the sites, the programme had a positive 
effect on self-reported victimisation, according to the survey. The decrease in victimisation was 
five percentage points greater for respondents in the trial sites, compared to those in the control 
sites. 
Two of the six sites had significantly greater reductions in total recorded crime than their control 
sites, while individual crime types reduced in three sites. Across the pair-matched sites, the 
programme had a positive effect on perceptions of five of the eight types of antisocial behaviour 
measured in the survey. Three of the six trial sites showed reductions, compared to their control 
sites. Analysis of antisocial behaviour incidents was only possible for one site, and there was no 
data available for the control site. The total number of incidents fell significantly, as did the 
number of criminal damage incidents. There was an overall effect on the public perception of 
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change in the crime rate over the previous 12 months. There was an increase in the percentage of 
respondents who thought crime had reduced in the trial sites. The percentage of people who 
thought crime had increased over the previous 12 months did not change (Tuffin et al., 2006). 
 
Across the sites, there was a positive effect on feelings of safety after dark. The number of 
people who felt very (or fairly) safe walking alone in the area after dark rose by one percentage 
point for respondents in the trial sites, and fell three percentage points for those in the control 
sites. There was no effect on feelings of safety during the day, with the vast majority of 
respondents to the baseline survey feeling fairly or very safe. There was a limited effect on fear 
of crime, which is measured by asking respondents how much they worry. For the majority of 
these indicators there was no effect attributable to the programme; they fell in all sites, trials and 
controls. Only one of the eight indicators improved: worry about being physically attacked by 
strangers. Taking sites together, there was a positive effect on perceptions of risk of seeing 
graffiti or experiencing property damage, with no effect on the perceived likelihood of being a 
victim of burglary, vehicle crime or robbery. Four of the six sites improved on one or two of the 
indicators. Across the sites, there was an overall positive effect on public confidence in the 
police. The percentage of people who thought the police in their area were doing an excellent or 
good job increased by 15 percentage points compared to only three percentage points in the 
control sites. Four of the six sites experienced positive improvements, compared to their control 
sites. There was no overall effect on the satisfaction of those contacting the police for any reason 
other than as a victim. There was a positive effect on one of the social cohesion indicators. The 
percentage of people saying they trusted many or some of the people in their area increased by 
three percentage points across the trial sites and fell by two percentage points in the control sites. 
The result for one site was significant, compared to its control. There was no overall effect on 
other indicators of efficacy or cohesion, although one individual site showed an effect on 
whether respondents agreed that theirs was a close, tight-knit community. The programme had 
no effect on involvement in community or voluntary activity (Tuffin et al., 2006). 
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2.5.3 The Boston Gun Project 
 
The Boston Gun Project was a problem-oriented policing initiative expressly aimed at taking on 
a serious, large-scale crime problem— homicide victimisation among young people in Boston. 
Like many large cities in the United States, Boston experienced an epidemic of youth homicides 
between the late 1980s and early 1990s. Boston youth homicides (ages 24 and under) increased- 
from 22 victims in 1987 to 73 victims in 1990. Youth homicide remained high, well after the 
peak of the epidemic. Boston averaged about 44 youth homicides per year between 1991 and 
1995. A new understanding of the city’s youth violence problem was created by the Boston Gun 
Project research activities. The research findings were discussed and analysed within the 
working group problem-solving process and were instrumental in the development of an 
operational strategy. The research findings and the working group process thus led to the 
“Operation Ceasefire” intervention. Operation Ceasefire included two main elements: a direct 
law enforcement attack on illicit firearms traffickers supplying youth with guns, and an attempt 
to generate a strong deterrent to gang violence (Braga, Kennedy, Piehl & Waring, 2000:2-4).  
 
Braga et al. (2000: 8-12) furthermore explain without the support of a formal evaluation, 
Operation Ceasefire has been hailed in the media as an unprecedented success. The well-known 
large reduction in yearly Boston youth homicide numbers certainly suggests that something 
noteworthy happened after Operation Ceasefire was implemented in mid-1996. As discussed 
earlier, Boston averaged 44 youth homicides per year between 1991 and 1995. In 1996, this 
number decreased to 26, and then further decreased to 15 in 1997. Although these numbers 
demonstrate that there was a sudden large decrease in Boston youth homicide, they do not 
provide a rigorous assessment of whether Operation Ceasefire was associated with the decrease. 
Consequently, the impact evaluation focused on four key questions: 
 
• Were the significant reductions in youth homicides and other indicators of non-fatal 
serious gun violence associated with the implementation of Operation Ceasefire in 
Boston? 
• Did the timing of Boston’s significant reduction in youth homicide coincide with 
the implementation of Operation Ceasefire? 
 50 
 
• Were other factors responsible for Boston’s reduction in youth homicide? 
• Was Boston’s significant youth homicide reduction distinct, relative to youth 
homicide trends in other major U.S. and New England cities? 
 
It follows that the time series shows a 63% reduction in the mean monthly number of youth 
homicide victims from a pretest mean of 3.5 youth homicides per month to a posttest mean of 1.3 
youth homicides per month. Analyses suggest that the Ceasefire intervention was associated with 
statistically significant reductions in all time series, including: 
 
• 63% decrease in the monthly number of youth homicides in Boston 
• 32% decrease in the monthly number of citywide shots fired calls 
• 25% decrease in the monthly number of citywide gun assault incidents  
(Braga et al., 2000: 8-12) 
 
This simple analysis suggests that Operation Ceasefire was associated with a large reduction in 
Boston youth homicide. Although the time series analyses revealed that the implementation of 
Operation Ceasefire was associated with a significant reduction in youth homicide, the time 
series models do not establish whether the reduction actually started before or after the 
commencement of the programme. As a result, a model that checked for significant changes in 
the entire time series for each successive month. These analyses suggested that the maximal 
significant decrease in the Boston youth homicide time series occurred in June 1996 - about the 
same time Operation Ceasefire was fully implemented. These results reinforce the observation 
that the implementation of the Boston programme was associated with significant reductions in 
youth homicide. The youth homicide and gun violence reductions associated with the Ceasefire 
intervention could have been caused or meaningfully influenced by other causal factors. We 
therefore controlled for changes in Boston’s employment rate as measured by the   
Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training, changes in Boston’s youth population 
aged 14 to 24 as measured by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, changes in citywide trends in 
Violent Index crimes as measured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime 
Reports, changes in homicide victimisation among older victims (ages 25 and older), and 
changes in youth involvement in street-level drug market activity as measured by Boston police 
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department’s arrest data. Admittedly, these controls are far from ideal, but these variables 
represent the best available information on these alternate explanations for Boston decrease in 
youth homicide. When these control variables were added to our models, our findings did not 
substantively change (Braga et al., 2000:12-15). 
In order to compare youth homicide trends in Boston relative to youth homicide trends in major 
U.S. and New England cities, a model that maximised the ability to control for the various 
trends, seasonal variations and random fluctuations in the time series of each city, was 
introduced. As a result, these models revealed that only Boston experienced a significant 
reduction in the monthly count of youth homicides, coinciding with the implementation of the 
Operation Ceasefire programme. It follows that the principal intervention, Operation Ceasefire, 
was likely responsible for a substantial reduction in youth homicide and youth gun violence in 
the city (Braga et al., 2000:16-17). 
 
The reasons for performing impact evaluations are now briefly discussed.  
 
2.6 Reasons for Conducting Impact Evaluations 
 
Information generated by impact evaluations informs decisions on whether to expand, modify, or  
eliminate a particular policy or programme and can be used in prioritising public actions. In  
addition, impact evaluations contribute towards improving the effectiveness of policies and 
programmes by addressing the following questions: 
● Does the programme achieve the intended goal? 
● Can the changes in outcomes be explained by the programme, or are they the result of 
some other factors occurring simultaneously? 
● Do programme impacts vary across different groups of intended beneficiaries (for 
example males, females, and indigenous people), regions and over time? 
● Are there any unintended effects of the programme, either positive or negative? 
● How effective is the programme in comparison with alternative interventions? 
● Is the programme worth the resources it costs?  (Impact Evaluation – Overview, 2006:1) 
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Stated differently, Regalia (1999:1) explains the reasons for evaluating a programme, policy or  
project’s impact as an indispensable tool to assess whether a programme is achieving its  
objective, how the beneficiaries’ situation changed as a result of the programme and what the  
situation would have been without the programme. Moreover, if an impact evaluation is carried 
out at an intermediate stage of project execution, very important lessons can be learnt on how the 
programme design and/or the project execution can be modified to improve the effectiveness of 
the intervention. In addition, members of the policy community are confronted daily with 
questions for which they seek meaningful answers, such as the impact of a particular reform 
programme on development or peace building (Bowden, Humphreys & Mack, 2006). 
 
2.7 The significance of impact evaluations 
 
“If we lived in a world of complete certainty and perfect administration there would be no need 
for evaluation” (Hogwood & Gunn, as quoted by Taylor, 2005:602). According to Savedoff et al. 
(2006:13-14), the value of impact evaluation is best understood as part of a broad scientific 
enterprise of learning, in which evidence is built over time and across different contexts, forming 
the basis for better policymaking and programme design. This type of knowledge is in part a 
public good, in the sense that once the knowledge is produced and disseminated, anyone can 
benefit from it without depleting it or excluding others from its benefits. As a result, in this way, 
investments in building knowledge can have tremendous and unpredictable returns. For example, 
the discovery in the late 19th century that cholera was transmitted through contaminated water, 
has saved untold lives around the world. When a developing country or development agency 
learns what works (or not), that knowledge can be invaluable to others facing similar problems. 
The replication of impact evaluations in similar programmes in different places builds an ever-
expanding base of evidence and is the most systematic way of improving public policy and 
spending public money well.  
On the other hand, although the value of the information from impact evaluations may be very 
great, the suggestion that more such evaluations are required is often met with skepticism – if not 
outright rejection. The main objections are that good impact evaluations are not appropriate for 
answering questions of importance to decision-makers and also cannot be ethically implemented. 
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Additionally it is furthermore argued that impact evaluations are too costly and produce results 
too late to be of use to decisionmakers. Moreover, it is claimed that impact evaluations do not 
provide important information about how programmes operate, are too complex and also do not 
influence policymaking. 
 
These objections are, however, not supported by the facts. As a result, Savedoff et al. (2006: 21-
23) provide valuable information regarding the significance of impact evaluations. It follows that 
current impact evaluation methods can indeed answer questions that are important to decision-
makers. Although it is difficult to design high quality impact evaluations that can answer policy 
questions such as “Under what circumstances should a country have a fixed exchange rate?”, the 
range of questions that can be answered by well-designed impact evaluations is nevertheless 
much wider than is generally recognised. This implies that, for example, studies aimed at 
learning the best way to assist individuals can be relatively easy to design, but still require time 
and money. For instance, certain questions can be easily studied by comparing participants and 
non-participants – who have been randomly assigned to a “treatment” and “control group” – 
because they relate to how individuals respond to specific interventions. As per illustration, these 
questions can include similar questions as follows: Do vitamin A supplements reduce infant 
mortality? Do textbooks increase students learning? Do microfinance programmes improve child 
nutrition? 
 
However, Savedoff et al. (2006:22) continue to accentuate the ability of impact evaluations to 
answer questions that are significant to decisionmakers. Consequently, questions regarding the 
best ways to “produce” services – requiring comparisons across classrooms, facilities or districts 
– can also be addressed in a relatively straightforward fashion. It follows that impact evaluation 
can, for example, effectively address questions such as: does hiring an additional teacher in non-
formal schools improve attendance and performance? Or, what are the most effective ways to 
reduce provider absenteeism in schools and government clinics? In addition, it is also still 
feasible, though more resource-intensive, to use randomised assignment to assess programmes 
that have externalities – that is, to measure the net impact on a person (or community)  from a 
programme that was delivered to a neighburing person or community.  
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This implies that impact evaluation can also effectively provide answers to questions such as: 
does agricultural extension have effects beyond the farmers who are directly affected through the 
diffusion of their learning to their neighbours, or does school-based mass treatment of children 
for intestinal parasites, in a high prevalence area, improve health and schooling, even for those 
not receiving the treatment? 
 
In other cases, measuring the impact of a national programme delivering new social services is 
also possible by contrasting changes across districts or municipalities, as they are introduced in  
successive waves. Moreover, impact evaluation can therefore provide answers to questions such 
as: do cash transfers to poor families that are conditional on school attendance and utilisation of 
preventative health care services, improve children’s health and schooling? Even questions that 
might be considered quite difficult to answer – such as the impact of gender on political 
decisionmaking – can be rigorously studied; for example, do quotas for women’s participation in 
political decisionmaking improve allocations of public funds? (Savedoff et al., 2006:22).        
   
In addition, Savedoff et al. (2006:23) furthermore advocate that the ethical challenges of impact 
evaluation can be successfully managed. However, some argue that impact evaluations that rely 
on collecting data from control groups are unethical, because they exclude people from 
programme benefits. This criticism only applies when resources are available for serving anyone 
as soon as the programme starts. In fact, whenever funds are scarce or programmes need to be 
expanded in phases, only a portion of potential beneficiaries can be reached at any time. 
Furthermore, whenever one has a reasonable doubt of a programme’s efficacy, or concerns with 
unforeseen negative effects, it is not only ethical, but an imperative responsibility, to adequately 
monitor and evaluate the impact. It is also argued that impact evaluations are too costly or 
difficult. This argument is often made by comparing the cost of an evaluation to the programme 
that is its subject. However, the appropriate comparator is not the programme cost, but the value 
of the knowledge it would produce. For example, evaluations of demonstration training 
programmes in the US and Latin America have sometimes exceeded a third of the initial 
programme costs, but the evaluation results affected decisions regarding the rollout of much 
larger national programmes.  
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In theses cases, the value of scaling up programmes that worked and avoiding or redesigning 
those that were ineffective, was extremely high. To the degree that these findings were 
generalisable, they yielded benefits to other countries as well. Thus, a few well-selected impact 
evaluations can generate knowledge that influences the design and adoption of an entire class of 
interventions around the world. 
 
Furthermore, Savedoff et al. (2006:24) continue explaining that at times the additional cost of 
doing a good impact evaluation is actually quite small. When projects are results-orientated and 
require baseline data, an intelligent design for data gathering can determine whether or not an 
impact evaluation will be feasible – sometimes without any additional cost of data collection. 
Costs are also likely to be lower in studies of developing country programmes, because the field 
costs of surveys and local researchers is generally lower than in high-income countries. The 
principal cost of a random assignment study is the cost of data collection; and the cost of 
collecting data for a bad study is just as expensive as collecting data for a good study. For 
example, a large primary education programme in India spends millions of dollars collecting data 
on all the districts in which the programme was implemented.  
 
However, as noted above, this kind of data collection does not lend itself to a proper impact 
evaluation. A proper data collection strategy might have cost less and, most importantly, would 
have provided useful information about the programme’s impact. As a result, critics must 
recognise that the cost or difficulty of good impact evaluations is not a universal fact, but rather, 
one that has to be judged for particular questions and contexts. Another critique of the need for 
impact evaluation studies is that the results are not useful for decisions, because they take too 
long to produce results. However, the time taken to produce results greatly depends on the 
questions being studied. Some rigorous impact evaluations produce results within a matter of 
months. Others take longer, but are still available in time to affect important policy decisions. 
For example, the initial findings of Mexico’s impact evaluations of its national conditional cash 
transfer programme were available in time to convince a new administration to preserve it. 
 
 
 
 56 
 
In addition, it is also possible to design impact evaluations that generate useful feedback during 
implementation. For example, a multi-year study of the impact of HIV education in Kenya was  
designed to not only monitor the long-term impact, but also to assess the intermediate outcomes, 
such as the accuracy of knowledge about HIV transmission. The transfer of knowledge is only a  
necessary, not sufficient, condition for the programme to have an impact; but measuring the  
success or failure of reaching such intermediate goals can help programme managers make  
necessary adjustments to improve implementation. More fundamentally, however, it is more 
important to have accurate information about what programmes work, even if it takes some years 
to acquire, than to have inaccurate information generated quickly. (Savedoff et al., 2006:24). 
 
In addition, critics sometimes claim that impact evaluations only inform whether or not 
something has an impact, without saying why and how. Conversely, Savedoff et al. (2006:25) are 
of the opinion that a good impact evaluation can provide reliable evidence about the mechanism 
by which the outcome is achieved, when it simultaneously collects information on processes and 
intermediate outcomes. This implies that impact evaluations are not a replacement for sound 
theories and models, needs assessments, monitoring, and operational evaluations. All of  
these elements are nevertheless necessary to complement the analysis of impact. On the other  
hand, it is equally true that the knowledge gained from impact evaluations is a necessary  
complement to these other kinds of analyses. 
 
Another critique of Savedoff et al. (2006:25-26), is that such studies are too complex to be  
understood by policymakers and do not influence policymaking. In fact, good impact 
evaluations, and randomised evaluations in particular, are relatively easy to present to policy 
makers, with a little work. For example, the MDRC, formerly known as the Manpower 
Demonstration Research Corporation, conducted randomised control trials of numerous state 
welfare programmes in the United States. Because the findings were readily conveyed to 
policymakers, MDRC’s studies had a significant impact on U.S. welfare reform legislation in the 
mid-80s. In addition, other cases where impact evaluation affected subsequent policy can be 
found in Latin America. In the 1980s, evaluation of radio-assisted education programmes in 
Nicaragua led to widespread replication of this promising intervention. Most important of all, if 
impact evaluations are not started today, then we will never have access to the information 
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needed for evidence-base decisions. This point has been made in recent declarations associated 
with the creation of the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria, the replenishment of World 
Bank and African Development Bank concessional funds, and the formulation of the Millennium 
Development Goals. In each case, attention to the measurement of results makes it imperative to 
lay down the foundations today so that we can learn about the effects of our actions in future.  
Any investment takes time to yield benefits, and building the kind of knowledge generated by 
impact evaluations is one of the best investments we can make today.  
 
Moreover, in support of Savedoff et al., the significance of impact evaluations is furthermore 
emphasised in Assessing results using impact evaluations (2007). This paper advocates that 
impact evaluation is essential to making aid more effective. This implies that impact evaluation 
is about understanding what works in development, under what circumstances, and why. They 
are, however, not about simply measuring inputs – such as, for example, how many school  
meals were delivered in a school feeding programme. Instead, they are about assessing impacts 
on key development objectives, such as children’s nutritional status. As a result, by determining  
who gains from a programme and by how much, impact evaluations are a key to making aid  
effective. Additionally, this paper argues that impact evaluations contribute to a culture of 
accountability. It follows that impact evaluations help foster a culture of accountability within 
governments of developing countries. They cannot be used to evaluate the effects of every 
programme or intervention – especially where a policy is economywide. Credible impact 
evaluations should, however, gradually become a central input to the design of effective policies. 
 
Moreover, impact evaluations are essential for creating a “knowledge bank”. The number and 
quality of impact evaluations are gradually improving. More research is needed, however, but 
research also needs to move onto bigger questions. These include understanding why the same 
intervention can be successful in some circumstances and settings but not in others, and how to 
make policies more effective.  It follows that gaining this understanding will require making 
cost-effectiveness comparisons across policies. Similarly, impact evaluations also improve 
knowledge of policies. Credible, rigorous impact evaluations have large returns, because they 
advance our knowledge about the effects of policies, have lessons for the design of interventions, 
and help ensure the political sustainability of successful programmes.  
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Some examples to illustrate the abovementioned statements are as follows: 
 
●  In Bangladesh, families who own more than one half-acre of land are ineligible for most 
group-based microcredit programmes. This rule was used to compare the outcomes of 
families with “just under” and “just above” the maximum amount of land holdings. The 
evaluation showed large, positive effects of microcredit on household welfare. The results 
underscored the negative effects of credit constraints in developing countries and the 
potential of microcredit programmes as a way of alleviating these constraints. 
 
● In Argentina, matching techniques were used to estimate the impact of a programme that 
provided support to families that had become unemployed during the severe economic 
crisis of 2002. The evaluation showed that the programme reduced aggregate 
unemployment and extreme poverty. Together with earlier research of the impact of 
welfare programmes, this impact evaluation has helped governments develop appropriate 
policies during macroeconomic shocks. 
 
● The rigorous nature of the PROGRESA evaluation, a conditional cash transfer 
programme in Mexico, was one of the reasons for the administration of President Fox to 
support a programme inherited from the previous administration – an unusual outcome. 
The name of the programme was changed, but the design was essentially left unchanged. 
It follows that the programme has now continued with the administration of President 
Calderon. Much the same happened in Colombia, where a rigorously evaluated cash 
transfer programme survived an administration change – in part, because of the results of 
a credible impact evaluation (Assessing results …, 2007). 
 
In support of the abovementioned literature, international leaders committed their support during  
a global meeting for the creation of an independent entity to sponsor rigorous impact evaluations 
of social programmes in developing countries. Consensus was reached among participants from 
developing countries, international organisations, bilateral donors and private foundations, that 
such studies were crucial to learning about what works in development, and there was a call for 
developing country governments to play a central role in the new entity. Furthermore, meeting 
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participants agreed that this newly created entity – with members drawn from developing 
countries, bilateral and multilateral agencies, foundations, and NGOs – should be established to 
channel funds to high-quality, independent impact evaluations around key questions that 
confront policymakers in both donor agencies and developing country governments (A major 
step forward …, 2006).  
 
In addition, there is a growing appreciation within the development community that an  
important aspect of public sector management is the existence of a results or performance  
orientation in government. Such an orientation – in effect, an “evaluation culture” – is considered  
to be one avenue for improving the performance of a government, in terms of the quality,  
quantity and targeting of the goods and services which the state produces. In support of this  
objective, a number of countries are working to ensure results orientation through building or  
strengthening their monitoring and evaluation systems. Evaluation specialists have a strong  
advocacy that monitoring and evaluation systems are a “good thing” and have intrinsic merit. On  
the other hand, this kind of argument is a “hard sell” to skeptical or overstressed governments in  
the developing world (Mackay, 2006:1).  
 
In accordance with the abovementioned literature, the South African government also realised 
the importance of the role evaluation has in government. During his presentation at the National 
Guiding Principles and Standards for Monitoring and Evaluation of Public Sector Policies and 
Programmes in South Africa, Levin (2006) indicated that during 2004 the South African cabinet 
formally adopted a resolution in support of the development framework. Subsequent to this 
resolution, the President, in his State of the Nation address furthermore emphasised and 
entrenched the importance of monitoring, evaluating and reporting for government. As a result, 
the Governance and Administration (G&A) cluster was mandated with the overall responsibility 
of designing and implementing a governmentwide Monitoring and Evaluation Framework. The 
South African government has, over the past ten years, recognised the challenges arising from 
having to transform the state into a developmental one, while simultaneously attempting to 
deliver and redress the legacy of the past social imbalances.  
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As a result, to ensure that tangible results are achieved, there is an increasing recognition of the 
attendant and urgent need for greater effectiveness in the way that Government monitors, 
evaluates and reports on its policies, projects and programmes. 
 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom (UK) government, for example, uses a wide range of  
evaluations methods, including impact evaluation, to ensure that policies, programmes and 
public services are planned and delivered as effectively and efficiently as possible. It follows that 
the impact evaluation approach to policy evaluation is used extensively by the UK government 
and is at the heart of their performance management system. Consequently, governments of any  
country need to know at the outset of policy development, and after policies have been  
implemented, their likely and achieved impacts, in terms of both the positive and negative  
outcomes (Davies, 2004:2,4). Additionally, the need for good analysis and sound evaluation  
to be at the heart of policymaking has been recognised in a number of UK government  
publications (Owens, 2003:2). Similarly, Pollit (as quoted by Sandberg, Stensaker and Aamodt, 
2002:44) argues that one of the most distinctive characteristics in European state steering during 
the past decade has been the overwhelming interest in new public management ideas resulting, 
inter  alia, in an evaluative state. It follows that a central aim of the evaluative state has been to 
link up routine evaluation with evaluation for strategic change - in other words, linking 
evaluation closer to the overall policy steering and to important management issues (Neave, as 
quoted by Sandberg et al., 2002:44).  
 
International examples of the establishment of programme evaluation follow. 
 
2.8 The Institutionalisation of Programme Evaluation: International Examples 
 
International examples of countries’ efforts to institutionalise evaluation, including impact 
evaluation, illustrate the link between evaluation and the larger mandate of improving public 
sector management. These countries were used as examples to illustrate the realisation of the 
international community’s efforts to improve public sector management through programme 
evaluation. 
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2.8.1 Programme evaluation in Sweden 
 
Evaluations were first undertaken in the 1950s by public commissions preparing policy 
decisions. The commission system combined the views of stakeholders, and introduced research 
findings into decisionmaking. As a result, from the 1960s evaluation began to be viewed as  
an activity that could continuously provide decisionmakers with information. Consequently,  
specialised research bodies and agencies were then founded with evaluation as their main task 
(Blomquist, 2003:24). 
 
2.8.2 Australia’s programme evaluation 
 
Evaluation became an integral part of Australia’s public management reform process in the mid- 
1980s, when the government’s evaluation strategy was launched. It follows that evaluation has  
been systematically integrated into corporate and programme management and planning. As a 
result, all public programmes, or significant parts thereof, are reviewed once every three to five  
years. All major new proposals include an evaluation strategy. Ministries are currently required 
to provide an annual evaluation plan, and results of major evaluations are expected to be made 
public (Blomquist, 2003:24). 
 
2.8.3 Programme evaluation in Chile 
 
The first initiative involved developing a system of performance indicators for government 
programmes. By 1994 the Budget Directorate requested indicators on performance from all  
government agencies. The second component was programme evaluation, focusing on cost, 
timelines and feedback to decisionmaking. Hence, there has been political agreement to evaluate 
all programmes in Chile. This clear target has helped to deal with initial resistance by agencies  
(Blomquist, 2003:24).
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2.8.4 Evaluation of programmes in Québec 
  
As part of its far-reaching initiative to modernise the management of their public service, the 
government of Québec has granted a very special status to the evaluation function. By its nature, 
this function has become the primary mechanism for applying the basic principles of reforms that 
include the development of targeted results, the achievement of concrete results, and the 
measurement of results achieved and reporting thereof.  In addition to the increased involvement 
of professionals in the evaluation of government programmes, Québec’s legislators proposed, 
through legislation, that the relevance, effects and performance of these programmes be 
evaluated more extensively (Dubois, 2002).  
 
The expectations of the future of programme evaluation are presented next. 
 
2.9 The Future Predictions of Programme Evaluation 
 
Additionally, in agreement with the abovementioned authors, Worthen (2001:410) visualises a  
number of predictions for the future of programme evaluation, in the next decade or two, that  
furthermore emphasise the importance of the evaluation profession. The author signifies his faith 
in the importance of programme evaluation, judging that evaluation will become an increasingly 
useful force in our society, in improving both public programmes and policymaking, aiding in 
corporate “quality improvement” efforts in improving society through its various institutions, 
and even improving itself. Furthermore, the author is confident about the future role of 
programme evaluation. As a result, there will be more, not fewer, evaluations in the public, 
private and non-profit sectors in the U.S. and other developed countries, as evaluation becomes 
increasingly institutionalised because of pressure for accountability brought about both by  
economic challenges and intervention of courts and legislative bodies concerned with 
social justice, and also increasing recognition that evaluation is often the gatekeeper to 
meaningful programme improvements. 
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In addition, the demand for programme evaluation is also predicted to increase. As a result,        
evaluation will continue to spread rapidly around the globe until there are few countries  
where programme evaluations are not an occasional occurrence, at least, and the number of 
national and multinational professional societies for evaluation will increase. In turn, the 
progression of programme evaluation is also believed will develop, since evaluation will expand 
slowly beyond its present (and in some cases respected) role in health, education, psychology 
and other social sciences and services such as family welfare and criminal justice, to become 
important in the natural sciences and other fields as yet less touched by programme evaluation. 
Moreover, evaluation (and evaluators) will become more politically sophisticated as evaluators  
increasingly recognise that their studies are both technical and political endeavours, requiring 
them to struggle with new conceptualisations of how evaluations can serve their political role 
well without being discounted by skeptics as merely another political (and hence non-credible) 
activity (Worthen, 2001:410). 
 
As a profession, Worthen (2001: 410) perceives that programme evaluation will grow slowly but 
steadily in the next two decades, but it will not, during that period, acquire all the hallmarks of a 
matured profession such as medicine, accounting or the law. It will continue to lack means for  
certifying or licensing evaluators, although some interim style of “credentialing” evaluators 
(based on factors such as training and experience) may emerge in that time span. Consequently, 
as demands for evaluation pervade deeper into society, opportunities for evaluation careers will 
gradually increase, although the number of university graduate programmes for training 
evaluators will increase slightly, if at all, not attaining the numbers to warrant systems for 
accrediting evaluator preparation programmes. The author is furthermore of the belief that 
evaluation training will become increasingly applied, and will shift gradually from training 
doctoral level evaluators to producing more evaluators prepared at masters degree level. The 
author also envisages that internal evaluation will become more common because of its benefits, 
despite its frequent threat to objectivity.  Creative involvement of both internal and external 
evaluators to optimise the advantages of both perspectives will, unfortunately, continue to be 
rare. 
Myths concerning programme evaluation are now presented.      
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2.10 Myths about programme evaluation 
 
Regardless of the significance and increasing demand and awareness of impact evaluations, 
illustrated above, McNamara (2007:2) identifies various myths that exist about impact 
evaluations. Firstly, evaluation is perceived to be an inappropriate process producing worthless 
outcomes. That may have been a problem in the past, when programme evaluation methods were 
chosen largely on the basis of their ability to achieve complete scientific accuracy, reliability and 
validity. That approach would often generate extensive data from which very carefully chosen 
conclusions would be drawn. Generalisations were avoided. As a result, evaluation reports 
tended to reiterate the obvious, and left programme administrators disappointed and skeptical 
about the value of evaluation in general. However, more recently, evaluation has focused on 
utility, relevance and practicality at least as much as scientific validity. Secondly, the myth exists 
that evaluation concerns the demonstration of programme achievements or failures. 
Consequently, this myth assumes that success is implementing the perfect programme and never 
having to hear from employees, customers or clients again – the programme will now run itself 
perfectly. That doesn’t happen in real life. Success involves remaining open to continuing 
feedback and adjusting the programme accordingly. Evaluation gives one continuing feedback. 
Lastly, evaluation is perceived to be an exclusive, complicated and inflexible process relying on 
external assistance. It follows that many people believe that they must be completely conversant 
with concepts such as validity and reliability. They don’t. They do have to consider what 
information they will require in order to make current decisions about programme issues or 
needs. In addition, they have to be willing to commit to understanding what is really going on. 
People regularly undertake some form of programme evaluation – they just don’t do it in a 
formal fashion, so they don’t get the most out of their efforts or they draw conclusions that are 
inaccurate. 
 
Factors that could influence programme evaluation follow. 
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2.11 Resistance to Programme Evaluation 
 
In addition, Posavac and Carey ([s.a.]:40-46) identify a number of potential sources of 
resistance to programme evaluation. The authors regard these sources as political and 
psychological factors that can undermine an evaluation project. Some factors are based on 
legitimate concerns, while others are based on the misunderstanding of evaluation. One such 
factor is the appearance of self-appointed subjective evaluation specialists. This implies that 
programme personnel have had some experience working on a research project. Because of this 
experience, they may feel attached to a specific evaluation design. For example, they may insist 
on testing subjects prior to a treatment or new programme, when the evaluators feel that a pretest 
may artificially sensitise the subjects to the treatment to be evaluated.   
 
As a result, self-styled experts may also want to use their own favorite measurement instrument, 
even when the professional evaluators feel that it will needlessly lengthen a questionnaire that 
they judge to be adequate for measuring the goals of the programme. Consequently, evaluators 
are advised to take the time to listen to such suggestions carefully and with an open mind, 
because they may have some merit. If the suggestions seem counterproductive or not feasible, 
they are well advised to be gentle but firm in adhering to the design and measures that they feel 
are appropriate. Subsequently, if evaluators give in to pressure, against their better judgment, 
they will have no one to blame but themselves if the project is poorly executed.  
Another source of resistance to programme evaluation is the misconception that evaluation does 
not promote innovation. This implies that personnel in human service organisations may be 
concerned that evaluation will interfere with innovation, by inhibiting them from experimenting 
with new techniques. The staff may feel that evaluation permits absolutely no variation in the 
programme during the period of data collection. However, the need for retaining programme 
identity does not mean that clinicians or programme personnel cannot be flexible in the day-to-
day operations of the programme within broad structural boundaries. Each programme will have 
variability built into it; therefore, evaluation will not limit this. 
An additional myth is the fear that an ineffective programme will be terminated. It is true that an 
evaluation could result in the restriction or elimination of a programme in those instances in 
which results demonstrate that a given approach is not working out as expected. However, before 
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sponsors can completely eliminate a programme designed to meet a specific problem, they are 
ordinarily under some pressure to decide what to put in the place of the terminated programme. It 
is therefore more likely that an evaluation will result in the reassessment of a programme, rather 
than its elimination.  
 
Nevertheless, evaluators will not be able to eliminate anxiety completely in people who are 
basically insecure or who have doubts about their own competence. In a good programme these 
persons will be in the minority. Moreover, the fear that information will be abused represents 
another myth about evaluation. This implies that there may exist some concern that information 
gained about the performance of staff may be abused. Past experience may have taught them to 
be cautious of evaluators who have overstepped the boundaries of programme evaluation or who 
have been careless about maintaining confidences. Being trusted is critical in calming these 
suspicions. The reputation for trust is very fragile, and hard to regain once it has been lost. 
Effective evaluators will not only explicitly try to convey the idea that programme evaluation is  
distinct from individual performance appraisal, but they will carefully avoid speaking or acting 
in such a way that might even give the appearance that they are engaged in individual 
performance appraisal (Posavac & Carey, [s.a.]:40-46).  
 
Furthermore, accusations that evaluation methods are insensitive is also regarded by Posavac and 
Carey ([s.a.]:40-46) as a source of resistance. In addition, there is the accusation that evaluation 
designs are insensitive to the details of human services. Programme objectives are often varied 
and complex. For example, a hospital program for psychiatric patients presents a very difficult 
evaluation project. This is true because it is very difficult to find many persons with the same 
diagnosis. The severity of the problem often varies widely. However, there is a good deal of 
merit in the charge of insensitivity. Evaluators will gain the confidence of managers and staff not 
only by being aware of such a problem, but also by articulating this awareness in such a manner 
that programme staff members are reassured that the details of human services have been 
appropriately addressed. Early in the planning stage, the programme personnel can be assured 
that the evaluation will not begin until they have had the opportunity to carefully review the 
evaluation proposal and feel comfortable that their concerns in this area have been addressed 
properly.  
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Another objection is that programme evaluation drains money that could be spent on direct 
service. As the statement stands, it is true. However, the main question is whether or not it can 
improve service. As a result, the alternative to spending money on evaluation is to risk spending 
money on services that are of doubtful value. Those who present this objection fail to face the 
reality that the day of accountability has arrived. Today, it is hard to find a programme funded 
either by government agencies or private foundations, that does not carry the stipulation that a 
certain amount of money in the grant be spent on the evaluation. 
 
An additional argument of those who are totally opposed to the concept of evaluation is that  
evaluation has had very little impact on programmes. There is a good deal of validity to this 
objection. It follows that evaluators have often been frustrated by seeing their reports set aside  
and disregarded. However, the frustration of evaluators should be eased when they reflect on the  
hard reality that evaluation research is not a sympathetic social science activity, but rather a 
political decisionmaking tool. Because evaluation researchers work in a political context, the  
results of their work must be timely and appropriate for decisionmaking. Well-designed and  
carefully executed studies are worthless, if they do not contribute to the decisionmaking process.  
 
In some instances, evaluators cannot put all the blame on policymakers if reports are not used.  
In spite of the apparent validity of complaints about the lack of impact, there is also evidence that 
these complaints are overstated. Firstly, evaluation studies have had an accumulative effect in  
certain areas. For example, the common finding that class size has marginal effects on learning 
may at first persuade one to set aside class size as being of minimal importance. However, as  
more research was done on schools in other countries, it became clear that the marginal effect of  
class size was true only within the range of class size customarily found in American schools. As  
a result, it sometimes takes time before the significance of evaluation research can be put into 
perspective. Secondly, evaluation research has some long term value insofar as it challenges 
conventional wisdom; for example, evaluation research illustrated that schools made smaller  
contributions to the learning of children than did family background. Lastly, another source of 
resistance to evaluation is the fact that programme personnel are generally enthusiastic and 
confident about the potential effects of their programme.  
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As a result of their enthusiasm and maximum effort, they expect their new programme to have 
dramatic results – a “slam-bang” effect.  It follows that these personnel will have a tendency to 
feel betrayed if evaluators are able to demonstrate only a moderate improvement over the old 
programme.  
 
The difficulty can arise when the programme that was replaced was already achieving its goals 
reasonably well, and the new programme is expected to improve on the replaced programme. 
One way to handle the high level of expectation is to help programme personnel arrive at some 
rule of thumb for improvement that can reasonably be expected. For example, if a previous 
system for admitting patients to a hospital received a favourable or satisfactory response from 
75% of patients admitted, the sponsors of a new programme for admitting patients should be 
satisfied if they raise the percentage of satisfied patients to 80% or 85%. Anything beyond that is 
unrealistic (Posavac & Carey, [s.a.]:40-46).  
 
The breach that exists in impact evaluation follows. 
 
2.12 The Breach in Impact Evaluation  
 
According to Savedoff et al. (2006:2-3), the missing puzzle piece in learning about what kinds of 
social interventions can succeed is impact evaluations - studies that document whether particular 
programmes are actually responsible for improvements in social outcomes, relative to what 
would have happened without them. An “evaluation gap” has emerged, because governments, 
official donors and other funders do not demand or produce enough impact evaluations, and 
because those that are conducted are often methodologically flawed.  Correspondingly, Chen and 
Rossi (1980:106) were earlier of the opinion that a source of one of the more serious problems of 
evaluation research is the typical finding that evaluated programmes have little or no 
effectiveness. Recently, claims have been made that the problem of no effect may be attributed 
to the inadequacy of current evaluation methodology. Furthermore, in one field after another, 
evaluation researchers found that the programmes in place, or contemplated, have few or no 
effects of the sort intended by their designers. 
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In addition, Savedoff et al. (2006:2-3) believe that too few impact evaluations are being carried 
out. Documentation shows that United Nations (UN) agencies, multilateral development banks, 
and developing countries’ governments spend substantial sums on evaluations that are useful for 
monitoring and operational assessments, but do not put sufficient resources into the kinds of 
studies needed to judge which interventions work under given conditions, what difference they 
make, and at what cost. Even when impact evaluations are commissioned, they frequently fail to 
yield useful information because they do not use rigorous methods or data. For example, a 
systematic review of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimated that 15% of all its 
reports included impact assessments, but noted that “[m]any evaluations were unable to properly 
assess impact because of methodological shortcomings”. Similarly, a review of 127 studies of 
258 community health financing programmes found that only two studies were able to derive 
robust conclusions about the impact on access to health services. In support of Savedoff et al., 
donor countries committed US$34 billion to aid projects addressing health, education and 
poverty in the developing world. In addition, developing countries themselves spend hundreds of 
billions more on similar programmes. However, surprisingly few studies rigorously measure the 
impact of the spending (A major step forward …, 2006).  
 
Savedoff et al. (2006:2-3) are furthermore of the opinion that an impact evaluation gap exists, 
because there are too few incentives to conduct good impact evaluations – and too many 
obstacles. These obstacles include technical, bureaucratic, and political challenges. While impact 
evaluations generally have to be designed as an integral part of a new programme, politicians and 
programme managers are focused in the early programme phases, on design and implementation. 
However, the same people who would like to have good evidence today about the impact of 
earlier social programmes, are unlikely to make the efforts necessary to design and implement 
the kind of impact evaluation study that would benefit those who follow. In support of Savedoff 
et al., Chen and Rossi (1980:107) estimate that the problem of “no effects” of programmes rather 
lies in the extent to which programmes have been properly interpreted in the designing of 
evaluation researches.   
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According to Savedoff et al. (2006:29), concern about the evaluation gap is widespread, as 
demonstrated by the many ways that public agencies, intergovernmental commissions, NGO 
networks, research centres and foundations are addressing it. As a result, many initiatives are 
under way to: 
 
● increase access to existing information through reviews, searchable databases, and policy                                                       
pamphlets and newspapers 
● improve regular data collection by developing both country governments and aggregate                   
indicators 
● promote specific evaluations with grants and other kinds of funding 
● conduct research and demonstrate good evaluation practice                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
Tolerance for the evaluation gap is weakening, however. Developing countries’ governments are  
demanding better information about the efficacy of social spending. As an example, during 2001  
Mexico passed legislation requiring that impact evaluations be conducted on a variety of social  
programmes, explicitly recognising the value of learning what works and why, as a guide for 
future budget decisions.  In addition, NGOs have collaborated with leading academic institutions 
to evaluate the impact of their programmes, with the goal of identifying what does and does not 
work.  As a result, this is seen as vital for better programmes and more effective fundraising.  
Moreover, donor countries are increasingly concerned that international financial assistance  
should generate results (Savedoff et al., 2006:3).   
 
Additionally, a growing number of examples show that good impact evaluations can be feasible,  
ethical, timely and useful. The capacity to conduct impact evaluations at research institutions  
around the world is greater than ever before, using a range of proven methods to measure  
impacts that can be attributed by a particular programme or policy. The technology and networks  
for sharing information have increased dramatically. Impact evaluations have, for example, 
played critical roles in helping NGOs modify education programmes in India to improve student 
achievement, protected and expanded national conditional cash transfer programmes in several  
Latin American countries, and demonstrated the impact of inexpensive health interventions in 
improving school attendance in Africa.  
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Building this knowledge requires that governments and agencies take a strategic view and   
conduct impact evaluations in projects that can yield important information on what is effective 
and what is not. It also requires that evaluations use methods that measure the net impact of  
programme activities in a valid way. Better coordination of impact evaluations across countries 
and institutions would make it possible to cluster some studies around common thematic areas 
and improve the ability to generalise findings.  
 
2.13 Reasons why good impact evaluations are limited 
 
Amid growing demand for knowledge about what works, the resources and attention devoted to 
impact evaluation are still limited. When a new program is being designed is precisely when an 
impact evaluation can most easily be developed to provide useful answers about the program’s 
impact. That is the moment when program designers want the benefit of prior research, however 
have few incentives to invest in a new study (Savedoff et al., 2006:26-27). These authors 
furthermore present the following reasons why good impact evaluations are limited. 
 
2.13.1 Demand 
 
Amid the growing demand for knowledge about what works, the resources and attention devoted  
to impact evaluation are still limited. A central cause of the shortfall is the nature of the  
benefits of impact evaluations. The benefits of the knowledge generated by impact evaluations 
go well beyond the organisation or place in which they are generated. That means that the  
collective interest in seeing that a body of impact evaluation research gets built, reviewed,  
disseminated and improved, is greater than the individual interest of any particular group,  
agency or country. Because knowledge from impact evaluations is a public good, the incentives 
for any individual organisation to bear the costs are much lower than the full social benefits  
would justify. In support of Savedoff, Duflo ([s.a.]:35,37) is correspondingly of the opinion that 
 the benefits of credible impact evaluations extend far beyond the organisation conducting the  
evaluation. Rigorous and systematic evaluations have the potential to leverage the impact of  
international organisations well beyond simply their ability to finance programmes. Credible 
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impact evaluations are international public goods: the benefits of knowing that a programme 
does or does not work, extends well beyond the organisation or country implementing the 
programme. Savedoff et al. (2006:26) furthermore explains that because the knowledge from 
impact evaluations is not a “pure” public good – there are often substantial benefits to the 
country or agency that commissions the study for learning about its own programmes - such 
studies do get done, but not in the numbers or with the quality justified by the potential global 
benefits. 
 
The situation is complicated by the fact that impact evaluations are not regular, ongoing  
activities of most organisations, but are applied strategically to programmes from which 
important knowledge can be gained. Structures of decisionmaking generate diffuse demands for   
knowledge from impact evaluations, not synchronised with the time frame required by such  
studies, forcing them to compete for resources and attention with programme implementation, 
and even, at times, discouraging the gathering of information that could be potentially 
constraining or embarrassing. Thus, the general problem created by the public good nature of 
impact evaluations can be further elucidated by looking at some particular obstacles to 
conducting impact evaluations – those related the structure of demand, the absence of timely 
funding, and the patterns of incentives (Savedoff et al., 2006: 27). 
 
Demand for the knowledge produced by impact evaluations tends to be spread out across many 
actors and over time. Demand arises every time someone in government, an NGO, a multilateral  
development bank or a bilateral agency asks: “What programmes are effective at …?” This can  
occur when a new programme is being designed, when additional funding is being requested, or  
when internal reviews of institutional performance are being conducted. 
The time that a new programme is being designed is precisely when an impact evaluation can 
most easily be developed to provide useful answers about the programme’s impact. That is the 
moment when programme designers want to benefit from prior research, yet have few incentives 
to invest in a new study. If they do not invest in a new study, the same programme designers will  
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find themselves in the same position four or five years later, because they missed the opportunity 
to learn whether the intervention had an impact. Other institutions and governments that might 
have learnt from the experience also lose when these investments in learning about impact are 
neglected (Savedoff et al., 2006: 27). 
 
2.13.2 Funding and incentives 
 
Consequently, it is in such circumstances that timely availability of funding can make a huge  
difference. Despite a lack of incentives to conduct impact evaluations, many programme 
designers and managers still have an interest in measuring the impact of their programmes. 
When funding for impact evaluation studies is not readily available, it makes it more difficult to 
act on their interest. Other incentives exist at the institutional level to discourage impact 
evaluations. Government agencies involved in, for example, social development programmes or 
international assistance, need to generate support from taxpayers and donors. Since impact 
evaluations can go any way – demonstrating positive, zero or negative impact – a government or 
organisation that conducts such research runs the risk of findings that undercut its ability to raise 
funds. Policymakers and managers also have more discretion to pick and choose strategic 
directions when less is known about what does or does not work. This can even lead 
organisations to pressure researchers to soften or modify unfavorable studies or simply to 
suppress the results – despite the fact that knowledge of what does not work is as useful as 
knowledge of what does work.  
When such pressure holds sway, a noticeable bias appears in the body of published findings.  
Studies which demonstrate that programmes are successful are more likely to be publicised by 
the participating institutions and also are more likely to be published in academic journals. A 
publication bias emerges that provides an unfairly positive assessment of programmes. One way 
to counter this publication bias is to establish a prospective registry of impact evaluations - that 
is, to record impact evaluations when they start. It follows that future literature reviews can 
better assess whether published findings are representative or not (Savedoff et al., 2006: 27). 
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In line with the abovementioned authors, Dubois (2002) is of the opinion that despite positive  
developments in the evaluation of government departments, the measuring of impact in these  
institutions are no easy task to achieve. Thus, various obstacles are identified that may impede 
the development of impact evaluation in our government institutions. Firstly, there has been a 
lack of debate, even within the evaluation discipline, as to what impact evaluations should entail. 
In anticipation of the evaluation discipline establishing clear theoretical foundations, we will not 
be able to take full ownership of our professional tasks, such as designing research questions, 
variables, indicators, etc., which currently are often performed by programme managers. 
The second obstacle is the way the term “results” has been used in official government 
documents, without any indication as to whether it refers to outcomes (services) or impacts 
(effects). Consequently, as a corrective measure, the evaluation discipline should design accurate 
definitions of “impact” and “results”, in order to establish clear guideposts. 
The third obstacle relates to the new forms of production of public services. More specifically,  
the question arises as to how effectively one can evaluate impacts, when a growing number of 
programmes come under the responsibility of various kinds of partners. These actions should be 
controlled more closely, through rules requiring tighter accountability and through performance 
and evaluation measures that would be legally binding on these various partners. 
The last obstacle concerning the obstruction of the effective evaluation of impacts in government  
organisations, is their failure to allocate sufficient financial, human and physical resources to the  
evaluation function. This implies that governments need to make a sincere investment in the  
development of this function. As a result, such an investment could be earmarked in partner  
programmes that have small budgets and thus do not have enough resources to conduct impact  
evaluation exercises individually.  
 
2.14 Closing the Evaluation Gap  
 
Savedoff et al. (2006:28) are furthermore of the opinion that the time is right for a major push 
 to close the evaluation gap. Why? Firstly, there is a clear personal commitment from a growing  
community of professionals who recognise the value of impact evaluations, many of them  
employed by governments and international agencies. Secondly, the capacity around the world to 
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collect data and conduct research, is growing. Many more people than ever before are trained in 
impact evaluation methods and in fields that allow them to interpret the findings of such studies,  
and technological advances have reduced the costs and time of collecting and processing data. 
Thirdly, there appears to be a growing recognition in many agencies of the need to measure  
results. This cannot be done well without complementary studies that address the issue of  
attribution. In addition, as befits a profession that keeps up with the times, evaluation has moved  
from merely generating findings about specific programmes, to generating knowledge (Patton,  
2001:332).  
  
Finally, skepticism about the use of funds for development assistance puts pressure on agencies 
to measure impact. When the overriding risk is closure of a programme or severe reduction in 
funding, then the downside risk of negative findings is less problematic. Both managers and  
project designers see greater benefit in measuring the impact of their programmes in the hope 
that they can demonstrate that the programmes should continue. Beyond these initiatives, 
policymakers in developing countries have expressed interest in gaining access to better 
information, building knowledge and incorporating evidence in policy decisions. During 
interviews, surveys and meetings, officials in developing countries have requested more support 
for systematic production and the use of impact studies. For the international community, too, 
demand for knowledge about impact is growing, as a consequence of commitments to 
substantially increase aid flows in novel ways, efforts to hold agencies accountable for the use of 
public funds, and emphasis on results and performance. International commitments, such as the 
Millennium Development Goals, create both a challenge for impact evaluation and an 
opportunity to learn (Savedoff et al., 2006:29). 
 
2.15 Guiding Principles for Impact Evaluation  
 
How can we expand the knowledge base of “what works” in social development programmes? 
Since 2004, the Center for Global Development (CGD) has been asking this question of leaders, 
officials and researchers from developing countries, bilateral agencies, development banks, 
NGOs and private foundations, and has found strong demand for increasing the evidence base 
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with rigorous studies in health, poverty reduction, education and other social sectors, as a way to 
guide and improve social policy decisions. In an attempt to overcome the breach in impact 
evaluation, the CGD formulated guiding principles as a guide to action, as presented in 
Communique: Improving social development through impact evaluation …, 2006. As a result, 
this paper philosophises that impact studies are beneficial, and therefore argues that impact 
studies should be an integral component of the programme from the design stage. Impact studies 
are therefore essential complements to programme monitoring and process evaluation, to know if 
public resources are being used effectively to promote social development. However, reviews 
have demonstrated that too few impact studies are being conducted with the requisite reliability 
and validity to provide the evidence base needed by public and private decisionmakers and 
programme designers in developing countries. Such impact evaluations are also essential to 
efforts to improve accountability of government social spending.  
 
Moreover, another principle this paper advocates is that knowledge is a public good. This implies 
that though countries may recognise the value of impact studies, these countries - and 
organisations generally - do not have incentives to invest sufficiently in the implementation of 
such studies relative to the global value of the information that would be generated. It follows 
that once impact studies are completed and disseminated, many countries can benefit by using 
their findings with adaptations to local contexts. Hence, there is a larger collective demand for 
impact studies than from any single organisation or country. Therefore, collective action by 
multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies, developing countries’ governments, private foundations, 
NGOs and research centres, is necessary to assure that sufficient investment in impact studies 
occurs, that findings are widely disseminated and data is made public, and that studies address 
questions of enduring importance and relevance to policymaking.  
 
As an additional guiding principle, this paper proposes that a collective initiative is required to 
promote impact studies. This entails that the abovementioned stakeholders should work together 
to implement an initiative, with the appropriate institutional structure, to promote, finance and 
stimulate the use of reliable and valid impact studies that address questions of enduring  
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importance, provide models of good practice for emulation and for going to scale, provide 
opportunities for capacity building through collaboration, and promote methodological 
innovation and high evaluation standards. 
 
Additionally, supplementary guiding principles are recommended to accomplish the breach that 
exists in impact evaluation. It follows that the quality of impact evaluations is essential. As a 
result, it is suggested that any collective action to promote and finance impact studies should 
make the quality of those studies its top priority. This means endorsing and promoting studies 
that reliably measure the impact that can be attributed to a specific programme or policy, 
draw valid inferences from the evidence, are appropriate to the particular policy questions that 
are being asked, correspond to operational realities and are appropriate to the social, cultural, 
economic and political context. 
 
These guiding principles furthermore propose that impact evaluations should be promoted if and 
when they address relevant questions. This means that increasing the number of impact 
evaluations that use high quality methods should not be the aim of a collective enterprise. The 
aim should be to promote good impact evaluations that address questions of major significance, 
either because of the scale and quality of the programme, the opportunity for influencing a public 
policy decision, or the potential contribution to answer a question of enduring importance. What 
is more, any effort to increase the quality and quantity of impact evaluations should provide 
opportunities for building capacity at local level, through collaboration and the creation or 
strengthening of professional networks at both national and international levels. Besides the 
abovementioned recommended principles, it is further proposed that any initiative should be 
designed with the recognition that monitoring and forms of evaluation other than impact 
evaluation, are integral to sound implementation and generation of knowledge about key 
processes. This implies that although functions such as developing the capacity for good 
programme monitoring may be outside the scope of an international initiative on impact 
evaluation, the same parties should attend separately to this important concern. Lastly, it is 
advised that the initiative should be complementary, strategic, transparent, inclusive and 
independent.  
 
 78 
 
In other words, organisations and governments are pursuing a wide range of activities to improve 
the evidence base, including conducting process and institutional evaluations, establishing 
evaluation standards, and, inter alia, introducing or improving impact evaluation work within 
specific institutions.  
 
The programmes and studies promoted by this new initiative should complement and bring 
added value to existing activities. The initiative should promote the relevant use of impact 
evaluations for select programmes that are, inter alia, strategically important because of their 
potential scale and impact on important social problems. Furthermore, the initiative should be 
transparent in all its activities, as well as inclusive, recognising developing country partners, both 
in governments and NGOs, as full partners. Finally, the initiative has to have substantial 
independence from the agencies and organisations that it is involved in evaluating, and all 
information gathered through this process should be available in the public domain, with free 
access to all. Communique: Improving social development …, 2006). 
 
2.16 Ethical and Political Considerations of Evaluation 
 
Robson (2000:28-29) is of the view that evaluation is inextricably linked to ethical and political 
issues. Evaluations in public services are linked to social policies and priorities, at root deriving 
from party political (Politics with a large P) initiatives, as well as within-service uses of power. 
James (as quoted by Robson, 2000:42) is of the opinion that policymakers will always find 
reasons to ignore, or be highly selective of, evaluation findings, if the information does not 
support the particular political agenda operating at the time when decisions have to be made. An 
important consideration when agreeing to carry out an evaluation, is the existence of an intention 
to use the findings in some way. Typically, the intended use is for policymakers when making 
decisions about the programme being evaluated. The author furthermore argues that policy-
making is by definition political. Evaluations in public services are linked to social policies and 
priorities. An evaluation of these services is obviously inherently tangling with extremely 
sensitive ethical and political issues. The ethical issues of impact evaluation follow.     
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2.16.1 The ethics of evaluation 
 
Evaluation deals with issues which affects people’s lives. It is therefore a minimum requirement 
that it should be carried out to a high standard. It follows that there are different stakeholders 
each with an interest in evaluation. As a result, these interests must be recognised and respected 
if the evaluation is to be carried out in an ethically responsible manner. Consequently, there are 
more specific safeguards to be addressed for the clients or the users of the programme or service, 
as well as for staff and other participants directly involved with its running. Three main aspects 
therefore need to be considered – namely, consent, privacy and confidentiality. It is a general 
ethical principle not to seek to evaluate, or have take part in an evaluation, anyone who either 
does not know they are involved or does not wish to take part. This is usually referred to as 
voluntary informed consent. Additionally, privacy is concerned with respect for an individual’s 
wish to have control over access to themselves and information about themselves.  
 
While people are likely to have a clear idea about what they wish to keep private, and what 
would be a violation of that privacy, it is more difficult to judge this in relation to others. This is 
particularly so when participants differ from the interviewer in gender, sexual orientation or 
ethnic background. The voluntary nature of participants’ involvement acknowledges a right to 
privacy which can be exercised by refusing to take part in the study. It follows that if the 
principle of voluntary informed consent is honoured, the related issues of confidentiality and 
anonymity can and should be covered.  Moreover, confidentiality concerns information about a 
person (such as interview transcripts, notes, or video or audio cassettes) and an agreement about 
how this information will be treated so as to respect participants’ privacy. On the other hand, 
anonymity refers to ensuring that a person’s name, or other unique identifier, is not attached to 
information about that person (Robson, 2000:29-32).       
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2.16.2 The politics of evaluation 
 
According to Robson (2000:41), an evaluation is inevitably linked to policy and to political  
decisions. Should a programme or service be stopped or continued? Should its budget and 
personnel be increased or cut back? There is a fundamental difference between the concerns of 
evaluators who evaluate other people’s programmes, and administrators and other personnel 
whose careers depend on their implementing and running successful programmes. 
Administrators and politicians are not noted for taking an objective, scientific view, even though 
researchers have long urged them to do so. James (as quoted by Robson, 2000:42) is of the 
opinion that policymakers will always find  reasons to ignore, or be highly selective of, 
evaluation findings, if the information does not support the particular political agenda operating 
at the time when decisions have to be made.  
 
In support of Robson, Rossi et al. (2004:19) agree that evaluation is a rational enterprise that 
takes place in a political context. The authors are furthermore of the opinion that political  
considerations intrude in three major ways, and the evaluator who fails to recognise their 
presence is due for a series of shocks and frustrations. Firstly, the policies and programmes with 
which evaluation deals, are the “creatures” of political decisions. They were proposed, defined, 
debated, enacted and funded through political processes, and in implementation they remain 
subject to pressures - both supportive and hostile - that arise out of the play of politics. Secondly, 
because evaluation is undertaken in order to feed into decisionmaking, its reports enter the 
political arena. As a result, the evaluative evidence of programme outcomes has to compete for 
attention with other factors that carry weight in the political process. Thirdly, and perhaps least 
recognised, evaluation itself has a political stance. By its very nature, it makes implicit political 
statements about such issues as the problematic nature of some programmes and the 
unchallengeability of others, the legitimacy of programme goals and programme strategies, the 
utility of strategies of incremental reform, and even the appropriate role of the social scientist in 
policy and programme formation.  
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In correspondence with Robson and Rossi et al., Taylor (2005:601-602) is of the opinion that  
recent years have seen an “evidential turn” in the political language of public policy that, as a  
result, has generated increased attention to policy and programme evaluation. From being a  
contingent instrument of administration, evaluation has become a central legitimating device for  
a new form  of politics. As a result, a political critique emerged from within governments in the  
1990s, which saw much academic research as driven by dogma. Taylor is furthermore of the 
opinion that political values should be stripped out in favour of “objective scientific” evidence of  
“what really works”. In addition, along with audit and performance management, evaluation has 
become a key entry in the lexicon of new public management and the quest of what politicians  
increasingly frame as “value-free policy”.  This increasing role of evaluation as a political  
phenomenon can be traced in Britain to the rise of neo-liberalism, public choice theory and new  
managerialism over the last two decades of the 20th century. These movements created a  
drive towards “evidence” as a basis for consumer choice.  
 
Stated differently, Bovens, ‘t Hart and Kuipers (2005:319) are of the opinion that policy 
evaluation is nothing but the continuation of politics by other means. This is most conspicuous in  
the assessment of policies and programmes that have become highly controversial, (a) because 
they do not produce the expected results, (b) because they were highly contested to begin with, 
(c) they are very costly and/or inefficient, or (d) because of alleged wrongdoings in their 
implementation. Consequently, the relation between governments and evaluation is not without 
complications. In a democratic society, evaluation results are open to the public, the political 
party in office, and politicians in opposition. It follows that if a programme is not doing well, a 
chance arises for criticising the government. Politicians who stipulate both the scope and the 
types of information they need, are probably the most decisive parties for evaluation success 
(Sandahl, as quoted by Mathison, 2005:73).   
 
As a result, when public policies are adopted and programmes implemented, the politics of 
policymaking do not come to an end. The political and bureaucratic controversies over the nature 
of the problems to be addressed and the best means by which to do so that characterise the policy 
formulation and policy selection stages of the policy cycle, do not suddenly subside when 
“binding” political decisions are made in favour of option X or Y. Nor do the ambiguities, 
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uncertainties and risks surrounding the policy issue at stake, disappear. They merely move from 
the main stage, where political choices about policies are made, to the less visible arenas of 
policy implementation, populated by (networks of) bureaucratic and non-governmental actors 
who are involved in transforming the words of policy documents into purposeful actions. 
Subsequently, at one time or another, the moment arrives to evaluate what has been achieved 
(Bovens et al., 2005:318).   
 
2.17 Summary 
 
This chapter provided an overview of impact evaluations in organisations. A comprehensive 
body of literature on impact evaluation in organisations, as well as international illustrations of 
public sector and policing organisations’ impact evaluation processes, indicated the movement 
and direction of evaluating the impact of programmes.  
 
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the literature on restructuring processes in business and 
policing organisations.  
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CHAPTER 3   LITERATURE REVIEW ON RESTRUCTURING PROCESSES IN 
BUSINESS AND POLICING ORGANISATIONS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the literature on restructuring processes in business and 
policing organisations. The literature review presents the reader with a synopsis of the 
knowledge base upon which the present study is built. As a result, this study acknowledges 
findings previously published about the topic and what has been discovered in the present 
research. As a result, such a literature review enables the researcher to accurately illustrate where 
the current research fits in. The literature review can therefore be clarified as a journey to 
discover what other researchers have accomplished on the topic, how it has been researched, and 
also what the primary results have been, in order to obtain a detailed perceptive of the topic and, 
additionally, to evaluate it with the present study. The literature review in this study is, in fact, a 
comprehensive study of the literature published on restructuring processes in organisations. 
An extensive body of literature on restructuring processes in organisations nationally and 
internationally, in addition to the literature within the SAPS, provides the foundation for the 
current study. Literature such as official SAPS documents, journal articles, library sources and 
media and newspaper reports were consulted. This chapter thus elucidates the search process 
through examining the literature. Subsequently, a presentation and discussion of the literature 
review follows. 
 
3.2 Historic and Present Overview of Restructuring Processes in Organisations  
 
“If you or some part of your organisation is involved in restructuring, you are not alone. Changes 
in the marketplace and drives toward efficiency demand organisational flexibility, and 
restructuring is one of the most common strategies. There are many reasons that businesses 
change their structure – some reasons better than others” (Cooper, [s.a.]:1). Stated differently, 
Douglas Engelbart, the American inventor, already experienced restructuring in 1970 as follows: 
“Today’s environment is beginning to threaten today’s organisations, finding them seriously 
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deficient in their nervous system design… The degree of coordination, perception, rational 
adaption, etcetera, which will appear in the next generation of human organisations will drive our 
present organisational forms, with their clumsy nervous system, into extinction”. This 
observation may shed some light on the cycle of restructuring that most companies find 
themselves in. Consequently, change has meant one thing for most of the time – organisational 
restructuring (Organisational Restructuring, 2006).  
 
3.2.1 Motivational aspects for organisational restructuring 
 
Lee and Teo (2005:25) emphasise that companies are faced with more competitive markets and 
greater demands on cost controls, and thus are taking the fast track cost-cutting by, among 
others, reorganising their divisions and streamlining their operations. Hence, organisational 
restructuring has been and will continue to be used as a turnaround strategy to control costs and 
to realign internal structure to meet changing environmental conditions. Correspondingly, 
structural change is stimulated by rapid environmental change, increasing complexity and 
uncertainty, and the predominance of loosely coupled organisational components (Schwarz & 
Shulman, 2007:831).  In support of the abovementioned authors, Palmer et al. (as quoted by 
Schwarz & Shulman, 2007:830-831) also emphasise that organisations of all kinds have to deal 
with regulatory, cultural, economic, technological and physical environments that are potentially 
changing more rapidly than the organisations themselves. Consequently, the pressure on 
organisations to adapt and change their structures is immense.  
 
Savery and Luks (2000:309) furthermore also believe that if it were not for change, a manager’s 
lot would be an easy one, planning could be accurately based on historical events and the issue of 
organisational design would be resolved. However, today’s environment is full of uncertainty, 
market changes, changing workforce demographics, social and political pressures and, not least 
of all, technological advances, making today’s organisation one of constant changes. One change 
which has occurred regularly in many companies is known as downsizing, rightsizing or re-
engineering. This has occurred alongside the removal of managerial levels - known as delayering 
(Savery & Luks, 2000:309). The critical nature and reasons for change must, however, be 
 85 
 
clearly, consistently and regularly communicated to employees – this being an area in which 
many organisations face tremendous challenges (Savery & Luks, 2000:309).  
In line with the abovementioned authors, McKinley and Scherer (2000:740) believe restructuring 
implies that the environment is changing and thus denies that the environment is stable or that 
the environment is similar to past environmental states. In fact, the interpretation that 
environments are rapidly changing and the restructuring that underpins that interpretation, 
appears to have acquired the status of an order-creating ideology among some top executives in 
recent decades.  
Ogbonna and Harris (2003:512) correspondingly believe that the generation of an organisational 
structure capable of coping with the needs of modern businesses, has been one of the most 
problematic issues facing organisations and their managers, and therefore argue that 
organisational structural change has been one of the most topical issues in management and 
organisational studies over the past two decades. As a result, recent research interest has moved 
away from the evaluation of merits and problems of traditional forms of organising to the 
investigation of new ways of structuring organisations. Consequently, both European and 
Japanese organisations are increasingly adopting innovative structural practices, although there 
were significant differences in the rate of change in the two regions. In short, the review of the 
literature on innovative organisational forms shows that this topic has attracted widespread 
interest over the past few years. Academics and practitioners appear to agree that the 
increasingly turbulent business environment requires organisations to adopt innovative ways of 
organising their activities in order to maintain an advantage in the market place. 
 
Various symptoms indicate the need for organisational restructuring. It follows that 
organisational restructuring occurs when new skills and capabilities are needed to meet current 
or expected operational requirements. In addition, another symptom of the need for 
organisational restructuring is when the accountability for results is not clearly communicated 
and measurable, resulting in subjective and biased performance appraisals. Moreover, parts of 
the organisation could be significantly over- or understaffed, which in turn necessitates 
organisational restructuring. Another reason for organisational restructuring is that organisational 
communications are inconsistent, fragmented and inefficient. Furthermore, technology and/or 
innovation are creating changes in workflow and production processes that prompt restructuring. 
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Organisational restructuring could, in addition, take place when significant staffing increases or 
decreases are contemplated, when personnel retention and staff turnover is a significant problem, 
workforce productivity is stagnant or deteriorating, or when personnel morale is deteriorating 
(Organisational Restructuring, [s.a.]:1). 
 
According to Bergh and Ngah-Kiing Lim (2008:594,600), most research to date has portrayed 
restructuring as a purposeful response to governance, strategy, and industry pressure. Some 
authors have argued that firms use restructuring to improve internal efficiency, in response to 
active takeover markets (Jensen, 1993:831). In support of Jensen, Kaplan and Weisbach 
(1992:107) also argue that organisations implement restructuring to improve efficiency.  On the 
other hand, others have posited that shifts from weak to strong internal governance have led to 
the use of restructuring to refocus corporate strategies (Chatterjee, Harrison & Bergh, 2003:87-
96). Another explanation proposes that restructuring reverses excessively diversified strategies to 
more optimal levels (Bergh & Lawless, 1998:87-102). As a result, information asymmetries 
between managers and owners will be reduced (Bergh, Johnson & DeWitt, 2008:133-148).  
 
Additionally, most theoretical perspectives depict restructuring as a response behaviur, used for 
quickly improving the firm’s economic and strategic conditions. Moreover, restructuring is often 
driven by uncertainty and can be a punctuated and fast action rather than a continuous and 
evolving process. As a result, restructurings that occurred in recent years are frequently 
integrated with ensuing actions which collectively represent a strategic reaction to resolving the 
matter that drove the restructuring. It follows that restructuring in more distant years may not be 
as pertinent or applicable. Therefore, even numerous restructurings spread over several previous 
years could play a weaker role, since they may not be part of the response that was created for 
resolving the motivating factor.  Schwarz and Shulman (2007:831) similarly agree that structural 
change is offered as a means to help the organisation evolve. However, limited structural change 
occurs in organisations. As a result, several possible reasons why specific limited structure 
patterns occur follow.  
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3.2.2 Reasons for limited structural change in organisations  
 
Schwarz (as quoted by Schwarz & Shulman, 2007:832) argues that during times of high 
uncertainty, limited structural change can occur, because of a default homeostasis position 
skewing the organisation towards maintaining existing structures and networks. Similarly, much 
like change theory’s presumption of equilibrium states, the organisation strives for linearity 
(Meyer, Gaba & Colwell, 2005:456-473). This reasoning draws on the strength of the 
standardisation and the formalisation dimensions of an organisation’s existing structure. It thus 
emphasises that the impact of change on organisations is characterised by limited, subtle or 
gradual alterations to existing structures. 
 
Additionally, Schwarz and Shulman (2007:832) believe that limited structural organisational 
change occurs, since organisations engage in a process of introspective self-renewal. It follows 
that organisations reinforce or recreate established structures, since organisational members lack 
critical reflexiveness. More specifically, Nelson and Winter (1982) explain that members do not 
create new structural representations, instead selecting among those that they either already 
identify with or store in their memory. As per illustration, Gavetti (2005:599-617) uses 
Polaroid’s transition to digital imaging. Once a strategy and structure have been decided, the 
organisation fleshes out this template by modifying its current practices to make them consistent 
with this choice, thereby embedding a structural routine. 
 
Moreover, Schwarz and Shulman (2007:832) trust that another possible reason for limited 
structural change could be due to the way organisational members anchor their judgments on 
prior experience, to reflect on change. The authors argue that limited change becomes a 
personalised experience as organisational members selectively draw on and reinforce perceived 
safe social order. As a result, they enact change around their lives, habits and perceptions, based 
on social reminders derived from their experience (Ocasio, 1997:187). In this manner, 
individuals and groups can choose to resist, manipulate, or possibly even ignore change 
(Schwarz & Shulman, 2007:832). 
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What is more, Carlopio (2003) is of the opinion that limited structural change occurs, due to the 
location and pattern of the initial dispersion of change within an organisation. Changes are 
usually introduced into a limited area, rather than across the entire organisation. As a 
consequence, change is bound to specific self-contained spheres of the organisation, creating an 
artificial internal barrier to change (Schwarz & Shulman, 2007:832). 
 
In addition, Scott (2001) notes that limited structural change is a reflection of well known 
regulative, normative and cultural institutional pillars. It follows that these powerful internal 
constraints and external pressures restrict change, in order to help the firm gain legitimacy, 
leading to structural similarity (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999:653-683). Schwarz and Shulman 
(2007:832) are therefore of the sentiment that organisations are compelled to manage such 
dependencies in order to survive or preserve any market advantage; since the organisational 
environment is not dependable, they face the prospect of attempting to control structural 
conditions instead.  
 
3.2.3 Phases of organisational restructuring 
 
Cooper ([s.a.]:4) suggests a number of key elements that should be followed and addressed 
during the implementation of a restructuring process: 
 
3.2.3.1 Phase I: Planning and design 
 
A significant factor during the planning and design of organisational restructuring is to remain 
focused on the reason for the new design. Additionally, efforts to make the restructuring process 
work should be intensified, and consciousness that support process changes take time and 
sustained energy, should also be created. It follows that communication should be sustained as 
people adjust to the new organisation. Another important factor during organisational 
restructuring is to have a clear and compelling business case that is tied to stakeholder needs. 
Agreement on key criteria for the new design that addresses the business case, is imperative. On 
the other hand, the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed structure, as well as the resultant 
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changes through the organisation, must be understood. It is thus recommended to involve key 
stakeholders to design the best structure. Consequently, appropriate information should be 
communicated as soon as possible to prepare people for change (Cooper, [s.a.]:4). 
 
In the light of the gap that exists between the cognitive order experienced by top managers and 
the cognitive disorder experienced by their subordinates, as explained by McKinley and Scherer 
(2000:736), Furnari ([s.a.]:1) suggests that when restructuring a company, it is critical that key 
people are involved with all aspects of the planning, developing and execution stages of “the 
plan”. By seeking input from employees, greater acceptance and buy-in will emerge, and support 
for change will materialise. Revitalising a company becomes a major strain on its people and the 
organisation. Discontent can be a common factor within the management team, and will often 
permeate throughout the company.  
 
Since there is a natural resistance to change, it is crucial to approach the effort in the appropriate 
manner. Thus, when recommending changes it is important that the benefits of the change are 
clearly communicated. Furnari ([s.a.]:1) identifies the following as common mistakes that can 
jeopardise a successful restructuring: 
 
• lack of a detailed strategic business plan that establishes the framework for the 
company’s objectives and time lines 
• collapse of constructive communication throughout the organisation 
• lack of accountability and effective incentive programmes 
• lack of analytical tools and timely information to track and monitor the company’s 
progress to effectively adjust strategies when required 
• cost reductions that are too severe and do not provide the necessary resources to support 
the core needs of the operations 
• implementation of short-term solutions that do not address the long-term needs of the 
company 
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In support of Cooper’s phases of organisational restructuring, Furnari ([s.a.]:1) correspondingly 
notes suggestions to improve communication at all levels when instituting a major restructuring 
aimed at revitalising an organisation. The author suggests that the general objectives and 
expectations of the restructuring should be clearly communicated to all employees of the 
company. In addition, a schedule for regular employee meetings to facilitate continuous dialogue 
at all levels of the organisation, should be established. Procedures to ensure that key information 
and operational metrics are reported on in a timely fashion, and applicable steering committees 
to include various levels of management, should also be developed. Another suggestion to 
improve communication at all levels when instituting major restructuring, is to survey various 
levels of employees, to obtain feedback and provide a channel for communication. 
 
3.2.3.2 Phase II: Implementation 
 
Cooper ([s.a.]:4) advocates continuous discussion of the reasons and business case during the 
implementation of restructuring. This implies that an organisation’s capacity for change should 
be kept in mind, and feedback to adjust as the process progresses should also be invited. 
Moreover, the rationale and business case of the restructuring must be communicated 
continuously and transparently to employees. The implementation of such a process must be 
planned thoroughly, taking into account the many process changes required to support the new 
structure. Furthermore, people should be involved in open dialogue during implementation, to 
invite suggestions and feedback to determine needed modifications as the restructuring process 
progresses. 
 
McKinley and Scherer (2000:741-743) pose this question: Do middle managers and employees 
at the technical core of the organisation make sense of organisational restructuring in the same 
way that the organisation’s leadership does? The authors believe that the answer to this question 
is likely to be “no”. It follows that since top executives are charged with managing the 
relationship between the organisation and its environment, organisational restructuring in a 
turbulent environment will appear to resolve problems and create order. Nevertheless, in 
contrast, employees below the top executive levels are more remote from the rhetoric and the 
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reality of fundamental environmental transformation than are executives at the apex of the 
organisation. Consequently, those subordinates will not place as high a value as their superiors 
do on the alignment of internal structure with the changing condition of the environment because 
it disrupts established business processes and opens up alternatives to established ways of getting 
the work done. In other words, a gap exists between the cognitive order experienced by top 
managers and the cognitive disorder experienced by their subordinates during organisational 
restructuring.  
 
Moreover, Lee and Teo (2005:26-37) caution that many top managers do not realise that massive 
changes in organisational relationships could result from reorganisation. Subsequently, 
restructuring inadvertently cause dramatic changes in the deep-seated, informal organisation that 
can easily block communication and create opposition to change. Additionally, there are 
potentially negative consequences to the work environment in the immediate term, after 
organisational restructuring. If work satisfaction and trust in the organisation continue to be 
depressed well beyond the end of the restructuring, and well beyond an apparent improvement in 
some aspects of the work environment, the productivity of the organisation could be in serious 
danger. Therefore, a key ingredient necessary to sustain effective change is high morale. It 
follows that employees must “buy in” to the management strategy of change. In other words, 
employees must align their interests with those of management, and they must become involved 
and committed to bring about genuine, lasting improvements in the organisation, otherwise this 
may set back the organisation’s efforts to achieve the anticipated goals of restructuring.  
 
Stevenson, Bartunek & Borgatti (2003:244) are of the opinion that sometimes planned 
restructuring efforts involve attempts to get people and groups within organisations to work 
together more effectively. When this is the aim, the change agent often attempts to increase 
formal structural connections between people and groups under the assumption that information 
will flow more freely, barriers and conflict between work functions will break down, and 
innovative activities will diffuse more effectively in a dense network. At the same time, 
however, organisation members who stand to lose influence and/or structural autonomy if 
barriers are broken down, may work against efforts to increase formal connections in ways that 
weaken their influence. Stated differently, Skogan (2008:27) is of the opinion that specialised 
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units such as detectives are often threatened by department-wide programmes that require them 
to change their ways. For example, detectives may be required to actually exchange information 
with uniformed officers, and not just to “suck it into their black hole”, and they might find debate 
opening about their effectiveness.  
In addition, Baruch and Hind (2000:29) describe the management of organisations today as 
dominated by the experience and consequences of change. Changes, be they business re-
engineering processes, restructuring, flattening, etc., bring innovation - but also chaos and 
uncertainty - to the management of people in the workplace. It follows that many such changes 
have involved the reduction of employee numbers and a limitation in career opportunities. Not 
long ago a desired image, for many firms, was to be seen to offer a secure place to work. Now, 
the whole concept of a lifelong career in a company, or even an industry, has become exceptional 
rather than expected. Beyond merely downsizing, it is entirely plausible that over the course of 
an individual’s working life a given firm may cease to exist (at least independently), and any 
given industry may shrink through a process of cutbacks and mergers. Furthermore, it is 
becoming increasingly well documented that employees who remain in an organisation after 
significant downsizing or delayering often experience the adverse effects of change as 
profoundly as those who have left. In addition, it is acknowledged that “survivors” of 
restructuring may become demotivated, cynical, insecure and demoralised. This might be as a 
result of stress and anxiety, based on fear of further downsizing or restructuring, or due to 
diminishing trust between employees and management – or, indeed, a combination of these 
factors.  
 
Johnson (1994) is furthermore of the view that any plan for change should allow for incremental 
implementation, encourage employee participation, and provide continual communication and 
education on the project. Organisational change puts strain not only on the organisation as a 
whole, but also on individual employees within the organisation. In fact, if an organisation is to 
successfully implement change, a change strategy must be developed that takes the employee’s 
psychological processes into account. Implementing a change initiative without attending to such 
processes can result in employees experiencing stress and cynicism, each of which has the 
potential to reduce organisational commitment, job satisfaction, trust in the organisation and 
motivation (Elias, 2007:2).  
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Kouzes and Posner (as quoted by Elias, 2007:2) furthermore indicate that successful change 
requires employees to be intrinsically motivated, able to see change as a learning opportunity, 
and feel as though they have control over the change process.  
 
3.2.3.3 Phase III: Follow through 
 
Attentiveness to the reason for the new design should also be created. As a result, efforts to make 
it work should be invigorated and organisational members should realise that support processes’ 
changes take time and sustained energy. Dialogue should furthermore be kept open as people 
adjust to the new organisation. Furthermore, the reason for the new structure, as much as making 
it work, should be the focus of the process. As a result, this will energize people to focus on 
customer needs. Consequently, the process changes that must take place should be followed 
through. However, enthusiasm and employee involvement should be sustained until the support 
processes are fully in place. Sufficient time should then be allowed for employees to function 
and experiment within the new structure, whereafter communication with stakeholders should be 
maintained to plan important adjustments (Cooper, [s.a.]:4). 
 
On the other hand, Hannan and Freeman (as quoted by Bowman & Singh, 1993:11) propose that 
restructuring in general is disruptive, and thus, that it thus increases the rate of corporate failure. 
Hannan and Freeman argue that the selection pressures of population ecology reward 
organisations for being reliable and accountable. As a result, the attempt to adapt to 
environmental changes, particularly through corporate overhaul, increases the firm’s probability 
of failure ceteris paribus [Other things being equal: used to indicate that something would be the 
case if everything else under consideration remains the same]. In support of Hannan and 
Freeman, Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett (as quoted by Bowman & Singh, 1993:11) argue that 
change is hazardous because it destroys, by definition, some of the firm’s existing practices. This 
destruction, Amburgey et al. (1990:160-164) argue, must therefore be accompanied by a loss of 
corporate competence, due to the abandonment of familiar routines. Another proposition in this 
regard is that reorganisation may disrupt relationships with external actors that organisations 
need to survive (Anderson, as quoted by Bowman & Singh, 1993:11). 
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On the other hand, Swanson and Power (2001:161-162) are of the view that organisational 
change, frequent restructuring and downsizing have become accepted features of work in modern 
occupational environments. Although many changes may have positive long-term outcomes, the 
prevailing view in the literature suggests that the change process itself engenders tensions and 
insecurities, which lead to distress in both “victims” and “survivors” of the process. For the 
“victims” of restructuring, the fact of losing one’s job may rate as a major life event or stressor, 
which may or may not be cushioned by short-term financial gains in the case of redundancy. 
However, the “survivors” of organisational restructuring also experience job insecurity in the 
lead up to the changes, and increased job demands after reorganisation, which have been shown 
to have a negative impact on physical and mental health. Role stressors, including ambiguities, 
conflicts of interest and increased workloads may all contribute towards lowered morale for 
surviving workers post-restructuring. Such increases in workload may occur as a result of 
coming to grips with new or unfamiliar structures, new responsibilities or technologies, or may 
be due to reduced manpower resources and support from managers or colleagues. However, 
Bergh and Ngah-Kiing (2008:598) are of the opinion that firms having more experience with 
restructuring are likely to have higher post-restructuring performance than those having less. 
 
There is variation in the way authors view the negative effects of restructuring on performance. 
Amburgey et al. (as quoted by Bowman & Singh, 1993:11), for example, claim that “like a 
powerful elixir, organisational change may be deadly – but if survived may promise good 
health”. In other words, they suggest a greater hazard of failure in the near term following 
organisational restructuring, but good performance if the hazardous period is successfully 
weathered by the organisation. Conversely, Zajac and Kraatz (as quoted by Bowman & Singh, 
1993:11), in their study of the restructuring of colleges in response to environmental changes 
show that restructuring is, in fact, beneficial to organisations. As a result, Zajac and Kraatz 
conclude that restructuring is a common and predictable response to radical changes in the 
environment. Moreover, examples of companies involved in restructuring programmes are 
evident throughout all markets and industries.  
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Organisations are redefining their strategy by focusing their attention on their customer base and 
re-engineering their business processes accordingly. It follows that restructuring often leads to 
the breakup of an organisation into focused businesses, which is seen as the only mechanism to 
ensure competitiveness within the organisation (Chaharbaghi & Nugent, 1994:47). 
 
In agreement with Zajac and Kraatz, Fay and Luhrmann (as quoted by Schwarz & Shulman, 
2007:829) are of the opinion that the dominant position is that change is essential and that 
organisations are always changing. About thirty years of research support this axiom, often 
illustrating the strategic advantages of restructured organisations (Dunbar & Starbuck, as quoted 
by Schwarz & Shulman, 2007:829). McKinley and Scherer (2000:737) are of the opinion that 
although organisational restructuring certainly has consequences, they are outside the domain of 
the restructuring construct itself. This implies that since the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of 
organisational restructuring has to be judged by restructuring’s consequences and the implication 
of those consequences for different organisational constituencies, there is no good or bad 
restructuring in our definitional repertoire. Therefore, organisational restructuring might have 
good or bad outcomes, but it is not in itself good or bad. Stated differently, restructuring can be 
managed effectively, but there can be significant negative consequences associated with poorly 
managed restructured programmes (Bowman & Singh, 1993:7). 
 
However, the contemporary organisational realities of restructuring, among others, have not only 
changed organisational systems. They have had a major effect – mostly negative - on workers in 
them, and continue to take their toll on employees at all levels (Burke & Nelson, 1997:328,333).  
In addition, Ford (2007:321) is of the view that effective leaders do not merely prepare an 
organisation prior to a change effort. They must have the patience to constantly build the 
capacity for change among organisational members throughout the various stages of the change 
effort. Leading-edge organisations are deriving ever increasing value by tapping into employee 
and stakeholder expertise and capability.  
 
Business and police organisations worldwide are increasingly faced with challenges to their 
increasingly complex environment. Consequently, these organisations are obligated to review 
and adapt their organisational structure in order to address these challenges and to meet the needs 
 96 
 
of the communities they serve. Once again, it has to be emphasised that it is not the goal of this 
study to deal with, in particular, restructuring processes in national and international business 
and police organisations, but to lay emphasis on the significance of restructuring in such 
organisations, as well as to recognise the importance for business and police organisations to 
endeavour in restructuring processes. Furthermore, this study will identify lessons that can be 
learnt from these organisations’ restructuring efforts for change in the SAPS, in order to 
substantiate the significance of such changes for policing organisations. 
Examples of multinational and national non-policing organisations’ restructuring processes 
follow. 
 
3.3 Organisational Restructuring: Multinational and National Examples of Non-
Policing Organisations 
 
As the organisational environment becomes increasingly complex and more subject to changes, 
the need to reformulate the organisation’s structure and/or to adjust elements of the existing 
structure becomes more frequent. As a result, senior managers are challenged with the demand to 
incorporate various changes in the implementation of the modified structure. It is not the 
aspiration of this study to embrace, in particular, restructuring processes in international and 
national organisations, but to lay emphasis on the significance of restructuring, as well as to 
acknowledge the importance for national and foreign organisations to endeavour in restructuring 
processes. Additionally, this study will subsequently identify lessons that can be learnt from the 
international and national organisations, for change in the SAPS.  
 
This literature review, therefore, presents a brief overview of the organisations of the Royal 
Dutch/Shell Group, Vodafone, Transnet and Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA), and 
points out some of the restructuring efforts that have already been carried out or identified for 
implementation in these organisations. 
The first multinational non-policing organisation to be presented is the Royal Dutch/Shell Group.  
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3.3.1 Organisational Restructuring: The Royal Dutch/Shell Group 
 
At the beginning of 2000, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies (Shell) was emerging 
from one of the most ambitious and far-reaching organisational restructurings of its 93-year 
history. However, this restructuring was introduced before 2000. Consequently, the restructuring 
had involved the shift from a geographically-based to a primarily business sector based structure, 
the elimination of over 1,000 corporate positions, the sale of much of its London headquarters, 
and the redesign of its systems of coordination and control. The restructuring had been 
precipitated by the realisation that Shell would need to change the way it did business if it was to 
retain its position as the world’s largest energy and chemicals company and offer an adequate 
return to shareholders in an increasingly turbulent industry environment. By the end of 1999 it 
was clear that the changes were showing results. Head office costs had been reduced, and the 
increased coordination and control that the new sector-based organisation permitted were helping 
Shell to control costs, focus capital expenditure and prune the business portfolio. Return on 
capital employed (ROCE) and return on equity (ROE) for 1999 were the highest in ten years 
(Grant, [s.a.]).  
 
The reorganisation that had begun in 1994 under the chairman of the committee of managing 
directors, Cor Herkstroter, and continued under his successor, Mark Moody-Stuart, had 
transformed the organisational structure of Shell. From a decentralised confederation of over 
two hundred operating companies spread throughout the world, a divisionalised group with clear 
lines of authority and more effective executive leadership had been created. However, Shell 
remained a highly complex organisation that was a prisoner of its own illustrious history, and 
where corporate authority remained divided between The Hague, London, and Houston (Grant, 
[s.a.]). 
 
Faced with growing evidence of suboptimal financial performance and an over-complex, 
inward-looking organisational structure, Herkstroter called a meeting of Shell’s fifty top 
managers in May 1994. The outcome was the appointment of a high-level team to study Shell’s 
internal organisation and come up with options for redesign. The driving force behind the 
redesign was the desire to have a simpler structure in which the reporting relationships would be 
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clearer, and thus to allow the corporate centre to exert more effective influence and control over 
the operating companies. A simpler structure would help eliminate some of the cost and inertia 
of the head office bureaucracies that had built up around Shell’s elaborate committee system. 
There was also a need to improve coordination between the operating companies. This 
coordination, it was felt, should be based upon the business sectors rather than on geographical 
regions (Grant, [s.a.]). 
 
The central feature of the reorganisation plan of 1995 was the dismantling of the three-way 
matrix through which the operating companies had been coordinated since the 1960s. In its 
place, four business organisations were created to achieve closer integration within each 
business sector across all countries. It was intended that the new structure would allow for more 
effective planning and control within each of the businesses, remove much of the top-heavy 
bureaucracy that had imposed a costly burden on the group, and eliminate the power of the 
regional fiefdoms. The new structure would strengthen the executive authority of the committee 
of managing directors by providing a clearer line of command to the business organisations - and 
subsequently to the operating companies - and by splitting central staff functions into a corporate 
centre and a professional services organisation (Grant, [s.a.]).  
 
As Royal Dutch/Shell approached the second century of its corporate life, there was a clear 
consensus within the company that the organisational changes made during 1995–9 had created 
a structure that was much better able to respond to the uncertainties and continuous changes 
that affected the oil industry. Outside the company, Shell-watchers both in the investment 
community and in other oil companies had little doubt that the 1996 reorganisation had 
contributed substantially to the efficient and effective management of the group. The stripping 
away of much of the administrative structure in the group’s head offices in London and The 
Hague, the elimination of the regional coordinating staff, and the closure of some of Shell’s 
biggest national headquarters not only reduced cost, but seemed to be moving Shell towards a 
swifter, more direct style of management. The restructuring of chemicals and downstream 
businesses revealed both a tough-mindedness and a decisiveness that few had associated with 
the “old” Shell (Grant, [s.a.]).  
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It follows that the SAPS could learn valuable lessons for change in its organisation, that can be 
learnt from the restructuring of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group. The extensive nature of this 
group’s viable restructuring initiative, and the sustainability thereof, could be a significant 
indicator to the SAPS’s restructuring efforts in terms of identifying practicable and achievable 
solutions to their change efforts. Moreover, Shell’s character to take their shareholders’ interests 
into consideration during their change initiative, reflects an organisation that values external 
partnership and interaction with its clients. It follows that the SAPS could also learn from Shell’s 
attributes by interacting more closely with its clients, namely, the South Africa community, 
during its change initiatives. The involvement of a large number of Shell’s top structure in the 
decisionmaking process, furthermore, features it as an organisation that values participative 
decisionmaking. The SAPS could apply participative decisionmaking in its change efforts, by 
involving its members. The simplified organisational structure adopted by the Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group could be to the advantage of the SAPS, if the organisation similarly embraced a simplified 
organisational structure by becoming more sub-divisionally - rather than divisionally - 
structured. In addition, a simpler structure for the SAPS could also facilitate the eradication of 
the organisation’s administrative bureaucracies that, in turn, could enhance internal 
communication.   
 
As a result, the SAPS’s structure could encourage a more outward-looking structure, thus 
improving service delivery, rather than focusing inwards towards the organisation’s internal 
shortcomings. The simplicity of such a structure would, in turn, remove much of the top-heavy 
bureaucracy characterised in the SAPS. Moreover, the introduction of uncomplicated 
coordination and control mechanisms by the SAPS, similar to the Royal Dutch/Shell Group 
during its restructuring process, could result in improved managerial control benefits on the 
lower hierarchical levels of the organisation, as well as attention on the focus of its primary 
functions. As a result, a more direct style of management - and thus a clearer line of command - 
would result in the strengthening of authority on the lower hierarchical levels in the SAPS. In 
addition, decisionmaking and vertical communication in the SAPS would benefit from the direct 
style of management.    
 
The second multinational non-policing organisation to be presented is Vodafone.  
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3.3.2 Restructuring Vodafone 
The mobile giant Vodafone replaced its current structure - which was based largely on specific 
countries - and instead took a more consolidated, regional approach, in addition to creating a unit 
focused solely on creating new businesses. The three new business units are Europe, including 
such markets as Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom; Central Europe, the Middle 
East, Asia-Pacific and its affiliates; and New Businesses and Innovation. The company did, 
however, point out that the restructuring should allow for more cost cuts, particularly in more 
mature markets in industrialised countries, and make operations in emerging markets more 
profitable.  Chief Executive Arun Sarin said: "This new structure is an important step forward for 
the group as it is aligned with Vodafone’s evolving strategy and addresses the different priorities 
across the group. It will enable us to continue to outperform our competitors as the changes 
deliver a streamlined and simple structure with a clear focus" (Vodafone's restructuring …, 
2006).  
In addition, Vodafone had created the New Business and Innovation Unit (NBIU) earlier in 2006 
in a restructuring process that also included dividing the business into two geographic regions. 
Under the terms of the latest initiative, the NBIU’s responsibilities in developing the mobile plus 
strategy would be devolved to the operating companies and to the European region. A group 
strategy and new business function would identify new business opportunities and key partners. 
However, Vodafone had announced that it was axing its NBIU division, and as a result of this 
restructuring, the unit’s CEO, Thomas Geitner, would quit the company. Vodafone had said that 
its NBIU would be absorbed back into the structure of the company (Vodafone axes innovation 
division, 2006). Meanwhile, Vodafone had also restructured, realigned business units and 
reshuffled personnel, although not entirely with a great deal of coherence. The NBIU is a good 
example. Set up six months ago, it was heralded as a crucial element in a revised structure that 
would reinvigorate the organisation and halt slowing growth. It was given the task of heading up 
the convergence strategy (Vodafone's diversion, 2006).  
Moreover, Vodafone Italy began a strategic partnership with a customer care company, Comdata 
Care, in November 2007. Consequently, approximately 900 back office and credit management 
employees were outsourced to the partner company, with no redundancies as a result. Vodafone 
 101 
 
Italy agreed that these employees would be protected from redundancy for the duration of its 
seven-year contract with Comdata and there would be no change to the current employment 
terms. These agreements were developed in consultation with trade unions and the Italian 
government. To facilitate a smooth transition, selected managers were trained in how to support 
people affected by this change. 
Furthermore, Vodafone Germany restructured its sales function in 2007/08, affecting 1,600 
employees. Around 2,000 call centre employees in Germany were given training to adapt to new 
management structures. These changes were made in agreement with the Works Council. 
Additionally, in March 2008, Vodafone UK announced a reorganisation to improve customer 
service and respond to new market challenges. This was likely to affect 450 existing employees, 
as well as creating new jobs in customer service roles. Vodafone UK consults with employees 
through one-to-one meetings with managers and through a Collective Consultation Forum of 
employee representatives. Affected employees are offered redeployment and outplacement 
support (Organisation and change …, 2007).  
In addition, the SAPS could furthermore learn significant lessons from Vodafone’s restructuring. 
Firstly, changes in the SAPS should similarly be simplified with a clearer focus, in order for 
members to have a comprehensive understanding of such changes. Secondly, Vodafone’s 
consultative interaction during the company’s restructuring with its employees could act as a 
valuable lesson for the SAPS during its change processes. Consultation with employees during 
change acts as a powerful communication tool. Thirdly, Vodacom’s support structure for 
affected employees of the restructuring process during the company’s restructuring efforts has to 
most certainly be considered as an important lesson to be learnt by the SAPS. Lastly, Vodafone’s 
initiative to involve employees during its restructuring, in the form of employee representatives, 
should be clearly noted by the SAPS.  Employee representation and participation in the SAPS 
during change processes would create a sense of involvement by members and could reduce 
resistance to change.    
The first national organisation to be presented is Transnet.   
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3.3.3 Transnet Restructuring 
Transnet is a large South African rail, port and pipeline company. It was formed as a limited 
company on 1 April 1990. The majority of the company’s stock is owned by the Department of 
Public Enterprises (DPE) of the South African government. The company was formed by 
restructuring into business units the operations of the then South African Railways and Harbours 
and other existing operations and products. (Transnet, 2008).  
 It follows that this state logistics and transport giant Transnet is undergoing a makeover, in order 
to help South African businesses become more globally competitive. Writing in the 2003/2004 
annual report, group chief executive Maria Ramos indicated that the current structure of Transnet 
does not provide the platform necessary to maximise the growth and competitiveness inherent in 
the South African economy. Transnet has shown an increasing inability to respond to the 
demands of its business environment. According to Ramos, Transnet’s structure and size do not 
facilitate the ability to provide a competitive and integrated transport and intermodal service. In 
addition, inadequate corporate governance and lapses in financial discipline and risk 
management have resulted in poor operating performances and substantial financial impairments 
in many businesses within the group. Moreover, inefficiencies, low margins, investment 
backlogs, aged assets and infrastructure, as well as the maintenance costs of underutilised rail 
networks and port infrastructure, are undermining operational returns. In response, Transnet 
developed a strategic plan designed to meet the challenges posed by globalisation and to 
integrate the needs of the company’s First and Second Economy. Transnet’s core port and rail 
operations play a pivotal role in South Africa’s First Economy and its increasing global 
exposure. It follows that Transnet will be focusing on its rail and harbour operations and 
divesting itself of other interests, such as South African Airways.  
As has been done with the National Ports Authority and the South African Ports Operations, 
Transnet intends to separate the operational and infrastructural elements within Spoornet. 
Consequently, Transnet intends, with this vertical separation, to sharpen the company’s focus 
and allow them to introduce, inter alia, public-private partnerships more readily into the group. 
Transnet’s strategy will therefore have a strong focus on service levels (Transnet restructuring 
…, 2005).  
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In addition, the Minister of Public Enterprises indicated that Transnet will be streamlined to 
focus on freight and pipeline transportation and that the company will exit from a range of non-
core assets, which will still primarily remain in the hands of Government. Passenger rail services 
will be combined and placed under the direction of the Minister and Department of Transport 
and the South African Airways will become a stand-alone SOE (South Africa, 2006).  
Moreover, according to South Africa (2000:7-8) the above restructuring plan of Transnet is 
likely to have the following impacts: 
• The restructuring of Transnet’s debt will enable the enterprise to operate on commercial 
principles. As a result, it will enable the various divisions to operate as independent 
business units without cross-subsidising each other’s contributions towards the debt. 
Transnet and its various business units will therefore be able to make market decisions. 
• The concessioning of Coallink, Orex, LuxRail and LinkRail will mobilise private sector 
capital and expertise (both locally and internationally). 
• The commercialisation of Spoornet’s general freight business (GFB) will ensure that it 
operates on market principles. This should enable it to offer more efficient and effective 
services. 
• Because of the high levels of over-employment in Spoornet, the current transformation 
process and the envisaged restructuring will result in job losses. Where possible, 
alternative job opportunities are being investigated. 
• The restructuring of ports is likely to improve their service levels, as well as ensuring that 
South Africa has ports that are able to meet the needs of a growing economy. 
• The separation of the ports into a ports authority and port operations will separate the 
landlord function from the operation of the ports. 
• The privatisation of port operations should improve the level of service and the 
competitiveness of the ports. 
• The restructuring of South African Airways (SAA) has already shown benefits in terms 
of the airline’s efficiency. 
• The incorporation of Petronet will ensure that it offers a cost-effective service. 
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• The disposal of non-core units within Transnet will ensure that it focuses on its core 
business and improves its effectiveness. 
According to the article Transnet takes a new road (2007), Transnet launched its new corporate 
brand identity, signalling the culmination of a three-year transformation from a diversified 
conglomerate into a focused and integrated bulk freight transport company. The new brand’s role 
is multifaceted to (a) co-ordinate and differentiate the portfolio of port, rail and pipeline 
businesses, each having built their own varying degrees of brand affinity and recognition; (b) to 
reflect Transnet’s global appeal; (c) to differentiate the parastatal among other parastatals and 
global South African businesses; (d) to signal a new era in the transformation and restructuring 
of Transnet; and (e) to communicate the “one company, one vision” platform for Transnet going 
forward, while becoming a rallying point for building a new Transnet culture internally. As a 
result, the implications of the re-brand means there is now one dominant, overarching brand with 
the various sub-brands identified only descriptively in relation to the parent brand. It follows that 
this has necessitated a name change for some of the familiar Transnet operating divisions. While 
Transnet Limited’s corporate brand remains, Spoornet has become Transnet Freight Rail, South 
African Port Operations is now Transnet Port Terminals, National Ports Authority is now 
Transnet National Ports Authority, Transwerk becomes Transnet Rail Engineering, and Petronet 
becomes Transnet Pipelines. Consequently, Transnet’s three-year turnaround strategy has 
worked well to create a strong foundation for the transport utility’s new four- point growth 
strategy the group chief executive indicated. In addition, an era of upheaval marked by low 
profitability is now a part of the company’s history (Transnet says …, 2008).    
An over-complex organisational structure does not foster effective service delivery, growth and 
competitiveness in any organisation. Firstly, this is one important lesson to be learnt by the 
SAPS from the restructuring process of Transnet. Secondly, Transnet’s vertical separation of the 
operational and infrastructural elements of one of its businesses could furthermore act as a lesson 
for the SAPS. It follows that the SAPS’s operational and infrastructural components could also 
be vertically separated, in order to enhance the focus on service delivery and crime prevention.   
The second national organisation and last non-policing organisation to be discussed is 
Amalgamated Banks of South Africa. 
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3.3.4 Restructuring: Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA) 
 
Absa is based in Johannesburg and is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited (JSE). 
It is the largest consumer bank in South Africa and also one of South Africa’s largest financial 
services. Business is conducted primarily in South Africa and on the Africa continent, where it 
has equity holdings in banks in Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. As at June 
2006, Absa had assets of R466 billion, more than 720 physical outlets, 8,1 million customers, 6 
256 automated teller machines and 34 688 permanent employees. ABSA was formed in 1991 
through the merger of the United, Allied and Volkskas Groups. This was followed in 1992 by 
acquisition of the Bankorp Group (which included Trust Bank and Bankfin). The banks each 
traded under their own names until 1998. The name was changed to Absa Group Limited in 
1997. In 2005 Barclays Bank of the United Kingdom purchased a 56.4% stake in Absa, which 
represents the largest foreign direct investment in the country (Absa Group …, 2008). 
 
It follows that during late 2001 Absa informed Sasbo (the Finance Union (formerly the South 
African Society of Bank Officials) that it intended restructuring some of the functions of its 
Delivery Channel Services. At that time, Absa made it clear that Project Galaxy, as the process 
was named, would have a major impact on staff numbers. Project Galaxy, said the bank, had 
been devised to re-engineer its back-office branch processes to free branches to concentrate 
solely on customer service and sales. Consequently, the re-engineering would be achieved by 
centralising and automating the functions of its processing centres. As a result, an objective of 
the streamlining process would be to identify and remove non value added and duplicated 
services from the branches. An impact of the exercise would be that some processes would 
migrate from the branches to the central processing units (Group Administration) and call centres 
(Absa Direct). Absa’s restructuring plan resulted in continuous consultations between the bank, 
with the union being kept informed of progress each step of the way. They also involved its core 
Negotiation Consultative Forum (NCF) in all consultations - except where emergency meetings 
had to be held to sort out problems - and kept its regional offices fully informed on the project’s 
progress.  
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During one of the consultations, after in-depth deliberations, the parties agreed that the bank 
would restructure on a regional - as opposed to branch – level, to allow staff more scope to apply 
for vacancies at the bank. At the last consultation meeting, which took place on 20 September 
2002, Absa provided Sasbo with an estimate of the number of staff affected by the re-
engineering process. Although it was still premature to assess the exact impact on jobs, the 
outcome of the exercise looked promising. Absa gave the union its assurance that new positions 
would be created at Group Administration and Absa Direct. Natural attrition and redeployment 
would further combine to keep job losses to a minimum. In addition, despite the impact of 
Project Galaxy, some employees would remain in the branch back office to perform selected 
control activities and provide branch support. Staff not affected by the re-engineering process 
were switchboard operators, hosts, inquiries clerks, ATM custodians and front-line staff, i.e. 
tellers. The bank also indicated that some back-office branches in rural areas would not be 
affected by the project. Once the roll-out process has been completed at each branch, staff would 
be given a three-month reassignment period to seek employment elsewhere in the Group, or 
externally. The bank foresaw the project being completed by around July 2003 (Clearing ABSA 
confusion …, 2002).  
 
As a result, according to Personal Banking …(2008), the successful absorption of new functions 
flowing from Project Galaxy added a new dimension to Group Administration’s scope of 
services. Consequently, internal service excellence and customer centricity have become 
interwoven in operational functions. This has therefore transformed Group Administration from 
a support function to an integral link in the delivery chain. Group Administration thus aims to be 
the sole administrative service provider in the ABSA Bank through the successful integration of 
Project Galaxy, process integration, optimisation and re-engineering, as well as in/out/co-
sourcing opportunities. This will therefore improve the cost-to-income ratio and enable true 
customer centricity. However, the implementation of the new business model of Project Galaxy 
and ABSA Vehicle and Asset Finance (Bankfin) substantially reduced employee numbers in 
ABSA. Only 991 of the total reduction of 2 927 employees were actual retrenchments. Most of 
the affected employees were successfully reassigned within the ABSA Group, with a minimal 
effect on employee morale. Retrenched employees interested in self-employment were helped to 
prepare for its challenges by the ABSA Foundation (Employees …, 2008). 
 107 
 
ABSA’s continuous consultation efforts regarding its restructuring process are a valuable lesson 
to be learnt by the SAPS. The SAPS could thus also engage in constant consultation with its 
members during change initiatives. As a result, members would remain informed of each step of 
such a process.    
 
A presentation and discussion of the literature review on restructuring processes in police 
organisations are presented below. 
 
3.4 Restructuring Processes in Police Organisations 
 
During the past two decades, governments in the major industrialised countries have sought to 
achieve greater efficiency in public sector expenditure. As a result, new management techniques, 
derived primarily from the private sector, have been introduced to restructure public sector 
agencies along broadly corporate lines, but with the important added dimension of 
accountability. These main catalysts for change have been common between western nations 
(Fleming & Lafferty, 2000:154). In recognition of Fleming and Lafferty, Neyroud (2007:16) is 
also of the opinion that the public sector is under pressure to prove itself and deliver its remit, 
and also produce demonstrable improvements that benefit the public and achieve value for 
money. Consequently, the public sector is constantly changing, with the creation of new start-up 
bodies and the merging and restructuring of departments and agencies as a result of this pressure. 
 
In addition, Campbell (1996:23) is also of the belief that there can be hardly a government 
department or agency which has not experienced, or continues to experience, restructuring.  
It follows that policing is also being transformed and restructured in the modern world, and, as a 
result, has entered a new era characterised by a transformation in the governance of security. In 
other words, policing is undergoing a historic restructuring believed to be worldwide (Bayley & 
Shearing, 2001:vii,1). The explanations for the current restructuring of policing involve 
shortcomings of the public police, an increase in crime, the nature of economic systems, the 
character of government, and the social structure, ideas and culture.  
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In agreement with Bayley and Shearing, Maguire and King (2004:20) also confirm that several 
transformations in goals have reshaped the policing industry in recent years, and promise to 
continue doing so in the future.  
 
In addition, Bayley and Shearing (1996:585-591) furthermore confirm the restructuring of 
policing, stating that over the past decade, police throughout the developed democratic world 
have increasingly questioned their role, operational strategies, organisation and management. 
This is attributable to growing doubts about the effectiveness of their traditional strategies in 
safeguarding the public from crime. In other words, the public police are going through an 
intense period of self-questioning - indeed, a true identity crisis. Public police are thus no longer 
confident that they are either effective or efficient in controlling crime, and they are anxiously 
examining every aspect of their performance – objectives, strategies, organisation, management, 
discipline, and accountability. As a result, these movements amount to the restructuring of 
policing in contemporary democratic societies. Stated differently, Bayley and Shearing (2001:17) 
describe the restructuring of policing under way in the world today as involving more than 
changes in the types of people who are involved in it. The character of policing – meaning its 
practices and activities – is also changing. As a result, the authors call these elements the 
“mentalities” of policing, because how policing is conducted reflects distinctive ways of thinking 
about it. 
 
Bayley and Shearing (1996:585-591) furthermore argue that the police are also beginning to 
recognize that the traditional, quasi-military management model, based on ranks and hierarchical 
chain of command, may not accommodate the requirements of modern policing. As a result, 
several forces have recently eliminated redundant supervisory ranks, and almost all are talking 
about the value of participative, collegial management. This involves decentralising command 
and allowing subordinate commanders to determine the character of police operations in their 
areas. It follows that the restructuring of policing, which is already well advanced, has profound 
implications for public life, especially on the level and distribution of public safety, the vitality 
of civil rights, and the character of democratic government.  
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In support of the abovementioned literature, the organisational structures of large municipal 
police departments in the USA, for example, have changed substantially throughout the 20th 
century.  Over the past two decades, community policing reformers have urged police executives 
to revamp their organisational structures and administrative practices in a number of ambitious 
ways. As a result, police executives have been implored by reformers to reduce the size of their 
administrative components, to decentralise (both territorially and administratively), to 
despecialise, to reduce the depth of their hierarchies, and to civilianise, replacing sworn officers 
with civilians in a variety of occupational specialties. However, police organisations have 
become more functionally differentiated throughout the 20th century, adding new bureaus, 
divisions and specialised units to perform separate functions as the need (or perceived need) 
arises. Under community policing, police organisations are supposed to become less functionally 
differentiated. Community policing officers are thus encouraged to become “uniformed 
generalists” responsible for developing customised responses to a wide variety of situations, 
rather than frequently referring citizens to other more specialised “cubbyholes” within the 
organisation. In addition, community police reformers have urged police agencies to reduce the 
depth of their hierarchies to improve the flow of communication throughout the organisation. 
This recommendation flows from a broader movement in both the public and private sectors to 
“flatten” or “delayerise” the organisation (Maguire, Shin, Zhao & Hassel, 2003:251,255-266).  
 
However, King (as quoted by Maguire et al., 2003:266) argues that the existing research base is 
insufficient to support the conclusion that reducing the depth of the hierarchy will improve 
communication or other characteristics of organisations. In accordance with Maguire et al. 
(2003:251), Carter and McGoldrick (1994:63) similarly emphasise the significance of 
restructuring police services through illustrating restructuring in the police service of the United 
Kingdom (UK). For example, the UK police service has found itself undermined by the same 
problems as other state monopolies: high and rising costs, top-heavy bureaucracy, a lack of 
flexibility, and a propensity to favour ever greater increments in resourcing. As a result, new 
working practices and methods are slow to be implemented because of the inherent conservatism 
of the structure. Consequently, considerable pressure has mounted to review performance in 
terms of efficiency, effectiveness and value for money, while providing a quality service. In 
other words, the structure of Britain’s police - last reformed in 1964 - does not fit the demands of 
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the 1990s. Maguire et al. (2003:268) are furthermore of the view that organisational reformers in 
the 1990s hailed the benefits of decentralisation for both business firms and public agencies. 
Police reformers followed suit, as the community policing reform rhetoric began to embrace 
concepts such as “participatory management” and “empowerment” of lower level employees, 
supervisors and administrators, and “shared” decision making. It follows that research on police 
innovation has shown that decentralisation is viewed by experts in policing as one of the most 
important administrative innovations of the 1990s. 
 
Viewed historically, Bayley and Shearing (2001:1-2,35) are furthermore of the opinion that what 
is happening to policing is not unprecedented. It could be argued that the monopolisation of 
policing by government is an aberration. The authors then question if the current restructuring of 
policing is, then, simply a return to the past, another cycle in the historical ebb and flow of 
policing power between governmental and nongovernmental agencies. It follows that the 
restructuring of policing that is taking place today is, however, taking a different form than in the 
past, because contemporary societies are organised differently from previous ones. Indeed, the 
concepts and terminology inherited from the past are inadequate for understanding what is 
happening today. As a result, for policymakers to comprehend, and possibly deal effectively with 
the current transformation in policing, it will be necessary to examine contemporary 
developments with a fresh intellectual eye. However, the current transformation of policing has 
not yet attracted the sustained scholarly attention it deserves. Although researchers have “nibbled 
around the edges” of the topic, the extent, nature and impact of police restructuring have yet to 
be determined. Although the authors believe the restructuring of policing is worldwide, it 
remains for new research to document its extent across the globe. Yet, it is known that the 
change is occurring across the divide of economic development, with developing democracies 
participating along with developed ones.   
 
Examples of restructuring in policing organisations internationally, are succinctly presented 
below. 
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3.4.1 Restructuring police organisations: International examples 
 
Police organisations worldwide are increasingly faced with challenges to their growingly 
complex environment. Consequently, these police organisations are obligated to review and 
adapt their organisational structure in order to address these challenges and to meet the needs of 
the communities they serve. Once again, it has to be emphasised that it is not the goal of this 
study to deal with, in particular, restructuring processes in international police organisations, but 
to lay emphasis on the significance of restructuring in such organisations, as well as to recognise 
the importance for international police organisations to endeavour in restructuring processes.  
Furthermore, this study will then identify lessons that can be learnt from these international 
police organisations’ restructuring efforts for change in the SAPS, in order to substantiate the 
significance of such changes for policing organisations.  
This review of the literature, therefore, presents a concise summary of the restructuring efforts in 
the police organisations of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Australia, Turkey, Sierra Leone and England 
and Wales, and indicates various restructuring efforts that have been implemented in these 
organisations or identified to be implemented. 
 
The first police organisation to be presented is the Bosnia-Herzegovina police.  
 
3.4.1.1 Police restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina  
 
The 1992-1995 war left Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) with three police forces: 
Bosniak, Croat and Serb, each with its own jurisdictions (Bosnia’s stalled police reform …, 
2005:3). During and immediately after the war, the police were organised in parallel structures 
along ethnic lines in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croats controlled the Western parts which 
they called the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna. The Serbian police had their headquarters in 
Pale, while the Bosniak police force was based in Sarajevo and controlled the districts of Central 
Bosnia. The police were further under the influence of the intelligence services and operated as a 
tool in the service of the political regime via the respective Ministers of Interior (Wisler, 
[s.a.]:140). 
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Furthermore, according to Muehlmann (2007:37-40), the police restructuring efforts in Bosnia, 
driven by the international community, using in particular the leverage of European integration, 
attempted to achieve a reform that would transform a very fragmented police system into a de-
politicised single structure. Once the discussion was initiated in early 2004, police restructuring 
increasingly dominated the political life and public debate in Bosnia during 2004 and 2005. The 
Bosnian political system was built on a complex, decentralised, multi-layer and mainly ethno-
political power-sharing model. It followed that most competencies were vested on the level of 
two entities, the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter 
Federation). While the Republika Srpska, a more centralised entity, created one unified police 
body that was regionally subdivided, the fragmented Federation entity created eleven different 
and independent police forces, all commanded under different regulations. All these police forces 
were very different in size and had different legal bases, preventing the formation of one single 
security area within Bosnia. 
 
In addition, the total number of serving police officers was excessive - 16 800 police officers in 
2004 (a number proportionate to most Western European countries would be 11 000). This, 
along with similar overstaffing in all other parts of the administration system, led to an excessive 
financial burden, raising fears of bankruptcy at both entity and state levels. Another downside of 
the system was that the boundaries of police districts had been drawn according to front lines 
during the war, rather than on technical policing criteria. While the division made sense in some 
areas, the system created was totally dysfunctional in others. This fragmented system encouraged 
a tendency of non-cooperation among different police elements and a lack of willingness to 
create institutional frameworks. As a result, it allowed for ethnically composed policing 
elements, which acted largely independently from one another and remained under the influence 
of their wartime political masters. In addition, there was an unhealthy political interference in 
operational policing – a legacy of the war and also of the country’s communist past. 
 
Almost ten years of international policing in Bosnia, under the leadership of the United Nations-
led International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) 
(which took over from the IPTF in early 2003), tried to cope with the challenges of the Bosnian 
policing system and to increase its effectivity and efficiency. Furthermore, taking the initiative in 
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2004 to trigger the restructuring of the Bosnian police was based on a variety of very sound 
reasons. Politically, it was necessary to create a modern police force, without political 
interference in operational police work, within an efficient political and legal framework. 
Economically, it was necessary to make the system sustainable and viable in the long run. From 
a policing perspective it was also necessary, in order to create a single security space for the 
country, sub-divided according to technical policing criteria, fit to fight crime and organised 
crime in particular. Considering these police restructuring discussions as a “case study” for 
internationally-led negotiations in the area of security sector reform, the case of Bosnia is a very 
telling one. It started from a valid point – an insufficient police structure – but it was an 
internationally imposed discussion, including imposed timelines that fitted the main international  
proponents, but were not compatible with the importance that such fundamental changes to the 
security sector (at the very heart of every political system) – signified for the political elite of 
Bosnia. 
 
After numerous discussions, political agreement on police reform was reached on 7 November 
2005, which called for implementation to begin without delay. Police reform, however, entered a 
different dimension, as it was the most far-reaching reform envisaged by the international 
community up to that point in time. Police reform was not a technical undertaking, merely about 
improving security and policing; it also meant decisive changes in the political and constitutional 
landscape of Bosnia (Muehlmann, 2007:53). 
 
In no other country of the region has the international community spent more money on police 
reform, and fielded larger police reform missions, than in Bosnia. However, no other country has 
faced a similar crisis over this issue. As a result, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) 
offers ten arguments in favour of police restructuring in Bosnia: 
 
• Police restructuring will make police accountable to the citizen first not to politics. 
• Police restructuring will make BiH safer for citizens, tougher for criminals. 
• Police restructuring will get rid of barriers that help criminals and hinder the police. 
• Police restructuring will cut bureaucracy and beef up crime fighting. 
• Police restructuring will rationalise the use of scarce resources. 
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• Police restructuring will provide the police with modern equipment to fight crime. 
• Police restructuring is a European Union requirement. 
• Without police restructuring, there will be no change in European visa requirements for 
  BiH citizens. 
• Police restructuring will mean new career opportunities for police officers across BiH. 
• Police restructuring will mean that a police officer will receive the same salary for the 
  same job anywhere in BiH (The worst in class, 2007:9).  
 
The SAPS could furthermore learn valuable lessons from the shortcomings experienced by the 
BiH police restructuring. At first, the excessive employment of administrative personnel placed 
an unnecessary financial burden on the restructuring efforts of the BiH police. As a result, the 
SAPS has to ensure that it has a streamlined administrative system that justifies the magnitude of 
the organisation, in order to simplify change efforts with the emphasis on higher operational 
personnel turnover. Secondly, the restructuring effort in BiH indicates the incorrect identification 
and implementation of police districts, and signifies the importance of the appropriate 
demarcation of police districts based on technically operational policing criteria. More 
specifically, the SAPS could learn that policing districts cannot be set on political or emotional 
orientation during change efforts, but rather on concrete operational and technical policing 
grounds, within an efficient political and legal framework.   
 
The second police organisation, the Australian police follow.  
 
3.4.1.2 Restructuring Australian police organisations 
 
During the 1980s, in response to government demands for cost-effectiveness and administrative 
accountability, the Australian public sector endeavoured to apply the private sector solution to 
the public sector problem. New managerial practices were implemented, with a view to changing 
the internal culture of organisations, increasing operational performance, efficiency and 
cooperation.  
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In a relatively short period of time these managerialist techniques came to dominate public and 
police administration in Australia and in most English-speaking countries (Dixon et al., as 
quoted by Fleming & Lafferty, 2000:155). 
 
Through an examination of police organisations in Queensland and New South Wales, the 
impetus for organisational change, particularly in the context of employment practices, has 
largely been driven by revelations of entrenched corruption and police misconduct. As a result, 
organisational goals of accountability and cultural change have been the critical influences on the 
restructuring agenda (Fleming & Lafferty, 2000:154).   
 
Australia’s policing system has one federal, six state and two territory jurisdictions. Before the 
1980s, these police services were structured on authoritarian, paramilitary lines, and regulated 
through strict organisational rules and legislation. Recruitment, training and disciplinary 
processes were conducted internally, with little regard to merit or aptitude. Senior officers 
preferred this system, and although there were some misgivings within police organisations 
regarding its effectiveness, there was considerable resistance to change at all levels. However, 
the move to reconstruct police services as corporate entities was resisted vigorously by senior 
police officers, rank and file police and their unions. Nevertheless, the restructuring of police 
organisations was initiated in several police jurisdictions during the 1980s, with the introduction 
of such managerial practices as strategic planning, performance management and performance-
based contract employment for senior executives (Palmer, as quoted by Fleming & Lafferty, 
2000:155). 
 
Budgetary considerations forced police organisations to adopt programme management schemes 
and to decentralise command. As responsibility for planning and budgeting was devolved to 
frontline managers, budgetary practices, once concerned solely with the management of police 
numbers, were refocused on the distribution of limited financial resources and operational 
outcomes.  
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Furthermore, in line with administrative trends, a process of “regionalisation” developed 
responsibility, authority and control in order to reduce overlap and duplication, improve 
efficiency and strengthen accountability. As a result, greater local accountability, autonomy, 
delegation and discretion replaced strong centralisation (Fleming & Lafferty, 2000:156).  
 
The restructuring of the Australian police organisations furthermore signifies important lessons 
to be learnt by the SAPS.  The introduction by the Australian police organisations of a business 
oriented management practice, as opposed to the undemocratic, top-down management style in 
these organisations, improved aspects such as managerial control, local accountability and 
decisionmaking at the lower hierarchical levels. The command structure is thus streamlined and 
“user-friendly” - which in turn develops improved responsibility and control of managers at 
these lower levels. As a result, strategic planning, communication and the management of 
performance at these lower hierarchical levels are furthermore improved. The SAPS could 
therefore learn significant lessons during its restructuring process, through the rationalisation of 
its management approach and command structure, with the impetus on greater local 
accountability, autonomy, delegation and discretion.  
 
Thirdly, the Turkish police is presented. 
 
3.4.1.3 Turkish police restructuring 
 
According to Aydin (1996:39-53), although a certain amount of development and change has 
continuously taken place, the most rapid changes affecting the nature and context of policing in 
Turkey have been seen during the past few decades. During the 1960s and 1970s the change was 
towards more centralisation and militarisation, but, since then, this police organisation has 
attempted to become a more decentralised and democratic system. Currently there is a slow trend 
towards decentralisation from the existing highly centralised system, and there are some 
proposals for further organisational changes in the near future. Regarding Turkey, the idea that 
the introduction of the modern police was as a result of economic development and more 
specifically capitalism, or that it was a response to class struggle or changes in the class structure 
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of a society, can be challenged. It is difficult to assert that the introduction of the professional 
police in Turkish history is related to the development of capitalism. The increase in the rate of 
crime and criminals and social and political disturbances in Turkey, which required 
reorganisation towards a modern professional police, is also the result of not only rapid 
urbanisation and industrialisation but also changes in the social and economic situation.  
The “public police” consists of three separate national forces: the civil police and two military 
police forces (the gendarmerie and the coastal security guards). All the functions performed by 
the police and other military forces are the same, but normally the police are responsible for 
policing within the municipal boundaries of cities and towns, the gendarmerie work in rural 
areas, villages and small towns, and the coastal security guards are responsible for security of 
coasts and territorial waters. The organisations of all three forces have duplicate structures and 
facilities, such as separate budgets, central headquarters, provincial units, training schools and 
communication systems. The territorial organisation of the Turkish national police force 
corresponds to the administration subdivisions. There are three kinds of units or departments 
within the central organisation or headquarters: the principal, assistant and advisory units. The 
principle units are those which are responsible for main police work such as general security, and 
public order. Examples of this kind of unit are the departments of security, anti-terror, and 
traffic. Assistant units such as the departments of personnel affairs, health, and training deal with 
jobs which support and help the main units for a more effective policing service. Finally, 
advisory units like the inspection board, and the department of law, work directly under the 
command of the Director-General concerning their specialties to advise or inform the Director-
General or other interested departments or offices. Below the large central organisation 
(Headquarters), there are police departments in 76 cities as sub-divisions of the central 
organisation. Each city police organisation also has sub-divisions in districts or small towns. At 
the final level of the national police there are local police stations, attached to the district police 
commanderates. Despite this large territorial distribution a vast majority of the police are 
clustered in the larger cities, such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. 
 
The Turkish police organisation has been highly centralised since its foundation and no demands 
have been made for local police organisations. Centralisation has been a traditional feature of the 
general political and administrative system in Turkish history. Turkey’s long tradition of civil 
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disorders has also been one of the factors which produced a police organisation as a public order 
force through a highly centralised and militarised system. Turkey’s centralised and militarised 
style of policing came from the centralised soldiery tradition of France. Therefore, the Turkish 
police system at present resembles that of the French with regard to tasks, national structure, 
nature of control, and internal organisational structures. Not only are regulations, standardisation 
and procedures identical throughout the country, but also the Ministry of the Interior has the  
authority to direct, control and fund the police force (Aydin, 1996: 39-53). 
 
Currently, however, there is some evidence of a slow trend towards decentralisation, and the 
issue of decentralising the police is being discussed. Partly because of socio-economic and 
political development, and partly because it is becoming difficult to tackle some local problems 
from the center, there is a tendency towards localisation or regionalisation of policing. Although 
the slow trend towards decentralisation of the Turkish police is a development of the past decade, 
the most satisfactory efforts to change the system have been seen during the 1990s. In the move 
towards decentralisation, some police departments or services have been regionalised or 
localised, and the municipal police forces and the provincial departments of the police 
organisation have been given more power and responsibilities (Aydin, 1996:39-53). 
 
The Turkish police organisation still needs significant changes, and it is likely that further 
restructuring in the police service will continue to take place. The service shows a great 
willingness to change. During the last few years there has been a stronger debate concerning 
further changes and there are a number of proposals for police organisational change. First of all, 
there are some proposals to change policing at the level of the local police stations. According to 
statistics issued in 1993, the total number of police stations in Turkey was 1185. It is generally 
argued that this number of local police stations is more than enough, and as a result, the number 
of police stations, especially in the major cities, is being decreased. It is also argued that the 
police should go to the people, rather than taking them to the police station to take statements 
and to collect evidence. The other important proposal which has been put forward for 
organisational changes in public policing in Turkey, concerns the abolition of the dual policing 
system: the civil and military police forces. As a result, the role of the gendarmerie should be 
redefined and its position clarified either as part of the military, or as part of the police under the 
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civil authorities. These current and proposed organisational changes in public policing in Turkey 
are for the purpose of modernising and democratising the police, by reducing the high level of 
centralisation, bureaucratisation and the hierarchical personnel regime, in order to make policing 
in Turkey more legitimate, effective, efficient and accountable to the community (Aydin, 
1996:39-53). 
 
The restructuring of the Turkish police also holds lessons for the SAPS to learn. The fragmented 
Turkish police force, characterised by its separated police forces with duplicated structures, is a 
clear indication that the SAPS with its one national police service has more value through the 
elimination of duplicated functions and a clearly defined role.  
 
The Sierra Leone police is now presented. 
 
3.4.1.4 Restructuring the Sierra Leone Police 
 
By the time Sierra Leone’s civil war was officially declared over in January 2002, more than    
70 000 people had been killed, 10 000 maimed and more than half the population had fled the 
country or were internally displaced (Abrahamsen & Williams, [s.a.]:5). Meek (2003:105) 
describes the story of policing in Sierra Leone as not the most pleasant of tales. Distrusted and 
chased out of conflict zones during the war, the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) are challenged on 
multiple levels. Moreover, they are reasserting control for internal security in the country; 
building up a credible and effective police force, and re-engaging with local communities 
throughout Sierra Leone to build the trust of the local citizenry in the ability of the police to 
provide internal security. As a result, the need for developing a policing methodology that would 
meet these challenges was recognised at an early stage by both the Sierra Leone government and 
the members of the United Nations and the Commonwealth assistance team. Consequently, some 
of the key challenges facing the SLP included early questions about the size and structure of the 
revitalised police force, the type of policing it should engage in, and how policing could be 
exerted in the country, in the face of the widespread collapse of the criminal justice system. 
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It has become common wisdom to shift attention to police reform and issues of criminal justice, 
once the military threat recedes. Post-war societies tend to become plagued with high levels of 
criminality in the aftermath of armed conflict. Moreover, in many war-torn African countries, 
Sierra Leone being no exception, the boundaries between crime, corruption and conflict have 
become blurred during the course of the civil war. Britain supported the SLP transformation long 
before the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), by 
deploying an experienced United Kingdom top police officer Mr. Keith Biddle, to assist the 
government of this country. Such support was overdue for a police department that had been run 
down by years of war, and undermined by a culture of corruption, exacerbated by the neglect of 
successive governments which had systematically starved the police of the most basic resources. 
After a period as Commissioner of Police, Mr. Biddle took over as Inspector-General (IG) of 
Sierra Leone’s police force in July 1999. One of the IG’s first tasks has been to root out 
corruption. Consequently, a number of senior officers have been removed or retired, and a major 
effort has gone into training and a complete revision of rules, regulations and procedures. 
National standards and guidelines on discipline rank and structure, and a programme to raise 
police awareness in areas such as spousal and child abuse, are being instituted (Malan, Rakate & 
McIntyre, 2002).  
 
The pre-war strength of the SLP was 9 317, comprising a majority of unarmed general duties 
officers and a paramilitary Special Service Division (SSD). By the time Sierra Leone’s civil war 
was officially declared over in January 2002, approximately 900 members of the SLP had been 
killed in the ensuing ten years of war, and a considerable number had suffered the amputation of 
limbs by the rebels. The SLP’s strength was reduced to a low 6 600, after which it has seen a 
slow build-up to the present strength of some 6 900. The exact desired and affordable level will 
be determined by a thorough review of the policing requirements for Sierra Leone. The 
requirement will probably be assessed at more than 9 300 police officers (Malan et al., 2002).  
 
In discussions on reform of the police, the government of Sierra Leone and its international 
partners all recognised that building a new police force in Sierra Leone would require a dramatic 
departure from old-style policing in the country. The SLP needed to become a transparent and 
accountable service that was trusted by local citizens as much as by the national government. As 
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a result, the SLP was launched on a course of development with the “aim of creating a 
community police service, which is accountable to the people and is not an organ of the 
government”.  It follows that this approach requires decentralising the police force to local level 
and bringing in the support of local communities, including the paramount chiefs, youth 
organisations and local organisations, as well as members of the public. Moreover, in terms of 
structure, the SLP is top heavy, with more supervisors than operational members of the force. As 
a result, many officers have been reassigned from traffic duty to criminal investigations (Meek, 
2003:106-108).    
 
In addition, and in support of Meek (2003:106-108), Gbla (2007) states that these 
recommendations and suggestions culminated in the Sierra Leone police restructuring 
programme. The government also released its Police Charter, which, among others, outlines the 
role of the police force in relation to the government and the people, with emphasis on equal 
opportunity, professionalism and local needs policing. Subsequently, the police force released its 
Mission Statement. It follows that various activities have been undertaken by the police 
restructuring programme to realise the principles and values of the Police Charter and Mission 
Statement, such as the operationalisation of the local needs policing concept. The concept 
stresses the need for involving people in a partnership with the police to maintain law and order. 
A community relations department at police headquarters is tasked to work in concert with all 
divisional commanders to promote local needs policing, develop and implement various crime 
prevention strategies with local unit commanders, and provide an efficient link between the 
police and the community. Additionally, a complaints, discipline and investigations department 
has been established that deals with complaints from the public about issues of police discipline 
and corruption and takes appropriate corrective action. Moreover, a change management 
department was also established, which among others aims at improving the efficiency and 
productivity of police force members, especially with regard to management of its affairs. It also 
seeks to groom Sierra Leonean police officers for leadership positions. The former special 
security department has been transformed into an operational support group, whose functions 
include controlling internal upheavals and performing all operational duties related to security.  
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Finally, the restructuring programme has put in place oversight mechanisms to watch over the 
police. One such mechanism is the police council, the highest police body, with power to provide 
civilian oversight of policing in Sierra Leone. The restructuring programme also makes provision 
for the appointment of women in senior positions in the force.  
 
The force structure presently provides for four provincial commands, coinciding with the 
administrative provinces of Western Area, Northern Province, Southern Province, and Eastern 
Province, each under the command of an Assistant Commissioner. At the next level of 
organisation are the police divisions at district level (five of which have been established in the 
wake of successful disarmament). The idea is to expand the police divisions to twelve districts as 
the peace process progresses. The SLP is furthermore considering establishing approximately 30 
community-level policing units. Like any police agency, the SLP also has specialist branches, 
such as a Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and traffic police. The SSD will not, 
however, be disbanded, but is going to be “repositioned” to act in support of community 
policing, rather than being used, as it was in the past, as the armed wing of the ruling party 
(Malan et al., 2002).  
 
Furthermore, according to Meek (2003:109,114), in its current policing approach the SLP is 
focused on working with communities, and not engaging in aggressive behaviour or policing 
tactics. It follows that by engaging with communities, traditional rulers and the district councils, 
the SLP should also start to meet its service delivery objectives and implement crime prevention 
measures. As a result, commanders have started to work with communities to identify issues of 
concern and possible remedies, while local rulers have been consulted to work out systems of 
cooperation between traditional methods and 21st
 
-century policing. According to the Acting 
Inspector General, the largest challenge facing the SLP is personnel management – after years of 
neglect and infiltration of corrupt practices, a culture of management needs to be rebuilt. This 
includes increasing funding for the police, as well as decentralising the police force away from 
the capital, Freetown. 
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It follows that the SLP’s restructuring process could add valuable lessons for the SAPS’s change 
efforts. The SLP’s newly adopted focus on an improved community-based orientation, and 
engagement with such communities, emphasises the significance of the continuous 
communication, consultation and interaction with all role players during change efforts.   
 
Lastly, the police services of England and Wales are presented. 
 
3.4.1.5 Restructuring police services in England and Wales 
 
• During 1998, Police Chief Charles H Ramsey announced a sweeping restructuring of the 
England and Wales Metropolitan Police Department that eliminates the top-heavy system 
of organisational bureaus, replacing them with a more streamlined organisation that puts 
more police resources in the community, cuts bureaucracy and holds department 
managers accountable for addressing crime and disorder problems in their geographic 
areas of responsibility. According to Ramsey, his restructuring plan would strengthen 
community policing by placing a wider range of police resources in the seven police 
districts, where they are more accessible to the community, and by focusing those 
resources on reducing crime and solving problems in the city’s neighborhoods. This 
restructuring would not alter the current boundaries of police districts or police service 
areas (PSA). In addition, Ramsey is of the opinion that this new structure represents 
nothing short of the wholesale transformation of the Metropolitan Police Department 
from a bureaucratic, incident-driven agency to a streamlined customer-driven service 
organisation (Chief Ramsey announces…, 1998). This restructuring plan constitutes the 
following: 
• Eliminate bureaus: The current structure creates excessive bureaucracy and makes 
coordinating across units cumbersome. Consequently, the four existing bureaus (Patrol 
Services, Support Services, Technical Services and Human Resources) are being 
eliminated. It follows that they are being replaced by a more efficient organisation that 
promotes teamwork, communication and accountability. 
• Establish geographic accountability for fighting crime: The new structure organises 
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police districts into three Regional Operations Commands (ROCs) - North, Central and 
East. Each ROC will be led by a regional assistant chief, whose office will be located in 
the community, not at Police Headquarters. The regional assistant chief will be 
accountable for managing resources and coordinating crime-fighting efforts throughout 
the region. 
• Create full-service police districts: The role of the seven police districts is being 
dramatically expanded from a narrow focus on patrol to the full range of police services 
needed to solve crimes and address neighborhood problems. In addition to PSA patrol 
services, the districts will include violent and property crime investigations, focused 
mission teams, and operational support and customer service units. By placing violent 
and property crime detectives in the districts, the over-specialisation of personnel who 
only investigate one type of crime, is being eliminated. 
• Streamline business operations: Administrative and technical functions are being 
consolidated under a new corporate support structure. Led by an assistant chief, this 
single structure will better coordinate the delivery of services in four key areas: human 
services, business services, training services and operational support services (Chief 
Ramsey announces…, 1998).       
 
Furthermore, in September 2005, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) published 
the report “Closing the Gap”, which examined the police service’s capacity and capability to 
deliver protective services. The report concluded that the current structure of 43 police services 
across England and Wales was no longer fit for purpose. Consequently, the report promoted the 
position that larger strategic forces would be better placed to deliver services, and that such 
forces could offer significant savings in organisational support costs (Flett & Collier, 2005:1). As 
a result, Government concluded that police forces needed to have a minimum of 4 000 police 
officers, or 6 000 police officers and staff combined, to provide effective protective policing 
services covering terrorism, major crime and civil emergencies (Paterson, [s.a.]:1). 
 
Subsequently, according to Loveday (2005:339-340), the 43 police forces of England and Wales 
would be replaced with 12-15 regional strategic police forces. However, one consequence of the 
report and the Home Secretary’s response to it, was the request made to all police authorities and 
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forces to present a business case to the Home Office by the end of 2005, identifying the future 
structure of policing in the region and the pattern of amalgamation they might favour. In the 
course of this exercise it was found that alternatives to amalgamation, collaboration and 
federation had both been closed down by the Home Secretary, who concluded that only the 
option of amalgamation was now acceptable to his department. In what proved to be almost 
unprecedented in terms of speed of implementation, the Home Secretary gave deadlines for all 
forces to provide him with plans for future amalgamations on a regional basis. However, as 
currently constituted, many police forces were unable, in terms of manpower and resources, to 
support a range of protective services, and this had to be addressed with some degree of urgency. 
In response to this, many police authorities agreed, albeit reluctantly, to draw up business plans 
for restructuring. On the other hand, it also became apparent in the short period within which this 
exercise was conducted, that there were significant differences of opinion between tripartite 
members as to what form the eventual outcome of reform was likely to take. 
 
As a result, the following restructure proposals are examples of police restructuring in England 
and Wales: 
 
3.4.1.5.1 North Yorkshire Police Authority 
 
According to the article Restructuring proposals for North Yorkshire Police (2006:12) the Home 
Secretary intended to seek parliamentary approval later that year to amalgamate North Yorkshire 
Police (NYP) with the three other police services in the Yorkshire and Humber region, to create 
a regional police force from 1 April 2008. As a result, this new Force would have approximately 
12 000 police officers, 8 000 police staff and a budget of just under £1 billion. This strategic 
amalgamation of existing forces could produce the necessary scale of organisation to address the 
existing deficiencies of the majority of forces in England and Wales in tackling serious crime. 
The issue was all about creating the necessary specialisms within police forces, to be able to 
effectively tackle major crime and public order incidents, serious and cross-border crime and 
counter-terrorism – the “protective services”. It was furthermore anticipated that by pooling the 
existing protective services capacity within the region and then re-allocating them - even without 
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investing further resources- it should be possible to make significant improvements to 
effectiveness. However, this would be a very large organisation in terms of geographical 
coverage and resources. In addition, many people felt that local people would lose control of 
policing, and that as a result, resources currently spent in this area would be allocated to high-
crime areas elsewhere in the region. It was furthermore argued, on the other hand, that whenever 
there was a major crime incident in the area, police officers from communities throughout the 
force needed to be utilised to deal with such incidents. Consequently, this took officers from the 
very areas where they were most valued by communities – close to the communities. Objections 
to those proposals had to be lodged with the Home Office by 11 August 2008. 
 
3.4.1.5.2 Police forces in the East Midlands 
 
According to Coleman and Birkin (2006), the Home Secretary was proposing to merge 
Derbyshire, Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire and Northamptonshire, to form a 
single East Midlands “Force” from April 2008. Alongside the proposal was a commitment from 
the Home Office to strengthen local policing. As a result, community policing teams were being 
established across the Country to deal with local problems such as antisocial behaviour. The 
Home Secretary pledged that there would be such teams in every area in the country by April 
2008. The merger process has therefore been driven by the need to improve what has become 
known as “protective services” across the region, both now and in the future.  It follows that the 
five forces in the East Midlands were assessed as unable to meet the required standard in both 
level and range of protective services, due largely to funding issues, and recognised the need to 
reconsider how protective services are delivered.  
 
However, as a major turning point, Tendler and Webster (2006) announced that government 
plans for the £ 1 billion merger of police forces across England and Wales had collapsed. As a 
result, this decision marked the end of the biggest police reform for 40 years, which was 
proposed after concern that smaller forces were failing to cope with high profile investigations 
and counter-terrorism operations. In addition, there were concerns about bills which could 
include millions in IT costs, redundancies and pensions. One of the biggest areas of concern was 
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that different forces required different levels of precept, the section of the annual tax bill for 
policing. Consequently, if merged forces took the precept of the force with the highest level, that 
would be unfair on thousands of council tax payers. On the other hand, if the lowest level was set 
– suggested by ministers – the new forces would run into cash crises. 
 
Similar to the England and Wales Metropolitan Police Department, the SAPS also recognised the 
importance of a flattened police structure, through the elimination of many layers of command. 
The elimination of bureaus in the England and Wales Metropolitan Police Department by 
replacing these bureaus with one efficient unit, could act as a valuable lesson for the SAPS in 
order to improve communication and interaction between various units within the organisation. 
      
3.5 Summary  
 
This chapter presented a review of the literature on restructuring processes in organisations. The 
purpose of this chapter was to explain what other researchers have discovered about the 
restructuring processes in organisations, in order to obtain a detailed perceptive of the topic and 
to compare it with the present study. In addition, examples were provided of the restructuring 
processes that national and international organisations, including policing and non-policing 
organisations, have embarked upon to emphasise the significance and the relevance of 
restructuring in organisations, as well as the trends such organisations pursue to reformulate the 
organisation’s structure and/or to adjust elements of the existing structures. 
 
Moreover, the lessons identified, that can be learnt from the international and national 
organisations, for change in the SAPS, thus explain how and where restructuring has taken place. 
In other words, the identified lessons that can be learnt thus substantiate the significance of such 
changes for policing organisations.  
 
Chapter 4 provides a presentation and discussion of the results. The presentation, analysis and 
integration of the qualitative data are presented and discussed, according to emergent themes and 
subcategories. 
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CHAPTER 4  PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the presentation, analysis and integration of the qualitative data (semi-structured 
individual interviews and focus group interviews, as discussed in paragraph 1.10.4 of chapter 1) 
are presented and discussed by means of emergent themes and subcategories, to categorise 
patterns or trends that can be identified or isolated in order to indicate the realisation of the goal 
and objectives of this study, as mentioned in paragraph 1.4 of chapter 1. Initially, and to realise 
these goals, nine semi-structured individual and focus group interviews were conducted with 
different stakeholders directly involved with the FCS.  In-depth discussions were held with an 
independent qualitative researcher, to substantiate on the emergent themes and subcategories, 
with the aim of triangulation of the data analysis.  
 
In order to promote the trustworthiness of the study, the research methodology, as discussed in 
paragraph 1.10 of chapter 1, was implemented and adhered to in the gathering and analysis of the 
data. The demographic particulars of the research participants are presented in Annexure B. 
 
During the process of data collection (i.e. the semi-structured individual and focus group 
interviews) the objectives and resultant questions, reflected in Annexure A, were used as a 
guideline to structure the discussion. From the participants’ answers to the aforementioned 
questions, the resultant processes of data analysis by the researcher and independent coder and 
the consequent consensus discussion, the following main themes, reflected in Annexure C, 
emerged. In this table an exposition is provided of the themes and sub-themes. 
 
The results of the individual interviews and focus group interviews follow. 
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4.2 The Outcome of the Individual Interviews and Focus Group Interviews 
 
In the next section of this discussion, each of the main themes and accompanying subcategories 
(where applicable) are presented and confirmed or underscored by direct quotes from the 
transcripts of the interviews.   
 
Initially, an explanation of each theme is given, followed by the responses to the questions. In 
addition, direct verbatim reflections of the respondents’ responses are also presented, in order to 
enrich these responses. Finally, subsequent to the presentation of each theme and its 
subcategories, a critical reflection is presented, which concludes each theme.  
 
The first theme to be discussed explores how participants understand the rationale behind the 
restructuring of the FCS. 
 
4.2.1 Exploring the awareness of the motivation behind the restructuring of the FCS 
 
Any change initiative is a complex process that may lead to confusion and insecurity, if not 
properly understood by all the relevant stakeholders. As a result, each member has to be familiar 
with all the aspects of the restructuring process in the FCS, in order to prevent any uncertainty 
that may cause confusion, and also to streamline the restructuring process. The liability to create 
awareness among members on ground level, to familiarise and empower them with knowledge of 
the restructuring process is, however, the responsibility of the SAPS management. Consequently, 
this theme presents the respondents’ degree of understanding and familiarity with the 
restructuring process in the FCS. 
 
The answers to the question “Do you have an understanding of why the restructuring of the FCS 
has been undertaken and what it involves”?, gave rise to this theme. 
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On closer analysis of the answers given by the participants to this question, it was evident that a 
small number of participants had an understanding of why the restructuring of the FCS had been  
undertaken (though in some instances a limited understanding), while the majority of participants 
(through their utterances) indicated a complete lack of understanding as to why the FCS had to 
be restructured.  
 
Focus group interviews with participants, referred to in Annexure B, employed at the various 
FCS cluster units, revealed their understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the 
FCS to be diverse and also of a limited degree. One participant indicated his limited 
understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS,by saying it was primarily to 
bring the services of the unit closer to the clients and vice versa: “... the only reason I 
understand”. However, the dilemma that FCS detectives faced was the fact that they needed to 
cover a large geographical area to attend to complaints, which resulted in victims not being 
attended to timeously, and thus increasing these detectives’ understanding of why they had to be 
restructured: “… dit vat ons nog steeds ‘n hele ruk om daar uit te kom … nadat ons in kennis 
gestel is van ‘n voorval … ons weet nog steeds nie hoekom het hulle dit gedoen nie.” [“… It still 
takes us a while to arrive there… after we are informed of an incident … we still don’t know why 
they did it …”].  In addition, participants explained their limited understanding of this process to 
be as a result of inadequate communication and consultation regarding this process. However, 
members of the FCS were expected to comply with the restructuring: “… it was not 
communicated … we have to take an instruction and comply with …”, as a result, “… there is a 
whole lot of uncertainties about some issues”. A serious concern raised was the fact that 
members did not understand their role in this process:  “… what is our role in this restructuring 
…” However, when the restructuring process was eventually explained, it slightly improved his 
understanding thereof, but this process did not indicate a clear view of the future: “... later when 
it was explained it has got a direction … it doesn’t show exactly where we are heading to …”.  
The participant moreover described his limited understanding of this process to train general 
detectives at station level in FCS-related investigations, to enable these detectives to investigate 
such cases at their respective stations. However, the training never materialised, as a result of a 
lack of human resources at these stations: “… we have to … train them from their respective 
stations … they don’t have enough manpower … that we train them …”. 
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Explanations that were, furthermore, given of the rationale behind the restructuring process were 
to bring the services of the FCS closer to the community “… people had to travel far to raise 
complaints ...”, thus improving service delivery to the community, through the placing of FCS 
experts at station level: “... the restructuring is to benefit the people [referring to the public]. As 
a result, the community would be more at ease and content to raise complaints. However, another 
participant did not experience changes in service delivery to the community “... it is still the 
same service  that we are giving …”, but regarded the rationale of the restructuring process only 
as relocating from one office to another “… the only change is that we are moved from that place 
to this place …”. Another participant shared a similar view and raised his concerns that 
increasing service delivery had not transpired; nevertheless, the unit’s standard of service 
delivery had depreciated: “... that was their [referring to the SAPS management] main change … 
better service delivery to get expertise down to station level ... nothing has materialised 
everything have deteriorated”. One participant, furthermore, imagined that the restructuring of 
the FCS had the goal to familiarise FCS detectives with investigating all aspects of crime and not 
specialising in a specific field: “... they want each and every police official to investigate all the 
stuff ...”.   
  
In contrast to the abovementioned participant’s views, a number of participants evidently held 
negative reactions to the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS, revealing their uncertainty 
and confusion surrounding their understanding of the restructuring process of the FCS. These 
participants indicated that they had a complete lack of understanding of the restructuring of the 
FCS.  One participant firmly portrayed, by means of a comparison, his uncertainty about the 
rationale behind the restructuring: “… I felt like a puppy ... We didn’t understand what was going 
on ... where we were going what we are supposed to do, nothing ...”. Moreover, another 
participant summarised his confusion and uncertainty regarding his primary functions, the 
completion of the restructuring process and confirmation of his newly adopted station:   “... we 
are not sure if we are still going to do FCS cases … how long are they going to take to finish up 
this whole thing … we are still quite in the dark …”.  However, a few participants indicated that 
they make an effort to understand this process and the direction they are heading towards: “… we 
try to understand … where is it heading …?”  Besides, one participant described the 
restructuring of the FCS as a drawback, not only to police officers, but to the community as well: 
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“… this thing is a disadvantage not only for the police officers, but for everybody …” resulting in 
questioning the continuation of a positive attitude towards the restructuring of the FCS when 
there is no reward for them in return: “… why should we sustain anything if it don’t bring 
anything good to us, why?”  One participant suggested direct communication by the SAPS 
management, explaining the motivation behind this process, would have improved their 
understanding of this process: “… the management … must call all of the FCS members … 
explain all this to them but they didn’t do it up to now …”.   
 
Correspondingly, another participant summarised the reasons why he did not understand the 
rationale behind the restructuring process, by referring to the fact that they are still working in 
the same manner as before: “… it is still the same, nothing has changed”. He furthermore 
indicated that the communication about the restructuring process was poor, as they were told that 
the restructuring is a temporary arrangement, called a “duty arrangement” which would have 
been evaluated within six months, but “it is now almost two years no evaluation has been done 
no feedback has been given to us”. This viewpoint was shared by another participant. He voiced 
the feelings of neglect, cynicism, and lack of acceptance as “I feel I am being used … now I 
really do not know where I belong”. Very often the officials who were relocated were not 
accepted and incorporated into the new station, and he expressed this observation as follows: “… 
we are being discriminated here at the station because every time anything is said we are always 
excluded and isolated so I don’t know exactly where do we belong”. Another serious concern that 
was raised was the fact that these relocated officials carried out their specialised duties as before, 
but were not compensated as before: “… yet now it is worse because we are not even paid for the 
standby duties …. We are the ones who bring in the most of the convictions … but yet we have 
not been motivated. “. Another serious dilemma experienced by these relocated officials, was the 
fact that they were relocated without being provided with similar office facilities, sufficient 
equipment and other resources. They were now expected to deliver the same outputs as before, 
but without the resources.  
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One of the participants summed this up as follows: “ … we were situated in perfect offices 
friendly environment for women and children … everything to our disposal … then our offices 
were hijacked from us … we … sit without any facilities two to three officers in one small room 
… not adequate to … interview abused women and abused kids. We use to have cars like the 
combi to transport … the victims in a very nice way, now we can’t. It is just terrible it is 
demoralising us”.  
 
In addition to the abovementioned examination, it furthermore became apparent that participants 
and representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGO), comprised of social workers, 
psychology interns, play therapists and volunteers rendering counselling services to victims of 
domestic and sexual abuse related crimes, similarly had a limited understanding of the rationale 
behind the restructuring of the FCS. 
 
Participants justified their restricted understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the 
FCS as a result of the lack of communicating this process to them and by means of unconfirmed 
reports. These participants explained their limited understanding of this process was the doing 
away with the FCS as a specialised unit, thus dividing the unit’s knowledge and skills by means 
of placing FCS detectives at various police stations where they would perform duties as normal 
detectives:  “… didn’t want a specialised unit ... each station will have a little bit of expertise ... 
and work pretty much as a normal, a non-specialised unit cop, not in their expertise”.  Another 
participant confirmed that she experienced confusion about the restructuring process “...I don’t 
have an understanding why in the first place it was initiated…” and, in addition, did not 
experience any changes since the process was implemented: “I don’t think there is any 
difference…”.  
  
Another participant justified her restricted understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring 
of the FCS as a result of a lack of consultation with important role players: “... lack of 
consultation with the stakeholders … there was no discussion around this it was just a top down 
thing …” and suggested dialogue between her organisation, as an important role player, and the 
police, in order to inform these role players and to clarify this process: “... information sessions 
where they must inform us that there is going to be some changes …”.   
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A contributing factor to the deficient understanding of this process was the confusion of clearly 
defined roles among police members: “… even the police personnel themselves they were still 
confused as to what is happening and what are they expected to do …”. 
    
Moreover, the Manager Therapeutic Services of another non-governmental organisation NGO 
was also of the view that the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS was to bring the 
services provider (in this case the FCS) and the client systems closer together.  “… my 
understanding was to bring the police out in the community and to make the police more 
accessible to the community”. However, she questioned the feasibility of this process for 
practical reasons, that in turn increases the lack of the rationale behind the restructuring of the 
FCS: “... I am not sure if that is feasible and workable because … this [referring to abuse] is 
done under a shadow of secrecy so that still doesn’t make sense to me”.  In agreement with other 
participants, this participant also experienced the absence of consultation and communication 
regarding this process, as a major contributing factor to the lack of understanding the rationale 
behind the restructuring of the FCS “… lack of consultation …” and describes this process as 
enforced upon members and other role players: “… it was just a top down thing …”.  It came to 
light that this process was sudden and unexpected without contingency plans in place: “… there 
were no measures to put into place to address the shortcomings …”. 
  
A senior researcher of a regional human security research institute’s Crime and Justice 
Programme communicated his understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring, stating 
that the reasons for restructuring the FCS units were to bring these units closer to communities 
and to flatten the organisational structure, in order to enhance service delivery: “… closing down 
of the area offices and ... decentralise FCS units to bring them closer to communities”. 
 
It furthermore emerged from the individual interviews with senior public prosecutors 
(prosecuting in cases of domestic violence, child abuse and sexual offences), that these 
prosecutors also have a limited understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the 
FCS. However, not all the prosecutors were equally familiar with this restructuring process. As a 
result, the majority expressed their uncertainty and negative sentiment towards the restructuring.  
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A senior public prosecutor voiced his understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of 
the FCS, as an effort by the SAPS to introduce every police official to investigate the entire 
spectrum of crime and, as a result, do away with certain crimes only investigated by certain 
specialised officials “… gepoog word om alle polisiemanne te laat werk met alle tipe misdrywe - 
dat daar nie veronderstel is om sekere beamptes te wees wat net met sekere misdrywe werk nie” 
[“… efforts are being made to involve all the SAPS members with all kinds of crimes preventing 
members from handling only certain cases”]. Consequently, it will also increase sufficient 
human resources in all areas in order to enable police officials to investigate all types of crimes. 
“… genoeg mense … in elke omgewing te hê wat met alle tipe misdrywe kan werk” [“…to have 
sufficient members in all areas to handle all types of crimes”].  Additionally, this senior public 
prosecutor explained his understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS as an 
endeavour by the SAPS to provide a more accessible service to the community through the 
training of general police officials at station level by the FCS detectives at their newly designated 
stations. This understanding by the participant was communicated to him through FCS detectives 
and not by means of official SAPS channels at a higher level: “… vaardighede … oor te dra aan 
ander lede in die betrokke stasies … om meer toeganklik te wees vir lede van die publiek … wat 
die lede basies aan my verduidelik het” [“…members explained to me that it is to transfer skills 
to members at the stations … in order to be more accessible to the public”].  It came to light that 
the severe lack of communication and consultation with role players mainly contributed to the 
lack of knowledge about why the FCS was restructured.  It follows that this participant became 
aware of the rationale behind the restructuring, in the media: “… daar was nie vooraf enige 
motivering rêrig gekommunikeer oor hoekom dit sou plaasvind … Die enigste kommunikasie … 
was maar wat ‘n mens in die media gesien het … Twee jaar na die proses … uhm … is daar nog 
steeds geen duidelike motivering …” [“… there was no prior communication why this process 
was taking place … the only communication was in the media … two years after the 
implementation of this process there is still no clear motivation …”].   
 
This participant emotionally conveyed her uncertainty about the rationale behind the 
restructuring. As a result, the participant expressed her concerns about the practicality of the 
restructuring process as “. ...onlogies ... ondeurdag en wat dit behels is dat alles nou chaos is … 
prakties verstaan ek dit glad nie”. [“…illogical … not thought through properl,y therefore 
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everything is chaos … practically I definitely don’t understand it”].  The participant furthermore 
questioned the success of what she was made aware of, through the grapevine, as to what the 
rationale behind the restructuring was, with the following remark: “… uit gesprekvoering was dit 
gewees om hulle meer beskikbaar te maak vir die mense wat hulle bedien …  As dit die doelwit 
was … dan is dit in elk geval nie bereik nie …” [“… through conversation it became known that 
it is implemented to make members more available to the public … if that is their objective … it 
is not achieved …”].  It became apparent that the total lack of communication about the reason 
for this process mainly contributed to the participant’s unfamiliarity with the motivation to 
implement this process: “… geen kommunikasie van enige party af … jy het nie regtigwaar enige 
inligting oor waarom dinge is soos wat dit is …” [“… no communication from any party … you 
don’t really have information as to why it is like it is…”].  It also appears that the restructuring 
created increased complexity in the judicial procedures that emphasise the rationale behind the 
introduction of this process “… as jy moontlik op ‘n verhoordatum sien dat die 
ondersoekbeampte het byvoorbeeld nie die subpoenas ingedien aan getuies nie … dan word daar 
vir jou gesê … ek is uitgeplaas … dit is nou deel van die herstrukturering … nou het jy geen 
waarborge nie dat dieselfde persoon wat gehandel het met die ondersoek aanvanklik huidiglik 
met die ondersoek handel nie”.  [“… you possibly only notice on the trial date that the 
investigating officer did not furnish witnesses with subpoenas … you are then informed that the 
official is placed at another component due to restructuring … now you don’t have any 
guarantee that the initial investigating officer will presently handle your case”].   
 
From this utterance by the participant one also gets an idea of how the restructuring of the FCS 
impacted on the level of service delivery.  This aspect will be presented as a separate theme, as 
discussed in paragraph 4.2.4 of chapter 4. 
 
Correspondingly, another senior public prosecutor admitted to being unsure about the rationale 
behind the restructuring, and simultaneously questioned the goals, objectives and strategy of this 
process, as well as the management level on which the decision to restructure the FCS was made, 
since no communication thereof was received. : “… weet nie werklik op watter vlak is hierdie 
besluite geneem nie … lees maar in die koerante dat hierdie eenheid gaan ontbind … nie veel 
gekommunikeer wat die doel daaragter is …” [“… are not really aware at what level these 
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decisions were made … I read in the newspaper this unit is disbanding … not much was 
communicated what the objective is …”].  Moreover, the participant probed the method the 
SAPS utilised in approaching the restructuring. As a result, the participant’s vagueness was 
enhanced through confusion of the whereabouts of the FCS detectives and their commanders 
who previously rendered service in a particular jurisdiction: “… jy weet nie waar om hierdie 
mense in die hande te kry nie …  jy weet nie noodwendig waarheen al die lede uitgeplaas is wat 
lopende dossiere by jou het nie en jy weet ook nie presies watter bevelvoerder moet jy kontak …” 
[“… you don’t know where to get hold of these people … you don’t know where all these people 
are now placed that still have dockets with you and you also don’t know which commander to 
contact …”].  
 
In an e-mail message (Annexure E) as stated by Machakela (2009), the Manager: 
Communication and Marketing and the National Negotiator of SAPU explained this union’s 
understanding of the restructuring of the FCS: “It was intended to address functional problems 
within the SAPS, including duplicity of functions, weak command and control, and poor service 
delivery. The restructuring process also sought to eliminate the area level management that had 
come to be viewed as an unnecessary level of authority. This meant that the SAPS management 
would now operate on a national, provincial and station level, in line with the requirement of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (South Africa, 1996: sec.40 (1)).  However, in 
practice, this union’s understanding was that only the area offices would have to close down and 
members affected would then be placed at police stations closer to their place of residence. It 
follows that this process was never aimed at closing down specialised units such as the FCS. On 
the other hand, what was supposed to happen was that the command and control of the FCS 
would have to be re-arranged in order for the unit to at least report to the provincial office 
thereby keeping the expertise and resources which were utilised by the unit”.  
 
The Head: Efficiency Services in the SAPS, referred to in Annexure B, confirmed the reasons 
why the restructuring of the FCS had to take place.  This senior officer conveyed that the main 
reasons for restructuring the FCS were that the general public did not have easy access to the 
services of the FCS: “...die publiek het nie toegang gehad tot die dienste van die GKS nie...” 
[...the public did not have access to the services of the FCS...].  
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It follows that the SAPS utilised a strategy to empower police stations to improve service 
delivery with regard to FCS functions. The officer also emphasised that the functions of the FCS 
were not discontinued, however, the capacity of the unit’s functions were enhanced at station 
level: “...om stasies te bemagtig... dienslewering aan die publiek te verbeter... GKS funksies is 
nie gestaak nie, dit bestaan nog steeds... kapasiteit van stasies is verhoog...” [“...to empower 
stations... to improve service delivery to the public... FCS functions are not suspended... the 
capacity of stations is increased...”].  
 
On the other hand, a minority of participants expressed a positive outlook towards the 
restructuring of the FCS being expectant of this process. A senior researcher and representative 
of a regional human security research institute was of the opinion that a number of reasons the 
SAPS announced for restructuring the FCS is an indication of good judgment; however, the 
process needs to be executed appropriately. “… there is a lot of positive things one can say about 
their [referring to the SAPS] intentions … but then it needs to be done properly”. 
 
In addition, one of the participants from one of the focus group discussions and a representative 
of an NGO (comprised of social workers, psychology interns and volunteers rendering 
counselling services to victims of domestic and sexual abuse related crimes), positively 
demonstrated an attitude of ownership in collaboration with the FCS in order to take 
responsibility towards improving the circumstances surrounding the restructuring of the FCS. 
“… as the community we should all take responsibility … we can’t blame all of them [referring 
to the FCS] because they don’t make the decisions”.    
 
From this storyline, the “absence” of the FCS restructured unit can also be deduced, which will 
impact on their level of service delivery.  This statement must also be read in conjunction with 
the theme focusing on participants’ views about the effect of the restructuring of the FCS on 
service delivery, as discussed in 4.2.4 of chapter 4. 
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From the above, it is evident that participants seem to have valid concerns about the lack of 
feedback to them around their future, of being treated as outsiders by the stations they were 
relocated to, not receiving the same compensation as before, and being expected to carry out 
their work with less - and inferior - resources. 
 
It became apparent that the participants’ understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring 
of the FCS units was heterogeneous. The respondents’ degree of understanding and familiarity 
with the restructuring process in the FCS, however, remains the responsibility of the SAPS 
management. The complete ambiguity of a large number of participants’, opposed to a minority 
of participants’ familiarity with the process concerning the rationale behind the restructuring of 
the FCS, might be the result of the failure or lack of ability of the SAPS management to 
effectively communicate the motivation and underlying principles of the restructuring process to 
members and other stakeholders at the lower hierarchical levels, in order to familiarise and 
empower them with knowledge of this process. This contrasting appearance among participants 
might also refer to the doubtful communication style in which internal and external 
communication is taking place in the SAPS.  In addition, the high level of uncertainty among 
respondents firstly illustrates the inability of the SAPS management to successfully communicate 
the importance of the restructuring of the FCS internally to its members at the lower levels, and 
secondly, to other relevant stakeholders externally. The lack of communication from the SAPS 
might explain why a number of participants have negative attitudes (referring to the thoughts or 
feelings that prevail among them) towards the restructuring process, being pessimistic, 
disapproving or critical towards the process. These pessimistic attitudes and uncertainties that 
prevail among a number of participants might be as a result of the undemocratic and dictatorial 
way in which this process was enforced upon them. On the other hand, these negative attitudes of 
participants raise the question about their enthusiasm to understand the rationale behind the 
restructuring of the FCS, and the appearance among them of expecting rewards as a precondition 
to understanding or accepting this process.  
 
The theme to be discussed next evaluates participants’ perceptions and experiences of the 
implementation of the restructuring process.   
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4.2.2 Evaluating the implementation of the restructuring process  
 
The implementation of any change initiative should be executed with the necessary diplomacy, 
consultative communication and transparency. Participants’ perceptions and experiences of the 
implementation of the restructuring process refer to what the participants’ thoughts, feelings and 
assessment are of the way in which the restructuring process in the FCS was carried out and 
enforced upon them. In other words, how do participants’ evaluate, judge and interpret their 
dealings in the execution of the restructuring of the FCS to which they were compulsorily 
subjected? Participants’ interpretation and assessment of the implementation of the restructuring 
process can take the form of a clear, well executed and understood process carried out gradually. 
Conversely, participants can also experience the implementation of the restructuring process 
characterised by confusion, uncertainty and unconfirmed reports that are executed 
instantaneously.  
 
The answers to the following questions gave rise to this theme: “Do you have an understanding 
of why the restructuring of the FCS has been undertaken and what it involves?” and “From your 
experience, has the SAPS management clearly communicated and consulted the goals and 
objectives of the restructuring process of the FCS? In other words, did the SAPS management 
interact with you?”  
 
The storylines presented under this theme will serve as testimony that the majority of the 
participants perceived and experienced the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS as a 
process shrouded in confusion, characterised by a lack of consultative communication with 
stakeholders, from the SAPS management side.  This process lacked transparency; it was viewed 
as a one-sided, top-down approach. 
 
It prominently transpired from focus group interviews conducted with members employed in 
FCS units (referred to in Annexure B) that the vast majority of participants experienced and 
perceived the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS as a process characterised by 
confusion, uncertainty and unconfirmed reports that were executed instantaneously.   
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The participants vocalised their perceptions and experiences on the implementation of the 
restructuring process of the FCS as follows: 
 
During focus group interviews conducted with participants employed at the FCS units, the 
majority of the participants declared that they had been made aware of the restructuring of the 
FCS in the media and not through official SAPS communication channels:  “... we didn’t even 
read it [referring to the restructuring of the FCS] in the document [referring to official SAPS 
document] … I heard from the restructuring on the National Television … no one ever told you 
why and what it is about.”  Another participant similarly learnt of this process “... from the 
newspaper and I did not believe it”.  A number of participants similarly voiced their resentment 
towards the authoritarian manner in which the implementation of this process was eventually 
communicated to FCS detectives: “… [the SAPS management] just told us that you are going to 
that police station. We were not professionally informed about the restructuring”.  One 
participant described the implementation of the restructuring process by comparing it to chaos 
“... ‘implementation’ is actually a good word for chaos … there was no implementation thereof”, 
as a result of the initial indecision of the SAPS management to restructure the unit, as well as the 
uncertainty of members’ new placements, to which they were subjected: “… they told us that the 
FCS unit … is not going to close down. The next morning they … gave us letters for reporting a 
week later to a different station ...”. 
 
Participants furthermore correspondingly echoed what other participants had said about the lack 
of consultative communication from the SAPS management’s side concerning the goals and 
objectives of the restructuring process of the FCS.  One of the other participants stated that they 
were informed of the restructuring of the FCS by phone: “We received a telephone call quarter 
to five in the afternoon ...”, whereafter another participant correspondingly confirmed that FCS 
detectives at their particular unit were belatedly informed of this process: “… the next morning at 
8 o’clock and we received all the letters” [referring to official letters communicating that 
members of the FCS had been restructured and thus placed at other stations.]  One participant 
passionately summed up his sentiment towards the implementation of the restructuring process 
as a dreadful experience that was not conveyed to the FCS unit he was then attached to: “... it 
was terrible first of all it was not communicated”.  Another concerning issue that was raised was 
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the fact that the implementation of the restructuring process was shrouded in uncertainty: “… 
nobody still is telling us exactly what it is  [referring to the restructuring process] so there is a 
whole lot of uncertainties about some issues”. An additional concern that was mentioned was 
that the implementation of this process was enforced upon members and, in addition, lacked 
participative decisionmaking: “… the members did not have any say or choice with the 
restructuring”, and labelled the restructuring as a “negative experience”.  Moreover, another 
participant suggested that the SAPS management should have consulted members on the lower 
hierarchical levels, in order to gain firsthand experience prior to implementation of this process: 
“… hulle kon ons ‘input’ gevra het … in hoofkantoor of ‘wherever’ besluite neem … geen rêrige 
idee van wat se impak dit gaan hê …” [“… they could have asked our input … Head Office or 
wherever decisions are made don’t really have an idea what the impact would be …”]. It came 
to light that this process was implemented under false pretences, since the SAPS management 
did not divulge all the steps and extent of this process to the FCS detectives: “… they say we are 
here for duty arrangements … it is now nearly 2 years being in this duty arrangement …”.  
 
Once again the lack of consultative communication from the SAPS management side about the 
implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS, and the goals and objectives of this 
process, became apparent.   
 
A detective from the FCS dejectedly explained his experience of the implementation of this 
process, that led to the lack of consultative communication from the SAPS management, as an 
uninformative meeting where instructions, rather than information concerning this process, were 
given: “… it was just a meeting … and we were just been told … not like a communication”. 
Moreover, another participant also experienced the implementation of this process as a sudden 
process that was enforced upon participants, lacking consultation  “…it [referring to the 
restructuring of the FCS] was not properly conveyed to us it was just implemented, whether we 
like it or not we have to comply …”. An additional participant was of the opinion that the 
implementation of the restructuring process was not comprehensively premeditated, thus leading 
to numerous predicaments: “... when we were moved to the station we have to sit in the passage 
because there was no office … if it was thoroughly planned, I don’t think we would encounter so 
many problems. We needed time to thought it through … and explain to the community as well”.  
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In addition, another participant experienced a complete lack of consultation; consequently, FCS 
members were ordered to report for duty at their new stations:  “… didn’t even come and ask our 
opinion they just told us on that day you have to report by that police station”.  
 
Besides the abovementioned feedback from FCS detectives, it noticeably came to light during 
focus group discussions with NGOs (comprising social workers, psychology interns, and 
volunteers rendering counselling services to victims of domestic and sexual abuse related crimes) 
that the majority of participants perceived the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS as 
a process covered with confusion, uncertainty and characterised with a lack of communication 
and unconfirmed reports. Participants also agreed that the implementation of the restructuring 
process was abrupt and unanticipated. 
 
A participant and representative of an NGO portrayed her experience of the implementation of 
the restructuring of the FCS to be initially mystified, in disorder, and characterised with 
unconfirmed reports and gossip: “… it was a bit confusing ... there were rumours then they 
[referring to the FCS] are closing, then they are not”.  Consequent to these rumours then, only 
the police liaised with stakeholders to shed light on the implementation of this process: “… after 
that I think the police had a few meetings where they got role players together and then they 
explained the process”. Similarly, an additional participant initially experienced the restructuring 
process to be confusing to herself, to members of the SAPS, as well as to members of the 
community, since the previously established cooperating network had failed after the 
implementation of this process. However, this participant currently had an improved 
understanding of the process, as a result of applying her sole discretion and creativity to improve 
her understanding:  “… it was confusing because for instance the person [referring to FCS 
detective] who we used to contact … was no longer the one responsible and we didn’t know who 
is the new person to contact … at the police station they didn’t know what to do with those kind 
of cases … my experience has been confusion to both myself, my clients and the police 
themselves … I had to use my own creativity in terms of establishing network in staying [in touch 
with] the police station …”. 
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Another participant, furthermore, without hesitation indicated that she was completely unfamiliar 
with the restructuring of the FCS: “I don’t understand the process … I don’t know what it is”. 
Another participant followed up, expressing her ambiguity concerning the implementation of this 
process, stating that the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS was not a thoroughly 
executed process, and, in addition, questioned the whereabouts of FCS detectives after the 
implementation of this process that, in turn, led to a lack of information:  “I still find it very 
confusing … because we don’t know who to speak to.  Where did these experts go?”  
The researcher then enquired about the factors contributing to the lack of understanding of the 
restructuring process. A number of participants similarly agreed that there was no appropriate 
communication. That, in turn, led to vagueness and doubt concerning the whole restructuring 
process: “I think people were not really clear what it was about when it was happening and what 
to do”.  Another participant also confirmed that SAPS management did not clearly communicate 
and consult the goals and objectives of the restructuring process of the FCS.  He express this 
observation as follows: “In my experience there has never been any communication between my 
organisation and the SAPS during the restructuring process in actual fact you [referring to the 
researcher who is a member of the SAPS] are the first person from the SAPS who came to have a 
discussion with us”.  It also became evident that a large number of these participants were also 
made aware of the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS through the media: “We saw 
everything [about the restructuring] on television”. On the other hand, a large number of the 
participants became aware of this process through unconfirmed reports and hearsay:  “Word of 
mouth I would say. It would be somebody telling something ...”.  
 
Another participant did not only confess to confusion amongst themselves as an NGO working 
closely with the FCS, but pointed also to confusion in the FCS itself, relating to the restructuring: 
“… there were even confusion amongst the people in the unit [referring to the CFS unit]… there 
was confusion on our side … on their side as well”.  The vast majority of participants 
furthermore expressed the view that the SAPS executed the restructuring process without 
consulting role players at the lower levels, thus not preparing them for this process that resulted 
in disorder: “… they just implemented it. They didn’t involve anybody - key people who are 
working on ground floor level … not preparing the market for it”.  
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It was chaos”. You know the one day you spoke to a person [referring to FCS detective] and the 
next day … nobody can tell you where you can find a person …”. 
What’s more, another participant experienced that members of the community who are in need to 
access the services of the FCS, are also negatively affected by the implementation of this process 
and the lack of communication thereof: “… it was difficult especially for members of the 
community … where would they report their cases and … the cases that they reported … nobody 
knew about those cases and it was confusing to us”. 
  
Moreover, the Therapeutic Manager of another NGO (rendering counselling services to victims 
of violence and abuse) comparably voiced her experiences about the implementation of the 
restructuring of the FCS to be a sudden and unexpected order from the SAPS management that 
came as a surprise: “... it was very sudden and unexpected … implemented without any 
forewarning or consultation … a top down policy … It was just a decree, an order declared … 
We were just told overnight there is no longer going to be a FCS unit”. 
It also emerged during this interview that the SAPS management had not clearly communicated 
and consulted the goals and objectives of the restructuring process of the FCS to the NGO sector. 
As a result, the lack of communication and consultation created ambiguity and uncertainty 
among the NGOs and members of the FCS. “Having spoken to many FCS Officials … there is a 
lot of confusion and lack of clarity around the restructuring process… To date there has been 
no… reach out to us as partners in the process.” It also came to light that the implementation of 
the restructuring process had been a one-sided process that was not given the appropriate 
attention it deserved from the SAPS:  “I don’t think this was a thought out process … it was 
planned … uhm … at the top excluding people that are involved hands on.”  This participant 
described her awareness of the restructuring as a discourteous disruption of her organisation’s 
daily functions, since a number of FCS detectives unexpectedly announced the withdrawal of 
their services to NGOs:  “… such a rude interruption … a few officers said they can no longer 
assist us … suddenly all of this just came to an end … it was just a sudden interruption”. 
 
Moreover, in line with the aforementioned storylines, an interview conducted with two 
researchers from a humanitarian security research institute’s crime and justice programme, 
confirm what the other participants had experienced during the implementation of the 
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restructuring process of the FCS. One researcher stated that they are in the initial phases of 
conducting an investigation into the restructuring of the FCS unit.  From their initial discussion 
with members of the mentioned units it became clear that there was a definite lack of 
consultation and communication from the SAPS management “... there was no proper 
consultation from the Police Management...”. Although there was some sort of communication 
from the SAPS management, it, however, only materialised after the implementation and 
criticism towards this process: “There were communication send out but these were out when the 
decisions were already taken … communication only held after criticism”. The participant 
pointed to the fact that this mode of operation [referred to above] “… is indicative of the way in 
which management [referring to SAPS Management] handle the fault - members were send to 
police stations, senior members, without proper consultation”. 
Additionally, this participant also remarked that no stakeholders were consulted, however; the 
SAPS could have consulted the NGOs: “… nobody was consulted but they [could have] 
consulted NGOs regarding this restructuring process and that was the biggest … no consultation 
....”  The participant expressively stated that there was an evident lack of consultation and 
communication of the restructuring process by the SAPS management. However, the SAPS only 
started communicating this process after public criticism, and explaining this communication 
rather as damage control “… police management were then forced to start communicating but the 
process was already on the way.  It was more a question of damage control than communicating 
... especially in terms of public criticism.  In some cases [members] were already transferred and 
then they received communication in terms of the reason for this whole restructuring process”. It 
also transpires that the police union was misinformed about the goals and objectives of the 
restructuring process in order to gain their support “… later on it became clear that the way in 
which this was communicated to the unions was interpreted by the unions to mislead them just to 
get them on board”.  
 
It furthermore prominently emerged from the individual interviews with senior public 
prosecutors (prosecuting in cases of domestic violence, child abuse and sexual offences) that 
they widely considered the implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS to be 
categorised as an abrupt process lacking consultative communication, resulting in uncertainty 
and confusion. 
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During individual interviews with senior public prosecutors it became apparent that the goals and 
objectives of the restructuring of the FCS were not communicated to and consulted with them.  
One participant expressed his perceptions and experiences in relation to the implementation of 
the restructuring process of the FCS, by questioning the consultation and involvement of all the 
other relevant role players: “… in die eerste plek weet ek nie of al die rolspelers wel geken is …”  
[“… in the first instance I don’t know if all the role players were actually known …”].  This 
participant, however, experienced no consultation regarding this process in his department, and, 
in addition, also questions the relevance of the objectives of this process in relation to the 
objectives of other important role players: “... van ons kant af is die Nasionale Vervolgingsgesag 
op grondvlak was daar nooit enige konsultasie ….”. Ek weet nie presies hoe pas dit in die hele 
strategie van polisiëring en die bekamping van misdaad van die polisie nie … ek weet nie rêrig 
of pas dit in by ook die oogmerke van ander rolspelers ...” [“… from the National Prosecuting 
Authority at ground level there was no consultation … I don’t exactly know how it complements 
the whole strategy of policing and the prevention of crime … I also don’t really know if it 
complements the objectives of other role players…”].  It furthermore surfaced that this 
participant’s lack of knowledge about the implementation of the restructuring process is 
contributable to the absence of proper communication, consultation and the practical 
implementation thereof:  “… daar was geen kommunikasie … daar was geen behoorlike 
konsultasie … in die implementering daarvan nie”.  [“… there was no communication … no 
proper consultation with the implementation thereof”].  It furthermore emerged that the media 
played a greater function than the SAPS management in communicating this process: “… die 
eerste bewuswording van so ‘n moontlike herstrukturering was maar bloot in die media gewees” 
[“… the first awareness of a possible restructuring was in the media”]. 
The participant, furthermore, anticipated the restructuring process. However, this process was 
then already implemented without additional information or prior warning: “Jy het basies geweet 
dit gaan kom en die volgende wat jy sien is dit het reeds plaasgevind …” [“You basically 
anticipated it and then next it already occurred …”].   Should consultation and communication 
of the restructuring process have transpired, it would then have decreased existing dilemmas and 
also increased cooperation between roleplayers: “… as dit dan nou wel hulle doel was en dit is 
goed oorgedra dan sou dit baie meer vlot kon verloop … en veral die ander rolspelers en net 
hulle terugvoer gekry het … ek dink probleme wat nou bestaan sou dalk moontlik ondervang kon 
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word”. [“… if it was their objective and it was properly carried over it would have been more 
streamlined … especially the feedback of other role players … I anticipate challenges that now 
exist would have been minimised”].  The practical and logistical difficulties experienced after the 
implementation of the restructuring process were also questioned. As a result, it indicates and 
reflects the rapid manner in which this process was implemented: “... is daar rêrig aan die 
praktiese en logistieke probleme gedink ... en die implementering daarvan?  Dit is maar net weer 
eens ‘n aanduiding dat daar nie … baie dink daaraan gegaan het van moontlike probleme wat 
kan ontstaan”. [“… was there really any thought given to the practical and logistical problems 
… and the implementation thereof? It is once more an indication that challenges that might 
occur were not thought through properly”].  
In correspondence with the aforementioned senior public prosecutor, another senior public 
prosecutor indicated the lack of communication and consultation from the SAPS management 
about the goals of the restructuring of the FCS.  This participant also vocalised that she perceived 
and experienced a lack of understanding of the restructuring process, due to the lack of 
communication, since this process was never discussed with personnel on ground level: “… ons 
wat in die howe geopereer het is nooit gekontak en gevra of dit nou enigsins ‘n invloed gaan hê 
op ons werksvermoë of niks nie …” [“… we who operate in court were never contacted and 
asked if it would have an influence whatsoever on our working ability …”].  She therefore 
regarded the implementation of this process as a top-down, one-sided approach: “... ‘n 
ondeurdagte eensydige besluit …” [“… an incoherent one-sided decision …”]. 
 
The participant was, additionally, of the sentiment that the SAPS management did not realise the 
significance and advantage of communicating this process to the National Prosecuting Authority, 
since the SAPS was too actively involved in internal challenges, and therefore neglected 
communication with other role players: “Ek dink nie die SAP verstaan dat hulle dalk met ons 
moet kommunikeer nie en dat dit dalk net tot hulle voordeel gaan wees nie… hulle is so 
aangewese op hulle eie sake”.  [I don’t believe the SAPS realise they have to communicate with 
us and that it possibly could be to their advantage … they are too involved with their internal 
agendas”]. 
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The participant furthermore described her perceptions of the implementation of the restructuring 
process as problematic “Dit is problematies… [“It is problematic…”] and questions the SAPS 
management for the reasons for restructuring the FCS “... hulle het dit net besluit en nie geweet 
hoekom hulle dit implementeer nie” [“… they have only decided it without knowing the reasons 
for implementing it”], since the service delivery of this unit has deteriorated as a result of the 
restructuring: “... ondersoeke word nie gedoen nie, dossiere kom nie hof toe nie, getuies word nie 
gedagvaar nie, mense kom nie hof toe vir borgaansoeke nie, want ons kan hulle [verwys na 
SAPD lede] nie kontak nie dit is ‘n problem … geen kommunikasie ten opsigte van hierdie 
proses”.  [“… investigations are not done, dockets don’t reach court, witnesses are not 
summoned, people don’t arrive for bail applications because we cannot contact them [referring 
to SAPS members]. It, furthermore, emerged during this interview that the participant 
experienced the implementation of the restructuring process negatively and also questioned the 
advantages this process held for the SAPS: “Behalwe vir ‘n paar individue … is dit vir my asof 
niemand verder meer omgee nie … ons ervaar dit glad nie positief nie en ek glo ook nie dat dit 
vir hulle enigsins tot voordeel gestrek het nie.” [“Except for a few individuals it seems to me as 
if nobody cares any longer … we don’t experience it positively and I believe that it also was not 
to their advantage either”]. 
 
Another senior public prosecutor expressed her experience of the complete lack of 
communication and consultation about the goals of the restructuring of the FCS.  It follows that 
the sole communication this public prosecutor received was via the “grapevine” from 
investigating officers: “… daar is geen kommunikasie ten opsigte daarvan aan die howe … 
gekommunikeer anders as wat ons maar hoor by die ondersoekbeamptes wat hier kom” [“… 
there was no communication thereof to the courts … other than what we heard from contact with 
investigating officers”]. 
 
This utterance by the participant also paints a word picture of how the restructuring has impact 
on the level of service delivery.  This aspect is addressed as a separate theme, as discussed in 
paragraph 4.2.4 of chapter 4.   
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It furthermore emerged in an e-mail message (Annexure E) that SAPU also perceive the      
implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS to be categorised as a process lacking 
consultative communication, resulting in uncertainty and confusion. “The SAPS management 
informed the SSSBC that in terms of the restructuring, areas would be abolished and area 
commissioners re-deployed to stations. It was decided that a model of accounting stations, with 
stations clustered around them, would be followed. It was also agreed that implementation of the 
restructuring would begin in April 2006 and be completed in February 2007. In April 2006 the 
SAPS gave the SSSBC an overview of the new organisational structure that has already been 
approved by the SAPS management. However, the new structure did not address the concerns we 
had raised. In addition, SAPU disputed the SAPS’s claim that extensive consultation had taken 
place about the new structure, and argued that such consultation was still needed. SAPS 
management denied that they had not answered all the unions’ questions on the framework. They 
also denied the claim that there had not been extensive consultation on the restructuring process, 
stating that a number of workshops were held to discuss the process. As SAPU we were adamant 
about the point and placed on record that in terms of the law there was never a meaningful 
consultation process on the matter. The SAPS then agreed that a workshop would be held at the 
end of April 2006 for further discussion. This meeting never took place”. Moreover, SAPU’s 
confusion about the restructuring of the FCS was enhanced through vague and confusing reports 
by the SAPS: “...the SAPS management did an about-turn on the restructuring. They told us that 
they no longer ‘restructuring’ because the process would take a long time (14 moths), but said 
they would continue the ‘strengthening of police stations, in the various provinces. At this point 
the lines between what was restructuring and what was redeployment were becoming blurred, 
and unions raised additional concerns about the process. In response the SAPS management 
claimed that the restructuring and the strengthening of police stations were two separate 
processes that should not be confused. We remained adamant...we needed clarity regarding the 
two processes...”.  SAPU furthermore accentuated the absence of sufficient consultation between 
the SAPS and labour unions regarding the restructuring process and also signified the negative 
impact the insufficient consultation had on the relationship between the SAPS and the labour 
unions: “The queries raised by unions at the SSSBC remain unanswered, as do their objections 
about the lack of proper consultation. This did not bode well for further negotiations between the 
labour and police management”.   
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On the other hand, the Head: Efficiency Services in the SAPS is of the opinion that the SAPS 
communicated the restructuring of the FCS to all the relevant role-players through all the 
communication mediums utilised in the SAPS: “...herstrukturering was gekommunikeer aan alle 
relevante rolspelers deur alle mediums tot beskikking van die SAPD byvoorbeeld formele 
aanbiedings by byvoorbeeld die ISS, Pol tv en interne dokumente...”[...restructuring was 
communicated to all relevant role-players through all the mediums available to the SAPS for 
example formal presentations at the ISS, Pol tv and internal documentation...]. This senior 
officer also explained that the communication of the restructuring process to members and the 
implementation of the process was the responsibility of the various Provincial Commissioners: 
“Die Provinsiale Kommissarisse was verantwoordelik vir die kommunikasie van die 
herstrukturering proses... die Provinsiale Kommissarisse was verantwoordelik vir die 
implementering van die proses in hul provinsies”. [“The Provincial Commissioners were 
responsible for communicating the restructuring process... the Provincial Commissioners were 
responsible for the implementation of the process in their provinces”].    
    
It significantly emerged from the interviews and focus group interviews that participants 
predominantly perceived and experienced the implementation of the restructuring process of the 
FCS as a process primarily characterised by mystification, ambiguity and insecurity. In addition, 
the doubtfulness of participants concerning the goals and objectives of this restructuring process 
might be explained by the vague and instant implementation of the restructuring process of the 
FCS, and also as a direct result of the failure of the SAPS management to successfully 
communicate the importance of this restructuring process to its members at the lower levels, as 
well as to other role players involved. The lack of knowledge among participants concerning the 
goals and objectives of the restructuring process of the FCS, furthermore, bring up the question 
of the degree of openness, clearness and unambiguousness applied by the SAPS management 
during the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS in order to set a clear vision of the 
restructuring. On the contrary, the SAPS advocates transparency in the organisation, opposed to 
the evasive and vague manner the restructuring was enforced upon members and other role 
players. Moreover, the abrupt and unanticipated implementation of the restructuring of the FCS 
raises the question of the implementation style resorted to by the SAPS, as a new democratic 
service.  
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The participants not only shared how they perceived and experienced the way in which the 
restructuring process of the FCS was implemented, but also provided indicators, guidelines and 
recommendations about how they would have preferred the communication about - and the 
 implementation of - the restructuring of the FCS to have been handled. As a result, proposals 
about the preferred communication and the way of implementation of the restructuring of the 
FCS, are presented. 
 
4.2.3 Proposals on the communication style and implementation method of the 
restructuring process  
 
While the quotations from the transcribed interviews in the previous theme, as discussed in 
paragraph 4.2.2 of this chapter, paint a word picture of how the process regarding the 
restructuring of the FCS was communicated and implemented, this subcategory provides insight 
into how the participants would have preferred the communication and implementation of the 
restructuring of the FCS to have taken place. The preferred communication about, and the way of 
the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS, refers to the ideal style, approach or method 
participants would have selected, with reference to the communication and execution of this 
process. Pertaining to this sub-theme, participants furthermore provided their advice, proposals 
and course of action that would have been an ideal approach of communicating and 
implementing the restructuring process.   
 
This sub-theme was deduced from the following question the researcher posed to the 
participants: “In your view how would you have preferred the communication about and the 
implementation of the restructuring of the FCS to have taken place?”  
 
The pointers, tips and recommendations concerning the preferred communication and 
implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS, as proposed by the participants, is 
presented next in the form of direct quotations from the transcribed interviews, as answers to the 
aforementioned question.  
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It became evident in the focus group interviews with NGOs (comprising social workers, 
psychology interns, and volunteers rendering counselling services to victims of domestic and 
sexual abuse related crimes), that all the participants would have preferred the communication of 
the restructuring of the FCS, and the implementation thereof, to have been more transparent and 
media-driven, as opposed to the way it was done,  in order to educate and appropriately inform 
not only FCS and other SAPS members, but also other relevant role players and the broader 
community. 
 
Participants from a focus group interview, and representatives of a NGO, dually proposed 
alternative methods and approaches on how the restructuring of the FCS could have been 
informatively and effectively communicated to all role players, by suggesting the use of 
technology to reach and inform numerous people. In addition, a number of participants also 
suggested one-on-one discussions, initiated by the SAPS, to convey information concerning this 
process. Furthermore, it strongly emerged that a large number of participants regarded the media 
as a crucial communication medium, and it therefore would have been an appropriate course of 
action to communicate and execute the process: “I would say by the way of television and over 
the radio for those that don’t go to the police station”.  Another participant recommended that 
the SAPS should have implemented and conducted direct dialogue, as a method of 
communication and consultation, with all the relevant role players. “Also like proper meetings 
that are taking place in the local communities … a information session or workshops which 
involved all the stakeholders … If I didn’t attend this meeting [referring to focus group interview 
with researcher] I would still be in the dark …”.  This would have resulted in an improved 
understanding of the process and contributed to participative decisionmaking: “… we would have 
gained an understanding of why is this restructuring needed and … also get input from us …”. 
 
Prompted for another response on the issue as to how participants in this interview would have 
preferred the communication and the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS to have 
taken place, another participant implied that the SAPS failed to take advantage of an opportunity 
to inform and educate the greater community about FCS functions, as a large number of the 
community were not adequately informed about the unit’s services: “That would have been a 
perfect awareness opportunity … but still people don’t know …”.  
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In agreement with the aforementioned participants, a Therapeutic Manager of an NGO rendering 
counselling services to victims of violence and abuse, would have preferred prior detailed 
orientation with relevant roleplayers concerning the restructuring. However, this process was 
forced upon members and other roleplayers without the necessary communication: “… to have 
been discussed and workshopped and brainstormed around … it would have been imperative for 
them to discuss it with us before ... making any decision ...”.  The latter part of this statement 
made by the participant also refers to the impact of service delivery on the service provider, and 
also on the client systems they serve.  These aspects are focused on, as discussed in paragraph 
4.2.4 of chapter 4.  A consultative forum where this process had to be contemplated, thus placing 
emphasis on the importance of role players’ participation, was also suggested:  “… certainly to 
have had a stakeholders meeting … a consultation forum to get all the stakeholders together to 
discuss …”. Consultation with role players at the lower hierarchical levels was also highly 
regarded; however, it appeared that the SAPS management opted rather for a coercive approach:  
“… at grass root level discuss their challenges and the way forward … it has been a top-down 
policy … instead of making a unilateral decision”. 
 
Similar to the aforementioned feedback from NGOs, participants from the focus group 
discussions conducted with members of the FCS units concurred that they would have preferred 
the communication and implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS to be executed 
with prior consultative communication, by means of orientation discussions. Participants 
emotionally declared their desire for the communication and the implementation of the 
restructuring of the FCS to have been executed collectively and transparently, in order for them 
to have been conversant with this process. As a result, ambiguity among participants would have 
been alleviated, and buy-in into this process would have been increased: “… explain to them 
what is going to happen … it would be better if we [were] called in and explained to us …”.  
Another participant strongly suggested that the SAPS management should have furnished 
members with a detailed explanation of the restructuring process: “Why is it done what are they 
expecting out of it.  How is it going to benefit us let alone our victims …?”   
 
In order to emphasise FCS members’ sensitivity towards the preferred way in which the 
communication and implementation of the restructuring of the FCS should have taken place, a 
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senior officer from one of the restructured FCS units firmly suggested that collective dialogue 
with the entire FCS would have been appropriate, since senior commanders were also unaware 
of this process: “... all the members could have been called … not even our National Head of the 
FCS knew about the restructuring …”.   
  
Moreover, participants also would have preferred participative decisionmaking during the 
implementation and communication of this restructuring process. As an example, participants 
compared a previous change initiative, characterised by proper consultation and communication, 
with the restructuring of the FCS. As a result, participants would have been content with a 
similar and more liberal approach from the SAPS management: “They called a meeting with the 
people; they explained to them what is going to happen … there were meetings with the members 
… all were happy”.   
 
Additionally, during an interview conducted with two researchers from a humanitarian security 
research institute, these participants similarly emphasised the importance of devoted consultation 
and communication of the restructuring process of the FCS.  The respondents would have 
preferred prior internal and external consultation and communication as well as the opportunity 
for all role players to participate in the decisionmaking process: “Everybody inside the police and 
outside the police should have been made fully aware of what they [referring to SAPS 
management] intended to do, and how they intended to do this … prior to the presentation stage 
...” As a result, participants would have taken ownership of the restructuring process, thus 
reducing existing dilemmas. However, role players were withheld the opportunity to participate 
and facilitate in the process, as a result of the lack of efficient consultation and communication: 
“They would have then at least had the idea that they were given the opportunity to participate 
in the planning of this process … the lack of communication, consultation … took away 
opportunities for members and other role players to make an impact on this whole process”.   
In addition to the aforementioned participants’ perspectives, interviews conducted with various 
senior public prosecutors correspondingly revealed their preference for the manner of the 
communication and implementation of the restructuring of the FCS to have taken place. These 
participants also emphasised the significance of prior consultation, and thus would have 
preferred consultative communication with all role players. “Dit is tog belangrik … om eers die 
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ander rolspelers te ken … voordat jy iets implementer …” [“It is certainly important to consult 
with other role players prior to implementing something …”].  It surfaced during these 
interviews that participative decisionmaking was also highly preferred among these participants, 
in order for them to take ownership of this process “... as hulle dit ook net aan die lede 
gekommunikeer het sodat die lede daarin kon inkoop sou dit nie so skielike impak gewees het op 
… lede nie”. [“… if they had communicated it to the members so that they could buy into this 
process it would not have had such a sudden impact on them”]. However, participants were of 
the opinion that these important factors had not been adhered to by the SAPS management. 
Consequently, current dilemmas concerning the restructuring of the FCS could have been 
minimised: “… probleme wat nou bestaan sou dalk moontlik ondervang kon word ...” [“… 
problems that currently exist could then possibly have been decreased”].    
 
Another participant equally shared the sentiment of other colleagues: “… as hulle byvoorbeeld 
die idee wat hulle gehad het met die wederkeurige Openbare Vervolging in elke divisie bespreek 
het ...” [“… they should have discussed their idea with the National Prosecuting Authority …”].  
However, the participant was of the opinion that prior consultation and communication would 
have, nevertheless, revealed the significance of a specialised FCS unit: “... dan sou jy in elk geval 
gehoor het dat die NPA se idee is dat ‘n spesiale eenheid soos hierdie wat ‘n prioriteitmisdaad 
ondersoek is nodig ...” [“… then you would have anyhow noticed that the National Prosecuting 
Authority considers it necessary that a unit such as this that investigates priority crimes is 
necessary …”].  Consequently, the SAPS then would have been prompted to reassess the 
restructuring process of the FCS: “Dan sal hulle ... die besluit herdink het ...” [They would have 
reconsidered their decision …”].  Prior communication from the SAPS regarding the 
organisation’s intended strategy towards the implementation of the restructuring process would 
have been welcomed, in order to adapt specialised working methods: “… vir ons ten minste moes 
gesê het van hulle planne en dat ons … uhm … miskien met die mense wat dan betrokke sou wees 
daarmee ten minste kontak kon behou maar daar was geen kommunikasie nie”.  [“… at least 
they could have informed us of their intentions, to enable us to keep contact with them; however, 
there was no communication”]. 
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An additional participant similarly suggested an informative convention stipulating the details of 
the restructuring process of the FCS: “… om ‘n vergadering te belê wat al die aanklaers [insluit] 
…” [“… to organise a meeting that includes all prosecutors …”]. As a result, state prosecutors 
would then be empowered to inform and advise the community concerning their enquiries, that 
in turn would have simplified this process: “… om hierdie mense darem net in te lig …” [“… to 
inform these people …”].   
Moreover, this state prosecutor also emphasised the significance of a meeting between all the 
relevant role players in order to discuss future processes: “… ten minste die rolspelers bymekaar 
roep …” [“… to at least call all role players together …”]. 
 
The Manager: Communication and Marketing and National Negotiator of SAPU, in his e-mail 
message (Annexure E) implicated that the SAPS used misleading tactics and methods to 
communicate the restructuring process to all the relevant role-players: “As SAPU we were and 
are still of the firm opinion that the unions were misled... The different terminology used by the 
SAPS to define the process: beefing up stations, restructuring, strengthening of police stations 
and re-organisation was confusing to the labour, the bargaining council, members and the 
general public...It can, in fact, be interpreted as an inventive method to gai approval of the 
restructuring process...”.   
The Head: Efficiency Services in the SAPS suggested that in order to achieve success of 
restructuring the FCS a number of actions should be strictly adhered to. Firstly a clear strategy 
should be defined: “...strategie moet duidelik gedefinieer wees...”. [“...strategy has to be clearly 
defined...”]. Secondly, the officer recommended that a comprehensive implementation plan 
should be set up: “...’n omvattende implementering plan moet opgestel word...”. [“...an inclusive 
implementation plan has to be set up...”]. Moreover, the strategy has to be communicated 
effectively to obtain buy-in from all the role-players: “...strategie moet behoorlik 
gekommunikeer word om alle rolspelers te laat inkoop...”. [“...the strategy has to be 
communicated effectively to obtain buy-in from all the relevant role-players...”]. Additionally, 
the process has to be effectively monitored and the impact thereof should be evaluated: “...die 
proses moet behoorlik gemonitor word en impak moet geevalueer word...”. [“...the process has 
to be effectively monitored and the impact thereof should be evaluated...”].  
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Lastly, the officer suggested regular feedback of the process to make the necessary amendments 
and corrections: “...terugvoer vir aanpassings en korreksies deurgaans...”. [“...regular feedback 
to initiate adjustments and improvements...”].   
 
From the above reactions, it appears that the perceptions of the respondents illustrated that the 
communication style and the approach to the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS, 
which the SAPS management applied, are disputed.  This might explain the ambiguity among 
participants, and the reason why these participants suggested a more transparent approach as an 
alternative to the autocratic style the SAPS has drawn on. It furthermore raises the question of 
the management style of a democratic police service. This could also act as an explanation why 
participants failed to buy into this process and take ownership thereof. In addition, the 
perceptions of participants could indicate that the communication and implementation of the 
restructuring process of the FCS was inefficient, and impacted negatively at ground level. 
Furthermore, the perceptions of participants could indicate that the internal and external 
communication around the restructuring of the FCS, is questionable. A contributing factor to the 
respondents’ perception that communication of the restructuring process of the FCS has been 
inefficient could be that the SAPS focused too much on their internal communication structures 
and permitted no opportunity for creativity and innovation.  In addition, participants’ pessimistic 
perceptions of the management of information in the organisation, could reflect on the SAPS’ 
failure to take advantage of opportunities to inform and educate their members.  
 
The theme discussed next explores the participants’ views of how they experienced the impact of 
the restructuring of the FCS on service delivery. 
 
4.2.4 The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on service delivery 
 
Effective service delivery is a fundamental factor to the successful continuation of any 
organisation. As a result, organisations’ efficiency is directly measured according to their 
adequate service provision levels. The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on service delivery 
refers to the effect, positive or negative, that this process had on the internal and external service 
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delivery provided by the FCS, that was prompted by the restructuring process. Stated differently, 
it points to the consequences brought about by the restructuring of the FCS on the unit’s service 
delivery to its clients. The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the unit’s service delivery 
could take the form of improved service delivery through the implementation of a flatter 
command and control structure, which, according to the SAPS management, often leads to the  
duplication of functions, as the key blockage to service delivery, capacity building at station 
level, training and the transfer of skills. On the contrary, service delivery could also take the 
form of unsatisfactory and inadequate services rendered to victims, clients and perpetrators. 
 
The answers to the following questions gave rise to this theme: “According to you, do you think 
the FCS’s functionaries will benefit as a result of the restructuring? What effect will this 
restructuring have on aspects such as service delivery?” 
 
Participants representing an NGO (comprising social workers, psychologists, and volunteers 
rendering counselling services to victims of domestic and sexual abuse related crimes) 
sensitively shared their experiences and presented numerous examples to illustrate how the 
restructuring of the FCS negatively impacted the unit’s service delivery.  
 
It emerged from these discussions that the standard of service delivery in the FCS has 
plummeted after the implementation of this process. 
One participant illustrated the pessimistic emotions of the community, with whom she interacted 
on a daily basis, regarding the standard of service delivery in the FCS, by means of their 
statements: “... they feel ‘ag well they are not there for us, why should we even worry 
reporting’”.  It came to light that a part of the community had no faith in the ability of the 
SAPS’s service delivery in FCS related cases, even before the implementation of the 
restructuring process. As a result, these members of the community were even more sceptical 
about the service delivery of the restructured FCS units, and were thus of the opinion that this 
process has had an increased negative impact on them: “... they were not helpful before so now 
they will even be less helpful”.  In agreement with the aforementioned participant, the cynical 
attitude of victims of FCS-related crimes was furthermore accentuated as a result of inefficient 
service delivery in a number of jurisdictions. It follows that victims of FCS-related crimes would 
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be reluctant to report cases to the SAPS, as a result of inexperienced SAPS members and 
confusion among members: “… the women they are not motivated to report their cases because 
they said they’ve been pushed from pillar to post … they don’t know their procedures …”. 
 
In addition, it appeared that general police officers at station level did not have any knowledge 
regarding procedures and regulations that had to be followed when dealing with an FCS-related 
victim. Consequently, victims of these crimes were exposed to secondary victimisation, as a 
result of the inability of the SAPS to render efficient services to these victims: “... there is 
nothing we can do about this ... that is one example of the police station that haven’t any clue 
how to deal with a child that is in need and what the procedures were”.  It also transpired that 
members at police station level were not trained or equipped - and also not sensitised to render 
an efficient service to these victims. In addition, another participant’s experience further 
illustrates the inconsiderate approach of officials at station level: “... I’ve got a call from a l3-
year-old boy. He went to the police and the police chased him away ... the Captain told us that 
they don’t attend to foreigners …”. In support of the response to the aforementioned participants, 
one participant adamantly considered prescribed procedures, practice and the code of behaviour  
that was abided to prior to the restructuring of the FCS to have disappeared after the 
implementation of this process: “The whole protocol management of child abuse just diminished 
...”.  
 
It also transpired from these focus group discussions that participants regarded FCS detectives to 
be physically exhausted, as a result of insufficient specialists in this field, thus negatively 
impacting service delivery: “... they are maybe overworked. Because they obviously are and one 
specialist is not enough for one area.”  Moreover, participants anticipated FCS-specialists to be 
dispensed with totally; as a result, service delivery to the public would thus become inaccessible: 
“The specialist will disappear and ... The services are not going to be available to the public”. 
Another concern is the fact that a number of participants currently experienced the FCS 
detectives to be already inaccessible: “... they [referring to FCS detectives] are very difficult to 
phone.  Their cell phone is off and they are certainly not in their office. They don’t seem to get 
their messages. When you follow up the rails, nothing happens there either …”.  
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Besides the aforementioned participants’ experiences, a participant, and Therapeutic Manager of 
another NGO rendering counselling services to victims of violence and abuse, correspondingly 
gave her experiences on how the restructuring of the FCS impacted on service delivery.   
 
It also became apparent during the focus group interviews that the level of service delivery of the 
FCS unquestionably decreased after the restructuring of the FCS.  It furthermore came to light 
that FCS detectives “vanished” as a result of this restructuring process. Consequently, the 
general SAPS officers were mainly performing these related functions, however the officers lack 
training and experience in FCS-related functions: “Our general involvement currently is with the 
SAPS officers at the moment”.  Subsequently, victims of these crimes have been negatively 
influenced and furthermore exposed to secondary trauma since they have experienced difficulties 
accessing counselling services. These victims previously relied mainly on the services of the 
FCS in order gain access to counselling services: “...this [referring to the restructuring of the 
FCS] obviously delayed services and did not meet the best interest of the child … A lot of the 
children were brought in previously [by] FCS officers and now there [is] nobody to bring these 
children … because the FCS said the offices were unable to offer this any longer”. The 
inefficiency of general police officers was furthermore highlighted, since “… the police then 
came to the safe house they took the child from the safe house and there was a car parked 
outside with suspects whom the child was expected to identify … this is not only secondary 
victimisation … the system traumatising the child even further …”. 
On the contrary, it became known that FCS officers were intensely involved with NGOs before 
the restructuring of the FCS, and to a great extent also committed to service delivery: “Before 
the restructuring ... there was a deep commitment and assistance in service delivery …”.  
However, it appeared that this state of affairs changed for the worse.  A contributing factor to the 
significant deterioration in service delivery of the FCS was the fact that the general SAPS 
officers were obliged to become involved with these crimes; however, these officers lacked the 
necessary affection, drive, training and passion concerning crimes against women and children, 
in order to efficiently perform these tasks:  “Many of them [referring to the general police officer] 
don’t want to be in this position ... They find the work very challenging and very traumatic ... 
certainly does not have the training ... skills ... and the knowledge ...”. 
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 Another serious concern raised was the fact that the investigation process was also significantly 
negatively affected:  “I think it [referring to the restructuring] delayed the process of 
investigation ... and as a result this impacts on the criminal justice system as well”.   
 
With reference to the quality of the FCS investigations, another dilemma experienced by the 
SAPS was the fact that non-FCS detectives were too inexperienced to effectively investigate 
related cases: “… a lot of the officers don’t actually knows [the] processes of what needs to be 
done or even know how a statement need to be taken or written, so it has affected the quality … 
because they don’t know any better”.  Another participant furthermore illustrated the general 
SAPS officer’s lack of knowledge regarding the correct practice and procedures when dealing 
with these crimes. It follows that effective service delivery to victims of these related crimes 
were inadequate: “... the SAPS officer is not aware of all these things or they are not sufficiently 
trained ... people do not know what to do”, therefore the participant cynically predicted a grim 
future for victims of FCS-related crimes, thus emphasising the importance of training SAPS 
officials in order to direct these officials to render effective services to the community: “… the 
way things are moving right now I see a very bleak future unless strict measures are taken ... to 
offer lots of training and develop protocols … around the future process”.  
Moreover, it notably came to light during focus group interviews with participants from the 
various FCS units, that participants, to a great extent, agreed on the negative impact the 
restructuring of the FCS had on the functions and the service delivery of the unit.  
One participant regarded the lack of sufficient specialised detectives as a major impediment in 
providing an adequate service to victims of FCS-related crimes. A serious concern that came to 
light was the fact that there are not sufficient FCS detectives to investigate these cases, therefore 
they regularly have to work very long hours without extra remuneration: “... because you are not 
enough ... so the members have to work every second day 24 hours without any remuneration”. 
In addition, another participant questioned whether the influence of the restructuring process of 
the FCS would have a beneficial impact on the unit’s service delivery over the long term. “No I 
can’t see how they are going to improve the service delivery... I don’t think in the long term or 
2009 there is going to be any results ...”  
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Another participant highlighted the absence of sufficient human resources as a major drawback 
to providing an efficient service to the community: “… they must give us more resources … we 
are 6 or 7 but we are serving … 3 stations you cannot do that”. 
 
What’s more, one more participant emotionally and sympathetically referred to the restructuring 
of the FCS as a disadvantage to providing an efficient service to the community. As a result, 
members experienced a sense of eradication for failing the community: “… the restructuring kill 
us as members of the FCS … lastly to the community that we have served … we don’t have … 
enough time to make time for their matters”.  In support of the aforementioned reactions, another 
participant sincerely questioned the resemblance of the restructured FCS units with the 
centralised FCS unit, referring to the harmonised and consistent service delivery provided to the 
community: “… I just think nothing will be the same again … you can’t do the investigation as 
you use to”.  
 
On the other hand, another participant sensitively summarised his emotions regarding the 
substandard service delivery.  He regarded his disheartening service delivery as a result of low 
spirits:  “We are still serving the people but not with … a willing heart that kind of attitude. The 
morale story”.  In addition, the following storyline summarises another participant’s view on 
how the restructuring negatively impacted the service delivery of the FCS.  It emerged that low 
morale, the lack of consultation with these members, and the large geographical area to be 
serviced, contributed to the substandard service delivery:  “It really have a negative impact … 
we are negative towards our job … service delivery is no longer like before you know everything 
has been disturbed … they deteriorated service delivery because they did not consulted with the 
members now the time … to and from the scene is almost double that it was in the past …”. 
Another participant presented a similar view, since “... service delivery never has been as poor 
as now”.  An additional participant made a comparison of the quality of the service rendered 
before the implementation of the restructuring, and thereafter. As a result, this participant 
concluded that the services rendered before the restructuring were of a higher quality, and 
therefore regarded this process to be responsible for the declining service: … back then we could 
be three best performers in a row … we don’t performing like then before … something is not 
right so I think it is a result of that [referring to the restructuring process]”. 
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Furthermore, the participants painted a word picture of the uncertainties, challenges, problems 
and realities they faced as a result of the restructuring of the FCS, and the impact thereof on their 
level of service delivery. It came to light that, apart from the lack of human resources, physical 
resources were an additional constraint that the restructured FCS units had to encounter to 
deliver an efficient service to the community. As a result, victims of related crimes were 
negatively impacted:  “… we are piled up in one office while in the past everybody has his or her 
own office [and] was able to make proper interviews with the victim or complainant. In this case 
you cannot”. 
 
On the other hand, it emerged that the uncertainties, challenges, problems and realities members 
of the FCS faced as a result of the restructuring of the FCS, contributed to members’ physical 
and mental health, that in turn impacted on the quality of their service delivery: “… you become 
depressed like me … I was hospitalised last year November because of this work … Depression 
and stress … they placed me far away … my home is maybe say 52km to come to work … I don’t 
get a time to rest that is why I end up landing in the hospital”. 
 
Another participant illuminated uncertainties, challenges, problems and realities regarding the 
provisioning of efficient service to the community. It appeared that participants from the 
decentralised FCS units were regarded as “orphans” by the various police stations where they 
were placed, since these stations do not want to take responsibility for the FCS members. As a 
result, participants experienced a lack of acceptance and recognition within their internal ranks. 
Consequently, victims of FCS-related crimes were negatively influenced as a direct result of the 
restructuring of the FCS: “… we are sitting at one police station, while we are serving three 
police stations.   All three stations are fighting; we don’t have the budget for FCS so we are not 
going to buy it for them and at the end of the day wie word benadeel? Dit is die klaagsters.” 
Members furthermore experienced nepotism practiced by station commissioners of the 
accounting stations where FCS members were stationed, and this contribute to inefficient service 
delivery. The following verbatim quotations attest to this statement:  “… you are being forced to 
do the dockets which they want at the station which you are stationed … you must go and do that 
docket … and you’ll leave others station dockets …”. 
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Additionally, during an interview conducted with two participants from a humanitarian security 
research institute, one participant firmly emphasised the significance of a specialised unit, in 
order to focus on a specific crime and thus maintain high levels of service delivery.  It transpired 
from this interview that pride in and loyalty to a group were significant factors, and consequently 
gave rise to satisfactory service delivery: “… they develop an “esprit de corps” that is extremely 
important for any specialised unit …”.  It follows that specialists continuously received 
exclusive and valuable in-service training and skills through the constant interaction and 
collaboration among these specialists: “... they can share their experience with all the 
investigators ... they learn from each other ... new members who are recruited ... benefit from the 
combined expertise that you find in these units ... they receive in-service training that you will or 
can no way replace with any other type of training …”. This implies that the service delivery of 
the FCS was constantly enhanced. Moreover, the likelihood of involving these specialists with 
unrelated investigations was also excluded: “… if they are centralised in that way chances [of] 
involving them in the investigation of other cases are very small ...”. 
 
On the other hand, the participant concluded that the restructuring of the FCS deprived the unit 
of its individual character. Therefore, pride in and devotion to the FCS unit as well as the 
opportunity to share and transfer combined knowledge and skills vanished: “... where you have a 
single unit that is now decentralised the spirit is removed ... they lose their esprit de corps and 
they loose the opportunity to share their experience ...”.  It follows that members of the FCS unit 
were gradually becoming involved with other investigations not related to FCS functions. As a 
result, these members lose their competence to specialise, thus affecting service delivery 
negatively: “... you will find members of FCS units carrying cases with dockets with other types 
of crimes … they loose the ability to produce new investigators because they are not a self 
supporting unit anymore so they loose ability to provide in-service training”.  
 
The participant was, furthermore, concerned about the effect of the restructuring of the FCS on 
the emotional and psychological state of these members, and therefore envisaged the 
depreciation of this unit’s service delivery becoming more evident in the medium and long term:   
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“… on the medium and on the longer term the damage is going to show much more clearly … 
they will loose that specialised skills the expertise. So what they done now is a short term gain 
for a long term lost in terms of expertise.”  
 
This storyline also refers to the loss of expertise and must be read in conjunction with the theme 
and the participants’ views about the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the expertise and 
specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS, as discussed in paragraph 4.2.7 of chapter 4.   
 
Furthermore, during an interview with a senior public prosecutor, it clearly emerged that the 
SAPS was increasingly finding it demanding to provide an efficient service to the community 
and other role players, regarding FCS related functions: “Chaos daar word [nie] dienste meer 
gelewer nie ... geen beheer oor wat hulle doen nie ...” [“Chaos, services are not rendered 
anylonger… they have no control of what they are doing …”]. The participant was also 
experiencing a significant negative impact on the services of the FCS: “... swakker skakeling 
swakker …  uhm … dossiere swakker alles”. [“… inferior communication, sub-standard dockets, 
everything is sub-standard”].    In line with other participants, this participant also confirms the 
vanishing of FCS detectives. The participant was furthermore of the opinion that the FCS no 
longer had control over their functions, as a result of the decentralisation of the unit.  
 
Additionally, the participant questioned the decentralisation of the FCS units and the impact 
thereof on the delivery of services by the FCS.  It follows that the participant experienced 
members of the FCS to be, in effect, removed further away from the court, although the 
decentralisation of these members had indeed brought them closer: “… die lede het net van 
kantoor verskuif en weggeraak … in effek verder weg beweeg want nou is daar nie meer mense 
wat jy weet net hierdie sake ondersoek nie. So hulle het in die niet verdwyn as’t ware”.  [“… 
these members just relocated their offices and vanished … in effect they are less accessible now 
since there are no longer members that you are aware of that only investigate these cases. They 
actually just vanished”].   As a result, the FCS members’ level of service delivery did not reflect 
their decentralised status.  
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The participant furthermore illuminated uncertainties, problems and realities regarding the 
provisioning of efficient service by the FCS to the community, by referring to uninformed 
investigating officers: “... ‘n ondersoekbeampte … nie geweet het van die inwerking trede van 
die nuwe wet [verwys na nuwe Wet op Seksuele Misdrywe] … hoe gaan hy dan nou ‘n diens kan 
lewer aan die individue wat slagoffers van die misdade is as hy nie eers verstaan waaroor dit 
gaan nie”. [“… an investigating officer was not aware of the implementation of the new law 
[referring to the new Law on Sexual Offences] … how will he be able to render a service to 
victims of related crimes if he does not understand what it is about”].  
 
 It, furthermore, came to light that junior investigating officers with little or no experience were 
utilised to investigate FCS-related cases, that in turn negatively impacted on service delivery and 
the judicial processes: “… ‘n konstabel wat aangestel is by GKS wat ‘n groot klomp dossiere 
ondersoek het met baie baie min ervaring en sy is nou weer in die tussentyd weggeplaas …” [“… 
a constable with little experience was appointed at the FCS, handled numerous cases and she 
has in the meantime already been transferred…”].  On the other hand, the participant also 
experienced a small number of FCS detectives who were prepared to provide quality service to 
the public: “… daar is etlike speurders wat baie hard probeer… bereidwillig is … wat etlike jare 
diens het in dieselfde GKS eenheid maar hulle is baie min en dun gesaai …” [“… there are 
numerous detectives that attempt their utmost best … enthusiastic … who have had many years 
service in the FCS; however they are very scarce …”]. Additionally, it became apparent that as a 
result of inadequate service delivery by the FCS, other role players were also negatively 
impacted.  “Ons sukkel om sake van die grond af te kry ... instruksies word nie nagekom nie ... 
dossiere word hof toe gestuur sonder dat dit behoorlik nagesien is deur ‘n offisier ... dit lei tot 
terugtrek ...” [“We struggle to get cases of the ground … instructions are not adhered to … case 
dockets are sent to court without proper perusal by officers … it leads to the withdrawal of cases 
…”].  Another serious concern raised was the fact that a number of investigating officers did not 
follow correct procedures, that hampered service delivery: “... [mense word] nie gedagvaar nie, 
mense word nie hof toe gebring nie, ons kry nie dossiere nie. Ons kan nie behoorlik voorberei 
nie ...” [“… people are not summonsed, they are not taken to court, we do not receive case 
dockets. We cannot properly prepare …”].  
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It furthermore emerged from an interview with a senior public prosecutor that various 
uncertainties, challenges and problems regarding the provisioning of efficient service to the 
community and to other relevant role players, surfaced as a result of the lack of interest and 
training of general non-specialised detectives, previously responsible for investigating less 
serious crimes, now being responsible for investigating FCS-related cases. It follows that 
investigations were substandard, that in turn impacted negatively in court hearings: “… hierdie 
mense nie weet waarvoor om te soek nie … ondersoek beamptes daag nie op met dossiere by 
hulle nie hulle weet nie hoe om te getuig by borgaansoeke nie hulle weet nie watter spesiefieke 
getuienisse moet hulle bewaar …”  [“… these officials are not aware of what they have to search 
for … investigating officers arrive without case dockets, and they are unfamiliar with how to 
provide witness at bail applications; they do not know what specific evidence they have to 
preserve …”].   
 
Moreover, this participant accentuated the significance of specialisation in the field of FCS 
investigations, therefore the need for specialised and experienced investigation officers 
contributed to the existing challenging circumstances: “…  jy sit met ‘n persoon wat nog nooit … 
met hierdie tipe van goed gewerk het nie … dit maak ‘n situasie wat alreeds baie moeilik is nog 
moeiliker”. [“… you have officials that have never worked with these types of cases … it makes a 
difficult situation even more challenging”].  
 
In accordance to the abovementioned participants’ views, the Manager: Communication and 
Marketing and the National Negotiator of SAPU, Bernard Machakela (2009) in his e-mail 
message (Annexure E) is also of the opinion that service delivery has been negatively affected by 
the restructuring process: “...the process has taken place at the expense of members and of 
policing...The result is members’ inattention to duty, which hampers effective policing”.  
 
While the aforementioned storylines mostly pointed to the negative impact the restructuring of 
the FCS had on levels of service delivery, and in some instances already explained how it 
affected the victims of violence and abuse, one senior public prosecutor was, on the other hand, 
of the opinion that the restructuring of the FCS had indeed positively impacted on the levels of 
service delivery.   
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It emerged during this interview that this participant experienced an improved level of service 
delivery by the FCS. It follows that the decentralisation of the unit resulted in the service of the 
unit being more accessible as opposed to its service prior to the restructuring process: “... hulle 
ook meer toeganklik moontlik is vir slagoffers en getuies op hierdie stadium”. [“… they are 
currently possibly more accessible to victims and witnesses”].  The participant was furthermore 
of the opinion that the lack of resources experienced by the FCS were also minimised as a result 
of the restructuring, since the decentralised units were situated closer, thus improving service 
delivery: “... was goed in daardie sin dat jy mense het wat nou basies twee blokke weg van die 
hof af sit ... die mense en die kantoor self nader is …” [“… it is beneficial that officials are 
situated two blocks away from court … the officials and their offices are closer…”]. 
 
In addition, from this participant’s experience it appears that the quality of investigations by the 
FCS after the restructuring process was equivalent to the quality of investigations of this unit 
prior to this process: “Die kwaliteit van die ondersoekwerk is nie anders as wat dit in die verlede 
was nie”. [“The quality of the investigations is not different than previously”].  However, the 
possibility exists that this unit’s standard of investigation may have improved since the 
accessibility of the FCS members has improved: “... ondersoek dalk beter is omdat die 
ondersoekbeamptes nader aan die slagoffers en aan die howe is ... die afhandelingstempo dalk ‘n 
bietjie vinniger is” [“… investigations have possibly improved since the investigators are closer 
to victims and to the courts … the tempo at which cases are finalised is possibly faster”].   
Nevertheless, it is difficult to establish from statistics if the restructuring of the FCS had any 
effect on the service delivery of this unit, since the total of FCS-related crimes were constant: 
“Dit is moeilik om te sien uit statistiek ...” [“It is difficult to gauge from statistics …”].  Contrary 
to other participants’ experiences, this participant did not experience the services of the FCS to 
be executed by general SAPS officers: “So ons werk nie met gewone polisiemanne wat nou 
skielik daardie tipe werk voor uitgedeel is nie ... die hoeveelheid misdrywe bly maar konstant”. 
[“We do not work with normal police officials … the number of cases remain constant”].  
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From the above it appears that the restructuring of the FCS had a detrimental effect on the 
service delivery of the unit, as well as on the client system it served. A contributing factor to the 
deteriorated service delivery of the FCS could have been the lack of physical and human 
resources experienced by the FCS. Furthermore, it appears that additional causative factors 
contributing to the unsatisfactory service delivery by the FCS may be the revolution in the unit’s 
primary functions, thus involving these detectives with non-FCS-related investigations and the 
compulsory involvement of inexperienced general SAPS members with FCS-related functions. 
This might explain the fading of the “esprit de corps” [a feeling of pride in belonging to a group 
and a sense of identification with it] after the restructuring process, that was characterised in the 
FCS prior to this process that resulted in high levels of service delivery. In addition, the lack of 
acceptance by general SAPS members, experienced by FCS detectives at their decentralised 
stations, raises the question of the degree of the alliance and cooperation within the internal 
structures of the SAPS. This might explain the inadequate service delivery of the FCS. On the 
other hand, the internal climate on service delivery in the SAPS is therefore also questioned.  
Moreover, participants’ perception that the community had no faith in the SAPS and were even 
more skeptical about the abilities of the FCS after the restructuring, questions the SAPS’ external 
climate on service delivery.  
 
The next theme focuses on participants’ perceptions of the effect of the restructuring process of 
the FCS on the morale and productivity of the members. 
 
4.2.5 The effect of the restructuring process on the morale and productivity of FCS 
members 
 
Change in any organisation, such as the restructuring of the FCS, brings with it certain concerns 
among members, that in turn have an effect on their daily functioning. The morale and 
productivity of the members refer to their self-esteem and spirits with which they have to deal, 
with that, in turn, having an effect on their service excellence and effectiveness. Stated 
differently, morale and productivity is the drive and self-confidence members have in order to 
perform their functions optimally.  
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The morale and productivity of members can take the form of a lack of purpose and direction, or 
a feeling of senselessness that, resultantly, has a negative influence on member’s productivity. 
On the other hand, morale and productivity can also take the form of a positive and meaningful 
mindset among members, creating a sense of worth to fulfil their functions with the necessary 
productivity, drive and passion.     
 
This theme resulted from the answers given by the participants to the following question: 
“According to you, what effect will the restructuring of the FCS have on the morale and 
productivity of the members?” 
 
Focus group interviews conducted with members of the FCS, overwhelmingly agreed that the 
restructuring of the FCS negatively influenced their morale - and therefore their productivity. 
Respondents strongly expressed their negativity towards the restructuring process and the effect 
this process has had on them. Consequently, these FCS members did not predict an improvement 
in their low morale; in fact, they foresaw their morale to worsen. “I don’t think it will get higher 
... it will just get lower and lower and lower”. Respondents furthermore felt that they had been 
negatively affected by the restructuring process. More specifically, respondents’ negative morale 
was mainly as a result of inadequate physical and human resources, the absence of overtime 
remuneration, and adverse working conditions that often resulted in conflicting opinions with 
other colleagues at station level. Respondents’ feelings of rejection by other members at station 
level was a contributing factor to their low self-esteem and effectiveness. “The morale is 
definitely down ... productivity is down because the way that we were treated …we [are] shunt 
into one office ... I am working more hours than before that is why my morale is still low ... there 
is no overtime money”. Another participant similarly shared the same experience. He described 
his low self-esteem as: “... we are demoralised … we were on a pedestal doing good work … we 
were special we did our job and we had our right to exist once we were disbanded we were 
treated very bad at this place ...”. 
 
 In support of the aforementioned participants, another participant also admitted the decrease in 
his morale to be as a result of the uncertainty brought about by the restructuring process: 
“Morale is low. Because you don’t know where you stand”. On the other hand, it emerged 
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during these focus group discussions that the commander of a FCS unit experienced that not only 
his spirits but also those of the victims had been negatively impacted by the restructuring. “… 
even our victims, their morale had been dropped and even our Commanders morale has dropped 
and mine also”. 
Additionally, in order to emphasise the low self-esteem and spirits of FCS members, the 
aforementioned commander of an FCS unit gave a number of examples to illustrate the extent of 
this behaviour. It follows that a number of FCS members called for reassignment to other units 
within the SAPS “Some of the members have already applied for transfers because they don’t 
want to work like this ... they don’t like to work in these conditions”, whereas another FCS 
member was on sick leave for nervous tension related matters, as a direct result of the 
restructuring process: “Already got one [member] of stress ... I don’t blame those who is going 
on stress ...”  Interestingly, this commander expressed his understanding and sympathy towards 
members who could not continue their functions at the FCS, due to stress-related conditions 
resulting from the restructuring.  On another occasion this participant furthermore described the 
effects of the restructuring on some members’ psychological and general well-being, that 
consequently influenced their morale and productivity. It once again came to light that members 
developed nervous tension related conditions, and as a result, were more often absent from work:  
“… two members now here at the unit … has got the high blood pressure … he could not handle 
this cases anymore … one member which is of stress and the rest of the members I won’t say they 
book sick as usual because why you can see they are tired …”. Correspondingly, other 
participants also voiced their low self-esteem by comparing the morale of members before and 
after the restructuring process. These participants came to the conclusion that although FCS 
members were negative prior to the restructuring, the morale of these members had never been in 
a lower state: “Daar was negatiwiteit [voor die herstrukturering] maar dit was nie so erg as wat 
dit nou is nie”. [“There was negativity [prior to the restructuring]; however, not to the current 
extent”].  
  
Moreover, a number of participants painted distressing pictures of their experiences, in support 
of their low morale and productivity. It became apparent that these participants experienced 
significant difficulties and challenges during their daily functioning, as opposed to before the  
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restructuring, which, in turn, ought to have had a negative effect on their morale and 
productivity. Often officials had no means of transport, which forced them to walk to their 
appointments: “… we are battling with the old vehicle ... I had to walk to go to court. I have to 
ask a lift to go to the meeting ... ons loop waar ons wil wees.  Ek het al geloop van hier af tot by 
[naam weerhou agv anonimiteit] [approximately 15km] [“… we walk where we need to be. I 
once have walked from here to [place withheld to preserve anonymity] [approximately 15km]. 
These officials occasionally worked very long hours without overtime remuneration or rest days: 
“Ons werk twee naweke ‘n maand wat ons nie betaal word nie ... soms werk jy van agtuur in die 
oggend [tot] die volgende oggend agtuur”.  [Dan] “… begin jy jou normale dag ...”.  [Daar’s] 
“… nie een wat in hierdie eenheid werk wat nie negatief is nie”. [“We work two weekends per 
month without remuneration … occasionally we work from eight o’clock in the morning to eight 
o’clock the next morning … then you start with yout normal day again … there is not one official 
in this unit who is not negative”].   
 
Similarly, another participant, the commander of the unit, presented practical examples of 
members’ experiences, as motivation for members’ low morale and productivity. These 
illustrations include work overload and far distances to travel to attend to complaints:  “… a 
member is carrying about 50 dockets … up to 80 dockets … it is a disaster”.   
 
Supporting the aforementioned participants’ negative sentiments regarding their morale and 
productivity, a few participants explained the motivation behind their unenthusiastic behaviour 
as being a result of the lack of support systems after the restructuring was implemented and no 
recognition for members’ services under difficult circumstances: “… you are dealing with your 
stress alone … and the cases that we are doing are so stressful … no one is giving us some 
motivation … The failure from the side of who ever implemented this not giving us enough 
support and recognition”. 
 
Furthermore, participants shared their experiences of how the restructuring of the FCS impacted 
their productivity. On the one hand, one participant experienced a decrease in productivity, and 
as a result, questions the motivation of victims to report cases: “... the cases I still have are not 
so many as like we used to have maybe it is because of this restructuring people are not coming 
 174 
 
forward with their cases”. On the other hand, one participant experienced an increase in cases to 
investigate, compared with before the restructuring. However, it appears that this increase was as 
a result of coercing from officers at the accounting station where the FCS members was now 
situated, in order to give preference to that particular station’s cases. As a result, other stations’ 
cases were unintentionally neglected, and productivity was therefore negatively impacted as a 
result of the restructuring: “Myself I am getting more cases ... you are getting more time for the 
station you are working at because of the pressure you are getting ... the productivity is not like 
before”. Another participant experienced a decrease in productivity, referring to the reduction in 
the conviction rate of perpetrators: “... productivity is not the same as it used to be ... I mean the 
conviction rate is very low ...”.  
 
Correspondingly, another participant shared his sentiment towards the productivity of FCS 
members: “It [referring to the restructuring of the FCS] makes the productivity very very low for 
me”. Another participant experienced the productivity of the FCS unit to be similar to before the 
restructuring process; however, she was of the opinion that members had to increase their efforts 
with lesser resources: “... die produktiwiteit van die eenheid is nog steeds dieselfde ... ons moet 
harder werk met minder resources ...” [“… the productivity of the unit remains the same … we 
have to work harder with fewer resources …”].  In support of the aforementioned participants, 
another participant also experienced a decline in his productivity by making a comparison with 
how it was before this process was implemented. It emerged that although members were trying 
their utmost to deliver a quality service, physical and human resources, as well as support from 
other non-specialised SAPS members, were a contributing factor to the decline in productivity: 
“… not to say that the people are not doing their best… just that the resources … makes the 
conviction very very poor…”.  
 
Contrary to the cynical emotions experienced by the majority of the FCS members towards the 
morale and productivity caused by the restructuring process, a minority of the participants were 
attempting to remain confident and devoted, despite their initial low self-esteem and 
unfavourable circumstances.  
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It follows that these few members realised they had to adapt their mindset in order to continue 
their passion for their profession. However, new challenges were emerging regularly with which 
they had to deal: “... my morale is very low but I had to lift myself up because I love this job ... 
I’m making the best out of it”.  
 
It also emerged from the focus group discussions with FCS members, that some of these 
members had a sympathetic feeling of guilt and remorse towards the community they served and 
other roleplayers they were actively involved with, for the decrease in services from the FCS: “... 
we are very very sorry to leave the FCS ... we are now far from our other people ... even the 
NGO and other organisations that were helping us ... there is nothing that we can do”.  Another 
participant did self-investigation for his feelings of guilt and low-self esteem, questioning his 
own ability: “… you forever complain sometimes you are blaming yourself sometimes you think 
you are not good enough … my morale is low very very low … I love doing what I am…”. 
During an interview conducted with two researchers from a humanitarian security research 
institute, one participant confidently expressed that the restructuring of the FCS had a significant 
impact on the morale of the unit’s members: “… this [referring to the restructuring of the FCS] of 
course had a very negative effect on the morale of members”.  The participant furthermore 
judged the SAPS to be presently categorised by a military character. As a result of this 
antagonistic character, the organisation concentrated more on internal dilemmas rather than on 
external challenges when confronted with low self-esteem and spirits of the workforce: “In any 
organisation, especially an organisation with a sort of a military character, and the police 
without any doubt still has a very clear military character ... but the moment you have a negative 
or a morale that is negatively affected … You start focusing inwards instead of outwards ... you 
are more concerned about your own problems than you are with the problems of those that you 
are suppose to be serving”.  It furthermore came to light that the low morale of FCS members 
created by the restructuring process, in turn negatively affected their service excellence: “... an 
unhappy official is certainly not going to provide an efficient and effective service ...”. The 
participant also emphasised the insensitivity of the SAPS management towards the objections of 
these members: “... it seems like police management is very unsympathetic to the complaints they 
received from these members ...”. 
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During an interview with a senior public prosecutor it correspondingly appeared that the 
restructuring of the FCS brought about major administrative shortcomings, accompanied by a 
notable lack of resources: “... dit het definitief ‘n impak op hul moraal in die sin van dat hulle 
effens negatief staan teenoor … uhm … die herstrukturering ... aanvanklik het hulle ‘n 
gesentraliseerede kantoor opset gehad ... administratiewe middele … uhm … tot hulle 
beskikking...” [“… it definitely impacted their morale since they are pessimistic towards the 
restructuring … previously they had a centralised office with administrative resources available 
…”].  In addition, it appears that the restructuring also created the discontinuation of sustained 
support and camaraderie among FCS members, since they currently function as a dependent unit. 
As a result, these constraints had a low-spirited effect on the morale and productivity of FCS 
members: “... maar ook bystand van mede kollegas en moontlik ander offisiere waar hulle nou 
geskuif het ... losstaande is ...” [“… they had support from colleagues and officers … since 
decentralising they are dependent …”]. 
 
In support of the adverse effect of the restructuring process on the morale and productivity of 
FCS detectives, another senior public prosecutor presented a practical example of detectives’ low 
self-esteem and productivity. It follows that the fragmentation of the camaraderie of these 
detectives, as a result of the restructuring, proved to impact the services and productivity of these 
members in a negative light:  “… jy het kameraderie wat ontstaan tussen die mense omdat hulle 
met sulke ernstige sake werk … so die mense wat hulle saam mee werk en hulle kollegas is 
geneig om vir hulle half belangrik te wees … daar nog ‘n kollega verloor word … die ervare 
kollega moet dan die onervare kollega oplei …” [“… camaraderie develops between these 
officials since they are involved with serious crimes; therefore, their colleagues are important to 
them … if another colleague is lost, the experienced colleague  has to train the inexperienced 
one…”]. 
 
While the aforementioned storylines mostly pointed to how the restructuring of the FCS had 
negatively impacted on the morale and the productivity of the FCS’ members, one senior public 
prosecutor perceived the morale to be negative, but the productivity as improved: “... die 
afhandeling van die sake kan moontlik vinniger wees ... die hele ondersoekwerk kan vinniger ... 
borgaansoeke kan vinniger afgehandel word ... in daardie sin is die produktiwiteit vir my beter 
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... hulle hulpbronne nou meer  bietjie beperk is … en dat hulle moraal waarskynlik nie is soos 
wat dit veronderstel is om te wees” [“… the finalisation of cases, investigations and bail 
applications have possibly improved although their resources are restricted as well as a decline 
in their morale”]. However, the participant experienced a decrease in the specialisation of cases 
in the court due to a lack of prioritisation: “Ek glo nie ‘n mens het die effek in die hof van iemand 
wat spesifiek met hierdie dossier werk nie, want dit is nie meer prioriteit nie.” [“I doubt the 
specialisation of cases in court since it is no longer a priority”]. The participant, in addition, had 
the impression that the restructuring of the FCS indeed had a negative effect on the morale of 
members of this unit, as a result of the lack of consultation with these members, the disregard of 
members’ personal circumstances and insufficient resources: “… ek weet nie of hulle ook rêrig 
behoorlik gekonsulteer is … baie van hulle moes noodgedwonge … uhm … skuif waar hulle 
moontlik … uhm … aanvanklik huisvesting gehad het naby die gespesialiseerde eenhede … die 
ander ding wat dit meer negatief … hulle hulpbronne nou meer beperk is …”.  [“… I suspect 
they are not properly consulted … a number of officials had no choice to decentralise from 
where they probably were accommodated close to their specialised units …”].  
The participant also believed that other practical and psychological aspects had a detrimental 
consequence on the FCS members’ morale and productivity. These aspects included the 
integration of FCS members with non-specialised detectives: “… jy nie nou meer gesien word as 
‘n gespesialiseerde persoon nie … uhm … jy word nou geag om moontlik ‘n gewone speurder te 
wees …” [“… you are no longer regarded as specialised, however, regarded as a normal 
detective …”], and the sharing of resources as well as the relegation of the FCS’s status as a 
specialised unit. It emerged that the participant experienced these aspects to reflect negatively on 
the quality of investigations: “... jy moet hulpbronne met hulle deel … uhm … jy moet kantoor 
spasie met hulle deel … dit het definitief ‘n praktiese invloed … daar is sekerlik niks wat ‘n 
persoon so demoraliseer as die feit dat niemand jou expertise as as sulks wil erken nie” [“… you 
have to share resources and office space with them that definitely has a practical impact … the 
fact that one’s expertise is not recognised has to be demoralizing …”].  
 
The participant was furthermore of the sentiment that the lack of continuous training of the FCS 
members evidently demotivated these members, since it was perceived that they were indeed 
specialised and therefore did not need additional training: “… dat daar nie volgehoue … uhm … 
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opleiding gegee word om hulle meer gespesialiseerd te maak nie … dit het ook definitief ‘n 
impak dat hulle nie meer gemotiveerd voel nie …” [“… there is no longer sustainable training to 
improve these officials’ specialised skills that impacts on their level of motivation …”].  
 
Consequently, these members let go of the aspiration to be specialised - that was then reflected in 
the substandard quality of investigations: “… dat daar niks is wat hulle meer dryf om ekstra 
moeite te doen om meer gespesialiseerd te wees nie” [“… there are no aspirations any longer to 
improve their specialty”]. 
Another participant similarly echoed what the aforementioned participant experienced with 
regard to the morale and productivity of the FCS members. This participant expressed that 
inefficient facilities hampered effective service delivery to victims of FCS-related crimes, and 
this, in turn, affected members’ morale negatively:  “… hulle het nie meer al die fasiliteite wat 
hulle nodig gehad het … hulle moraal is laag …” [“… they lack resource s… their morale is low 
…”].  Additionally, the participant sketched a practical illustration of the negative impact that the 
restructuring process of the FCS had on the productivity of members. It follows that the 
participant experienced the investigation process to be more time consuming as a result of 
inexperienced investigating officers:  “… dinge vat miskien nou bietjie langer… hulle is nie 
spesifiek opgelei vir die taak … hulle verwag die aanklaer moet al die opdragte gee terwyl hulle 
tog vanself moes geweet het dat hulle daai ondersoek vinnig moes doen …” [“… currently the 
process takes longer… they are not specifically trained for the task … they expect the prosecutor 
to provide instructions while they are aware they had to rapidly finalise the investigation …”].  
 
In agreement with the abovementioned participants, another participant correspondingly 
described FCS members’ drive, self-confidence and productivity to be at a low level. The 
participant presented the disregard for members’s expertise and specialised skills, “… hulle voel 
dat hulle spesialiste is en nou word ek stasie speurder … dis baie moeilik …” [“… these officials 
regard themselves as specialists, suddenly they are normal detectives … it is difficult …”], as 
well as relinquishing time and effort invested in investigations, to non-specialised detectives, as 
the main drivers for these members’ low morale and productivity:  “… dat hulle hulle lopende 
sake aan ‘n ander persoon moet oorgee wat hulle natuurlik baie tyd en ondersoek werk en en 
moeite in belê het…” [“… they had to carry over their incompleted cases that required time, 
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investigation and effort, to other members …”]. Contrary to the negative experiences of other 
participants regarding the morale and productivity of the FCS members, this participant, 
however, experienced continuous constructive productivity from a small number of these 
members: “… daar is ‘n paar goeies dit is nie net swart nie daar is lig aan die einde van die 
tonnel …” [“… there are a number of good officials, there is light at the end of the tunnel …”].  
Moreover, this participant experienced a decline in the majority of members’ productivity, and 
also admitted that the productivity of FCS members was not remarkable before the 
implementation of the restructuring process, possibly as a result of the high degree of difficulty 
to properly investigate such cases: “… dit was nooit “great” nie … dis vir my asof daar ‘n 
afname is … mense is nie so gemotiveerd om voort te gaan met dit waarmee hulle mee besig is 
nie” [“… it never was extraordinary, it seems if there is a decline … officials are not as 
motivated to continue their functions”]. 
 
A participant from one of the focus group discussions, a representative from an NGO 
(comprising social workers, psychologists and volunteers rendering counselling services to 
victims of domestic and sexual abuse related crimes), shared her speculation about how the 
restructuring of the FCS might have affected the morale of the members of this unit. The 
participant reasoned that the lack of communication and consultation with members of the FCS 
about the restructuring might have had an appalling effect on their morale: “… a lack of 
communication ... have a terrible impact on their morale and their passion”.  
 
The participant furthermore demonstrated her speculation by illustrating the low self-esteem and 
spirits of one of the senior members of the FCS: “… the Provincial Coordinator of the FCS, one 
minute we hear he is going to another unit, the next minute he is back … their passion is gone”.  
In addition, another participant conveyed her thoughts about how the restructuring of the FCS 
might have affected the morale and productivity of the members of this unit. The participant 
similarly experienced a decline in the morale and productivity of FCS members, and conveyed 
the rationale behind the negativity to be confusion about the restructuring among the SAPS 
themselves: “… their morale… deteriorate … because there was a royal confusion the police 
themselves … there are a lot of confusion now because … of the new structure … it affect their 
morale and your motivation to do your work”.   
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In contradiction to the pessimistic experiences of the aforementioned participants, this 
participant, however, continued to experience productive service from a few members: “… not 
all the police are like that some are giving us a good service …”. 
 
Additionally, the Therapeutic Manager of another NGO (providing counselling services to 
victims of violence and abuse) similarly shared her perceptions about the impact of the 
restructuring of the FCS on the morale and productivity of the FCS members. The participant 
emphasised the importance of factors such as the passion, devotion and the unique character a 
member requires in executing FCS-related functions. It follows that general SAPS officers now 
dealing with FCS related cases, revealed they were forced into this position and also did not have 
the unique characteristics required of them to perform these functions, as opposed to FCS 
members: “... some of them [referring to general SAPS members] have indicated that they have 
been forced into these positions.  It is not out of choice ... The FCS members have a different 
work ethic . ..they are very committed ... very passionate about what they do ... Absolutely, it 
definitely impacted on their morale”. As a result, members’ morale and, therefore their service 
delivery and productivity were without doubt negatively influenced. On the other hand, the 
participant similarly experienced the morale of the community to be adversely affected as a 
result of inefficient service delivery by general SAPS members, as opposed to the devotion and 
loyalty of FCS detectives prior to the restructuring: “… the general community … are not … we 
get lots of distressed calls from people the way they’ve been treated … the morale is not positive 
… not in favour of the police officers … previously … there was a high level of dedication and 
commitment …”. 
 
It furthermore appears that the uncertainty that prevailed among FCS members, as well as the 
decentralisation of these members, contributed to a decrease in productivity: “… productivity 
suffered ... many people did not know what the future entails ... This makes them very resentful 
and as a result will not able to deliver the goods”.  It additionally transpired from this interview 
that the productivity of investigating officers who handled FCS related investigations was 
unsatisfactory and also hampered the judicial processes, which often lea to frustration for the 
other role players involved and to the benefit of the perpetrators:  “… there is such frustration … 
it is delaying the process … cases gets thrown out of court …”.  
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From the above it is evident that the restructuring of the FCS had a negative effect on the morale 
and productivity of participants. A contributing factor to the low spirits and productivity of 
participants might be the inadequate physical and human resources, the absence of overtime 
remuneration and adverse working conditions that participants experienced, created by the 
restructuring process. In addition, the rejection of FCS detectives by their counterparts at station 
level, and the internal conflict between these members, as opposed to the solidarity that prevailed 
among members in the FCS prior to the restructuring, might explain the low self-esteem of these 
detectives. Furthermore, this might also explain why a number of FCS detectives called for 
reassignment to other units within the SAPS, while others could not continue their functions at 
the FCS, due to stress-related conditions resulting from the restructuring. Moreover, the 
appearance of coerciveness among certain station commissioners towards FCS detectives 
stationed at these station commissioners’ stations, created the impression that these 
commissioners take advantage of FCS detectives, to the detriment of other police stations in their 
jurisdiction. It therefore raises the question of the sincerity of these senior officers in facilitating 
the improvement of service delivery of the FCS as the primary goal of the restructuring of the 
unit. It also appears that the SAPS management was not sensitive towards the low self-esteem of 
its members and their client system.  This might also have been a contributing factor to the 
decrease in FCS detectives’ low morale and productivity. 
 
The perceptions from participants furthermore indicate that the SAPS management concentrated 
on internal dilemmas when confronted with low self-esteem and productivity of its members. As 
a result, external challenges were neglected. On the other hand, the attempt of a few FCS 
detectives to remain confident and devoted, despite their low morale and unfavourable 
circumstances, illustrated their calling and determination to deliver an efficient service to the 
community. On the contrary, it appears that general SAPS members that are forced to investigate 
FCS related cases, do not comprise similar characteristics as these FCS detectives, that 
consequently negatively affects their morale and productivity as well.  
 
Participants’ opinions regarding the feasibility and sustainability of the long-term goals 
envisaged by the restructuring of the FCS, now follow. 
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4.2.6 Outlook on the feasibility and sustainability of the long-term goals of the FCS 
restructuring 
 
It is imperative for an organisation to have long-term goals, in order to set a clear vision for the 
future. These goals should, however, be clearly communicated to the entire workforce, to gain 
understanding and buy-in among them. Participants’ opinions about the feasibility and 
sustainability of the long-term goals envisaged by the restructuring of the FCS, referred to 
participants’ views on the achievability and practicability of the long-term aspirations envisaged 
by this process and the maintaining thereof. In other words, the question of how participants 
assessed the probability of preserving and the perseverance of these long-term goals, comes to 
mind. Participants’ outlook on the feasibility and sustainability of these long-term goals could 
demonstrate an optimistic view of attaining and upholding the envisaged long-term goals. On the 
other hand, participants could also express negative sentiments towards the feasibility and 
sustainability of these goals, perceiving them to be neither viable nor maintainable.   
 
The answers provided by the participants on the following question gave rise to this theme: “In 
your opinion, will the restructuring of the FCS meet its long-term goals/objectives? How feasible 
and sustainable will this process be?” 
 
It came to light that members of the decentralised FCS units (ranging from a superintendent to 
constables) considered the long-term goals envisaged by the restructuring of the FCS to be 
ambiguous, and that they did not know what these long-term goals were, and therefore had major 
reservations about the feasibility and sustainability of this process: “… Well I don’t know … 
actually there is no long-term goal or objectives for the FCS …”.  Participants interestingly did 
not regard the FCS as a specialised unit any longer and were thus of the view that this unit, in 
addition, did not have long-term goals: “… we are not a unit anymore … There is no specialised 
unit out there …”.  Similarly, a number of participants expressed their ambiguity towards the 
goals and objectives of the restructuring process, by declaring their unfamiliarity with the entire 
process as a result of the lack of consultation and communication: “… we don’t know why this is 
done … we are still in the darkness … we don’t know what the short terms or the long term goals 
are …”.  
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Correspondingly, another participant articulated his suspicions about the accomplishment of the 
goals and objectives of the restructuring process: “I doubt it …” , illustrating his current 
disbelief, until changes occur: “… if I see an indication that there are improving … I would have 
a little hope … but at this case … there is no light at the  end of the tunnel”. 
  
Conversely, one participant appropriately identified the goals and objectives envisaged for the 
restructuring process: “… we’ll need to educate most of the SA Police service’s members to be 
able to deal with this cases …”. However, this participant had his reservations about these goals 
and objectives being accomplished, since this task was one not every member was capable of 
performing, and he therefore presented critical features investigating officers must have to 
investigate FCS related cases: “… the problematic situation not most of the people are interested 
on working with this cases … they come here without the knowledge … they turn negative …”. 
In addition, one participant was of the opinion that the SAPS management would continue to 
enforce the goals and objectives envisaged by the restructuring upon FCS members, therefore it 
would be sustainable: “… they have made up their mind … they will sustain.”   
 
Another participant sturdily remarked that the restructuring process would by no means be 
viable, since the expertise, knowledge and skills of FCS members could not be replaced with the 
training of general police officers, with regard to FCS-related crimes: “No it will never be, never 
… you can’t give that guy the experience of ten years. It would never be feasible … you have to 
train them all again …”. In support of the aforementioned participant, another participant 
questioned the feasibility of the restructuring process since no additional proficiency had been 
acquired, as had been stipulated by the SAPS management as one of the major objectives of this 
process - even though this process had been implemented a while ago: “None whatsoever, 
because they are [not] educating the detectives whom they indicated they will do it is a year 
down the line. No expertise has been gained at the detective’s branch”.   
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In contrast to the aforementioned participants, another participant perceived the restructuring 
process of the FCS to be feasible and sustainable by initiating the creation of a long-term strategy 
among the FCS detectives, the broader community and the victims of these related crimes: “… it 
might take long but … we need to come up with a strategy … referring to our community … 
referring to our victims … it will make a positive impact …”. 
In addition, it also emerged from the focus group interviews with the FCS units, that participants 
greatly questioned the benefits of this process for the community and the FCS members, and 
therefore cross-questioned their responsibility in sustaining the restructuring process: “Why 
should we sustain anything if it doesn’t bring anything good to us? … this thing is a 
disadvantage not only for the police officers but for everybody”. 
 
In face-to-face interviews conducted with senior public prosecutors, it transpired that the long-
term goals of the restructuring of the FCS could be feasible and sustainable, on condition that the 
SAPS management gave sincere attention to the problems currently experienced by all the role 
players: “… dit kan volhoubaar wees, dit kan effektief wees as die probleme wat daar [is] 
aandag [aan] gegee word en dit uitgestryk word …” [“… it could be sustainable and effective if 
attention is given to existing problems …”].   Participants were of the opinion that the SAPS 
management had to create increased awareness among FCS members and other role players, in 
order for them to be completely familiar with the aims and objectives of this process: “[daar 
moet] gekyk word na die lede, om hulle positief te kry rondom die doelwitte …” [“… members 
have to be inspired towards the objectives …”].  Stated differently, FCS members and other role 
players would have had to buy into this process and thus take ownership thereof in order to make 
this process sustainable: “… as die lede eers gewen kan word in hierdie herstrukturering dink ek 
kan dit volhoubaar wees” [“… members first have to buy into this process in order for it to be 
sustainable”]. In addition, participants believed that the SAPS management demonstrated a lack 
of support for the restructured FCS units, and did not adequately empower FCS members to 
effectively deal with the difficulties experienced during this process. These participants therefore 
raised the question whether the restructuring of the FCS would indeed be feasible and 
sustainable: “… daar’s te min gedoen … Dit is asof daar nie ondersteuning is om dit wel 
volhoubaar en wel effektief te maak nie” [“… not much was done … it is if there is not sufficient 
support to make it sustainable and effective”].  
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Conversely, a few participants indicated that they completely lacked an understanding of what 
the goals and objectives of the restructuring process were, and were therefore not in a position to 
comment on the achievability, feasibility and sustainability of this process: “… ek verstaan dit 
glad nie. … ek weet nie hoekom hulle afgeskaf is nie ek verstaan dit nog steeds nie”. [“…I 
completely do not understand it, I do not understand why they are disbanded”]. 
  
One participant, furthermore, provided recommendations on how the SAPS management could 
improve the sustainability of the restructuring of the FCS. It was proposed that the SAPS 
management reconsider the goals and objectives of the restructuring process, in comparison to 
the current achievements of this process: “… hulle sal na hele doelwit weer moet gaan kyk in die 
sin van wat hulle bereik het” [“… they should have to reconsider the objective in accordance to 
their achievements”].  It follows that the main goal of the restructuring process, namely, to bring 
the services of the FCS closer to the community they serve in order to improve service delivery, 
has not been met: “As dit was dat hulle die mense nader aan die slagoffers, nader aan die howe 
en die aanklaers wil bring dan sal hulle dit weer in die eerste plek moet gaan verander in die sin 
van die mense is nie daar nie”. [“If their objective is to bring the FCS officials closer to the 
victims, courts and prosecutors, they should consider changes since these officials are not more 
accessible”].  
 
In correspondence with the abovementioned statements concering the feasibility and 
sustainability of the envisaged long-term goals of the restructuring process of the FCS, another 
participant emphasised the significance of the empowerment of the FCS units, by means of 
physical and human resources, to practically enable them to uphold this process: “… hulle [sal] 
hierdie eenheid (as ‘n mens dit nog so kan noem) behoorlik moet bemagtig in die sin van 
voertuie en personeel” [“… they should sufficiently empower this unit (if you can still call it 
that) with vehicles and personnel”].  It once more came to light that the restructured FCS units 
were experiencing significant resource deficiencies; therefore, unless these shortcomings were 
not appropriately addressed, the restructuring of the FCS could not be sustainable.  
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However, this process was currently considered not to be feasible: “Dit gaan nie gebeur as hulle 
nie behoorlik bemagtig word nie. So, dit kan nie volhoubaar wees nie.  Eintlik [is] dit op die 
oomblik nie uitvoerbaar nie …” [“It will not happen if they are not properly empowered. 
Therefore, it cannot be sustainable; currently it is not practicable …”]. 
 
Similarly, the Therapeutic Manager of an NGO providing counselling services to victims of 
violence and abuse, clearly shared her perceptions about the feasibility and sustainability of the 
envisaged long-term goals of the restructuring process of the FCS.  It surfaced that the 
restructuring of the FCS had failed the needs of the community, and service delivery by the FCS 
had also deteriorated. As a result, this process was believed not to be feasible: “It is not feasible 
… it is not working … it is not meeting the needs … the very understanding I have … meeting the 
needs of the community. That objective is not been met, it is actually failing that objective”.  
It also emerged that the low self-esteem of SAPS members might have a significant impact in 
hampering the feasibility and sustainability of the restructuring process: “… many of the SAPS 
officers that I have spoken to or worked with … indicated a need to step down or to leave their 
job … I can’t see this as being feasible … I can’t see it being sustained either”. This participant 
also spoke of the morale of the SAPS members, as discussed in paragraph 4.2.5 of chapter 4. 
 
From the above reactions, it appeared that participants regarded the long-term goals and 
objectives of the restructuring of the FCS to be ambiguous, and therefore had their reservations 
about the feasibility and sustainability of this process. Participants’ perceptions that expertise, 
knowledge and skills of FCS detectives had been lost, without acquiring new expertise, might 
explain their suspicions about the feasibility and sustainability of this process. Participants 
furthermore gave the impression that the SAPS management did not support and empower the 
restructured FCS units in order to facilitate the feasibility and sustainability of this process. This 
might explain FCS detectives’ reservations pertaining to their responsibilities, in order to sustain 
the restructuring process.     
 
A discussion of participants’ views about the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the  
expertise and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS, follows. 
 
 187 
 
4.2.7 The impact of the restructuring process on the expertise and specialised skills of 
FCS detectives  
 
The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the expertise and specialised skills of the 
detectives in the FCS, relegate to the effect of the restructuring process on the detectives’ 
particular competence and their unique proficiency as FCS investigators. In other words, the 
expertise and specialised skills of detectives in the FCS also refers to their exclusive and 
exceptional ability and specialised training to investigate FCS-related cases. The impact on the 
expertise and these specialised skills can be affected positively, for example, through skills 
transfer, or it can have a negative impact - for example, work overload or a divergence in their 
primary functions.       
 
This theme was derived from the answers given by the participants on the following question 
posed to them: “According to you, will this restructuring process have an impact on the expertise 
and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS?” 
 
It evidenced from the focus group interviews conducted with participants employed at the FCS 
units, referred to in Annexure B, that these participants undoubtedly anticipated their expertise 
and specialised skills to be negatively affected by the restructuring of the FCS. More specifically, 
it came to light that participants predicted their expertise and specialised skills to be inadequately 
impacted by a transformation in their primary functions, thus resulting in the exhaustion of their 
expertise and specialised skills: “… these guys [referring to FCS detectives] who has got 
experience and expertise … is not only going to deal with [specialised] cases… [they] are going 
to lose all your experience in the long term …”. Another significant dilemma that influenced 
FCS detectives’ expertise and specialised skills, was the large geographical area these officers 
needed to serve. This participant motivated his viewpoint as a result of time constraints due to 
the geographical area that needed to be served, that in turn hampered proper investigation of 
these technical cases:  “Because of time … we need to rush ...  some of the other things you know 
you put a blind eye … you sacrifice you do quick quick stuff”. 
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Furthermore, it became apparent that FCS detectives were regarded as general detectives 
investigating non-specialised cases, thus confirming the alteration in these detectives’ functions. 
As a result, in the event of the investigation of FCS-related cases, FCS detectives experienced 
time constraints in fully applying their expertise and specialised skills. Consequently, these 
detectives’ exclusive and exceptional abilities to investigate FCS-related cases were significantly 
hampered: “I think the man with the expertise and the experience [referring to FCS detectives] 
… is working on the same level [as the general detective]… you don’t have enough time to 
specialise … you are definitely not investigating your case hundred percent”. 
It also came to light that FCS detectives considered their knowledge and skills not to be 
acknowledged after the restructuring of the FCS, since they were now used for less important 
functions: “Our expertise are not being recognised. We are a bunch of monkeys here and since 
the restructuring the only thing we became is taxi drivers and collecters. The only thing we do is 
taxi the person [referring to victims] from the police station to the hospital and collecting the 
dockets”. On the contrary, another participant experienced supporting and inspiring gestures 
from an NGO, at his particular FCS unit, working closely with FCS detectives, in the form of 
awards, in order to highlight these members’ unique proficiency as FCS investigators:  “... we’ve 
got people from the non-governmental organisation those who encouraging the FCS to explore 
their skills …”. 
  
On the other hand, one participant was of the opinion that expertise and specialised skills could 
be sustained, on condition that general police officers were primed to gain knowledge of and 
become skilled at FCS-related investigations: “Unless the people [referring to the general police 
officer] are prepared to learn about it [referring to FCS-related cases] … the expertise won’t be 
lost …”.  However, the question remains as to who will be responsible for educating these 
general officers, since FCS detectives cannot perform this function, as they are experiencing time 
constraints: “… who are going to teach those people?”   
In correspondence with the aforementioned participant, one participant shared similar views 
about how expertise and specialised skills of these FCS detectives could be sustained, 
emphasising the active involvement and cooperation of the entire SAPS organisation: “… it will 
depend if the entire detectives are willing to learn from us if they are … it will have a positive 
impact …”. 
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Moreover, during individual interviews conducted with senior public prosecutors, it came to light 
that participants, to a fair degree, agreed that the restructuring of the FCS might have had a 
detrimental impact on the expertise and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS. On the 
one hand, one participant did not foresee a significant effect on the expertise and specialised 
skills of FCS detectives, though the participant did predict the stagnation of these exclusive and 
exceptional abilities to investigate FCS-related cases: “Ek glo nie dit het het rêrig so ‘n 
verskriklike impak nie … Ek wil amper sê dit gaan stagneer”. [“I don’t believe it has such a 
great impact … I am predicting that that it’s going to be idle”].   However, if these detectives 
were uninspired, they would, in turn, not be encouraged to further develop their own knowledge 
and proficiency: “… wanneer jy iemand het wat gedemotiveerd is dan is hy gedemotiveerd om sy 
eie vaardighede en kundighede wel op te bou …” [“… when someone is demotivated, he is also 
demotivated to improve his skills and expertise …”]. As a result, detectives’ preparedness to 
develop their expertise and specialised skills would deteriorate. In addition, the transfer of 
knowledge and experience of FCS detectives to general police officers would contribute to their 
lack of inspiration: “… hulle dan nou veronderstel is om [kundigheid] oor te dra na hierdie 
gewone lede … gaan dit hulle net meer demotiveer … geen elite meer daarin nie … wat hom 
onderskei van ‘n ander gewone polisielid nie …” [“… if FCS officials are supposed to carry 
over their expertise to normal SAPS members these FCS members would become demotivated 
since there is no longer any speciality that distinguish them from a normal official …”].   
Moreover, these FCS detectives were not equipped to provide training to general officers: “Hy 
moet nou ‘n opleidingsrol vervul … waarvoor hy nie toegerus is nie…” [“… they now have to 
fulfil a training role that they are not equipped for …”].   It follows that FCS detectives would 
not be regarded as unique any longer.  
 
In addition, the participant emphasised the importance of the negative effect of discouraged FCS 
members on their expertise and specialised skills. It once again came to light that members of the 
FCS were not consulted about the planning and objectives of the restructuring process that was 
thus enforced upon them: “… persone wat nie deel was van die beplanning nie … bloot iets wat 
op hulle afgedwing is”. [“… people that were not part of the planning process … only something 
that was enforced upon them”].   
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As a result, these members had to take it upon themselves to yet again motivate themselves “… 
wat hulle self op hierdie stadium moet motiveer …” [“… that ought to motivate themselve at this 
stage …”] in order to perform specialised services since they lacked sufficient resources to 
perform their tasks optimally, and also did not receive any support in this regard: “… ‘n 
probleem dat daar geen hulpbronne rêrig is of ondersteuning vir hierdie lede om hulle werk te 
kan doen nie …” [“… it is a problem since there are no resources or support for these detectives 
to perform their duties …”].  As a result, the participant also experienced a detrimental effect on 
the judicial process: “… op die ou einde lei die slagoffer daaronder asook die hele hofproses …” 
[“… in the end the victim is negatively impacted as well as the entire court procedure …”]. 
Another damaging impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the expertise and specialised skills 
of the detectives in the FCS was the increasing questioning of standard procedures by these 
officials instructed by prosecutors, that in turn reflects on their expertise:  “... wat ek al meer 
ondervind het is dat hulle spesifieke opdragte sal begin navraag … standaard ondersoek werk … 
dit wil vir my lyk asof … uhm … hulle kundigheid besig is om af te neem inteendeel” [“… I have 
increasingly experienced that they question specific instructions … standard investigation 
procedures … It seems if their expertise is starting to decrease”]. 
 
On the other hand, another participant similarly concurred that the restructuring of the FCS 
might have had a negative impact on the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives. 
However, this participant measured the effect of the restructuring on expertise and specialised 
skills, against the method of implementing this process. As a result, it was emphasised again that 
police officers have to have the required interest and affection in order to investigate FCS-related 
cases: “… mense het ‘n spesiale belangstelling daarin …” [“… people have a special interest 
therein …”].  It appears that general police officers might not have these required characteristics 
to effectively deal with related cases. Consequently, the FCS detectives might, on the one hand, 
suffer the loss of being experts in their field, resulting in an exodus of these detectives: “… ons 
gaan ervaring verloor, want mense gaan nie meer daar bly nie …” [“… we are going to lose 
experience since officials are not going to remain there…”]. 
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On the other hand, sustainable interest from other members in the functions of the FCS might 
therefore disappear as a result of the eradication of specialisation: “… op stasie vlak weet ek nie 
of daai mense meer so as ‘n spesialiseenheid gesien word nie … mense sal nie meer lus wees om 
aansoek te doen nie, want dan is hulle op die einde van die dag net ‘n gewone speurder …” [“… 
I doubt if those officials are regarded as specialised at station level … other members would be 
discouraged from applying at this unit since they are at the end of the day only normal detectives 
…”]. It therefore surfaced that the restructuring of the FCS might have a harmful impact on the 
specialised skills and knowledge of FCS detectives. Another serious concern mentioned was the 
fact that a drastic decrease in the number of FCS detectives investigating FCS-related cases was 
experienced. A number of FCS detectives have been lost to the specific jurisdiction “… baie lede 
verloor … toegewyde ondersoekers …” [“… numerous members were lost … dedicated 
investigators …”], resulting in a gap in the expertise to investigate such cases, since general 
detectives now responsible for investigating these cases critically lacked training and experience: 
“… ons sit met konstabels met ‘n paar maande ondervinding wat niks weet nie … wie gaan hulle 
lei …? ... groot gaping tussen die outjies wat nou net ingekom het … geen spesifieke opleiding 
ontvang nie” [“… we have constables with a few months’ experience who know nothing … who 
is going to lead them …?... a big gap exists between the new appointees … they received no 
specific training”].  This viewpoint is shared by another participant. He experienced that the 
fragmentation of the FCS unit brought about a significant shortfall of experienced FCS 
detectives who were replaced with inexperienced general detectives - that, in turn, created 
difficulties for the judicial system: “… mense wat die die ervaring gehad … is na ander eenhede 
geplaas … met mense wat onkundig is … wat aangestel is …” [“… detectives who had the 
experience are placed at other units … members that are inexperienced were appointed …”].  
 
Additionally, the Therapeutic Manager of an NGO providing counselling services to victims of 
violence and abuse, correspondingly shared her perceptions about how the restructuring of the 
FCS would impact on the expertise and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS.  It 
emerged from this discussion that specialisation in the field of FCS-related investigations had 
been substituted by a universal approach: “… it stopped the work into further specialisation. The 
restructuring had move into generic work …”.   
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As a result of this collective approach, it appears that, on the one hand, the expertise and 
specialised skills of FCS detectives were not utilised appropriately.  On the other hand, general 
SAPS officers, beyond doubt, lacked expertise and specialised skills in order to perform FCS-
related functions: “… because of the lack of skills, knowledge, training they [referring to general 
SAPS officers] are not going to be effective …”. This participant also anticipated that the 
expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives would vanish as a result of the decentralisation 
of FCS detectives, culminating in the variation of these detectives’ primary functions and the 
inaccessibility of their services. It follows that these detectives’ expertise and unique skills would 
not be applied in line with their primary functions as FCS detectives: “… it [referring to skills 
and expertise] will be lost … these people are placed all over … we are not going to always be 
able to access that expertise and specialised service because they … have been restructured into 
various areas … Some of them will be getting involved with other work … so the skills that they 
have will not be holding in with those skills”. Moreover, the participant regarded the 
decentralisation of the FCS members to have taken the edge off their expertise, thus creating the 
message that FCS-related investigations were of lesser importance: “… it is diluting their 
expertise because they are just posted off to some SAP unit … and it also saying to them … that 
they diluting their importance of work with children …”. 
 
Another participant, a representative from an NGO (comprising social workers, pschyologists 
and volunteers rendering counselling services to victims of domestic and sexual abuse related 
crimes), confirmed the sentiment of the aforementioned participant about how the restructuring 
of the FCS would impact on the expertise and specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS. This 
participant raised a question mark as to how FCS detectives would aquire and further develop 
their specialisation if they were exposed to other functions outside their framework: “… how do 
you get specialised in something if you have to be Jack of all trades and master of none? If you 
specialise in something … you only do that … your experience level go up ... That is not what is 
happening at the moment …”.   
 
It appears from the above reactions that participants perceived the expertise and specialised skills 
of FCS detectives not to be acknowledged after the restructuring of the FCS. This might explain 
the participants’ perceptions that FCS detectives’ preparedness might deteriorate in developing 
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their expertise and specialised skills. It once again appeared that a significant lack of resources 
distracted these detectives from specialising in their field. It thus raises the question on how the 
SAPS deal with the allocation of policing resources such as vehicles, personnel and specialised 
equipment.   
 
The following theme to be presented and discussed is the participants’ views on whether the  
restructuring of the FCS was necessary to ensure its continued functioning. 
 
4.2.8 A review on the necessity to restructure the FCS 
 
Participants’ views on whether the restructuring of the FCS was necessary to ensure its continued 
functioning, referred to the question if it was indeed fundamental to restructure the FCS in order 
to guarantee the unit’s sustained operation. Stated differently, the question that comes to mind is: 
How essential was it to restructure the FCS to ensure that the unit continued to carry out its 
functions optimally?  Participants’ opinions could take the form of firmly and emotionally 
questioning the necessity of restructuring the FCS, while it could also be presented as 
suggestions on how to ensure this unit’s continuation and effective functioning. 
 
This theme was deduced from the answers provided by the participants on the following 
question: “Is the restructuring of the FCS necessary for the effective continuation of the 
functionaries of the FCS unit?” 
 
It was evident that all the participants from the restructured FCS units, referred to in Annexure B, 
overwhelmingly and indisputably concurred that the restructuring of the FCS was unjustified for 
the continued functioning of this unit. Participants expressed that the community had not 
experienced difficulties accessing the services of the FCS prior to the restructuring of the unit: “I 
don’t think it was a problem (especially for the community) to reach the FCS …”.   To the 
contrary, victims of FCS-related crimes experienced added complications reaching the detectives 
of the FCS after the restructuring: … the victims did not have to come to us. Now … they don’t 
know how to get the FCS member on call …”.  
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In agreement with the abovementioned participant, one participant also viewed the necessity for 
the restructuring of the FCS as unwarranted: “It was not, I don’t see the reason behind it …”, 
adding suggestions on how the SAPS could have communicated the necessity to restructure this 
unit. 
  
Similarly, another participant emotionally considered the restructuring of the FCS to be pointless 
for the effective continuation of the functionaries of the FCS unit. More specifically, this 
participant compared the decentralisation of the FCS as the fragmentation of parts of a larger 
structure that had to function in unison, in order to be optimally effective. It follows that the 
breakup of this previously united structure had adverse consequences for the effective 
continuation of the functionaries of the FCS unit, thus denouncing the deterioration of the 
functioning of the FCS as a hoax:  “... ons is besig om uitmekaar te val ... ons was ‘n kool 
gewees wat saam met klomp ander kole …, maar dan vat jy daai kool weg hy raak koud hy gaan 
dood ... en dit is presies wat hulle met ons nou gedoen het. Ons is ‘n kooltjie wat weggevat is uit 
‘n warm vuur uit, ons brand nog steeds ... maar ons gaan dood gaan”. [“… we are in the 
process of falling apart … we were like a hot coal together with other coals … then you take 
away that coal, its gets cold and die. We are like that hot coal that is taken away … we are still 
burning … however, we are dying”]. Another participant shared similar views, saying: “… It is a 
big big joke. We were functioning a 110% before the restructuring now we were not even 
functioning 10%”.   
  
It furthermore became apparent that participants foresaw a bleak future regarding the FCS and 
their functions. It follows that participants predicted the further deterioration of the unit’s 
functions if they are merged with the already overloaded general detectives at station level: “Not 
at all, not at all. They are destructuring it actually … GKS gaan nie meer bestaan nie … dit gaan 
soos ‘n gewone docket behandel word in ‘n speurtak waarvan die mense honderde op hand het”. 
[“… FCS will not exist anylonger … cases are going to be handled as normal cases at the 
detective branch of which these detectives have hundreds on hand”]. An additional participant 
also revealed negative emotions surrounding the necessity to restructure the FCS.  
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It came to light during this discussion that the unfamiliarity with the goal of this process 
contributed to members’ pessimistic sentiments regarding the essentiality to restructure this unit: 
“If I knew what their goal is then they can restructure so that we can reach for something better 
… I don’t know what is sitting there at the end of the day so I can’t say”. 
 
During an interview conducted with two researchers from a regional human security research 
institute’s Crime and Justice Programme, one participant, in agreement with the aforementioned 
participants, also regarded the restructuring of the FCS to be futile for the effective continuation 
of the functionaries of the FCS unit: “I don’t think that this type of restructuring is necessary at 
all …”. However, this participant suggested an alternative approach, as opposed to the 
restructuring of the FCS.  
 
It was recommended that another option could have been to maintain the FCS in its previous 
centralised structure, though FCS detectives could then have been empowered in a tutor capacity, 
providing training to members at station level: “… instead of dispersing them in the way that it is 
happening now, they should have … given them … the responsibility to train members at police 
stations … and in the same time obliging these units to provide in-service training on a 
continuous basis to members at the police stations”. As a result, these members would have 
gained firsthand knowledge of FCS-related functions, without negatively affecting the 
functionality of the FCS unit. Nevertheless, this participant foresaw increased difficulties ahead 
for the FCS: “… they could have manage it differently without having to resort to a 
decentralisation of our FCS units … in the medium and long-term … we will have more 
problems …”. 
 
In interviews conducted with senior public prosecutors, it appears that participants had diverse 
reactions about the necessity of restructuring the FCS to effectively continue its functions. One 
participant had not so much a view about whether the restructuring of the FCS was necessary for 
its continued functioning, but rather provided suggestions on how to ensure this unit’s 
continuation and effective functioning. In brief, the participant imagined the ideal situation to be 
the duplication of the previously centralised unit at every cluster unit where FCS detectives are  
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currently placed, providing that these cluster units receive adequate support from the SAPS 
management: “… ideaal kan wees … soos wat hulle aanvanklik was as hulle daai net kan 
dupliseer in elke distrik … sodat hulle omstandighede dan nou dieselfde bly en hulle dan nou 
effektief kan funksioneer” [“… the ideal would be the duplication of the previous FCS units at all 
the districts … their circumstances would remain similar and thus function effectively”]. As a 
result, these cluster units would have the capacity and resources to function effectively.  
 
The participant furthermore questioned the necessity of this process, since although the FCS 
members were now more accessible, their quality of investigations and the completion rate 
thereof were also questioned:  “… hulle is naby hulle is toeganklik … maar ek weet nie of hulle 
… kwaliteit nou beter is nie en dat daar ‘n beter afhandeling syfer van sake is nie”. [“… they are 
close and accessible … I doubt if their quality have improved and if there is a increase in the 
finalisation of cases”].  It follows that the participant suggested the intensification of resources at 
the previous centralised unit, in order to improve effectiveness, as opposed to the restructuring 
thereof:  “… ek kan nie sien hoekom daar wel ‘n herstrukturering plaasgevind het … as hulle 
moontlik gevoel het dat hulle nie so effektief was nie kon hulle bloot net hulle hulpbronne 
uitgebrei het … steeds gespesialiseerd gebly het”. [“… I do not see the reason behind the 
restructuring … if they thought they would not be as effective, they could just have increased 
resources and remain specialised”].   
  
On the other hand, another participant expressed her unfamiliarity with the necessity to 
restructure the FCS in order to ensure its continued functioning, since this unit provided an 
efficient service to the community: “… hulle was besig om ‘n spesialisdiens aan die gemeenskap 
te lewer, glad nie ‘n idee hoekom hulle nodig gehad het om te verander nie …” [“… they 
provided specialised services to the community, have no idea why they changed … why change it 
if it is not broken”.  In agreement with the aforementioned participant, this participant similarly 
questioned the need to restructure the FCS, since “… dit het hulle niks goeds in die sak gebring 
nie dit is nie asof ons beter ondersoeke het en gouer sake afhandel nie…”  [“… They have not 
gained anything, it is not that we now have improved investigations or that cases are more 
rapidly finalised …”].   
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Another participant also expressed the need to have the FCS unit restructured, in a negative light, 
posing the question as to why processes that are effective need to be altered?  In addition, this 
participant also anticipated that the decentralisation of FCS members would bring about total 
disorder in the system, unless the SAPS invested in intensive training of members, the 
appointment of expert and dedicated personnel in this field, and participative communication 
regarding FCS affairs between all role players: “… huidige stelsel kan tot niks anders aanleiding 
gee as as totale chaos … tensy daardie mense intensiewe opleiding gaan ontvang en … om 
mense aan te stel wat … kundigheid op daai spesifieke vlak het …” [“… the current system could 
only give rise to total chaos, unless these members receive intensive training and to appoint 
members who have expertise on that level …”]. 
 
The Therapeutic Manager of an NGO providing counselling services to victims of violence and 
abuse, also expressed her disagreement with the necessity to restructure the FCS for the 
continued functioning of this unit.  It emerged that the FCS was indeed functioning effectively 
before the restructuring: “I do not think it was necessary … things that were … working well was 
done away with …”.  As a result, it was recommended that instead of restructuring the existing 
structure of the FCS, the SAPS management should have strengthened this unit: “… rather than 
sharpening that existing structures I think those structures were just taken away”. Accordingly, 
the participant regarded the prospects of the FCS as grim, thus calling on the SAPS to recall the 
centralised FCS unit: [The future of the FCS looks] “… truthfully very bleak. We would like, 
ideally, to have the FCS reinstated like it was previously”.  
 
Another participant, a representative from an NGO (comprising social workers, pschyologists 
and volunteers rendering counselling services to victims of domestic and sexual abuse related 
crimes), correspondingly shared similar reactions stating that “… everything is the same”.  
Likewise, another participant also could not figure out the essentiality why the FCS had to be 
restructured: “I don’t see any necessity why it has to be restructured …”, due to insufficient 
communication and consultation from the SAPS management.  
 
From the above response it appears that participants perceived the restructuring of the FCS to be 
unjustified for the continued functioning of this unit. A contributing factor to participants’ 
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negative reactions might be their perception that victims currently experienced increased 
difficulties reaching the FCS. Participants furthermore gave the impression that the 
fragmentation of a previous interrelated unit may have had adverse consequences for the 
effective functioning of this unit.  
The theme to be discussed next explores how participants view the impact of the restructuring of 
the FCS on the victims of crime.   
 
4.2.9 The impact of the FCS restructuring on the victims of related crimes   
 
Participants’ views on the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the victims of crime, 
questioned how, if any, victims of FCS-related crimes would be affected - directly, indirectly, 
positively or negatively - as a result of the restructuring of the FCS. Participants’ outlook could 
take the form of, for example, confused victims negatively influenced by the restructuring of the 
FCS.   
 
This theme was derived from the answers given by the participants on the following question 
posed to them: “From your experience, how will the restructuring of the FCS impact on family 
violence, child protection and sexual offences investigations? On the one hand, what does the 
future hold for victims of these crimes?” 
 
During the focus group interviews with participants employed in the FCS , referred to in 
Annexure B, it came to light that these members were currently experiencing substandard 
services provided to victims of FCS-related crimes and, in addition, predicted that these victims’ 
needs would, furthermore, be adversely neglected as a result of the restructuring of the FCS. 
Participants foresaw an unpromising future for women and children falling victim to FCS-related 
crimes, owing to the failure of general police officers to manage them with the necessary 
consideration and care. Moreover, participants experienced the deterioration of services to 
victims shortly after the implementation of the restructuring process. It also became known that 
victims experienced difficulty accessing the services of the FCS because these victims were not 
aware of the whereabouts of the FCS:  
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“… I don’t know where to reach them they are really gone …”. As a result, victims lost trust in 
the FCS:  “… they don’t even trust us anymore …”. On the other hand, when victims did gain 
access to the FCS, unfavourable conditions made it difficult for them to receive adequate 
attention: “… we are working with the general detectives and abused victims has been holding in 
the same room as you have to interview a child”.  
It also surfaced that a number of victims were convinced that the FCS did not exist any longer, 
and therefore confusion was created among them:  “Victims don’t know exactly where to go 
because they’ve got that feeling that the FCS has closed down”.  However, when these victims 
learned that the FCS had only decentralised and still existed, they suffered great inconvenience 
trying to communicate with investigating officers who were attending to their cases prior to the 
restructuring. In addition, it appeared that the lack of knowledge of general police officers 
contributed to victims’ misery. Another participant correspondingly expressed that victims were 
experiencing secondary victimisation: “… slagoffers word net twee keer slagoffers …” [“… 
victims again become victims …”], as a result of the inefficient service delivery of the SAPS: “… 
dan praat ek van die polisie se swak dienslewering …” [“… then I’m referring to the inefficient 
service delivery of the SAPS …”].    The participant was furthermore of the opinion that victims 
were totally neglected, as a direct result of the restructuring of the FCS: “… het ek myself gesien 
slagoffers word totaal en al in die steek gelaat deur … die restructuring in geheel” [“… I have 
witnessed that victims are totally failed by the restructuring as a whole”].  On the contrary, 
victims were regarded as a priority, prior to the restructuring.  In addition, one participant 
experienced that victims of these related crimes were adversely affected as a result of the 
restructuring process. It emerged that insufficient manpower and the larger geographical area 
(contrary to before the restructuring) that needed to be serviced by these officers, significantly 
affected victims negatively, since attendance to these victims was delayed and investigations 
were therefore also delayed. Another worrying factor participants mentioned was the fact that 
“the conviction rate is low very low …”.   A serious lack of human and physical resources 
encountered by the FCS members, as opposed to the situation prior to the restructuring, 
contributed to the adverse impact this process had on victims of related crimes: “… if you need a 
vehicle the vehicle was there … every car was there for every need … now at this office we got 
only two cars …”.  
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On the other hand, another participant experienced the demands and prejudice of station 
commissioners, at the accounting stations where FCS detectives were based, as detrimental to the 
needs of victims in other areas. It surfaced that these station commissioners put pressure on FCS 
detectives to give priority to cases in their jurisdiction, thus resulting in the neglect of victims in 
other areas:  “… you received a docket with the hope that you will make time … to investigate 
but you forever postpone postpone you think tomorrow I’ll definitely go to … [name withhold] 
and do … [name withhold] cases … they want you to do stuff in … [name withhold] area. They 
[referring to victims] are frustrated … they have to wait a long time before you can assist to the 
complaint …”.  
 
During an interview conducted with two researchers from a humanitarian security research 
institute, one participant believed that the restructuring process created a few short-term benefits 
for victims of FCS-related crimes: “… in the short term I think they have made some efforts for 
victims of these types of crimes …”. However, the participant was of the opinion that these 
benefits might be lost to victims during the medium- to long-term as a result of the vanishing of 
expertise in the FCS: “… in the medium- and long-term …they also may lose these short-term 
benefits because … FCS … will loose some of their expertise … Victims … will certainly … 
relatively [be] affected …”. 
 
Interviews conducted with senior public prosecutors revealed diverse reactions to the impact of 
the restructuring of the FCS on the victims of crime. One participant pointed out that the 
restructuring of the FCS would in future impact positively and negatively on the victims of FCS-
related crimes. On the one hand, the participant was of the opinion that the restructuring of the 
FCS had had a negative impact on the victims of FCS-related crimes. Prior to the restructuring, 
victims received user-friendly and specialised services at the FCS, which currently have 
deteriorated: “… as ek dit nou gaan aanmeld het, dan sou dit waarskynlik beter vir my gewees 
het om dit drie jaar terug te gaan aanmeld in die sin van die omstandighede waarin dit 
waarskynlik dan aangemeld sou gewees het” [“… if I currently would have reported a case, it 
would have probably been better to report it three years ago since the circumstances would have 
been better”].    
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On the other hand, the participant trusted that the restructuring would be, to a certain extent, to 
the advantage of victims. It follows that victims would be closer to the investigating officer and 
the presiding court where they had to appear. In effect, accessibility and support to victims 
would be improved: “… as ‘n slagoffer dan nou hof toe moet kom … kan dit egter tot my 
voordeel … ek is nader aan die ondersoekbeampte … nader aan die bepaalde hof …” [“… if 
victims need to visit the court, it would be to their advantage since they are then closer to the 
investigating officer and the specific court …”]. Conversely, another participant raised her 
concerns about the importance of sufficient training, characteristics and emotional aspects an 
investigating officer must have, in order to successfully deal with victims. On the contrary, the 
participant was of the view that general detectives did not possess these qualities, which, in turn, 
would be to the detriment of victims: “… as ‘n mens nie behoorlik opgelei is of empatie het met 
hierdie tipe van slagoffers nie en verstaan hoe en wat so ‘n persoon deurgaan nie dan gaan jy 
nie weet hoe om daai getuie te hanteer … Hulle gaan nie vertroue hê in jou nie … Gewone 
speurders het net ‘n tipe van [houding] … hulle hoef nie ‘n verhouding met die persoon te hê nie 
… as dit nie daar gaan wees met opleiding en beskikbaarheid nie … gaan die slagoffers tweede 
kom” [“… if one is not properly trained or does not have the necessary empathy towards victims 
and also does not understand their circumstances then you won’t be in a position to correctly 
handle the victim … they won’t have faith in you … normal detectives feel they do not have to 
have a relationship with victims … if it is not put in place through proper training and 
availability, then victims will play second fiddle”].  It once again became known that these 
participants experienced challenging factors that included a significant lack of trained SAPS 
members, the need for emotional affection towards victims, insufficient communication between 
SAPS members handling FCS cases and prosecutors, the deficiency of SAPS members to 
prepare victims prior to their court proceedings, and a lack of physical resources experienced by 
detectives.   
  
During focus group discussions with NGOs, it furthermore came to light that these participants 
also did not foresee a promising future for victims of FCS-related crimes after the restructuring 
process. The Therapeutic Manager of an NGO providing counselling services to victims of 
violence and abuse, predicts an unpromising future for victims as a result of a deficiency in  
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training, compassion and understanding among general police officers - thus promoting further 
distress to these victims: “… the future is very bleak for victims … because of the lack of training 
and the lack of sensitivity. Victims are not given the treatment they deserve; as a result [they] are 
already suffering secondary victimisation and secondary trauma …”. 
 
In support of the participant’s negative outlook, she furthermore illustrated, by means of a 
comparison, how victims of these related crimes were affected. It became apparent that the FCS 
detectives played a significant role in providing comprehensive services to victims of these 
crimes: “… previously with the FCS unit … it was very integrated and comprehensive all the 
services … the FCS officer played a perfect role …”, as opposed to the inconsistent and 
disorganised service provided by them after the restructuring: “… whereas now it has become so 
fragmented and disjointed …”. Another concern raised was the experience of victims 
experiencing feelings of unsupportiveness and confusion relating to their cases. It emerged that 
these victims experienced disorder with the investigation of their cases: “… they would phone … 
to find out about the feedback of their case and nobody knew who was the investigating officer 
and they felt helpless and we would phone from one police station to another …”. 
 
One of the participants from a focus group discussion, a representative from an NGO 
(comprising social workers, psychologists and volunteers rendering counselling services to 
victims of domestic and sexual abuse related crimes) correspondingly agreed that victims were 
negatively affected by the restructuring of the FCS. It also appeared that victims were hesitant to 
report cases after the FCS had been restructured: “They won’t report … they are already 
doubtful to report”, “… they are negatively impacted by incompetence”.  Similarly, it surfaced 
that victims experienced feelings of hopelessness and were discouraged from reporting cases, as 
a result of the failure of the police to render support and protection: “… clients experience a form 
of helplessness and discourage …”.   Moreover, it seemed as if the victims had lost faith in the 
police after the restructuring of the FCS, and therefore rather drew on the services of NGOs 
which rendered related services:  “They don’t go to the police anymore. They come to the NGOs 
… They don’t have trust in the police anymore …”. 
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From the above perceptions of participants it appears that victims of FCS-related crimes were 
negatively impacted, as a direct result of the restructuring of the FCS. The perception of 
participants that victims experienced difficulty in accessing the services of the FCS, since they 
were unaware of the whereabouts of these units, illustrates victims’ added misery and secondary 
victimisation. The despair of these victims might explain why they lost trust in the FCS and 
rather resorted to NGOs, ahead of reporting cases to the FCS. A contributing factor to the 
negative impact of the restructuring process of the FCS on victims of FCS-related crimes, might 
be the disappearance of the expertise of FCS detectives and the lack of expertise and training of 
general SAPS members attending to these investigations.  
Isolated cases in which participants experience improved service delivery to victims might 
illustrate isolated advantages of the restructuring process on victims.   
 
Participants’ views on the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the perpetrators of crime, 
follow. 
 
4.2.10 The impact of the FCS restructuring on the perpetrators of related crimes 
 
Participants’ views on the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the perpetrators of crime 
question how, if any, perpetrators of FCS-related crimes were affected - directly, indirectly, 
positively or negatively - as a result of the restructuring of the FCS.  
 
This theme was derived from the answers given by the participants to the following question 
posed to them: “From your experience, how will the restructuring of the FCS impact on family 
violence, child protection and sexual offences investigations? On the other hand, what will the 
impact be on the perpetrators of these related crimes?” 
 
During focus group discussions with various FCS units, it emerged that detectives from these 
units envisaged that the restructuring of the FCS would be to the advantage of the perpetrators of 
related crimes in the future, since these perpetrators would be uncontrolled, with no sufficient 
protection to victims: “… they are going to have a royal time because they are going to be free 
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and there is nobody to protect victims. You don’t have a proper investigating officer to protect 
them. And they are going to know the expertise is gone”. In confirmation with the 
aforementioned participant, one participant, furthermore, experienced the perpetrators to be 
advantaged as a result of the restructuring of the FCS. It emerged that FCS detectives found it 
challenging to rapidly respond to crime scenes that, in turn, favoured the perpetrators due to a 
lack of evidence: “They are enjoying themselves. And they are having enough time …”. 
 
In addition, it appears that perpetrators were familiar with the restructuring of the FCS. 
Consequently these perpetrators would realise that the expertise and specialised skills of FCS 
detectives were inadequately impacted, and would thus use it to their advantage by committing 
additional crimes: “… they know what is going on inside the police. And they know that now is 
the time [to commit crimes]… die ekspertees is weg” [“… the expertise is gone …”].  
 
In agreement with the aforementioned FCS detectives, a senior researcher from a humanitarian 
security research institute’s Crime and Justice Programme also anticipated that the restructuring 
of the FCS would be to the advantage of perpetrators, since there was no longer an effective FCS 
capacity, as opposed to the authoritative FCS unit prior to the restructuring: “… I can only 
imagine criminals stand to gain a lot because where … in the past they were constantly looking 
over their shoulders because they knew there were a bunch of dedicated expert police officials 
working on them and now these units are in the process of being phased out …”.  
During interviews conducted with senior public prosecutors, participants had diverse reactions to 
the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the perpetrators of crime. One participant, on the 
one hand, viewed that the restructuring of the FCS could be a drawback to perpetrators, since the 
services of the FCS were more accessible to victims, and thus discourage perpetrators from 
commiting these offences: “… aan die een kant kan oortreders dalk dink maar hier is nou mense 
wat [as ek so ‘n misdryf gaan pleeg] my gaan ondersoek, of moontlik gaan arresteer, of dit vir 
my [moeiliker gaan] maak…” [“… on the one hand, perpetrators could imagine they would be 
investigated or arrested if they commit such a crime …”].  On the other hand, perpetrators could 
be advantaged as a result of the restructuring process, sensing that investigating officers have  
low self-esteem and therefore do not investigate cases efficiently: “Aan die ander kant kan ‘n 
oortreder ook eenvoudig sê … ‘dit is dalk makliker om misdrywe te pleeg’, want jy sit met lede 
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wat gedemotiveerd is …” [“… on the other hand, perpetrators could imagine it is easier to 
commit such crimes since members of the FCS are demotivated …”].  
Another participant experienced that perpetrators were currently at times negatively affected by 
the restructuring of the FCS, since investigating officers, from time to time, did not attend 
perpetrators’ bail applications in court: “… as hulle wil borgaansoek doen en ons kan nie die 
ondersoekbeampte in die hof kry nie …” [“… when they apply for bail and the investigating 
officer does not attend court proceedings …”].  However, the participant expected perpetrators 
to be advantaged by the restructuring of the FCS if investigations were not performed 
adequately. Currently, statements taken from victims and perpetrators were not up to standard - 
that could be to the advantage of perpetrators as a result of inexperienced investigating officers 
now investigating these cases: “… verklarings word so swak geneem. Hulle gaan voordeel trek 
… as die ondersoek nie behoorlik voltooi word nie gaan hulle gouer vrygelaat word, of 
onskuldig bevind word ...” [“… statements are substandard … perpetrators would be 
advantaged … if investigations are not investigated appropriately they would be released earlier 
or founded not guilty …”].     
 
The Therapeutic Manager of an NGO providing counselling services to victims of violence and 
abuse, also expressed her negative thoughts regarding the advantage that perpetrators gained 
after the restructuring was implemented. It came to light that the unsupportive conduct and 
service of SAPS members regarding these cases, suggests to perpetrators that they have 
complimentary access to these crimes without any adverse consequences: “… perpetrators get 
away with it the message given to them is … you know I can do it again nothing has happened. 
The law is not serious”.  
 
It furthermore surfaced during focus group interviews conducted with NGOs (providing 
counselling services to victims of violence and abuse) that participants were not optimistic about 
the advantages the restructuring of the FCS held for perpetrators of related crimes.  
 
It appeared that the empowerment of victims had been totally neglected after the restructuring, 
and therefore benefitted the perpetrators: “… FCS officers previously brought child victims for 
the court preparation programme … to testify effectively in court … this no longer happens. The 
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SAPS members are not longer able to offer their service …”.  It also appeared that prompt 
service delivery provided by general police officers was not up to standard, as opposed to FCS 
detectives’ punctual services, resulting in perpetrators not being apprehended: “… the FCS 
officers they would go out immediately and arrest the perpetrator … clients have come back and 
told us that they know where the perpetrator is and the SAPS member has not been successful in 
reaching out in arresting the perpetrator …”. Another concern raised was the fact that the 
substandard investigation and control of these cases, as well as the inaccessibility of FCS 
detectives, were favorable to perpetrators: “… because of the restructuring some of the cases are 
not follow through as a result because of … lack of other information … lack of the control so … 
the system have empowered the perpetrators more than our victims … can’t get hold of the 
investigating officer”. 
 
The experiences and perceptions of participants from the above storylines gave the impression 
that the restructuring of the FCS impacted favourably on the perpetrators of FCS-related crimes. 
The substandard investigations by inexperienced investigating officers might explain why 
perpetrators were advantaged by this process. A contributing factor might have been the neglect 
to empower victims after the restructuring, that led to the benefit of the perpetrator. It 
furthermore appeared that perpetrators were negatively affected by the restructuring; ironically 
this occurred when investigating officers failed to attend to perpetrators’ bail applications.   
 
Participants’ views on the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the partnerships, interaction 
and working agreements between the FCS and other stakeholders rendering services to the client 
system serviced by the FCS follow.  
 
4.2.11 Examining the impact of the FCS restructuring on the associated networks 
  
Participants’ views on the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the partnerships, interaction 
and working agreements between the FCS and other stakeholders rendering services to the client 
system serviced by the FCS, referred to the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the joint 
venture, collaboration, relations and operational arrangements between the FCS and other 
stakeholders rendering services to victims of FCS-related crimes. The impact on the partnerships, 
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interaction and working agreements could take the form of agreements amongst the internal 
clusters of the FCS and between the FCS and external stakeholders.   
This theme was derived from the answers given by the participants to the following question 
posed to them: “According to you, how will this restructuring process affect the partnerships, 
interaction and working agreements between the FCS, non-governmental organisations, 
community-based organisations, and other government departments?” 
 
On closer scrutiny of the collected data, it became clear that the participants spoke about the 
partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and external stakeholders, 
and also about the partnerships, interactions and working agreements amongst the internal 
clusters of the FCS.   
 
For this reason, this theme is divided in the following two sub-themes: firstly, the impact of the 
FCS restructuring on the external networks, and secondly, the impact of the restructuring of the 
FCS on the partnerships, interaction and working agreements internally among the FCS cluster 
units. 
 
4.2.11.1 The impact of the FCS restructuring on the external networks 
 
During focus group interviews conducted with detectives at the FCS units, as mentioned in 
Annexure B, it became apparent that the affiliation between the FCS and the external 
stakeholders rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS, deteriorated to such an 
extent after the restructuring process that communication and interaction between these 
organisations were virtually non-existing. “… We had quarterly meetings with the social workers 
… community based members … and those are no more.  We had lectures with the schools … at 
the moment if you go there only a few people will turn up to attend the meetings.  The community 
here are up in arms … They have lost their trust in the police because they know that there is no 
more experience …”. One participant explained the deterioration of partnerships, interaction and 
working agreements between the FCS and these external stakeholders to be appalling: “Absoluut 
haglik” [“[a]bsolutely appalling”]. 
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Participants experienced the interaction between these external role players and the FCS as of 
greater quality prior to the restructuring. It became known that a number of FCS detectives did 
not perceive the necessity of sustaining high-quality partnerships, interaction and working 
agreements with these external stakeholders any longer, since these detectives were of the 
opinion that their primary functions were going to be done away with in future: “… because with 
our morale that is so low you don’t even want to want to get into a relationship with the NGOs 
anymore, because for what reason?  
In the long run we are not going to deal with these cases anymore so why do you have to build a 
relationship with the NGO?... There is no communication whatsoever between any NGO 
department with the police or the FCS unit”. 
 
A number of FCS detectives sincerely regretted not having been in a position to maintain 
adequate interaction and working agreements between the FCS, the community and external role 
players rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS: “… we are very sorry to 
leave the FCS … because we are now far from our other people. We use to be together with even 
the NGO and other organisation that were helping us, but now we are very sorry, but there is 
nothing that we can do”.  It also emerged that certain FCS clusters succeeded in sustaining the 
high-quality partnerships, interaction and working agreements with these external stakeholders, 
despite the restructuring: “… they are so supportive … Some of them they have got channels up 
to our Provincial office where they know who to consult who to speak to … they come to our 
rescue … we feel comfortable about them … to work together with them it is a jolly thing …”.  
Another participant shared similar views: “… we are still working together as if normal … we 
are still having a good working relationship …”. 
During an interview conducted with two researchers from a humanitarian security research 
institute’s Crime and Justice Programme, it correspondingly became apparent that the 
partnership and interaction between the FCS and NGOs rendering services to the client systems 
serviced by the FCS, were significantly hampered as a result of the restructuring of the FCS. As 
a result, new relationships had to be established between these organisations:  “… the FCS units 
and the NGOs, to a large extent is very negatively affected by this whole restructuring process … 
now that it is all broken and gone and you must build up new relationships now”. 
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Individual interviews with senior public prosecutors, on the other hand, revealed that these  
participants had diverse reactions about the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the  
partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and external stakeholders  
rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS.  One participant speculated that the 
relationship between these role players would probably continue and not be affected by the 
restructuring: “… verhoudinge wat daar dan nou tussen … die eenheid is en dan nou ander 
rolspelers het … net voortgegaan …” [“… relationships between this unit and other role players 
only continued …”].  As a result, the impact of the restructuring of the FCS might have had a 
positive effect on the partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and 
other (external) stakeholders rendering services to the client-systems serviced by the FCS: “… 
op die oog af is dit dalk positief … dit lyk asof die werk vinniger gedoen word en dat daar beter 
samewerking moontlik is tussen die verskillende rolspelers” [“… initially it appears to be 
positive. It seems if the work is done faster and possibly improved cooperation between different 
role players”].  However, the lack of motivation among FCS detectives as a result of the 
restructuring might have hampered the relationship between role players: “… die ander kant van 
die “coin” waar jy sit met ouens wat … ongemotiveerd [is] en dan kanselleer die twee mekaar 
nou weer uit” [“… on the other hand, members are demotivated, thus, these two cancel each 
other out”]. 
 
On the other hand, it also appeared that the FCS did not create opportunities for liaising with 
NGOs and other departments in order to develop a strong partnership:  “Daar is ‘n probleem van 
samewerking tussen ons … Hulle is nie beskikbaar nie. Dit gebeur net nie - ‘n helse probleem 
hoe hulle nou deesdae inskakel met NGOs”. [“There exist challenges to cooperating with one 
another. They are not available … it just doesn’t happen any longer … a huge challenge how 
they cooperate with NGOs these days”].    
 
One participant interestingly explained the virtual disappearance of the interaction between the 
FCS and other role players, as a result of an identity crisis “… hulle het ‘n identiteitskrisis … 
hulle skakel nie rêrig met ons nie …” [“… they have an identity crisis, they don’t really interact 
with us …”] which these detectives had to deal with after the restructuring of the FCS, since they 
lack a sense of belonging. Consequently, it appeared that these detectives were experiencing 
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difficulties to come to terms with their circumstances: “Hulle probeer hulleself net vind …n hoe 
hulle moet funksioneer”. [“They are attempting to find themselves and how they have to 
function”]. Participants also compared the majority of FCS detectives to strangers, as a result of 
barely any direct communication between them and state prosecutors. Consequently, the 
importance of communication and interaction between these role players was emphasised, 
especially with sensitive cases investigated by the FCS: “… daar is min, nie veel 
ondersoekbeamptes, sommige sal nog spesifiek individueel hulle dossiere inbring maar meeste 
gee dit vir die skakelbeampte van die stasie so dit breek ook daar kommunikasie … ons is 
vreemdelinge vir mekaar” [“… few investigating officers would still individually bring their case 
dockets, however; the majority hand it over to the representative of the station; as a result, 
communication is broken down … we are strangers to one another”].   
 
On the other hand, participants were of the view that the level of cooperation and communication 
between the FCS and public prosecutors was greater prior to the restructuring process, that 
resulted in the enhanced relationship and understanding between these role players:  “Daar was 
meer samewerking … Daar was meer kommunikasie in die sin van jy het geweet met wie het jy te 
doen …” [“… There was increased cooperation and communication since knowing with whom 
you are dealing with …”].  
     
It also emerged during focus group discussions with NGOs providing counselling services to 
victims of violence and abuse, that the restructuring of the FCS had had a negative impact on the 
partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the FCS and other stakeholders 
rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS. It came to light that the interaction 
and professional practice between these role players had decreased to such an extent that NGOs 
had to rely on the personal commitment and support of FCS detectives. On the contrary, it 
surfaced that prior to the restructuring of the FCS, NGOs had an excellent relationship with the 
FCS:  “… we had forged a working relationship with them … It worked swiftly”. 
 
It furthermore came to light that this NGO took the responsibility and initiative upon itself to 
establish a new relationship and working agreement with the SAPS, in order to alleviate the 
widespread confusion at the time: “… created and establish our own network … while the SAPS 
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is trying to get their house in order”. On the other hand, these participants were experiencing 
continued and constructive partnerships, interaction and working agreements with other NGOs 
after the restructuring of the FCS: “With other NGOs yes certainly I think it is very positive …”.  
Participants viewed the collapse of collaboration and interaction between the FCS and NGOs as 
a direct result of the restructuring of this unit, and therefore held the SAPS management 
accountable: “[The lack of cooperation between ourselves and the FCS] … can [be] contribute[d] 
to the restructuring process … and the powers that be”.  
 
In contrast to the negative sentiments and experiences of participants, it emerged that a few 
participants were optimistic about the probability that circumstances surrounding the failure of 
interaction and partnerships between the FCS and NGOs could be recovered. However, the 
SAPS management had to be prepared to enter in dialogue with the NGOs in order to restore the 
situation cooperatively: “… it can improve … provided there is discussion and collaboration.” 
 
From the above perceptions of respondents it appeared that the restructuring of the FCS had 
resulted in the virtual collapse of the partnerships, interaction and working agreements between 
the FCS and external stakeholders rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS. 
An identity crisis and the lack of a sense of belonging experienced by FCS detectives might have 
been a reason for this deterioration of the partnership, interaction and working agreements 
between the FCS and external stakeholders. On the other hand, it might also explain a number of 
FCS detectives’ views that they did not perceive the necessity to sustain high quality 
partnerships, interaction and working agreements, since they foresaw their primary functions to 
be done away with. This, in turn, questioned the commitment of these detectives to fulfil their 
obligations towards external stakeholders and the community. On the other hand, a number of 
FCS detectives expressed their regret and sympathy towards these external stakeholders for not 
being in a position to maintain adequate interaction. This positive outlook may illustrate a 
number of FCS detectives’ commitment and responsibility towards the external stakeholders. 
 
The next sub-theme to be presented and discussed explores the impact of the FCS restructuring 
internally on the FCS clusters. 
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4.2.11.2 The impact of the FCS restructuring internally on the FCS clusters  
 
During focus group discussions with members from FCS units, referred to in Annexure B, it 
disturbingly came to light that the partnerships, interaction and working agreements internally 
amongst the FCS clusters were also non-existent after the implementation of the restructuring 
process. It appeared that the low self-esteem of detectives and difficult positions these detectives 
found themselves in were major contributing factors hy these FCS cluster units did not interact: 
“… each and every person’s morale is so down you don’t even want to communicate with the 
colleagues at a other station because you don’t want to hear his problems … you’ve got a lot of 
problems of yourself”.  As a result, partnerships between these units were also significantly 
damaged:  “At this stage your working relationship went down you don’t want to speak to a 
colleague at another station there is no communication with other units anymore”.   
 
Another disturbing factor that became known was that the restructured FCS units were occupied 
with their own internal complexities and were therefore apathetic to other cluster units’ 
problems: “Nobody is interested to listen to other because they are concentrating on their work. 
I am concentrating on my cluster …”.  Another participant similarly experienced that these 
clusters functioned completely individually: “… we must have meetings amongst each other …”.  
Another participant, in contrast, shared positive experiences about the interaction, partnerships 
and working agreements between the FCS clusters. It appeared that the FCS clusters assisted one 
another if the need arose, emphasising the camaraderie and mutual interest between these 
clusters: “If they got something that I don’t have then I can easily phone them … We share the 
same feeling so we can’t turn our backs on each other now”. 
 
It seems from the above reactions that the interaction and working agreements internally 
among the FCS clusters were significantly hampered as a direct result of the restructuring of the 
FCS. It also appears that the low self-esteem of FCS detectives and unfavourable working 
conditions these members found themselves in might explain why these units lost interest in 
interacting with one another. A contributing factor might also be that these units concentrated on 
their individual inter-departmental challenges and therefore neglected to interrelate with one 
another. 
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4.3 Summary  
 
This chapter provided the presentation, analysis and integration of the qualitative data [the semi-
structured individual interviews and focus group interviews with members of the FCS at the 
lower hierarchical levels and other relevant external stakeholders directly involved with the FCS, 
as discussed in 1.10.4 of chapter 1]. The respondents’ reactions to the individual interviews and 
focus group interviews were presented and discussed by means of emergent themes and 
subcategories, to explore the outcomes of these interviews. An explanation of each theme and 
subcategory enhanced the contextualisation of such themes and their subcategories, and 
furthermore provided the reader with a clear understanding of these themes and their subsequent 
subcategories. Moreover, participants’ responses to the questions were furthermore enriched by 
direct verbatim reflections from participants. In order to further improve contextualisation in this 
chapter, tables, as presented in Annxures A and B, provide background information of the 
respondents. A deeper understanding of how participants experienced the restructuring process 
of the FCS, and how prepared they were for this process, thus emerged. A critical reflection of 
each theme acted as conclusion thereof. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the interpretation of the findings. 
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CHAPTER 5  INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the interpretation of the findings. The data is interpreted and measured 
according to the emergent themes and accompanying subcategories, as discussed in chapter 4. 
Firstly, an overview of each theme and subcategory is presented, which is accentuated and 
complemented with literature sources, as well as examples of national and international police 
and non-policing organisations and the lessons that could be learnt from these organisations’ 
restructuring efforts. Subsequently, management and ground level perspectives from individual 
interviews and focus group interviews are incorporated to form a comprehensive interpretation of 
the findings.  
 
5.2 Overview of Emergent Themes and Subcategories 
 
It is imperative for all members of the FCS and other role players to understand the reasoning 
behind the restructuring of the FCS, in order to avoid any ambiguity that may lead to perplexity 
among them. The implementation of the restructuring process should be conducted in a way that 
respects the involved members’ and other role players’ thoughts and feelings. It follows that 
participants proposed guidelines on how they would have preferred the communication and 
implementation of the restructuring process of the FCS to have taken place. In addition, 
participants also expressed their opinions of the effect that this process has had on service 
delivery in the FCS. It is also accentuated that change in an organisation affects members’ spirits 
and self-confidence either positively or negatively. The feasibility and sustainability of the long-
term goals envisaged by the restructuring of the FCS then came under scrutiny.  Moreover, the 
impact of the restructuring process on the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives were 
also examined. The necessity to introduce the restructuring process in the FCS and the impact 
thereof on the victims and perpetrators of FCS related crimes, also received attention.  
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Change in an organisation, such as the restructuring of the FCS, can, furthermore, also affect 
internal and external collaboration, relations and operational arrangements between the FCS and 
other stakeholders rendering services to victims of FCS-related crimes. The emergent themes and 
accompanying subcategories are discussed in more detail in paragraph 4.2. 
 
The first theme, “Exploring the awareness of the motivation behind the restructuring of the 
FCS”, has, as its main challenge, for the SAPS management to create awareness and knowledge 
among FCS members and other relevant role players, of the motivation for restructuring the FCS, 
in order to create transparency, and simultaneously avoid uncertainty among everyone involved.  
 
The series panel studies and individual interviews delivered similar results. It follows that 
participants’ perceptions remained unchanged. The researcher explored for developments in 
participants’ perceptions regarding the restructuring process; however, these perceptions 
remained constant over this period. 
 
5.2.1 Exploring the awareness of the motivation behind the restructuring of the FCS 
 
Change initiatives are complicated processes that may cause mystification and lack of confidence 
if not properly understood by those affected by these change initiatives, as explained in 
paragraph 4.2.1. This theme has, as it central challenge, to involve all those affected by changes 
in their organisations and their being empowered by management with sufficient knowledge of 
the change initiatives in order to familiarise them with all aspects of such changes.  It follows 
that confusion and insecurity which might exist among those affected by these changes, will be, 
to a great degree, overcome. 
 
The significance of this theory is also accentuated in the brief history of programme evaluation, 
as discussed in paragraph 2.3. During the 1930s, individuals in leadership positions in 
government agencies then already recognised a critical need for orderly, explicit ways to handle 
their policy, administrative, programme and planning responsibilities. As government became 
increasingly complex and technical, its programmes could no longer be adequately managed by 
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people hired as intelligent generalists. As a result, the importance of evaluation is now widely 
acknowledged by those in political and administrative roles in government. Many international 
federal agencies have their own evaluation units, as do a large number of their state counterparts 
(Rossi et al., 2004:8-12). Programme evaluation is thus a valuable tool in achieving knowledge 
and an improved understanding of change initiatives. In addition, the significance of knowledge 
about - and understanding of - change initiatives is, furthermore, emphasised in paragraph 2.4. 
The demand for knowledge acquisition, which demonstrates membership in the elite ranks of 
learning organisations, has crescendoed into an organisational development and programme 
evaluation mania. Evaluation has moved from merely generating findings about specific 
programmes to generating knowledge. In this age of global capitalist ascendency, knowledge has 
become “intellectual capital”. Moreover, the significance of impact evaluations, as presented in 
paragraph 2.7, also values the importance of creating knowledge, and thus advocates that 
investments in building knowledge can have tremendous and unpredictable returns. Additionally, 
the impact evaluation of Mexico’s PROGRESA program, in paragraph 2.4.1.1, furthermore 
illustrates the significance of creating knowledge through impact evaluation. In order to 
emphasise understanding and knowledge of change initiatives impact evaluation, policymakers 
in developing countries have furthermore expressed interest in gaining access to better 
information, building knowledge, and incorporating evidence in policy decisions, as discussed in 
paragraph 2.13.  
 
The literature review on restructuring processes in business and police organisations, as 
presented and discussed in chapter 3, further highlights the significance to completely understand 
change initiatives implemented in organisations by those affected.  Furnari ([s.a.]) values this 
theme, as presented in paragraph 3.2.3.1, suggesting that when restructuring a company, it is 
critical that key people are involved in all aspects of the planning, developing and execution 
stages of  “the plan”. By seeking input from employees, greater acceptance and buy-in will 
emerge, and support for change will materialise. Revitalising a company becomes a major strain 
on its people and the organisation. Since there is a natural resistance to change, it is crucial to 
approach the effort in the appropriate manner. Thus, when recommending changes, it is 
important that the benefits of the changes are clearly communicated. Baruch and Hind (2000), as 
presented in paragraph 3.2.3.2, in addition acknowledge that changes in an organisation, be they 
 217 
 
business re-engineering processes, restructuring, flattening, etc., bring not only innovation, but 
also chaos and uncertainty to the management of people in the workplace. Johnson (1994), as 
discussed in paragraph 3.2.3.2, illustrates the importance for employees to understand change 
initiatives, and therefore values the view that any plan for change should allow for incremental 
implementation, encourage employee participation, and provide continual communication and 
education on the project.  
 
Organisational change strains not only the organisation as a whole, but also individual employees 
within the organisation. In support of Johnson, Elias (2007), as presented in paragraph 3.2.3.2, 
also emphasises the importance of empowering employees with sufficient knowledge of change 
initiatives, thus advocating that implementing a change initiative without attending to such 
processes can result in employees experiencing stress and cynicism, each of which has the 
potential to reduce organisational commitment, job satisfaction, trust in the organisation, and 
motivation In fact, if an organisation is to successfully implement change, a change strategy must 
be developed that takes the employee’s psychological processes into account. Kouzes and Posner 
(as quoted by Elias, 2007), also presented in paragraph 3.2.3.2, furthermore emphasise the need 
for employees to understand change processes, and are therefore in favour of the theory that 
successful change requires employees to be intrinsically motivated, able to see change as a 
learning opportunity, and feel as though they have control over the change process. 
 
Cooper ([s.a.]:4), in 3.2.3.3, also draws attention to the importance of this theme, supporting the 
value of keeping the energy and employee engagement alive until the support processes are fully 
in place, and also allowing time for people to function and experiment within the new structure, 
as well as keeping open dialogue with stakeholders to work out important adjustments. Ford 
(2007), as presented in paragraph 3.2.3.3, furthermore accentuates the importance of 
management to empower employees with sufficient knowledge of change processes, thus 
supporting the view that effective leaders do not merely prepare an organisation prior to a change 
effort. They must have the patience to constantly build the capacity for change among 
organisational members throughout the various stages of the change effort. Leading-edge 
organisations are deriving ever-increasing value by tapping into employee and stakeholder 
expertise and capability.  
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Examples of multinational non-policing organisations’ restructuring initiatives, presented in 
paragraph 3.3, furthermore accentuate the significance of creating awareness, through 
consultation, among employees on the lower levels, to familiarise and empower them with 
knowledge of change initiatives, in order to minimise confusion and uncertainty.  The example 
of the restructuring effort of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, as presented in paragraph 3.3.1, 
furthermore underlines the significance of involving employees during change processes, in 
order to familiarise the employees with such processes and thus avoid uncertainty created by the 
changes. In line with the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Vodafone’s simplified restructuring effort, as 
well as its consultative interaction during the company’s restructuring effort with its employees, 
as presented in paragraph 3.3.2, furthermore accentuates the necessity of a clear focus during 
organisational change, in order for members to have a comprehensive understanding of such 
changes so as to minimise uncertainty. Moreover, Vodafone’s initiative to involve employees 
during its restructuring, in the form of employee representatives, additionally creates a sense of 
participation that could enhance employees’ understanding of such changes and also reduce 
resistance to change. Furthermore, ABSA’s restructuring initiative, as presented in paragraph 
3.3.4, sets an example of the significance of continuous consultation efforts with employees 
regarding restructuring processes, to ensure that employees remain informed of each step of such 
a process.   
 
In addition, the literature review on restructuring processes in police organisations, as well as 
international examples of police organisations’ restructuring efforts, presented in paragraph 3.4, 
furthermore value the significance to familiarise employees with restructuring efforts in the 
organisation through a consultative approach. It follows that Maguire et al. (2003) (in paragraph 
3.4) draw attention to the approach of police organisations to embrace concepts such as 
“participatory management” and “empowerment” of lower level employees, supervisors, and 
administrators, and “shared” decision making. The restructuring process of the Sierra Leone 
Police, as presented in paragraph 3.4.1.4, furthermore is a classic example of the value of the 
continuous consultation and interaction with all role players during change efforts. 
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From the participants’ of the various FCS cluster units perceptions, as presented and discussed in 
chapter 4, it appears that the SAPS management has neglected to efficiently empower employees 
of the FCS at the lower hierarchical levels, and other role players, with sufficient knowledge and 
consultation regarding the restructuring of the FCS that, in turn, resulted in large-scale confusion 
and uncertainty about the rationale behind this restructuring process. “… I felt like a puppy ...  
We didn’t understand what was going on ... where we were going what we are supposed to do, 
nothing … we are not sure if we are still going to do FCS cases … how long are they going to 
take to finish up this whole thing … we are still quite in the dark …”.  
 
Participants were furthermore of the opinion that they undoubtedly did not understand the 
rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS, although they made efforts to understand this 
process and the direction towards which they were heading. Additionally, it strongly emerged 
that members from the FCS had a limited understanding of the restructuring process, as a result 
of inadequate communication and consultation regarding this process: “… nobody of us, the 
members on the floor doing the work weren’t informed what was the reason for the restructuring 
…”. Participants furthermore drew attention to the importance of the responsibility of the SAPS 
management to have familiarised employees with the restructuring of the FCS:  “… the 
Management … of the SAPS … must call all of the FCS members and then explain all this to 
them but they didn’t do it up to now”.   It was additionally made known that FCS detectives had 
feelings of neglect, cynicism and the sense of no acceptance and affinity, since the justification 
for this process was not communicated to them. It follows that these members were only given 
an order to restructure, with no clear indication of the grounds for it. As a result, insecurity, 
aggravation and apathy were created among these members. 
 
Moreover, participants and representatives of non-governmental organisations, presented in 
chapter 4, similarly had a limited understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the 
FCS. These participants justified their restricted understanding of the rationale behind the 
restructuring of the FCS as a result of the lack of communication of this process to them and by 
means of unconfirmed reports. As a result, confusion about the restructuring process was 
created: “… I don’t have an understanding why in the first place it was initiated …”. 
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Participants were therefore of the opinion that their restricted understanding of the rationale 
behind the restructuring of the FCS was as a result of a lack of consultation with important role 
players. The participants additionally suggested that dialogue between important role players and 
the police would have been a viable option to inform these role players of the rationale of 
restructuring the FCS, in order to clarify the process: “... lack of consultation with the 
stakeholders … information sessions where they must inform us that there is going to be some 
changes … even the police personnel themselves they were still confused as to what is happening 
and what are they expected to do …”. Another participant also experienced a lack of 
understanding as to the reasons why the FCS restructured, and regarded the absence of efficient 
communication and consultation, as well as the enforced style the SAPS management exercised 
during the implementation of the restructuring process, as a major contributing factor towards the 
lack of understanding of the rationale behind the restructuring of the FCS: “… lack of 
consultation … there was no discussion around this it was just a top down thing … without any 
consultation”. 
 
From the experiences of senior public prosecutors it once again appears that that the SAPS 
management failed to convey the underlying principles behind the restructuring of the FCS to 
other role players. It follows that not all the prosecutors were equally familiar with this 
restructuring process. As a result, the majority of these prosecutors expressed their uncertainty 
and negative sentiment towards the introduction of the restructuring and also questioned why the 
FCS had to be restructured: “… prakties verstaan ek dit glad nie … onlogies en ondeurdag en 
wat dit behels is dat alles nou chaos is …” [“… illogical … not thought through properly 
therefore everything is chaos … practically I definitely don’t understand it”].  In addition, 
participants confirmed the shortfall of the SAPS management to effectively convey the reasons 
of the FCS restructuring, since these participants learnt of this process through the media: “… 
weet nie werklik op watter vlak is hierdie besluite geneem nie … lees maar in die koerante dat 
hierdie eenheid gaan ontbind … nie veel gekommunikeer wat die doel daar agter is …”  [“… are 
not really aware at what level these decisions were made … I read in the newspaper this unit is 
disbanding … not much was communicated what the objective is …”].    
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For the restructuring of the FCS to be distinguished as a process characterised by adequate 
consultation and communication, the SAPS management should have, ahead of implementing 
the restructuring of the FCS, effectively communicated the motivation and underlying principles 
of the restructuring process to members and other stakeholders at the lower hierarchical levels, in 
order to familiarise and empower them with knowledge about all aspects of the process. In this 
way, uncertainty and confusion about the restructuring among those affected could have been 
minimized.  The significance of knowledge about and understanding of change initiatives among 
employees, as presented in chapters 2 and 3, is well documented in the literature, and practiced 
by national, multinational, police and non-police organisations. However, the SAPS management 
neglected to empower its employees and other role players with sufficient knowledge to 
comprehensively understand the restructuring of the FCS to which they were subjected, and were 
also expected to execute the process successfully. The failure of the SAPS to communicate and 
consult its employees and other role players regarding the restructuring of the SAPS, constituted 
a critical breakdown to the process. Although restructuring is a worldwide phenomenon practised 
in order to adapt to organisational changes, adequate action was not taken by the management of 
the SAPS to educate and prepare its members for this restructuring process. It follows that the 
top structure of the SAPS solely focused on the rapid implementation of the process, while 
ignoring the fears and uncertainty of employees. Consequently, members of the FCS and the 
other relevant role players did not have the knowledge and motivation to successfully implement 
the process. As a result, the restructuring effort of the FCS was, to a great extent, adversely 
affected, since the management of the SAPS failed to create understanding and the know-how 
among employees on the lower levels. This literature also indicates the negative consequences of 
organisations that fail to provide its employees with enough information of change initiatives – 
which, in turn, should act as a precautionary measure to the SAPS not to follow similar actions.   
 
The next theme to be interpreted is “Evaluating the implementation of the restructuring process”. 
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5.2.2 Evaluating the implementation of the restructuring process 
 
Well executed implementation of organisational change is characterised by the necessary 
subtlety towards employees, consultative communication and transparency, as explained in 
paragraph 4.2.2. The core challenge of this theme is thus to communicate the importance of the 
change initiative to employees in a clear and unambiguous way, in order to empower these 
employees with the necessary knowledge concerning the goals and objectives of the change 
initiative.  It follows that employees would experience the implementation of the change process 
as a well executed and understood process, thus improving the effectiveness of the change 
initiative. 
 
The value of well-executed implementation processes is also acknowledged as one of the  
reasons for conducting impact evaluations, as presented in paragraph 2.6. It follows that this 
reason suggests that if an impact evaluation is carried out at an intermediate stage of project 
execution, very important lessons can be learnt on how the programme design and/or the project 
execution can be modified to improve the effectiveness of the intervention. In addition, the 
importance of an effective implementation process is furthermore highlighted in the significance 
of impact evaluations, as discussed in paragraph 2.7, by making provision for conducting impact 
evaluations that generate useful feedback during implementation. As a result, measurement of 
the success or failure in reaching such intermediate goals can help programme managers to make 
necessary adjustments, in order to improve implementation. White (2006) additionally signifies 
the importance of impact evaluation during program implementation referring to Kenya’s 
agricultural extension services, in paragraph 2.4.1.2, and the knowledge arising from such an 
evaluation. Moreover, White (2006) also highlights the impact of India’s Integrated Nutrition 
Project, in paragraph 2.4.1.3, and the significance of impact evaluation during program 
implementation. Davies (2004: 2,4) furthermore draws attention to the significance of impact 
evaluations in order to improve implementation, as presented in paragraph 2.7. It follows that the 
government of any country needs to know at the outset of policy development, and after policies 
have been implemented, what their likely and achieved impacts - in terms of both the positive 
and negative outcomes – will be. The United Kingdom (UK) Government, for example, uses a 
wide range of evaluations methods, including impact evaluation, to ensure that policies, 
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programmes and public services are planned and delivered as effectively and efficiently as 
possible.  In addition, McNamara (2007:2), as discussed in paragraph 2.9, values the use of 
impact evaluation to improve implementation processes, by referring to the fact that success 
involves remaining open to continuous feedback and the adjustment of programmes accordingly.  
 
The literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations, as 
presented in chapter 3, furthermore supports and highlights the value of persistent and 
unambiguous communication during the implementation of change initiatives. Savery and Luks 
(2000:309), in paragraph 3.2.1, recognise the difficulty organisations have to implement changes 
in a clear and well understood manner, and therefore emphasise that the critical nature and 
reasons for change must be clearly, consistently and regularly communicated to employees – this 
being an area in which many organisations face tremendous challenges. Cooper ([s.a.]:4), in 
paragraph 3.2.3.1, additionally recognises the significance of consultative communication, 
participative decisionmaking and employees’ readiness for change during the implementation of 
change initiatives.  Johnson (1994), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, furthermore suggests that any plan for 
change should allow for incremental implementation, encourage employee participation, and 
provide continual communication and education on the project. Organisational change strains not 
only the organisation as a whole, but also individual employees within the organisation.  
 
Moreover, Elias (2007:2), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, emphasises the well-being of employees during 
the implementation of change, by suggesting if an organisation is to successfully implement 
change, a change strategy must be developed that takes the employees’ psychological processes 
into account. Implementing a change initiative without attending to such processes can result in 
employees experiencing stress and cynicism, each of which has the potential to reduce 
organisational commitment, job satisfaction, trust in the organisation, and motivation. Kouzes 
and Posner (as quoted by Elias, 2007:2), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, furthermore place high value on 
employees’ interests during the implementation process, indicating that successful change 
requires employees to be intrinsically motivated, able to see change as a learning opportunity, 
and feel as though they have control over the change process.  
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Examples of multinational non-policing organisations’ restructuring initiatives, presented in 
paragraph 3.3, furthermore highlight the importance of consultative interaction with employees 
and participative decisionmaking during the implementation of change initiatives. The example 
of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies’ (Shell) restructuring process, in paragraph 3.3.1, 
highlights the importance of participative decisionmaking with employees during 
implementation. Additionally, Vodafone’s restructuring process, in paragraph 3.3.2, furthermore 
accentuates the value of consultative interaction with its employees throughout the 
implementation process.     
 
From the participants’ of the various FCS cluster units experiences, presented in chapter 4, it 
became known that the vast majority of participants experience and perceive the implementation 
of the restructuring of the FCS as a process characterised by confusion, uncertainty and 
unconfirmed reports that were executed instantaneously: “... we didn’t even read it [referring to 
the restructuring of the FCS] in the document [referring to official SAPS document] … I heard 
from the restructuring on the National Television … no one ever told you why and what it is 
about … nobody still is telling us exactly what it [referring to the restructuring process] is so 
there is a whole lot of uncertainties about some issues”. In addition, respondents experienced 
that the media played a greater role when the implementation of this process was made known to 
members of the FCS than official SAPS communication channels. As a result, participants then 
also signified their antagonism towards the authoritarian manner in which the implementation of 
this process was eventually communicated to FCS detectives. As a result, one participant 
described the implementation of the restructuring process by comparing it to chaos: “... 
implementation is actually a good word for chaos … there was no implementation thereof”.  
 
It follows that these participants then highlighted the SAPS management’s lack of consultative 
communication pertaining to the goals and objectives of the restructuring process of the FCS. 
The absence of participative decisionmaking then surfaced, through participants’ experiences, 
during the implementation of the restructuring process, and as a result, this process was enforced 
upon them: “… the members did not have any say or choice with the restructuring … didn’t even 
come and ask our opinion they just told us on that day you have to report by that police station”.  
A major concern that this process was implemented under false pretentions, was also raised by 
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participants, since the SAPS management did not clearly reveal the extent of the restructuring 
process to them. Participants, furthermore, then came to the conclusion that the implementation 
of this process was not carefully studied prior to implementation, and therefore gave rise to 
numerous dilemmas: “... when we were moved to the station we have to sit in the passage 
because there was no office … if it was thoroughly planned, I don’t think we would encounter so 
many problems. We needed time to thought it through …”.    
 
Participants from non-governmental organisations, as discussed in chapter 4, additionally 
experienced the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS as a process covered with 
confusion, uncertainty and characterised by a lack of communication and unconfirmed reports:  
“… it was a bit confusing ... there were rumours then they [referring to the FCS] are closing, 
then they are not”. Participants experienced the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS 
to be a sudden and unexpected order from the SAPS management that came as a surprise: “... it 
was very sudden and unexpected … implemented without any forewarning or consultation … a 
top down policy … It was just a decree, an order declared … We were just told overnight there is 
no longer going to be a FCS unit”.  It follows that a number of these participants experienced the 
restructuring process not only to be confusing to themselves but also to members of the SAPS, as 
well as to members of the community, since the previously established cooperating network had 
failed after the implementation of this process. As a result, participants need to apply their own 
discretion in order to obtain a better understanding of the implementation of this process. 
Consequently, participants voiced their reservations about the degree to which the 
implementation of this process was studied. Once again, it became evident that the media 
fulfilled a significant role in creating awareness among these participants towards the 
implementation of the process, as opposed to official police channels: “We saw everything 
[about the restructuring] on television”.  
 
As a result, the lack of communication and consultation created ambiguity and uncertainty 
among the NGOs and members of the FCS.  Moreover, informal communication channels such 
as unconfirmed reports and hearsay also contributed to participants’ awareness regarding the 
implementation of the restructuring process:  “Word of mouth I would say. It would be somebody 
telling something...”. 
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As a result, it was made known that widespread confusion had been created among NGOs and 
the FCS itself. On the other hand, participants also experienced the implementation of this 
process to have a negative effect on the community, also as a result of the lack of communicating 
the restructuring to them.       
 
A senior researcher from a humanitarian security research institute’s Crime and Justice 
Programme furthermore revealed that there was a definite lack of consultation and 
communication from the SAPS management, concerning the implementation of the restructuring 
process. Communication only materialised after the implementation of and criticism towards this 
process: “There were communication send out but these were out when the decisions were 
already taken…communication only held after criticism”. 
 
It furthermore prominently emerged from the discussions with senior public prosecutors, 
presented in chapter 4, that they widely considered the implementation of the restructuring 
process of the FCS to be categorised as an abrupt process lacking consultative communication, 
resulting in uncertainty and confusion. It follows that these participants experienced no 
consultation regarding the implementation of this process in their department. As a result, 
participants viewed the implementation of this process as top-down one-sided approach: “... ‘n 
ondeurdagte eensydige besluit …” [“… an incoherent one-sided decision…”]. 
 
Participants’ explained that their lack of knowledge about the implementation of the 
restructuring process was contributable to the absence of proper communication, consultation 
and the practical implementation thereof:  “… daar was geen kommunikasie … daar was geen 
behoorlike konsultasie … in die implementering daarvan nie” [“… there was no communication 
… no proper consultation in the implementation thereof”]. In contradiction to the best practices 
on the implementation of organisational change, as advocated in chapters 2 and 3, participants 
revealed that the SAPS did not realise the importance of communicating the implementation of 
this process, since they were too actively involved in internal challenges, and therefore neglected 
communication with other role players. Consequently, the media once again acted as the 
communication medium in order to communicate the implementation of this process to these 
participants. 
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It furthermore also surfaced that unofficial communication channels such as the “grapevine” 
functioned very strongly as a result of ineffective communication during the implementation of 
this process: “… daar is geen kommunikasie ten opsigte daarvan aan die howe … 
gekommunikeer anders as wat ons maar hoor by die ondersoekbeamptes wat hier kom” [“… 
there was no communication thereof to the courts … other than what we heard from contact with 
investigating officers”]. 
 
Moreover, participants revealed that the implementation of the restructuring process brought 
about practical and logistical difficulties, which is indicative of the rapid manner in which this 
process was implemented. As a result, participants experienced the implementation of the 
restructuring process negatively, and also questioned the advantages this process held for the 
SAPS: “Behalwe vir ‘n paar individue … is dit vir my asof niemand verder meer omgee nie … 
ons ervaar dit glad nie positief nie en ek glo ook nie dat dit vir hulle enigsins tot voordeel gestrek 
het nie.” [“Except for a few individuals it is sensed if nobody cares any longer … we don’t 
experience it positively and I believe that it also was not to their advantage as well”]. 
For change processes to be implemented successfully they should be carried out with the 
necessary subtlety, consultative communication and transparency. The implementation of well-
executed change processes, and the value thereof, is widely documented in the literature and also 
practiced by national, multinational, police and non-police organisations, as discussed in chapters 
2 and 3. However, the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS was considered as a 
process not categorised by these important characteristics. The SAPS should have implemented 
this process with the necessary sensitivity towards its members and other role players, in a 
gradual, clear and explicable way, and also with sufficient consultative communication. In this 
way the mystification, ambiguity and insecurity that prevailed among participants could have 
been overcome. The failure of the SAPS to adhere to these best practices was a significant 
drawback to the successful implementation of this process.  
 
The next theme to follow for interpretation is: “Proposals on the communication style and 
implementation method of the restructuring process”. 
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5.2.3 Proposals on the communication style and implementation method of the 
restructuring process  
 
Successful organisational change efforts are characterised by transparency, effective 
communication and consultative decisionmaking. Consequently, in this theme participants 
provided insight into how they would have preferred the communication and implementation of 
this process to have taken place. The main focus of this theme, as presented in paragraph 4.2.3, 
points to the indicators, guidelines and recommendations participants presented after being 
subjected to the implementation of the restructuring process. In other words, a first-hand ground 
level perspective is captured of the preferred manner participants would have welcomed the 
communication and the implementation of this process to have taken place.  
 
The literature review on impact evaluations in organisations, as presented in chapter 2, highlights 
the importance of effective communication and participative decisionmaking during the 
implementation of change initiatives. The myth about programme evaluation, as presented in 
paragraph 2.10, stating that success is about implementing the perfect programme and never 
having to hear from employees, customers or clients again, since the programme will now run 
itself perfectly, is invalidated by the fact that success involves remaining open to continuing 
feedback and adjusting the programme accordingly. The literature review on restructuring 
processes in business and policing organisations, in chapter 3, furthermore supports and 
highlights the importance of transparency, consultative communication and participative 
decisionmaking during the planning, design and implementation stages of change.  It follows that 
the planning and design phase of organisational restructuring, presented in paragraph 3.2.3.1, as 
well as the implementation phase, in paragraph 3.2.3.2, furthermore make provision for sustained 
and transparent dialogue between management and employees, a transparent and convincing 
strategy recognising the needs of all those affected, the recognition by management of 
consequential changes, participative decisionmaking, as well as premature communication to 
prepare employees for change.  Furnari ([s.a.]), in paragraph 3.2.3.1, also values the 
abovementioned views and therefore emphasises the importance that it’s critical that key people 
are involved with all aspects of the planning, developing and execution stages of “the plan”. It 
follows that by seeking input from employees, greater acceptance and buy-in will emerge, and 
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support for change will materialise, since revitalising a company becomes a major strain on its 
people and the organisation. It is thus crucial to approach the change effort in the appropriate 
manner. Thus, when recommending changes, it is important that the benefits of the change are 
clearly communicated.  In support of the above literature, Furnari ([s.a.]) moreover suggests that 
when recommending changes it is important that the benefits of the change are clearly 
communicated, and therefore highlights various common mistakes that can jeopardise a 
successful restructuring. These errors include the lack of a detailed strategic business plan, the 
collapse of constructive communication throughout the organisation, and the lack of analytical 
tools and timely information to track and monitor the company’s progress to effectively adjust 
strategies when required.   
 
Additionally, Furnari ([s.a.]), in paragraph 3.2.3.1, draws attention to the importance of 
improving communication at all levels when instituting a major restructuring aimed at 
revitalising an organisation. The author suggests that the general objectives and expectations of 
the restructuring should be clearly communicated to all employees in the company. In order to 
emphasise the significance of this theme, Furnari also suggests that a schedule for regular 
employee meetings, to facilitate continuous dialogue at all levels of the organisation, should be 
established, the development of procedures to ensure that key information is reported on in a 
timely fashion, and applicable steering committees to include various levels of management, as 
well as the survey of various levels of employees, to obtain feedback and provide a channel for 
communication. In support of Furnari, Johnson (1994), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, also draws attention 
to the importance that change initiatives should allow for incremental implementation, 
encouraging employee participation, and providing continual communication and education on 
the project. Elias (2007) moreover suggests, in paragraph 3.2.3.2, taking the employees’ 
psychological processes into account. Implementing a change initiative without attending to such 
processes can result in employees experiencing stress and cynicism, each of which has the 
potential to reduce organisational commitment, job satisfaction, trust in the organisation, and 
motivation.   
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Moreover, the example of the restructuring effort of The Royal Dutch/ Shell Group, presented in 
paragraph 3.3.1, is indicative of the value that interaction and participative decisionmaking with 
all role players has on the communication and implementation of a restructuring initiative. 
Furthermore, Vodafone’s restructuring process, presented in paragraph 3.3.2, additionally 
accentuates the significance of a well-executed restructuring process and the communication 
thereof. The company’s consultative interaction with its employees during its restructuring 
process, its support structure for affected employees and the involvement of employees in the 
form of employee representatives, highlights the importance of employee representation and 
participation, effective communication and the acknowledgement of employees’ well-being. In 
addition, ABSA’s restructuring initiative, as discussed in paragraph 3.3.4, also gives emphasis to 
the importance of sustained consultation with employees during change. What’s more, 
international examples of police organisations’ restructuring processes, presented in paragraph 
3.4, furthermore accentuate the importance of this theme. It follows that the SLP’s restructuring 
process, in paragraph 3.4.1.4, emphasises the significance of continuous communication, 
consultation and interaction with all role players during change efforts. 
 
From the participants’ of the various FCS cluster units reactions, as discussed in chapter 4, it 
appears that the communication style and the approach to the implementation of the restructuring 
of the FCS, that the SAPS management has applied, are disputed. As a result, participants   
concurred that they would have preferred the communication and implementation of the 
restructuring process of the FCS to be executed collectively and transparently, with prior 
consultative communication by means of orientation discussions, in order for them to be 
conversant with this process. As a result, ambiguity among participants would have been 
alleviated and buy-in into this process would have been increased: “… explain to them what is 
going to happen … it would be better if we [were] called in and explained to us …”.  Moreover, 
participants also placed high emphasis on participative decisionmaking during the 
implementation and communication of this restructuring process.  
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It also emerged during an interview conducted with two researchers from a humanitarian security 
research institute, that they similarly emphasised the importance of devoted consultation and 
communication of the restructuring process of the FCS. As a result, the respondents would have 
preferred prior internal and external consultation and communication, as well as the opportunity 
for all role players to participate in the decisionmaking process: “Everybody inside the police and 
outside the police should have been made fully aware of what they [referring to SAPS 
management] intended to do, and how they intended to do this … prior to the presentation stage 
...”. As a result, participants would have taken ownership of the restructuring process, thus 
minimising existing dilemmas. On the other hand, one researcher was of the opinion that role 
players were instead withheld the opportunity to participate and facilitate in this process, as a 
result of the lack of efficient consultation and communication: “… the lack of communication, 
consultation … took away opportunities for members and other role players to make an impact 
on this whole process”.   
 
Furthermore, it was revealed during interviews with senior public prosecutors, that high 
emphasis was placed on prior consultative communication with all role players, in order to adapt 
specialised working methods: “Dit is tog belangrik … om eers die ander rolspelers te ken … 
voordat jy iets implementer …”. [“It is certainly important to consult with other role players 
prior to implementing something …”]. In addition, participative decisionmaking was also highly 
preferred among these participants, in order for them to take ownership of this process. 
Participants were, however, of the opinion that these important factors had not been adhered to 
by the SAPS management. Consequently, current dilemmas concerning the restructuring of the 
FCS could have been minimised. Moreover, participants suggested direct dialogue as the 
preferred way of communicating the implementation method of this process, stipulating the 
details of the restructuring process of the FCS: “… om ‘n vergadering te belê wat al die 
aanklaers [insluit] …” [“… to organise a meeting that includes all prosecutors …”]. As a result, 
state prosecutors would then have been empowered to inform and advise the community 
concerning their enquiries, that in turn would have simplified this process. 
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The way in which any change initiative is carried over to employees, and the approach to the 
execution of such changes, greatly depends on whether employees will accept these changes and 
take ownership thereof. Although the literature in chapters 2 and 3 broadly draw attention to the 
significance of effective communication and consultative decisionmaking during the 
implementation of organisational change, the SAPS management instantaneously implemented 
this process without sufficient communication. As a result, employees’ and other role players’ 
feelings were ignored. This is a crucial failure in the restructuring process of the FCS. It follows 
that the SAPS should have drawn on a communication style and implementation method that was 
in line with the characteristics of a democratic police service. Consequently, participants failed to 
buy into this process and take ownership thereof, thus making legitimate restructuring non-
viable. As a result, the implementation of the restructuring of the FCS was, to a great extent, 
negatively affected, since the SAPS management failed to effectively communicate every step of 
this process to all those involved, and also neglected to appropriately execute this process while 
keeping the feelings of employees and other role players in mind.  
 
“The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on service delivery” follows. 
 
5.2.4 The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on service delivery 
 
Effective service delivery is a fundamental factor in the successful continuation of any 
organisation, as explained in paragraph 4.2.4; therefore, organisations’ efficiency is directly 
measured against their levels of providing adequate services. The core challenge of this theme is 
therefore to assess the impact, positive or negative, on the internal and external service delivery 
provided by the FCS consequent to the introduction of the restructuring process, and the impact 
thereof on the victims and perpetrators of these related crimes. 
 
The overview of impact evaluations in organisations, as presented and discussed in chapter 2, 
acknowledges the significance of providing effective service delivery. Tuffin et al. (2006) 
illustrates the impact of efficient service delivery of a study performed in the England police 
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organisation in paragraph 2.5.2. This illustration signifies the positive impact of a package of 
local policing activities on service delivery in England policing. The findings of this study show 
that the public not only notice increased police foot patrol, they also notice the efforts that the 
police put into engagement and the effects of properly targeted problem solving designed to 
reduce anti-social behaviour. All these elements appear key to a successful approach to 
neighbourhood policing and subsequently to service delivery. Moreover, Muhlhausen (2006) and 
Braga et al. (2000) also illustrate the significance of impact evaluation on service delivery during 
two separate impact evaluations in American policing, as discussed in 2.5.1 and 2.5.3.  Davies 
(2004) values the importance of efficient service delivery, as discussed in paragraph 2.7. It 
follows that the UK Government, for example, uses a wide range of evaluation methods, 
including impact evaluation (which is at the heart of their performance management system), to 
ensure that policies, programmes and public services are planned and delivered as effectively and 
efficiently as possible. Davies (2004) furthermore believe that the government of any country 
needs to know at the outset of policy development, and after policies have been implemented, 
what their likely and achieved impacts in terms of both the positive and negative outcomes, will 
be. In addition, Blomquist (2003) illustrates the increased awareness among organisations of 
improved service delivery, as presented in paragraph 2.7. It follows that Australia’s public 
management systematically integrated programme evaluation into corporate and programme 
management and planning. As a result, all public programmes, or significant parts thereof, are 
reviewed once every three to five years; all major new proposals include an evaluation strategy, 
and ministries are currently required to provide an annual evaluation plan. Moreover, Dubois 
(2002), in paragraph 2.8.4 also acknowledges organisations’ quest to improve their services, by 
referring to the government of Québec’s initiative to apply programme evaluation as the primary 
mechanism, including the development of targeted results, the achievement of concrete results 
and the measurement of results achieved - and reporting thereof.    
 
Moreover, the literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations, 
as presented in chapter 3, furthermore accentuates organisations’ efforts to foster best practices 
in service delivery. It follows that the example of Transnet’s restructuring process, as discussed 
in paragraph 3.3.3, further illustrates the realisation created among organisations to promote and 
cultivate efficient service delivery. Additionally, Bayley and Shearing (1996), in paragraph 
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paragraph 3.4, similarly draw attention to organisations’ improved consciousness to adapt their 
strategies in order to achieve healthier results. It follows that police organisations throughout the 
developed democratic world restructured their organisations, in the realisation that they were not 
effective or efficient in controlling crime, and they are thus anxiously examining every aspect of 
their performance.  Carter and McGoldrick (1994), as presented in paragraph 3.4, furthermore 
highlight this theme by illustrating that the police service of the UK that was subjected to a 
review of its performance in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and value for money, while 
providing a quality service. Muehlmann (2007: 37-40,53) also indicates the significance of 
promoting efficient service delivery through restructuring initiatives referring to police 
restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as discussed in paragraph 3.4.1.1. Moreover, Aydin (1996: 
51-54), in paragraph 3.4.1.3, furthermore highlights the importance of the Turkish police efforts 
to foster efficient service delivery through restructuring in this organisation. 
 
From the participants of the various FCS cluster units’ perceptions, as discussed and presented in 
chapter 4, it appears that the restructuring of the FCS had a detrimental effect on the service 
delivery of the unit, as well as the client system it served. It follows that participants considered 
the lack of an ample number of specialised FCS detectives as a major hindrance to the provision 
of a satisfactory service to victims. As a result, these detectives frequently had to work extended 
hours without additional remuneration: “... because you are not enough ... so the members have 
to work every second day 24 hours without any remuneration”. Consequently, another 
participant questioned the long-term benefits of this process on service delivery. Moreover, a 
number of participants highlighted the absence of sufficient human resources as a major 
drawback for providing efficient service to the community. As a result, members experienced 
remorse for failing the community, since they were now overloaded with investigations: “… the 
restructuring kill us as members of the FCS … lastly to the community that we have served … we 
don’t have … enough time to make time for their matters”. It follows that participants sincerely 
compared the restructured FCS units with the centralised FCS unit, referring to the harmonised 
and consistent service delivery provided to the community prior to implementing this process.  
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Furthermore, participants considered their low morale, the lack of consultation and the large 
geographical area to be serviced as contributing factors to the substandard service delivery. 
Additionally, participants were confronted with uncertainties, challenges, problems and realities, 
as a result of the restructuring of the FCS, which thus impacted negatively on their level of 
service delivery. Subsequently, except for the lack of human resources, physical resources were 
additional constraints that the restructured FCS units had to encounter in delivering an efficient 
service to the community. As a result, victims of related crimes were negatively impacted. It 
follows that these uncertainties, challenges, problems and realities members of the FCS face as a 
result of the restructuring of the FCS contributed to members’ physical and mental health that in 
turn impacted on the quality of their service delivery.  Participants furthermore revealed that they 
experienced a lack of acceptance and recognition within their internal ranks, since they 
experienced a lack of responsibility from their newly adopted stations towards them. 
Consequently, victims of FCS related crimes were negatively influenced as a direct result of the 
restructuring of the FCS. Moreover, participants also experienced nepotism practiced by station 
commissioners of the accounting stations where FCS members were stationed, thus contributing 
to inefficient service delivery: “… you are being forced to do the dockets which they want at the 
station which you are stationed … you must go and do that docket … and you’ll leave others 
station dockets…” 
 
Referring to the impact of the FCS restructuring on the victims of related crimes, it appears that 
participants were currently experiencing substandard services provided to victims of FCS-related 
crimes, and in addition, these participants predicted that victims’ needs would, furthermore, be 
neglected as a result of the restructuring of the FCS.  Moreover, these participants forecasted an 
unpromising future for women and children falling victims of FCS-related crimes, owing to the 
failure of general police officers to manage them with the necessary consideration and care. 
Furthermore, participants were of the belief that the deterioration of services to victims came 
about shortly after the implementation of the restructuring process. These participants were 
further of the opinion that victims experienced difficulty accessing the services of the FCS, 
because these victims were not aware of the whereabouts of the FCS. On the other hand, when 
victims gained access to the FCS, unfavourable conditions made it difficult for them to receive 
adequate attention. As a result, victims lost trust in the FCS.   
 236 
 
The participants were also of the sentiment that victims were totally neglected as a direct result 
of the restructuring of the FCS, since they were experiencing secondary victimisation as a result 
of the inefficient service delivery of the SAPS: “… slagoffers word net twee keer slagoffers … 
dan praat ek van die polisie se swak dienslewering … het ek myself gesien slagoffers word totaal 
en al in die steek gelaat deur … die restructuring in geheel”. [“… victims again become victims 
… then I’m referring to the inefficient service delivery of the SAPS … I have witnessed that 
victims are totally failed by the restructuring as a whole”].  
 
Participants additionally believed that insufficient manpower and the larger geographical area, as 
opposed to before the restructuring, that needed to be serviced by these officers, significantly 
affected victims in a negative way, since attendance to these victims was delayed and 
investigations were therefore held up.  Participants also regarded the serious lack of human and 
physical resources encountered by the FCS members, as opposed to the situation prior to the 
restructuring, as a contributing factor to the adverse impact this process had on victims of related 
crimes. These participants were, moreover, of the opinion that station commissioners put 
pressure on FCS detectives to give priority to cases in their jurisdiction, thus resulting in the 
neglect of victims in other areas. On the other hand, it emerged that the restructuring would be to 
the advantage of the perpetrators of related crimes in the future, since these perpetrators would 
be uncontrolled, with no sufficient protection to victims: “… they are going to have a royal time 
because they are going to be free and there is nobody to protect victims. You don’t have a proper 
investigating officer to protect them. And they are going to know the expertise is gone”. It 
furthermore emerged that FCS detectives found it challenging to rapidly respond to crime scenes, 
that in turn favoured the perpetrators, due to a lack of evidence. What’s more, participants were 
also of the belief that perpetrators were familiar with the restructuring of the FCS. Consequently, 
these perpetrators would realise that the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives were 
inadequately impacted, and would thus use it to their advantage by committing additional crimes.   
It additionally emerged, from discussions with NGOs, that the standard of service delivery had 
unquestionably decreased after the implementation of this process. It was also revealed that the 
community had distrustful sentiments towards the FCS’s standard of service delivery. On the 
other hand, it was made known that a part of the community had no faith in the ability of the 
SAPS’s service delivery regarding FCS-related cases, even before the implementation of the 
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restructuring process. As a result, these members of the community were even more sceptical 
about the service delivery of the restructured FCS units, and were thus of the opinion that this 
process had an increased negative impact on them. It follows that victims of FCS-related crimes 
were reluctant to report cases to the SAPS, as a result of inexperienced SAPS members and 
confusion among members. It furthermore came to light that FCS detectives had “vanished” as a 
result of this restructuring process. Consequently, the general SAPS officers were mainly 
performing these related functions; however, these officers lacked training and experience 
regarding FCS-related functions, since they were neither trained nor equipped - and also not 
sensitised - to render efficient service to these victims. Consequently, victims of these crimes 
were exposed to secondary trauma as a result of the inability of the SAPS to render efficient 
service to them: “... there is nothing we can do about this ... that is one example of the police 
station that haven’t any clue how to deal with a child that is in need and what the procedures 
were”.   
 
On the contrary, it became known that FCS officers were intensely involved with NGOs before 
the restructuring of the FCS, and to a great extent also committed to service delivery.  However, 
it appeared that this state of affairs had changed for the worse. In addition, participants were also 
of the opinion that a contributing factor to the significant deterioration in service delivery of the 
FCS was the fact that the general SAPS officers were obliged to become involved with these 
crimes; however, these officers lack the necessary affection, drive, training and passion 
concerning crimes against women and children, in order to efficiently perform these tasks:  
“Many of them [referring to the general police officer] don’t want to be in this position ... They 
find the work very challenging and very traumatic ... certainly does not have the training ... skills 
... and the knowledge ...”.  As a result, the investigation process also is significantly negatively 
affected. Consequently, participants cynically predicted a grim future for victims of FCS-related 
crimes, thus emphasising the importance of training SAPS officials, in order to direct them to 
render effective services to the community.  
 
Additionally, it emerged that these participants predicted an unpromising future for victims, as a 
result of a lack of training, compassion and understanding among general police officers, thus 
promoting further distress to these victims. It also became known that the FCS detectives had 
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played a significant role in providing comprehensive services to victims of these crimes, as 
opposed to the inconsistent and disorganised service provided by them after the restructuring. As 
a result, these victims experienced disorder with the investigation of their cases. It surfaced that 
victims experienced feelings of hopelessness and were too discouraged to report cases, as a result 
of the failure of the police to render support and protection, and therefore rather drew on the 
services of NGOs who rendered related services. On the other hand, participants also considered 
that the empowerment of victims had been totally neglected after the restructuring, and therefore 
benefitted the perpetrators: “… FCS officers previously brought child victims for the court 
preparation programme … to testify effectively in court … this no longer happens. The SAPS 
members are not longer able to offer their service …”. Participants also revealed that the 
substandard investigation and control of these cases, as well as the inaccessibility of FCS 
detectives, are favourable to perpetrators. 
Additionally, the significance of a specialised unit, in order to focus on a specific crime and thus 
maintain high levels of service delivery, was accentuated during interviews with participants 
from a humanitarian security research institute. It follows that pride in and loyalty to a group 
were significant factors, and consequently gave rise to satisfactory service delivery: “… they 
develop an “esprit de corps” that is extremely important for any specialised unit …”. As a 
result, specialists continuously received exclusive and valuable in-service training and skills 
through the constant interaction and collaboration among them, resulting in the service delivery 
of the FCS being constantly enhanced. The participants were of the opinion that the restructuring 
of the FCS deprived the unit of its individual character; therefore, pride in and devotion to the 
FCS unit, as well as the opportunity to share and transfer combined knowledge and skills, 
vanished. Moreover, participants stated that the FCS unit had gradually become involved with 
other investigations, unrelated to FCS functions. As a result, these members lost their 
competence to specialise, thus affecting service delivery negatively. The participants also 
expressed concern about the effect of the restructuring of the FCS on the emotional and 
psychological state of these members, and therefore envisaged the depreciation of this unit’s 
service delivery to become more evident in the medium- and long-term. 
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Moreover, these participants also believed that the restructuring process had created a few short-
term benefits for victims of FCS-related crimes, referring to the impact of this process on victims 
of related crimes. However, these benefits might be lost to victims during the medium- to long-
term, as a result of the vanishing of expertise in the FCS: “… in the medium- and long-term … 
they also may lose these short-term benefits because … FCS … will loose some of their expertise 
… Victims … will certainly … relatively [be] affected …”.  On the other hand, one participant 
anticipated that the restructuring of the FCS would be to the advantage of perpetrators, since 
there is no effective FCS capacity any longer, as opposed to the authoritative FCS unit prior to 
the restructuring. 
 
Furthermore, it evidenced from the perceptions of senior public prosecutors, as presented in 
chapter 4,  that the SAPS was increasingly finding it demanding to provide efficient service to 
the community and other role players regarding FCS-related functions: “Chaos daar word [nie] 
dienste meer gelewer nie ... geen beheer oor wat hulle doen nie ...”. [“Chaos, services are not 
rendered any longer … they have no control of what they are doing …”]. As a result, a 
significant negative impact on the services of the FCS was experienced, since the FCS no longer 
had control over their functions, as a result of the decentralisation of the unit. It follows that the 
participants experienced members of the FCS to be, in effect, removed further away from the 
court, although the decentralisation of these members had indeed brought them closer. 
Consequently, participants regarded these members to have disappeared; however, a small 
number of FCS detectives were continuously prepared to provide quality service to the public. 
As a result, junior investigating officers with little or no experience were utilised to investigate 
FCS-related cases, that in turn negatively impacted on service delivery and the judicial 
processes.  Accordingly, the inadequate service delivery by the FCS resulted that other role 
players were also negatively impacted.  “Ons sukkel om sake van die grond af te kry ... 
instruksies word nie nagekom nie ... dossiere word hof toe gestuur sonder dat dit behoorlik 
nagesien is deur ‘n offisier ... dit lei tot terugtrek ...”. [“We struggle to get cases off the ground 
… instructions are not adhered to … case dockets are sent to court without proper perusal by 
officers … it leads to the withdrawal of cases …”]. In addition, participants experienced various 
uncertainties, challenges and problems, regarding the provisioning of efficient service to the 
community and to other relevant role players, that surfaced as a result of the lack of interest and 
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training of general non-specialised detectives previously responsible for investigating less 
serious crimes, and now responsible for investigating FCS-related cases. It follows that 
investigations were substandard, that in turn impacted negatively in court hearings. Participants 
furthermore highlighted the need for specialised and experienced investigation officers who 
could contribute to the existing challenging circumstances. 
One participant was, in addition, of the opinion that the restructuring of the FCS had had a 
negative impact on the victims of FCS-related crimes, since victims received user-friendly and 
specialised services from the FCS prior to the restructuring, that had now deteriorated. On the 
other hand, this participant anticipated that the restructuring would, to a certain extent, be to the 
advantage of victims, since these victims would be closer to the investigating officer and the 
presiding court where victims would have to appear. Conversely, another participant anticipated 
that the restructuring of the FCS could be a drawback to perpetrators, since the services of the 
FCS were more accessible to victims, and thus demotivate perpetrators from committing these 
offences. On the other hand, this participant believed that perpetrators could be advantaged as a 
result of the restructuring process, sensing that investigating officers had low self-esteem and 
therefore did not investigate cases efficiently. Similarly, another participant was also of the 
opinion that perpetrators would be advantaged by the restructuring of the FCS, if investigations 
were not performed adequately. Currently, statements taken from victims and perpetrators were 
not up to standard - that could be to the advantage of perpetrators, as a result of inexperienced 
investigating officers now investigating these cases. 
 
The main driver for restructuring the FCS is to improve the service delivery of this unit by 
bringing FCS services closer to the community. However, the reality is that the SAPS 
management has been unsuccessful in accomplishing this objective, since this process had a 
detrimental effect on the service delivery of the unit as well as on the client system it served. 
Effective service delivery is widely valued and practised by policing and non-policing 
organisations, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3, though it did not materialise at the lower 
hierarchical levels of the FCS and the client system it serves. It follows that FCS members could 
not act appropriately in order to improve service delivery, since they experienced numerous 
obstacles, that in turn hindered them from acting on this vision.  
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This implies that the restructuring of the FCS could be considered to be unsuccessful, since an 
organisation’s efficiency is directly measured against its level of providing effective service to 
the client system it serves.     
 
“The effect of the restructuring process on the morale and productivity of FCS members” as an 
additional theme follows. 
 
5.2.5 The effect of the restructuring process on the morale and productivity of FCS 
members 
 
Change in any organisation, such as the restructuring of the FCS, brings with it certain concerns 
among members that, in turn, have an effect on their daily functioning, as explained in paragraph 
4.2.5.  The main focus of this theme has, as its core challenge, to assess the impact of the 
restructuring process on the morale and productivity of the FCS members, referring to their self-
esteem and spirits which they have to deal with, that, in turn, have an effect on their service 
excellence and effectiveness. 
 
The literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations, as 
presented in chapter 3, makes provision for maintaining high standards of morale and 
productivity in organisations. The stagnation or deterioration of workforce productivity, or the 
weakening of personnel morale, are regarded as some of the motivational aspects prompting 
organisational restructuring, as presented in paragraph 3.2.1. However, Schwarz and Shulman 
(2007), in paragraph 3.2.2, reveal that limited structural change may occur as a result of the fact 
that organisational members anchor their judgments on prior experience to reflect on change and, 
therefore, can choose to resist, manipulate, or possibly even ignore change. Moreover, Lee and 
Teo (2005), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, recognise potentially negative consequences on the work 
environment in the immediate term after organisational restructuring. As a result, the authors 
caution that if work satisfaction and trust in the organisation continues to be depressed well 
beyond the end of the restructuring, and well beyond an apparent improvement in some aspects 
of the work environment, the productivity of the organisation could be in serious danger, and 
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therefore suggest that a key ingredient necessary to sustain effective change, is high morale. 
Stated differently, Stevenson et al. (2003) furthermore emphasise the significance of this theme, 
in paragraph 3.2.3.2, explaining that sometimes planned restructuring efforts involve attempts to 
get people and groups within organisations to work together more effectively. When this is the 
aim, the change agent often attempts to increase formal structural connections between people 
and groups under the assumption that information will flow more freely, barriers and conflict 
between work functions will break down, and innovative activities will diffuse more effectively 
in a dense network. However, organisation members who stand to lose influence and/or 
structural autonomy if barriers are broken down, may work against efforts to increase formal 
connections in ways that weaken their influence. Stated differently, Skogan (2008), in paragraph 
3.2.3.2, is of the opinion that specialised units such as detectives are often threatened by 
department-wide programmes that require them to change their ways, and therefore they might 
find debate opening about their effectiveness.   
 
Baruch and Hind (2000), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, additionally draw attention to the fact that 
employees who remain within an organisation after significant downsizing or delayering, often 
experience the adverse effects of change as profoundly as those who have left. In addition, it is 
revealed that “survivors” may become demotivated, cynical, insecure and demoralised, and 
therefore suggest this might be as a result of stress and anxiety, based on fear of further 
downsizing/restructuring, or due to diminishing trust between employees and management, or 
indeed a combination of these factors. Johnson (1994), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, is furthermore of the 
view that organisational change strains not only the organisation as a whole but also individual 
employees within the organisation, and therefore suggests that a change strategy must be 
developed which takes the employee’s psychological processes into account. In support of 
Johnson, Elias (2007), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, also values the importance of this theme, 
emphasising the fact that implementing a change initiative without attending to such processes 
can result in employees experiencing stress and cynicism, each of which has the potential to 
reduce organisational commitment, job satisfaction, trust in the organisation, and motivation. 
Cooper ([s.a.]), furthermore draws attention (in paragraph 3.2.3.3) to focus on the reason for the 
new structure, as much as making it work, since this will energise people to focus on customer 
needs. In addition, energy levels and employee engagement should be kept alive until the support 
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processes are fully in place. Similarly, Swanson and Power (2001), in paragraph 3.2.3.3, 
additionally emphasise that the change process itself engenders tensions and insecurities, which 
lead to distress in both “victims” and “survivors” of the process, which has been shown to have a 
negative impact on physical and mental health. It follows that role stressors, including 
ambiguities, conflicts of interest and increased workloads may all contribute towards lowered 
morale for surviving workers post-restructuring. Such increases in workload may occur as a 
result of coming to grips with new or unfamiliar structures, new responsibilities or technologies, 
or due to reduced manpower resources and support from managers or colleagues. In addition, 
Bayley and Shearing (1996), in paragraph 3.4, also draw attention to the significance of this 
theme.  It follows that the authors confirm the restructuring of policing, since police organ 
isations throughout the developed democratic world have increasingly growing doubts about the 
effectiveness of their traditional strategies in safeguarding the public from crime. 
 
From the participants of the various FCS cluster units’ perceptions, as discussed in chapter 4, it 
appears that the restructuring of the FCS had a negative effect on the morale and productivity of 
participants: “I don’t think it will get higher ... it will just get lower and lower and lower”. 
Respondents’ furthermore revealed that their negative morale was mainly contributable to 
inadequate physical and human resources, the absence of overtime remuneration, and adverse 
working conditions that often resulted in conflicting opinions with other colleagues at station 
level. Participants were of the opinion that contributing factors to their low self-esteem and 
effectiveness were their feelings of rejection by other members at station level and the internal 
conflict between these members, as opposed to the solidarity that prevailed among members in 
the FCS prior to the restructuring. As a result, this might explain the low self-esteem of these 
detectives.  Additionally, participants revealed that a number of FCS detectives called for their 
reassignment to other units within the SAPS, while others could not continue their functions at 
the FCS due to stress-related conditions resulting from the restructuring: “Some of the members 
have already applied for transfers because they don’t want to work like this ... they don’t like to 
work in these conditions ... Already got one [member] of stress ... I don’t blame those who is 
going on stress ...”. Participants were also of the belief that the SAPS management was not 
sensitive towards the low self-esteem of its members and their client system, and also gave no 
recognition for members’ services under difficult circumstances.  
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Additionally, a minority of the participants revealed that they were attempting to remain 
confident and devoted, despite their initial low self-esteem and unfavourable circumstances. It 
follows that these few members realised they had to adapt their mindset in order to continue their 
passion for their profession. However, new challenges were emerging regularly which they had 
to deal with: “... my morale is very low but I had to lift myself up because I love this job ... I’m 
making the best out of it”. Participants, furthermore, indicated that some of these members had a 
sympathetic feeling of guilt and remorse towards the community they served and other role 
players they were actively involved with, for the decrease in services by the FCS, and therefore 
questioned their own ability. 
 
From the participants of a humanitarian security research institute’s perceptions, as discussed in 
chapter 4, it appeared that the restructuring of the FCS had a significant impact on the morale of 
the unit’s members, that in turn negatively affected their productivity: “… this [referring to the 
restructuring of the FCS] of course had a very negative effect on the morale of members ... an 
unhappy official is certainly not going to provide an efficient and effective service ...”. 
Furthermore, one participant was firmly of the opinion that the SAPS had a military character, 
and therefore concentrated more on internal dilemmas rather than on external challenges, when 
confronted with a low self-esteem and spirits of the workforce. As a result, the SAPS 
management was also insensitive towards the objections of these members towards this process. 
From the senior public prosecutors’ perceptions, as discussed in chapter 4, it seemed as if the 
restructuring of the FCS had indeed had an adverse effect on the morale and productivity of its 
members. It furthermore became known that these members’ morale was negatively affected, as 
a result of the lack of consultation with these members, the disregard of members’ personal 
circumstances, insufficient resources, disregard for members’ expertise and specialised skills, as 
well as relinquishing time and effort invested in investigations, to non-specialised detectives. It 
follows that the fragmentation of the camaraderie of these detectives, as a result of the 
restructuring, proved to impact the services and productivity of these members in a negative way. 
One participant, however, perceived the morale to be negative, but the productivity had 
improved, though he experienced a decrease in the specialisation of cases in the court, due to a 
lack of prioritisation. Participants also believed that other practical and psychological aspects had 
a detrimental consequence on the FCS’s members’ morale and productivity. These aspects 
 245 
 
included the integration of FCS members with non-specialised detectives: “… jy nie nou meer 
gesien word as ‘n gespesialiseerde persoon nie … uhm … jy word nou geag om moontlik ‘n 
gewone speurder te wees …” [“… you are no longer regarded as specialised, however, regarded 
as a normal detective …”] and the sharing of resources as well as the relegation of the FCS’s 
status as a specialised unit. As a result, the quality of investigations was also negatively 
influenced. Moreover, participants believed that inefficient facilities hampered effective service 
delivery to victims of FCS-related crimes, and, in turn, affected members’ morale negatively. It 
follows that participants experienced the investigation process to be more time consuming as a 
result of inexperienced investigating officers, with adverse consequences for the productivity 
levels.  
 
From the respondents’ (representing NGOs) perceptions, as presented in chapter 4, it surfaced 
that the lack of communication and consultation with members of the FCS about the 
restructuring, as well as confusion about the restructuring among the SAPS themselves, had had 
an appalling effect on their morale and productivity. In addition, participants furthermore made 
known that general SAPS officers now dealing with FCS related cases revealed that they were 
forced into this position, and also did not have the unique characteristics required of them to 
perform these functions, as opposed to FCS members: “... some of them [referring to general 
SAPS members] have indicated that they have been forced into these positions.  It is not out of 
choice ... The FCS members have a different work ethic ... they are very committed ... very 
passionate about what they do ... Absolutely, it definitely impacted on their morale”.  
Consequently, members’ morale, and therefore their service delivery and productivity, were 
without doubt negatively influenced. On the other hand, participants similarly experienced the 
morale of the community to be adversely affected as a result of inefficient service delivery by 
general SAPS members, as opposed to the devotion and loyalty of FCS detectives prior to the 
restructuring. Participants were also of the opinion that that the uncertainty that prevailed among 
FCS members, as well as the decentralisation of these members, contributed to a decrease in 
productivity: “… productivity suffered ... many people did not know what the future entails ... 
This makes them very resentful and as a result will not able to deliver the goods”. 
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Without a positive and meaningful self-esteem among employees, high levels of productivity are 
not likely to happen. The literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing 
organisations, as presented in chapter 3, accentuates the maintenance of high standards of morale 
and productivity among employees during organisational change. However, the SAPS allowed 
the morale of FCS members, and therefore workforce productivity, to deteriorate, since the 
organisation was not sensitive towards the self-esteem of its members and their client system.  It 
follows that FCS members and other role players did not have sufficient moral support from the 
SAPS. As a result, these members could not perform their functions optimally; therefore, their 
productivity was also negatively impacted.       
 
5.2.6 Outlook on the feasibility and sustainability of the long-term goals of the FCS 
restructuring 
 
It is imperative for an organisation to have long-term goals, in order to set a clear vision for the 
future. These goals should, however, be clearly communicated to the entire workforce to gain 
understanding and buy-in among them, as set out in paragraph 4.2.6. This theme has as its main 
challenge to ensure the feasible implementation of these long-term goals envisaged by this 
process, and the maintaining thereof by the organisation’s employees. 
 
The literature review on impact evaluations in organisations, as presented in chapter 2, supports 
the significance of understanding and realising the achievability and practicability of 
programmes. Savedoff et al. (2006) draws attention to the fact, in paragraph 2.11, that 
developing countries’ governments are demanding better information about the efficacy of social 
spending; for example, Mexico passed legislation requiring that impact evaluations be conducted 
on a variety of social programmes, explicitly recognising the value of learning what works and 
why, as a guide for future budget decisions.  In addition, NGOs have collaborated with leading 
academic institutions to evaluate the impact of their programmes, with the goal of identifying 
what works and what does not.  
 
 
 247 
 
Additionally, the literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing 
organisations, presented in chapter 3, furthermore accentuates the value to communicate the 
long-term goals and objectives to employees, in order to realise a feasible and sustainable change 
effort.  It follows that Cooper ([s.a.]), in paragraph 3.2.3.1, places high value on clear and 
frequent communication of the purpose and business case, constructive communication 
throughout the organisation, as well as the importance of  remaining focused on the reason for 
the new structure, as much as making it work, and also cautions that the collapse thereof could 
jeopardise a successful restructuring. Moreover, Ford (2007), in paragraph 3.2.3.3, also draws 
attention to the fact that effective leaders do not merely prepare an organisation prior to a change 
effort, and therefore believe they must have the patience to constantly build the capacity for 
change among organisational members throughout the various stages of the change effort.  The 
example of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies’ (Shell) extensive nature of its 
restructuring initiative, presented in paragraph 3.3.1, additionally indicates the significance of 
identifying practicable and achievable solutions for change efforts. Furthermore, Vodafone’s 
restructuring process, presented in paragraph 3.3.2, highlights the importance of a clear focus, for 
members to have a comprehensive understanding of such changes, and to enable these members 
to make the change effort feasible and sustainable. In addition, Carter and McGoldrick (1994), in 
paragraph 3.4, draw on the UK police service to emphasise the importance of reviewing 
performance in order to enhance the feasibility of change efforts.   
 
From the respondents of the various FCS units’ perceptions, as presented and discussed in 
chapter 4, it came to light that these participants considered the long-term goals envisaged by the 
restructuring of the FCS to be ambiguous, and that they did not know what these long-term goals 
were and therefore had major reservations about the feasibility and sustainability of this process: 
“… “Well I don’t know … actually there is no long-term goal or objectives for the FCS …”. 
Participants were of the opinion that their unfamiliarity with the entire process was as a result of 
the lack of consultation and communication. In addition, participants interestingly did not regard 
the FCS as a specialised unit any longer, and were thus of the view that this unit, in addition, did 
not have long-term goals. It follows that participants furthermore expressed their suspicions 
about the accomplishment of the goal and objectives of the restructuring process, until proven 
otherwise.  
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A few members appropriately identified the goals and objectives envisaged for the restructuring 
process; however, they had their reservations about these goals and objectives being 
accomplished, since this task was a calling not every member was capable of performing, and 
therefore presented critical features investigating officers needed to have, in order to investigate 
FCS-related cases. Moreover, some participants were of the opinion that this process would 
indeed be sustainable, as a result of the SAPS management that would continue enforcing the 
goals and objectives of this process upon members: “… they have made up their mind … they 
will sustain.”   On the other hand, a number of participants believed that the restructuring 
process would by no means be viable, since the expertise, knowledge and skills of FCS members 
could not be replaced with the training of general police officers, with regard to FCS-related 
crimes. It follows that no additional proficiency has been acquired, as was stipulated by the 
SAPS management as one of the major objectives of this process, even though this process was 
implemented a while ago. Another participant believed that the restructuring process of the FCS 
could be feasible and sustainable by initiating the creation of a long-term strategy among the 
FCS detectives, the broader community and the victims of these related crimes. In addition, 
participants greatly questioned the benefits of this process for the community and the FCS 
members, and therefore cross-questioned their responsibility of sustaining the restructuring 
process: “Why should we sustain anything if it doesn’t bring anything good to us? … this thing is 
a disadvantage not only for the police officers but for everybody”. 
 
From the perceptions of senior public prosecutors, it appeared that the long-term goals of the 
restructuring of the FCS could be feasible and sustainable, on condition that the SAPS 
management gave sincere attention to the problems currently experienced by all the role players: 
“… dit kan volhoubaar wees, dit kan effektief wees as die probleme wat daar [is] aandag [aan] 
gegee word en dit uitgestryk word …” [“… it could be sustainable and effective if attention is 
given to existing problems …”].  Participants were, however, of the opinion that the SAPS 
management had to create increased awareness among FCS members and other role players, in 
order to be completely familiar with the aims and objectives of this process. As a result, FCS 
members and other role players would have to buy into this process and thus take ownership 
thereof, in order to make this process sustainable.  
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Participants were furthermore of the belief that the SAPS management demonstrated a lack of 
support for the restructured FCS units, and did not adequately empower FCS members to 
effectively deal with the difficulties experienced during this process. It follows that participants 
raised the question as to whether the restructuring of the FCS would indeed be feasible and 
sustainable. A number of participants indicated that they completely lacked understanding of 
what the goals and objectives of the restructuring process were, and, therefore were not in a 
position to reply on the achievability, feasibility and sustainability of this process:  “… ek 
verstaan dit glad nie … ek weet nie hoekom hulle afgeskaf is nie ek verstaan dit nog steeds nie”. 
[“…I absolutely do not understand it. I do not understand why they are disbanded”]. Participants 
also believed that the restructured FCS units were experiencing significant resource deficiencies. 
Therefore, unless these shortcomings were appropriately addressed, the restructuring of the FCS 
could not be sustainable; however, this process was not currently considered to be feasible. 
 
From the perceptions of NGOs, it surfaced that the restructuring of the FCS had failed the needs 
of the community and service delivery by the FCS has also deteriorated. As a result, this process 
is believed not to be feasible: “It is not feasible … it is not working … it is not meeting the 
needs… the very understanding I have … meeting the needs of the community. That objective is 
not been met, it is actually failing that objective”. 
 
Without the creation of long-term goals, organisations are bound to lose sight of their purpose. 
The literature review in chapters 2 and 3 accentuates the value of communicating the long-term 
goals and objectives to employees, in order to realise a feasible and sustainable change effort. 
However, the SAPS failed to communicate the long-term goals and objectives of the 
restructuring process to the FCS members and other external role players. This is a critical aspect 
of the failure of the restructuring of the FCS. It follows that these members did not understand 
what the long-term goals and objectives were, and therefore could not take action to make this 
process feasible and sustainable. This implies that the restructuring process of the FCS was 
indistinct and as a result could not be sustainable. As a result, the restructuring of the FCS had to 
a great extent been negatively affected, as the management of the SAPS neglected to 
communicate the long-term goals and objectives of this process.    
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5.2.7 The impact of the restructuring process on the expertise and specialised skills of 
FCS detectives  
 
The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the expertise and specialised skills of the 
detectives in the FCS refers to the effect of the restructuring process on the detectives’ particular 
competence and their unique proficiency as FCS investigators, as presented in paragraph 4.2.7. 
This theme has as its central focus to assess the effect that this process had on FCS detectives’ 
exclusive and exceptional ability and specialised training, to investigate FCS-related cases. 
 
The literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations, as 
presented in chapter 3, acknowledges the influence of change on expertise and specialised skills. 
It follows that Amburgey, Kelly and Barnett (as quoted by Bowman & Singh, 1993), as 
presented in paragraph 3.2.3.3, believe that change is hazardous because it destroys, by 
definition, some of the firm’s existing practices that are, in turn, accompanied by a loss of 
corporate competence due to the abandonment of familiar ‘routines’.  Ford (2007), in paragraph 
3.2.3.3, furthermore draws attention to his belief that leading-edge organisations are deriving 
ever increasing value by tapping into employee and stakeholder expertise and capability. On the 
other hand, Bayley and Shearing (1996) are of the opinion that community policing officers are 
encouraged to become “uniformed generalists” responsible for developing customised responses 
to a wide variety of situations, rather than frequently referring citizens to other more specialised 
“cubbyholes” within the organisation.  
 
From the respondents of the various FCS units’ perceptions, as presented and discussed in 
chapter 4, it appears that these participants undoubtedly anticipated their expertise and 
specialised skills to be negatively affected by the restructuring of the FCS.  Participants foresaw 
their expertise and specialised skills to be inadequately impacted by a transformation in their 
primary functions, thus resulting in the exhaustion of their expertise and specialised skills. In 
addition, participants were furthermore of the belief that FCS detectives’ expertise and 
specialised skills were influenced by the large geographical area these officers needed to serve,  
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resulting in time constraints that in turn hampered proper investigation of these technical cases: 
“Because of time … we need to rush ...  some of the other things you know you put a blind eye … 
you sacrifice you do quick quick stuff”. Participants, furthermore, considered their knowledge 
and skills not to be acknowledged after the restructuring of the FCS, since they were now utilised 
for less important functions: “Our expertise are not being recognised. We are a bunch of 
monkeys here and since the restructuring the only thing we became is taxi drivers and collecters. 
The only thing we do is taxi the person [referring to victims] from the police station to the 
hospital and collecting the dockets”. Moreover, a few participants were of the opinion that 
expertise and specialised skills could be sustained, on condition that general police officers were 
primed to gain knowledge of and become skilled at FCS-related investigations. However, 
participants posed the question of who would be responsible for educating these general officers, 
since FCS detectives could not perform this function, as they were experiencing time constraints.  
 
In addition, from the senior public prosecutors perceptions, as discussed in chapter 4, it came to 
light that the restructuring of the FCS might have a detrimental impact on the expertise and 
specialised skills of the detectives in the FCS. It follows that one participant did not foresee a 
significant effect on the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives, though the participant 
predicted the stagnation of these exclusive and exceptional abilities to investigate FCS-related 
cases. This participant was of the opinion that if these detectives are uninspired, they would, in 
turn, not be encouraged to further develop their own knowledge and proficiency. As a result, 
detectives’ preparedness to develop their expertise and specialised skills would deteriorate. In 
addition, the transfer of knowledge and experience by FCS detectives to general police officers 
would contribute to their lack of inspiration: “… hulle dan nou veronderstel is om [kundigheid] 
oor te dra na hierdie gewone lede … gaan dit hulle net meer demotiveer … geen elite meer 
daarin nie … wat hom onderskei van ‘n ander gewone polisielid nie …” [“… if FCS officials are 
supposed to carry over their expertise to normal SAPS members these FCS members would 
become demotivated since there is no longer any speciality that distinguish them from a normal 
official …”]. 
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It once again came to light that members of the FCS were not consulted about the planning and 
objectives of the restructuring process, and it was thus enforced upon them.  As a result, these 
members had to take it upon themselves to yet again motivate themselves in order to perform 
specialised service, since they lack sufficient resources to perform their tasks optimally, and also 
did not receive any support in this regard. Another participant similarly concurred that the 
restructuring of the FCS might have a disadvantaging impact on the expertise and specialised 
skills of FCS detectives. However, this participant measured the effect of the restructuring on 
expertise and specialised skills against the method of implementing this process. As a result, it 
was emphasised again that police officers had to have the required interest and affection in order 
to investigate FCS-related cases. The participant believed that general police officers might not 
have these required characteristics to effectively deal with related cases. Consequently, the FCS 
detectives might, on the one hand, suffer the loss of being experts in their field, resulting in an 
exodus of these detectives: “… ons gaan ervaring verloor, want mense gaan nie meer daar bly 
nie …” [“… we are going to lose experience since officials are not going to remain there…”]. 
On the other hand, sustainable interest from other members in the functions of the FCS might 
therefore disappear as a result of the eradication of specialisation. It furthermore became known 
that participants experienced that the fragmentation of the FCS unit brought about a significant 
shortfall of experienced FCS detectives who were replaced by inexperienced general detectives, 
which in turn created difficulties for the judicial system: “… mense wat die die ervaring gehad 
… is na ander eenhede geplaas … met mense wat onkundig is … wat aangestel is …” [“… 
detectives that had the experience were placed at other units … members that are inexperienced 
were appointed …”].  
 
Moreover, from the perceptions of NGOs, as discussed in chapter 4, it surfaced that 
specialisation in the field of FCS-related investigations had been substituted by a universal 
approach: “… it stopped the work into further specialisation. The restructuring had move into 
generic work …”.  As a result of this collective approach, participants believed, on the one hand, 
that the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives were not being utilised appropriately. 
On the other hand, participants were of the opinion that general SAPS officers, beyond doubt, 
lacked expertise and specialised skills in order to perform FCS-related functions. In addition, 
these participants were of the sentiment that the expertise and specialised skills of FCS detectives 
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were going to vanish as a result of the decentralisation of FCS detectives, resulting in the 
variation of these detectives’ primary functions and the inaccessibility of their services: “… how 
do you get specialised in something if you have to be Jack of all trades and master of none? If 
you specialize in something … you only do that … your experience level go up ... That is not 
what is happening at the moment …”.  It follows that these detectives’ expertise and unique 
skills would not be applied in line with their primary functions as FCS detectives. As a result, 
participants judged that a message was created that FCS-related investigations were of lesser 
importance.  
 
Expertise and specialised skills are essential factors in the effective continuation of an 
organisation. Members of the FCS’ expertise and specialised skills were not acknowledged after 
the implementation of this process. As a result, these members had feelings of disempowerment. 
This implies that the SAPS failed to create structures in order to preserve these members’ 
exceptional ability and specialised training. This was a significant drawback to the restructuring 
of the FCS.  
 
Consequently these members were discouraged from participating in the restructuring process. 
As a result, the restructuring of the FCS is impacted negatively, as members distanced 
themselves from this process.       
 
5.2.8 A review of the necessity to restructure the FCS 
 
Change in any organisation is inevitable. However, the central challenge of this theme is to 
examine the question of the essentiality to have restructured the FCS, in order to ensure that the 
unit continued to carry out its functions optimally, as presented and discussed in paragraph 4.2.8. 
 
The literature review on impact evaluations in organisations, as presented in chapter 2, 
acknowledges the importance of conducting impact evaluations in order to answer similar 
challenges.  
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The article Impact Evaluation – Overview (2006), in paragraph 2.6, draws attention to, among 
others, one reason for conducting impact evaluations is to establish how effective the programme 
is in comparison with alternative interventions? In addition, Regalia (1999), in paragraph 2.6, 
similarly highlights the rationale of conducting impact evaluations since it assess whether a 
programme is achieving its objective, how the beneficiaries’ situation changed as a result of the 
programme and what the situation would have been without the programme. Moreover, if an 
impact evaluation is carried out at an intermediate stage of project execution, very important 
lessons can be learnt on how the programme design and/or the project execution can be modified 
to improve the effectiveness of the intervention. In support of Regalia, Savedoff et al. (2006), in 
paragraph 2.7, also draws attention to the significance of impact evaluation. It follows that the 
necessity or effectiveness of a change initiative could be determined prematurely by utilising 
impact evaluations since it could generate useful feedback during implementation. Davies 
(2004), in paragraph 2.7, moreover illustrates the significance of conducting impact evaluations, 
referring to the UK government, to guarantee that programmes are planned and delivered as 
effectively and efficiently as possible and, thus, clarifying the necessity of such a programme. 
Blomquist (2003) furthermore illustrates, in paragraph 2.7, the link between evaluation and the 
larger mandate of improving public sector management, referring to successful international 
examples.      
 
Additionally, the literature review on restructuring processes in business –and policing 
organisations, as presented in Chapter 3, draws attention to organisational restructuring. Lee and 
Teo (2005), in paragraph 3.2.1, acknowledge the reality of organisational restructuring and, thus, 
believe that organisational restructuring has been, and will continue to be used as a turnaround 
strategy to control costs and to realign internal structure to meet changing environmental 
conditions.  In support of Lee and Teo, Schwarz and Shulman (2007), in paragraph 3.2.1, believe 
that structural change is stimulated by rapid environmental change, increasing complexity and 
uncertainty, and the predominance of loosely coupled organisational components. In addition, 
Palmer et al. (in Schwarz and Shulman (2007), as presented in paragraph 3.2.1, furthermore  
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draws attention to the fact that organisations of all kinds have to deal with regulatory, cultural, 
economic, technological and physical environments that are potentially changing more rapidly 
than the organisations themselves. Consequently, the pressure on organisations to adapt and 
change their structures is immense.  
 
Similarly, Savery & Luks (2000), in paragraph 3.2.1, also acknowledge that today’s environment 
is full of uncertainty, market changes, changing workforce demographics, social and political 
pressures, and, not least of all, technological advances, making today’s organisation one of 
constant changes. Moreover, Ogbonna and Harris (2003), in paragraph 3.2.1, furthermore 
highlight the necessity for organisations to restructure, and are of the opinion that organisational 
structural change has been one of the most topical issues in management and organisational 
studies over the last two decades. As a result, recent research interest has moved away from the 
evaluation of merits and problems of traditional forms of organising to the investigation of new 
ways of structuring organisations. 
 
The article Organisational Restructuring ([s.a.]), in paragraph 3.2.1, additionally provides 
various reasons for the need for organisational restructuring. It follows that organisational 
restructuring occurs when new skills and capabilities are needed to meet current or expected 
operational requirements. In addition, another symptom of the need for organisational 
restructuring is when the accountability for results is not clearly communicated and measurable, 
resulting in subjective and biased performance appraisals. Moreover, parts of the organisation 
could be significantly over- or under-staffed, that in turn necessitates organisational 
restructuring. Another reason for organisational restructuring is that organisational 
communications are inconsistent, fragmented and inefficient. Furthermore, technology and/or 
innovation are creating changes in workflow and production processes that prompt restructuring. 
Organisational restructuring could, in addition, take place when significant staffing increases or 
decreases are contemplated, when personnel retention and staff turnover are a significant 
problem, workforce productivity is stagnant or deteriorating, or when personnel morale is 
deteriorating.  
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Fay and Luhrmann (as quoted by Schwarz & Shulman, 2007), presented in paragraph 3.2.3.2, 
believe that the dominant position is that change is essential and that organisations are always 
changing. Bowman and Singh (1993), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, however, caution that there can be 
significant negative consequences associated with poorly managed restructuring programmes. 
On the other hand, Burke and Nelson (1997), in paragraph 3.2.3.3, believe that the contemporary 
organisational realities of restructuring, among others, have not only changed organisational 
systems; they have had a major effect on workers in them – mostly negative - and continue to 
take their toll on employees at all levels.  
 
From the participants of the FCS units’ perceptions, as presented and discussed in chapter 4, it 
appears that all the participants from the restructured FCS units overwhelmingly and 
indisputably concurred that the restructuring of the FCS was unjustified for the continued 
functioning of this unit. It follows that participants were of the belief that victims of FCS-related 
crimes experienced added complications in reaching the detectives of the FCS, after the 
implementation of the restructuring. One participant compared the restructuring of the FCS as 
the fragmentation of parts of a larger structure that have to function in unison in order to be 
optimally effective. It follows that the breakup of this previously united structure had adverse 
consequences for the effective continuation of the functionaries of the FCS unit, thus comparing 
the deterioration of the functioning of the FCS as a hoax:  “... ons is besig om uitmekaar te val ... 
ons was ‘n kool gewees wat saam met klomp ander kole …, maar dan vat jy daai kool weg hy 
raak koud hy gaan dood ... en dit is presies wat hulle met ons nou gedoen het. Ons is ‘n kooltjie 
wat weggevat is uit ‘n warm vuur uit, ons brand nog steeds ... maar ons gaan dood gaan” [“… 
we are in the process of falling apart … we were like a hot coal together with other coals … then 
you take away that coal, its gets cold and dies. We are like that hot coal that is taken away … we 
are still burning … however, we are dying”]. In addition, participants predicted the further 
deterioration of the unit’s functions if they were merged with the already overloaded general 
detectives at station level. These participants were of the opinion that the unfamiliarity with the 
goal of this process contributed to members’ pessimistic sentiments regarding the essentiality to 
restructure this unit.  
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From the perceptions of two researchers from a regional human security research institute’s 
Crime and Justice Programme, discussed in chapter 4, it surfaced that these participants regarded 
the restructuring of the FCS to be futile for the effective continuation of the functionaries of the 
FCS unit: “I don’t think that this type of restructuring is necessary at all …”. It follows that 
participants recommended that another option could have been to maintain the FCS in its 
previous centralised structure, though FCS detectives could then have been empowered in a tutor 
capacity, providing training to members at station level. As a result, the participants were of the 
opinion that these members would have gained firsthand knowledge of FCS related functions, 
without negatively affecting the functionality of the FCS unit. Nevertheless, these participants 
foresaw increased difficulties ahead for the FCS: “… they could have manage it differently 
without having to resort to a decentralisation of our FCS units … in the medium- and long-term 
… we will have more problems …”. 
 
What’s more, it became known from the perceptions of senior public prosecutors, discussed in 
chapter 4, that these participants were unfamiliar with the necessity to restructure the FCS in 
order to ensure its continued functioning, since this unit provided an efficient service to the 
community prior to the restructuring: “… hulle was besig om ‘n spesialisdiens aan die 
gemeenskap te lewer, glad nie ‘n idee hoekom hulle nodig gehad het om te verander nie …” [“… 
they provided specialised services to the community, have no idea why they changed …”].  “Why 
change it if it is not broken”. As a result, participants anticipated the decentralisation of FCS 
members to bring about total disorder in the system, unless the SAPS invested in intensive 
training of members, the appointment of expert and dedicated personnel in this field and 
participative communication regarding FCS affairs between all role players.  
 
From the perceptions of NGOs, as discussed in chapter 4, it appears that participants believed 
that the FCS indeed functioned effectively before the restructuring. As a result, participants 
recommended that instead of restructuring the existing structure of the FCS, the SAPS 
management should have strengthened this unit: “I do not think it was necessary … things that 
were … working well was done away with … rather than sharpening that existing structures I 
think those structures were just taken away”.   
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It follows that participants predicted a bleak future for the FCS and called upon the SAPS 
management to reinstate the previous centralised FCS units. 
 
Organisational restructuring occurs continuously and for different reasons. For organisational 
restructuring to be embraced, employees should realise the necessity of such a process. The 
literature in chapters 2 and 3 highlight the essentiality for organisational restructuring, and also 
provide various reasons for it. However, the need to embark upon the restructuring of the FCS 
was not communicated to FCS members or the external client system it served. It follows that the 
increased challenges and obstacles members and the external clientele encountered, raised 
serious questions about the necessity to restructure the FCS. Consequently, members of the FCS 
and the external client system perceived this process to be unjustified.    
“Examining the impact of the FCS restructuring on the associated networks” follows.  
 
5.2.9 Examining the impact of the FCS restructuring on the associated networks 
 
Participants’ views on the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the partnerships, interaction 
and working agreements between the FCS and other stakeholders rendering services to the client 
system serviced by the FCS, refer to the impact of the restructuring of the FCS on the joint 
venture, collaboration, relations and operational arrangements between the FCS and other 
stakeholders rendering services to victims of FCS related crimes, as discussed in paragraph 
4.2.11. It follows that the participants spoke about the partnerships, interactions and working 
agreements between the FCS and external stakeholders, and also about the partnerships, 
interactions and working agreements among the internal clusters of the FCS.   
 
As a result, this theme is divided into two sub-themes: firstly, the impact of the FCS restructuring 
on the external networks, and secondly, the impact of the FCS restructuring internally among the 
FCS clusters. 
 
The first sub-theme to be presented is “The impact of the FCS restructuring on the external 
networks”. 
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5.2.9.1 The impact of the FCS restructuring on the external networks 
 
The literature review on restructuring processes, as presented in chapter 3, acknowledges the 
significance of continuous communication with stakeholders. Cooper ([s.a.]), in paragraph 
3.2.3.3, also values constant interaction with stakeholders, by referring to continuous dialogue 
with stakeholders in order to work out alterations to the newly implemented structure. 
Additionally, Anderson (as quoted by Bowman & Singh, 1993), in paragraph 3.2.3.3, cautions 
that organisational restructuring may disrupt relationships with external actors, that organisations 
need to survive. Moreover, the illustration of The Royal Dutch/ Shell Group’s restructuring 
initiative, an organisation that values external partnership, as discussed in paragraph 3.3.1, 
furthermore accentuates the importance of external role players.     
 
From the participants of the various FCS units’ perceptions, as discussed in chapter 4, it 
appeared that the affiliation between the FCS and the external stakeholders rendering services to 
the client systems serviced by the FCS, deteriorated to such an extent after the restructuring 
process, that communication and interaction between these organisations were virtually non-
existent: “… We had quarterly meetings with the Social workers … community based members 
… and those are no more.  We had lectures with the schools… at the moment if you go there only 
a few people will turn up to attend the meetings.  The community here are up in arms … They 
have lost their trust in the police because they know that there is no more experience …”.  
Moreover, participants indicated that they did not perceive the necessity of sustaining high-
quality partnerships, interaction and working agreements with these external stakeholders any 
longer, since these participants were of the opinion that their primary functions were going to be 
done away with in future.  As a result, participants experienced the interaction between these 
external role players and the FCS to have been of higher quality prior to the restructuring. In 
addition, a number of participants sincerely regretted the fact of not being in a position to 
maintain adequate interaction and working agreements between the FCS, the community and 
external role players rendering services to the client systems serviced by the FCS. On the other 
hand, certain FCS clusters succeeded in sustaining the high-quality partnerships, interaction and 
working agreements with these external stakeholders, despite the restructuring.  
 
 260 
 
Similarly, from the perceptions of two researchers from a humanitarian security research 
institute’s Crime and Justice Programme (in chapter 4) it furthermore emerged that the 
partnership and interaction between the FCS and NGOs rendering services to the client systems 
serviced by the FCS, were significantly hampered as a result of the restructuring of the FCS. 
Consequently, new relationships had to be established between these organisations.  
 
From the perceptions of senior public prosecutors, presented in chapter 4, it appears that the FCS 
did not create opportunities for liaising with NGOs and other departments, in order to develop a 
strong partnership:  “Daar is ‘n probleem van samewerking tussen ons… Hulle is nie beskikbaar 
nie. Dit gebeur net nie - ‘n helse probleem hoe hulle nou deesdae inskakel met NGOs”. [“There 
exist challenges to cooperate with one another. They are not available … it just doesn’t happen 
any longer … a huge challenge how they cooperate with NGOs these days”].  
Additionally, one participant interestingly explained the virtual disappearance of the interaction 
between the FCS and other role players, as a result of an identity crisis which these detectives 
had to deal with after the restructuring of the FCS, since they lack a sense of belonging. 
Consequently, it appears that these detectives were experiencing difficulties in coming to terms 
with their circumstances. These participants furthermore revealed that there were barely any 
direct communication between them and the state prosecutors, and therefore compared the 
majority of FCS detectives to strangers.  
 
Participants were also of the view that the level of cooperation and communication between the 
FCS and the state prosecutors was higher prior to the restructuring process, that resulted in the 
enhanced relationship and understanding between these role players. On the contrary, one 
participant speculated that the relationship between these role players would probably continue 
and not be affected by the restructuring. As a result, the impact of the restructuring of the FCS 
might have a positive effect on the partnerships, interaction and working agreements between the 
FCS and other (external) stakeholders rendering services to the client systems serviced by the 
FCS. 
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From the opinion of NGOs, discussed in chapter 4, it seems that the interaction and professional 
practice between these role players decreased to such an extent that NGOs had to rely on the 
personal commitment and support of FCS detectives. On the other hand, it surfaced that prior to 
the restructuring of the FCS, NGOs had an excellent relationship with the FCS. It furthermore 
became known that certain NGOs took the responsibility and initiative upon themselves to 
establish a new relationship and working agreement with the SAPS, in order to alleviate the 
widespread confusion at the time: “… created and establish our own network … while the SAPS 
is trying to get their house in order”. Conversely, these participants were, however, experiencing 
continued and constructive partnerships, interaction and working agreements with other NGOs 
after the restructuring of the FCS. As a result, participants viewed the collapse of collaboration 
and interaction between the FCS and NGOs as a direct result of the restructuring of this unit, and 
therefore held the SAPS management accountable for it.  Furthermore, it also emerged that a few 
participants were optimistic about the probability that circumstances surrounding the failure of 
interaction and partnerships between the FCS and NGOs could be recovered. However, the 
SAPS management would have had to be prepared to enter into dialogue with the NGOs, in 
order to restore the situation cooperatively: “… it can improve … provided there is discussion 
and collaboration.” 
 
The significance of partnerships and working agreements with external role players in an 
organisation may not be ignored. The literature in chapter 3 accentuates the significance of 
maintaining continuous communication and constant interaction with external stakeholders, after 
organisational restructuring. On the contrary, adequate action was not taken by the SAPS in 
order to maintain these partnerships. As a result, partnerships and interaction with these role 
players were almost non-existent after the implementation of this process. This was a critical 
challenge to the restructuring process.  
 
Consequently, the critical question must be posed: Why did a democratic police service, which 
focuses on effective service delivery and partnerships, allow the deterioration of its external 
networks? 
The second sub-theme, “The impact of the FCS restructuring internally on the FCS clusters” 
follows. 
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5.2.9.2  The impact of the FCS restructuring internally on the FCS clusters 
 
The literature review on restructuring processes in business and policing organisations, as 
presented and discussed in chapter 3, draws attention to a few objectives of restructuring on the 
internal functioning of the organisation, as well as some of the impacts such a process could have 
on the employees, internally. Stevenson et al. (2003), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, acknowledge the 
intentions of organisational restructuring internally, and also point to the challenges that may 
occur within the organisation. These authors are therefore of the opinion that sometimes planned 
restructuring efforts involve attempts to get people and groups within organisations to work 
together more effectively. When this is the aim, the change agent often attempts to increase 
formal structural connections between people and groups, under the assumption that information 
will flow more freely, barriers and conflict between work functions will break down, and 
innovative activities will diffuse more effectively in a dense network. At the same time, 
however, organisation members who stand to lose influence and/or structural autonomy if 
barriers are broken down, may work against efforts to increase formal connections in ways that 
weaken their influence.  
 
On the other hand, Skogan (2008), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, portrays the internal impact of 
organisational restructuring among employees, and is thus of the opinion that specialised units 
such as detectives are often threatened by department-wide programmes that require them to 
change their ways. For example, detectives may be required to actually exchange information 
with uniformed officers, and not just “suck it into their black hole”, and they might find debate 
opening about their effectiveness.  Moreover, Baruch and Hind (2000), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, 
point to the internal difficulties that could arise from restructuring an organisation. As a result, 
these authors are of the opinion that it has been acknowledged that “survivors” of restructuring 
may become demotivated, cynical, insecure and demoralised. This might be as a result of stress 
and anxiety, based on fear of further “downsizing/restructuring”, or due to diminishing trust 
between employees and management, or indeed a combination of these factors. In addition, 
Johnson (1994), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, highlights the internal impact of restructuring on 
employees and therefore suggests that a change strategy must be developed that takes the 
employee’s psychological processes into account.  
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In support of Johnson, Elias (2007), in paragraph 3.2.3.2, thus cautions the implementation of a 
change initiative without attending to such processes that can result in employees experiencing 
stress and cynicism - each of which has the potential to reduce organisational commitment, job 
satisfaction, trust in the organisation, and motivation.  
 
Swanson and Power (2001), in paragraph 3.2.3.3, furthermore, draw attention to various 
disturbances employees could experience after the implementation of a restructuring process. It 
follows that “survivors” of organisational restructuring also experience job insecurity in the lead 
up to the changes, and increased job demands after reorganisation - which has been shown to 
have a negative impact on physical and mental health. Role stressors, including ambiguities, 
conflicts of interest and increased workloads may all contribute towards lowered morale for 
surviving workers post-restructuring. Such increases in workload may occur as a result of 
coming to grips with new or unfamiliar structures, new responsibilities or technologies, or due to 
reduced manpower resources and support from managers or colleagues. Burke and Nelson 
(1997), in paragraph 3.2.3.3, additionally accentuate the impact of restructuring on employees, 
and is of the view that the contemporary organisational realities of restructuring, among others, 
have not only changed organisational systems; they have had a major effect on workers in them – 
mostly negative - and continue to take their toll on employees at all levels. On the other hand, the 
example of Vodafone’s restructuring process, in paragraph 3.3.2, illustrates the value of an 
efficient support structure for affected employees to effectively deal with the internal impacts of 
such a process. 
 
From the respondents of the various FCS units’ perceptions, as discussed in chapter 4, it surfaced 
that the partnerships, interaction and working agreements internally amongst the FCS clusters 
were non-existent after the implementation of the restructuring process. It follows that 
participants indicated that the low self-esteem of detectives and the difficult position these 
detectives found themselves in, were major contributing factors to the reason why these FCS 
cluster units did not interact: “… each and every person’s morale is so down you don’t even 
want to communicate with the colleagues at another station because you don’t want to hear his 
problems …  you’ve got a lot of problems of yourself”.  
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As a result, partnerships between these units were also significantly damaged; therefore, these 
units functioned individually. In contrast, one participant indicated that the FCS clusters assisted 
one another if the need arose, emphasising the camaraderie and mutual interest between these 
clusters.    
 
For organisational restructuring to be successful, internal organisational challenges should be 
adequately dealt with. The literature in chapter 3 highlights the importance of internal interaction 
among employees, and also draws attention to internal challenges during organisational 
restructuring. However, the SAPS failed to a great extent to maintain and foster cooperative 
behaviour between the various FCS clusters, after the implementation of the restructuring 
process. In addition, the organisation also neglected to create structures to address employees’ 
challenges of functioning as individual clusters, thus losing their “esprit de corps”. In other 
words, the management of the SAPS focused exclusively on the implementation of this process, 
while ignoring the internal consequences and feelings of employees. As a result, members of the 
FCS did not have the necessary motivation and self-esteem to overcome these internal 
challenges, thus complicating the impact of this process on the internal network.  
 
5.3 Summary 
 
This chapter interpreted the findings and measured the emergent themes and accompanying 
subcategories. In addition, literature in support of each theme and accompanying subcategories 
was also presented, to emphasise the significance of these identified themes. Furthermore, 
examples of national and international police and non-policing organisations, and the lessons that 
could be learnt from these organisations’ restructuring efforts, were presented, to draw attention 
to the impact of organisational restructuring, as well as to enrich the explanation of the findings. 
Additionally, the impact of each step on the restructuring process of the FCS was explained to 
present a holistic interpretation of the findings. 
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Chapter 6 provides a summary of the thesis from chapter 1 to chapter 6, whereafter the 
interpretations made in this chapter are examined and conclusions drawn. Recommendations are 
also made, based on the findings of the identified themes, in order to address the impact of the 
restructuring process on the FCS. 
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CHAPTER 6  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a summary of the thesis from chapter 1 to chapter 6, whereafter the 
interpretations made in chapter 5 are examined, and conclusions drawn. Recommendations are 
made, based on the findings of the identified themes, in order to address the impact of the 
restructuring process on the FCS. Providing that the SAPS management commit themselves to 
the recommendations presented in this chapter, there may be a significant progression in the 
management and further development of the restructuring process of the FCS.  
 
6.2 Summary 
 
Chapter 1 commenced with an introduction to the rationale for the research that was undertaken - 
namely, to evaluate the impact of the restructuring process on the Family Violence, Child 
Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS). A problem statement was provided, explaining the 
purpose and importance of this research. Attention was drawn to the value of this research and its 
results. The presentation of the goals and objectives followed, that provided the aspirations and 
rationale for the study, as well as a clear and unambiguous summary of the research objectives. 
The primary objectives of the study were to identify and describe the impact - that is, the overall 
long-term effects, positive or negative, intended or not – of the restructuring process in the FCS, 
in order to assess the internal and external climate on service delivery, to determine whether the 
restructuring process in the FCS is achieving its proposed objective according to the extent and 
manner in which the situation of the beneficiaries (victims of FCS-related crimes, as mentioned 
in section 1.4) has changed as a result of this process, and to provide feedback to help improve 
the effectiveness of the restructuring process and improve future strategies.  
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Moreover, the demarcation of the field of study focused on how the study was narrowed in 
scope. Consequently, key theoretical concepts fundamental to this study were defined to provide 
a common understanding of their meaning in the study. Geographical and time limitations then 
followed for discussion, whereafter difficulties encountered during the study were 
acknowledged. Subsequently, the research methodology was presented and discussed, which 
clarified the particular steps that were taken to address the research problem, and consisted of the 
explorative characteristics of the study, the research approach and design, methods of data 
collection and analysis, and methods to ensure validity and reliability, as well as ethical 
considerations. 
 
Chapter 2 presented a comprehensive overview of impact evaluations in organisations.  A 
discussion of a variety of authors’ views on the topic of impact evaluation provided the 
conceptual perspective necessary to acquire a complete understanding of the topic. An overview 
of emergent themes was additionally presented in support of the literature. The focus of this 
chapter was on impact evaluations in national and international police and non-policing 
organisations, for a discussion on the best practices of these organisations that led to the 
movement towards conducting impact evaluations. Illustrations of impact evaluations were 
furthermore presented, to explain the importance thereof for organisational restructuring.     
 
Chapter 3 provided a holistic literature review of existing publications on the specific problem 
that was researched, to present the knowledge base upon which the study is built. The viewpoints 
of a wide variety of authors, that relate specifically to the key concept - namely, organisational 
restructuring - were discussed, to place the current study within the conceptual and theoretical 
perspective, as well as to obtain an in-depth understanding of the topic. In support of the 
literature, an overview of the emergent themes was also presented and discussed. Additionally, a 
summary of examples was presented of organisational restructuring processes in national and 
multinational police and business organisations, to indicate similarities to, and differences from, 
restructuring efforts in the SAPS. The chapter concluded with lessons that could be learnt by the 
SAPS from these organisations’ restructuring initiatives.  
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The aim of the analysis presented in chapter 4 was to understand the various elements of the data 
obtained, through an analysis of the relationships between concepts, constructs and variables, to 
identify and also isolate patterns and trends, as well as to establish themes and subcategories that 
emerged in the data. The data collected was described and illustrated by means of individual and 
focus group interviews with members at the lower hierarchical levels of the FCS, as well with 
various external role players serviced by the FCS. Questions relevant to the restructuring of the 
FCS were asked. In addition, the research design and approach were triangulated to ensure the 
richness of the data. In support of triangulation, in-depth discussions were held with independent 
qualitative researchers to corroborate on the emergent themes and subcategories. Each theme 
was initiated with an explanation, which was furthermore enriched by direct verbatim reflections 
of the participants’ responses. The chapter concluded with a critical reflection on the themes and 
subcategories that rounded off each of these themes.  
 
In chapter 5, the results of the analysis presented in chapter 4 were interpreted and measured 
against the comprehensive body of literature as presented and discussed in chapters 2 and 3. The 
structure of this chapter was based on the identified emergent themes and their subcategories. 
These themes were: exploring the awareness of the motivation behind the restructuring of the 
FCS; evaluating the implementation of the restructuring process; proposals on the 
communication style and implementation method of the restructuring process; the impact of the 
restructuring of the FCS on service delivery; the effect of the restructuring process on the morale 
and productivity of FCS members; the outlook on the feasibility and sustainability of the long-
term goals of the FCS restructuring; the impact of the restructuring process on the expertise and 
specialised skills of FCS detectives; a review on the necessity to restructure the FCS; examining 
the impact of the FCS restructuring on the associated networks; the impact of the FCS 
restructuring on the external networks; and, the impact of the FCS restructuring internally on the 
FCS clusters.  
 
An overview of each theme was presented, which was supported by the inclusion of various 
literature sources, as presented in chapters 2 and 3, to emphasise the significance of these themes 
for organisational restructuring.  
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The chapter then concluded with the perspectives of participants from the individual and focus 
group interviews, that were integrated to form a comprehensive interpretation of the findings. 
Lastly, the impact of each of these themes on the restructuring of the FCS was elucidated, to 
round off the holistic findings of the interpretations.  
  
6.3 Recommendations originating from the findings 
 
The findings made in this study necessitate recommendations on how restructuring in the SAPS 
can be improved. The recommendations are based on the responses received from the individual 
interviews and panel studies, and are directed at how restructuring in the SAPS should be 
approached, implemented and followed through.  
 
6.3.1 Recommendations on the planning and design of restructuring in the SAPS 
 
The planning and design phase of organisational restructuring generally commences when an 
organisation’s current organisational structure is ineffective. The planning and design of a 
restructuring initiative is a management function, of creating and sustaining actions required to 
create a desired organisational structure, with the intention of producing the framework and tools 
required to create an effective organisation. The planning and design of a restructuring process 
should, however, be realistic and structured according to the requirements of the organisation. It 
follows that the planning and design phase of organisational restructuring supports the 
management to elucidate and focus on the rationale of the restructuring process. As a result, the 
planning and design of a restructuring initiative is significant, to avoid error or even identify 
opportunities for further growth. The planning and design process furthermore enables 
management to have an improved understanding of what they want to achieve with the 
restructuring initiative, how and when they want to achieve the restructuring, and who should 
carry out this process.  
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6.3.1.1 Creating an understanding of the planning and design of restructuring in the SAPS  
 
Organisational restructuring is used by many organisations as a strategy to improve their 
efficiency. However, an organisation should only engage in such a process if it is fundamental to 
guaranteeing its optimal operation. It is therefore imperative to ensure that employees realise the 
necessity of such a process being embraced by them. As a result, the essentiality to restructure an 
organisation should be communicated to employees. When members of an organisation do not 
understand the need for restructuring, they may regard the necessity of the process as unfounded. 
As a result, it is inevitable for the management of an organisation to focus on the rationale for the 
new design. Moreover, the management team should energise efforts to make the restructuring 
successful, and realise that changes take time and sustained energy.  
 
Another significant factor is to create and maintain open dialogue with employees as they adjust 
to the new organisational structure. It is also crucial to have an unambiguous and convincing 
business case that is driven by the needs of stakeholders. It is, therefore, essential for the 
management, employees and other stakeholders to agree on criteria for the new design that 
address the business case. Moreover, the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed structure 
must be understood, as well as the resultant changes throughout the organisation. As a result, the 
involvement of key stakeholders to design an unsurpassed structure, is advantageous to the 
organisation, since greater acceptance and buy-in of the process will emerge, and support for 
change will materialise. In addition, information regarding the restructuring process must be 
communicated timeously, to prepare employees and other relevant stakeholders, for change.  
 
One of the first steps towards creating successful organisational restructuring is to empower the 
employees with sufficient knowledge about the rationale for the change, to eliminate 
mystification and ambiguity. When employees do not comprehensively understand the reasons 
why organisational restructuring is taking place, and also do not understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of the process, widespread confusion and uncertainty will prevail among them, that 
in turn could create increased challenges to the success of the process. It is therefore imperative 
to agree on principal criteria for the new design, that address the new organisational structure.  
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A democratic organisation such as the SAPS is expected to apply a user-friendly style of 
communication that promotes transparency and accountability. Such an organisation is 
furthermore characterised by a diplomatic approach to the implementation of its change 
processes, that in turn promotes participative decisionmaking and consultation and the 
involvement of key stakeholders. Effective communication is the cornerstone to familiarise 
members with the change process, to create understanding among them and encourage 
acceptance. It then follows that the implementation of change processes may be executed with 
fewer complications. It is, additionally, imperative that the communication effectively addresses 
members’ fears and uncertainties. Moreover, efforts to make the restructuring work must be 
intensified, and consciousness and sustained energy should be created by the management. 
 
The outcomes of this research indicate that the management of the SAPS failed to communicate 
the motivation and underlying principles of the restructuring process to members and other 
external role players at the lower hierarchical levels, in a timely fashion, in order to familiarise 
and empower them with knowledge of this process, to prepare them for change. As a result, these 
members did not understand the motivation behind the restructuring of the FCS, which in turn 
created pessimistic, disapproving and critical sentiments towards the process. The SAPS also 
neglected to energise and motivate employees to make this process a success. Consequently, 
instead of focusing on the reason for the restructuring and taking ownership of the process, 
members distanced themselves from it. As a result, members were captured in an uncertain and 
confusing environment, and therefore could not focus on organisational restructuring - which 
may have had a contributing effect on members’ pessimistic attitudes.  Moreover, it appears that 
the internal and external communication and information management of the SAPS was 
unreliable and confusing, since the SAPS also failed to maintain open dialogue between 
management, employees and other role players, as employees endeavoured to adjust to the new 
structure. Additionally, the organisation appears to have placed more value on an autocratic style 
when implementing change, as opposed to the discreet approach practised by a democratic 
organisation. It follows that the SAPS also did not place high value on the involvement of key 
role players to design the most appropriate structure.  
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The recommendations presented in this study are based on the three phases of organisational 
restructuring acting as key guidelines during restructuring processes, as discussed in paragraph 
3.2.2.  
  
Recommendation: It is recommended that, in order to achieve transparency, knowledge and 
ownership in the restructuring process of the SAPS, the organisation should: 
 
• Clarify reasons for restructuring prior to process initiation 
 
The SAPS management should remain focused on the reason for the restructuring, and therefore 
timeously and unambiguously communicate the motivation, necessity and underlying principles 
of the restructuring process to members and other external role players at the lower hierarchical 
levels. Additionally, the management of this organisation should provide the members and the 
external role players with detailed particulars of the rationale behind the restructuring of the 
FCS, through consultation and information sharing, to comprehensively acquaint them with this 
process and thus prepare them for change. This implies that the SAPS must continue to engage in 
dialogue and participative decisionmaking with its employees and other important role players. 
As a result, the organisation will have an improved understanding of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the proposed structure, as well as an enhanced understanding of the ensuing 
changes in the SAPS.   
 
• Formulate a detailed restructuring strategy 
 
It is imperative that the SAPS has a realistic, transparent and comprehensive strategy in place 
that addresses the needs of all those involved. 
 
• Communicate the restructuring strategy 
 
Additionally, the SAPS management should design strategies to ensure that the organisation’s 
internal and external communication - as well as the management of information - is reliable and 
transparent. Furthermore, the management of the organisation should apply a more diplomatic 
 273 
 
communication style and implementation method during the restructuring process. The SAPS 
should have detailed strategic initiatives in place, to warrant effective internal and external 
communication and information management. It is also recommended that the SAPS adapt its 
communication style and method of implementing change processes, to be more in line with 
democratic institutions. It follows that the SAPS should resort to a premature consultative 
communication style, characterised by transparency as well as participative decisionmaking, 
during change processes. Explicit time lines should be created to set a clear view of the future 
and to direct the restructuring process. 
 
• Obtain buy-in for the restructuring process 
 
The SAPS, its employees and other role players have to principally agree on the main aspects for 
the new structure.  
 
• Clarify roles to ensure success 
 
Moreover, the SAPS should energise efforts to make the restructuring process a success. The role 
of employees and external role players in this process should also be clearly defined and 
explained, to eliminate ambiguity as well as to streamline the process. 
 
• Timeous notification of forthcoming restructuring drives 
 
Communication and consultation of the rationale behind the restructuring process should be 
timeously implemented in a clear and explicit way, ahead of the implementation of the process, 
to prepare employees for the envisaged change. 
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6.3.2 Recommendations on the implementation of restructuring in the SAPS 
 
The implementation of a restructuring process refers to the execution or the realisation of such a 
process’s new plan and design to fulfill the desired goal and objectives of the restructuring 
initiative.  
 
6.3.2.1  Creating an understanding of executing restructuring in the SAPS  
 
In a democratic organisation such as the SAPS, change processes cannot be implemented without 
sufficient consultative communication and transparency. It is therefore imperative to 
continuously communicate and discuss the rationale and importance of the change initiative to 
employees in a clear and unambiguous way, in order to empower these employees with the 
necessary knowledge concerning the goals and objectives of the implementation of the change 
initiative. It is also essential to engage employees in open dialogue during implementation, and 
invite feedback from them, to make the necessary adjustments to the implementation of the 
restructuring process. As a result, employees would experience the implementation of the change 
process as a well-executed and understood process, thus improving the effectiveness of the 
change initiative.  
 
When a change process is not implemented in a gradual, clear and explicable way with sufficient 
consultative communication, mystification, ambiguity and insecurity may prevail among 
employees. It follows that the implementation of a restructuring process must, therefore, be 
planned thoroughly, taking into account the various process changes required to support the new 
structure. On the other hand, the management of the SAPS must pay attention to the 
organisation’s ability to change. 
 
In order for the restructuring process of the FCS to be beneficial for the SAPS and to be accepted 
by members, the implementation thereof should be understandable, realistic, gradual and 
transparent. From the perceptions of the participants, it is evident that the SAPS management 
neglected to implement the restructuring process of the FCS in a clear, gradual, well-executed 
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and understood manner. It follows that the implementation of this process was instantaneous and 
also characterised by mystification, ambiguity and insecurity, rather than a well-executed process 
distinguished by transparency. Additionally, when the morale of members in an organisation is 
upheld during organisational restructuring, it simplifies the process for these members to create a 
positive and meaningful mindset to fulfil their functions with the necessary productivity, drive 
and passion. However, when these members are confronted with a lack of purpose and direction, 
or a feeling of senselessness, their productivity is without doubt negatively impacted. It is 
therefore imperative for the management of an organisation to remain sensitive towards the self-
esteem of its employees and external clients during the implementation of organisational change, 
to promote productivity.  
 
Moreover, in order to set a clear view for the future, it is essential for an organisation to have 
long-term goals. However, these goals should be clearly communicated to the entire workforce 
to gain understanding and buy-in among them. On the other hand, these goals should also be 
practical and achievable. When an organisation’s long-term goals are not communicated 
effectively and transparently to all its employees, without sufficient support from management to 
facilitate these goals, employees may not realise the vision of the organisation, and therefore lose 
interest in accomplishing and maintaining these long-term aspirations. It follows that when 
employees do not realise what these goals are, it is impossible to achieve or maintain them. 
 
From the outcome of this study it transpired that the SAPS management failed to implement the 
restructuring of the FCS in a gradual, transparent and understandable way to encourage 
employee and external role player participation. Additionally, the SAPS management should 
have engaged in persistent communication and consultative decisionmaking with its members 
and the external role players regarding the reasons for the restructuring, to create readiness 
among the participants concerning the implementation of the process. More specifically, the 
SAPS should have committed itself to continuous participative dialogue with members, to 
educate them in the implementation of the restructuring process and to invite frequent feedback 
to make necessary modifications as the process progressed. Knowledge concerning the goals and 
objectives of implementing the restructuring process should also have been carried over to 
members and external role players.  
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Moreover, the practical implications of the implementation process regarding the restructuring of 
the FCS, should also have been explained to all those involved. On the other hand, the SAPS 
management should have paid attention to the organisation’s ability for change, taking into 
account the many process changes needed to support the new structure. Additionally, it became 
apparent that the SAPS considered it unnecessary to invite feedback and suggestions from its 
employees and external role players.  
It follows that the SAPS management should also have developed a strategy to take members’ 
psychological well-being into account during the implementation process.  
 
Furthermore, the outcome of this study indicates that the implementation of the restructuring of 
the FCS had a detrimental effect on the self-esteem, service excellence and effectiveness of FCS 
members and their external client system. It follows that the management of the SAPS was not 
sensitive towards the low morale of FCS members and their clients, created by this process. As a 
result, these members’ productivity levels were also negatively impacted. It follows that the 
organisation failed to develop strategies to address employees’ and their external client system’s 
psychological interests during the implementation of the restructuring process. Moreover, it 
appears that the SAPS management rather concentrated on internal dilemmas when confronted 
with low self-esteem and productivity of its members. As a result, the organisation’s external 
challenges were neglected.  
 
From the perceptions of the participants it is furthermore evident that the SAPS management 
failed to effectively and unambiguously communicate the long-term objectives of the 
restructuring of the FCS to its members and the external client system. As a result, these 
members were unable to realise these goals in order to make an effort to accomplish them, which 
in turn created negativity towards the process. Consequently, these members and the external 
client system had major reservations about the feasibility and sustainability of this process. 
Additionally, it appears that the SAPS management neglected to provide support to these 
members to achieve and sustain these goals. 
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Recommendation: It is recommended that in order for the restructuring process in the SAPS to 
be executed effectively, the organisation should 
 
• Emphasise the rationale and strategy  
 
The SAPS should continuously engage in persistent communication with its members and the 
external role players, accentuating the reasons for the restructuring, to create knowledge and 
readiness among these participants concerning the implementation of the process. 
 
• Create realistic time lines for process implementation 
 
The SAPS should create anticipated time lines for the implementation of restructuring initiatives. 
The implementation of restructuring processes in the SAPS should allow for their gradual 
execution.  
 
• Prioritise communication and participative decisionmaking  
 
The SAPS should, moreover, implement restructuring processes in a transparent manner, 
creating knowledge among members. Moreover, it is recommended that timeous and constant 
communication and consultative decisionmaking with members and external role players 
regarding the implementation of the restructuring should be put into practice. Education by the 
SAPS management to members and external role players on the implementation of the 
restructuring process also needs priority.  
 
• Monitor progress and create support structures 
 
It is also essential for the SAPS to engage employees and external role players in open  
dialogue during implementation, to monitor progress and invite feedback and proposals from 
them, in order to make the necessary adjustments to the implementation of the restructuring 
process. In addition, the SAPS should create strategies and support processes to address 
members’ psychological welfare during the implementation of a restructuring process. 
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Additionally, the SAPS should sensitise itself towards the low morale of its members that in turn 
give rise to their low levels of productivity. As a result, the SAPS should create and maintain 
high standards of morale and productivity in the immediate term, after the implementation of the 
change initiative and well beyond. The SAPS should, furthermore, develop and maintain trust 
between its employees, external role players and itself to simplify the initiation of restructuring 
initiatives.   
     
6.3.3  Recommendations on how to accomplish restructuring in the SAPS  
 
This phase entails that organisational restructuring is pursued until the goals and objectives of the 
restructuring initiative is a reality. In other words, managers should not discontinue pushing 
change forward or withdrawing from the restructuring process until the changes are embedded 
and well-established in the organisation.  
 
6.3.3.1  Creating awareness to realise restructuring in the SAPS  
 
Additionally, managers should also create increased awareness of the reason for the newly 
adopted structure. It follows that managers should revive efforts to realise successful 
restructuring, and employees should realise that changes take time and persistent energy. The 
focal point of the restructuring process should be the reason for the new structure, as much as 
making it work, that in turn will energise employees to focus on improved service delivery. 
However, enthusiasm and employee involvement should be sustained until the change is 
completely realised. Subsequently, adequate time should be permitted for employees to function 
and experiment within the new structure. Moreover, communication with employees and other 
role players should be maintained to plan important adjustments.  
 
From the perceptions of the participants it became known that the SAPS management 
prematurely withdrew from the restructuring process before this process could be well-
established in the organisation. It follows that this organisation’s management also did not create 
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increased awareness for the rationale of the new organisational structure. As a result, efforts to 
encourage the realisation of successful restructuring were neglected. The outcomes of this 
research additionally indicate that the SAPS management failed to create structures in order to 
preserve members of the FCS’s exceptional ability and specialised training, after the 
restructuring of this unit was implemented. It follows that a shift towards the transformation of 
the primary functions of FCS detectives as well as major time and resource constraints 
significantly contributed to the negative impact on these members’ expertise and specialised 
skills. As a result, these members were discouraged from participating in this process and 
therefore distanced themselves from it. This also implies that members were not encouraged to 
adopt the restructuring. Consequently, these members focused on self-preservation instead of 
organisational restructuring.   
 
It furthermore transpired that the reason for the new structure, namely, to improve the service 
delivery of the FCS, on the other hand created increased challenges. From the perceptions of the 
participants it is evident that the restructuring of the FCS had a damaging effect on the internal 
and external climate of service delivery of the FCS.  Consequently, the SAPS management failed 
in its effort to improve service delivery of the FCS through the restructuring of the unit. As a 
result, service delivery provided by the FCS deteriorated after implementing this process. It 
follows that the SAPS neglected to effectively pay attention to major contributing factors, 
resulting in the depreciation of the services delivered by the FCS, such as the lack of physical 
and human resources, a shift in the unit’s primary functions, the doubtful alliance and 
cooperation within the internal structures of the SAPS, and the fading of the esprit de corps of 
the unit.  
 
Moreover, it also surfaced from the perceptions of participants that the SAPS management 
ignored sustainable employee and other role player involvement in the restructuring process. 
Consequently, employees and important role players significantly lacked enthusiasm and 
commitment towards the restructuring process. On the other hand, although sufficient time was 
permitted for employees to function and experiment within the new structure, the management of 
the SAPS failed to communicate with employees and other role players to outline significant 
adjustments to the restructuring process. The results of this research signify that the restructured 
 280 
 
FCS units failed to maintain adequate partnerships and working agreements with external role 
players after this process was implemented. As a result, a virtual collapse of these partnerships, 
interaction and working agreements between the FCS and external stakeholders rendering 
services to the client systems serviced by the FCS, transpired. It follows that the management of 
the SAPS did not encourage these members to uphold these partnerships, and therefore 
overlooked the importance thereof.  
 
It furthermore emerged that the SAPS failed, to a great extent, to maintain and foster continuous 
dialogue and cooperative behaviour between the various FCS clusters, after the implementation 
of the restructuring process. It follows that no structures were created to promote partnerships, 
interaction and working agreements among the FCS clusters. Moreover, it appears that these 
units concentrated on their individual interdepartmental challenges and therefore neglected to 
interrelate with one another. This implies that the management of the SAPS focused exclusively 
on the implementation of this process, while ignoring the internal consequences and feelings of 
employees. As a result, members of the FCS did not have the necessary motivation and self-
esteem to overcome these internal challenges, thus complicating the impact of this process on the 
internal network.  
 
Recommendations: It is recommended that, to effectively follow through the restructuring 
process in the SAPS and to accomplish the end result of this process, the following is necessary: 
 
• Persistent management involvement 
 
The management of the SAPS should remain actively involved in all the phases of organisational 
restructuring and should not distant itself prematurely from the restructuring process. This 
implies that the SAPS management should pursue organisational restructuring until the goal and 
objectives of the restructuring process are entrenched in the organisation. 
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• Emphasise increased awareness of the reason for the new structure 
 
The SAPS should create increased consciousness among its employees and its external role 
players of the reason for the newly adopted structure. It follows that managers of the organisation 
should encourage efforts to realise successful restructuring.  
 
• Maintain interest and involvement after process implementation 
 
The SAPS should preserve employee involvement and enthusiasm, in anticipation of the total 
realisation of the restructuring process.  
It follows that the SAPS should allow adequate time for employees and external role players to 
function and experiment within the new structure. 
 
• Sustain effective and timeous communication 
 
The SAPS management should persist in communicating with employees and external role 
players to discuss and plan necessary modifications or improvements, until the anticipated 
outcome of the restructuring process is achieved. 
 
6.4 Procedural framework for implementing structural transformation in the SAPS 
 
As mentioned in paragraph 6.3, the management of the SAPS failed to timeously communicate 
the motivation and underlying principles of the restructuring process to members and other 
external role players at the lower hierarchical levels, in order to familiarise and empower them 
with knowledge of this process, to prepare them for change. Moreover, the SAPS management 
failed to implement the restructuring of the FCS in a gradual, transparent and understandable 
way to encourage employee and external role player participation. It also became known that the 
SAPS management prematurely withdrew from the restructuring process before this process 
could be well-established in the organisation. Consequently, various shortcomings were 
identified that influenced the effective management of the restructuring in the FCS. 
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Figure 6.1 below illustrates how these shortcomings in the structural transformation of the SAPS 
could be corrected. This figure demonstrates that structural transformation is not an isolated 
process. However, it is a continuous flow of processes intertwined and interrelated with one 
another. More specifically, this figure places emphasis on the timeous and effective 
communication of the restructuring strategy during the planning and design of the restructuring, 
to empower and familiarise all role players with such an initiative. In addition, knowledge and 
understanding of the implementation of restructuring in the SAPS should be created among all 
role players.  
In other words, role players should have sufficient knowledge of the process, and the 
implementation thereof should be realistic, gradual and transparent. In order to follow the 
restructuring process through and to successfully accomplish restructuring in the SAPS, active 
management, as well as role player involvement, interest and enthusiasm should be sustained 
through the application of timeous, effective and sustainable communication. Lastly, it is 
recommended that the SAPS consider the possibility of transferring the proposed procedural 
framework in figure 6.1 to similar organisational transformation initiatives that are implemented 
in the SAPS.  
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6.5  Conclusion 
 
This chapter summarises chapter 1 to chapter 5 whereafter recommendations were made on how 
restructuring in the SAPS can be improved. It is evident that if the SAPS management commit  
themselves towards the recommendations made in this chapter there may be a significant 
progression in the management and further development of the restructuring process of the FCS. 
Consequently, it will impact positively on restructuring initiatives – and total transformation – in  
South African policing.  
 
This study is important since the impact of the restructuring process in the FCS is identified and 
described. Consequently, this impact evaluation indicates the existence of various areas of 
contradiction between policy and practice as the emergent themes and subcategories indicated. 
Besides optimism from the SAPS management about the restructuring of the FCS, this self-
assurance of the management structure of this organisation is met with a discouraging picture of 
pessimism by its members. It follows that the overwhelming majority of practices implemented 
during the restructuring of the FCS do not reflect the intentions of the restructuring policy. It 
emerged that the restructuring of the FCS was implemented abruptly and was thus not a proper 
initiated process. Although a number of directives on transformation in the SAPS have been 
implemented over the past 14 years it appears that the mechanisms to address restructuring in the 
SAPS have been problematic to put into practice. Restructuring initiatives that have been 
implemented such as the redeployment of FCS detectives at station level are superficial changes 
since restructuring has focused mainly on strengthening capacity at station level, thus neglecting 
total service delivery. Despite progress in restructuring policing in South Africa much remains to 
be done as the recommendations suggest. 
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ANNEXURE A   
 
OBJECTIVES AND RESULTANT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Objective 1: 
To identify and describe the impact, that is, the overall long term effects – positive or negative, 
intended or not – of the restructuring process in the FCS in order to assess the internal and 
external climate on service delivery.  
 
Questions: 
 
1) Do you have an understanding why the restructuring of the Family Violence, Child 
Protection and Sexual Offences Unit (FCS) has been undertaken and what it involves?  
2) From your experience, has the SAPS Management clearly communicated and consulted 
the goals and objectives of the restructuring process of the FCS? In other words, did the 
SAPS Management interact with you? 
3) According to you, do you think the FCS’s functionaries will benefit as a result of the 
restructuring? What effect will this restructuring have on aspects such as service 
delivery? 
4) According to you, what effect will the restructuring of the FCS have on the morale and 
productivity of the members? 
 
Objective 2: 
To determine whether the restructuring process in the FCS is achieving its proposed objective 
according to the extent and manner in which the beneficiaries’ (victims of FCS related crimes as 
mentioned in section 1.7) situation has changed as a result of this process. 
 
Questions: 
1)  In your opinion, will the restructuring of the FCS meet its long-term goals/objectives? 
How feasible and sustainable will this process be?
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2) According to you, will this restructuring process have an impact on the expertise and 
specialized skills of the detectives in the FCS? 
 
Objective 3  
To provide feedback to help improve the effectiveness of the restructuring process and improve 
future strategies.  
 
Questions: 
 
1) Is the restructuring of the FCS necessary for the effective continuation of the 
functionaries of the FCS unit? 
2) From your experience, how will the restructuring of the FCS impact on family violence, 
child protection and sexual offences investigations? On the one hand, what does the 
future hold for victims of these crimes? On the other hand, what will the impact be on the 
perpetrators of these related crimes?   
3) According to you, how will this restructuring process affect the partnership, interaction 
and working agreements between the FCS, non-governmental organizations, community-
based organizations, and other government departments? 
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ANNEXURE B 
 
Table 1: DEMOGRAPHIC PARTICULARS OF THE RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
WHO PARTOOK IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
 
Interview Method of 
data 
collection 
Post description 
FCS Unit Focus group  FCS Detectives 
FCS Unit Focus group Unit Commander and  FCS detectives 
FCS Unit Focus group Unit Commander and FCS detectives  
Head: Efficiency Services, 
SAPS Head Office 
Individual 
interview 
Assistant Commissioner 
Magistrates Court: Children 
and Domestic Violence 
Individual 
interview 
Senior State Prosecutor 
Magistrates Court: Children 
and Domestic Violence 
Individual 
interview 
Senior State Prosecutor 
Magistrates Court: Children 
and Domestic Violence 
Individual 
interview 
Senior State Prosecutor 
Non-governmental 
Organization 
Individual 
interview 
Therapeutic Manager 
Non-governmental 
Organization 
Focus group Head of Department-Childrens Services; 
Social Workers; Psychology Interns; Play 
Therapists;  Training Coordinators and 
Volunteers 
Independent, non-profit 
applied policy research 
organization 
Individual 
interview 
Senior researcher and researcher 
South African Police Union E-Mail 
 
National Negotiator/Manager: 
Communication & Marketing 
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ANNEXURE C 
 
Table 2:  OVERVIEW: THEMES AND SUB-THEMES  
THEME SUB-THEME 
Participants’ understanding of the rationale 
behind the restructuring of the FCS. 
 
Participants’ perceptions and experiences 
of the implementation of the restructuring 
process 
The preferred communication about and way of 
implementation of the restructuring of the FCS: 
Participants’ pointers, tips and 
recommendations. 
 
Participants’ views about the effect/impact 
of the restructuring of the FCS on service 
delivery 
 
Participants’ perceptions on the 
restructuring of the FCS on the morale and 
productivity of the members 
 
Participants’ opinions about the feasibility 
and sustainability of the long-term goals 
envisaged by the restructuring of the FCS 
 
Participants’ views about the impact of the 
restructuring of the FCS on the expertise 
and specialized skills of the detectives in 
the FCS 
 
Participants’ views on whether the 
restructuring of the FCS was necessary to 
ensure its continued functioning 
 
Participants’ views on the impact of the 
restructuring of the FCS on the victims of 
crime 
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Participants’ views on the impact of the 
restructuring of the FCS on the 
perpetrators of crime 
 
Participants’ views on the impact of the 
restructuring of the FCS on the 
partnerships, interaction and working 
agreements between the FCS and other 
stakeholders rendering services to the 
client-systems serviced by the FCS 
The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on 
the partnerships, interaction and working 
agreements between the FCS and external 
stakeholders rendering services to the client-
systems serviced by the FCS, and  
The impact of the restructuring of the FCS on 
the partnerships, interaction and working 
agreements internally amongst the FCS-
clusters. 
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 ANNEXURE D  SAPS LETTER OF APPROVAL 
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ANNEXURE E E-MAIL MESSAGE FROM SAPU 
 
 
 315 
 
 316 
 
 317 
 
 318 
 
 319 
 
 
